In this paper we introduce the modelwise interpolation property of a logic that states that whenever $\models\phi\to\psi$ holds for two formulas $\phi$ and $\psi$, then for every model $\mathfrak{M}$ there is an interpolant formula $\chi$ formulated in the intersection of the vocabularies of $\phi$ and $\psi$, such that $\mathfrak{M}\models\phi\to\chi$ and $\mathfrak{M}\models\chi\to\psi$, that is, the interpolant formula in Craig interpolation may vary from model to model. We compare the modelwise interpolation property with the standard Craig interpolation and with the local interpolation (...) property by discussing examples, most notably the finite variable fragments of first order logic, and difference logic. As an application we connect the modelwise interpolation property with the local Beth definability, and we prove that the modelwise interpolation property of an algebraizable logic can be characterized by a weak form of the superamalgamation property of the class of algebras corresponding to the models of the logic. (shrink)

The main motivation of this paper is the study of first-order model theoretic properties of structures having their roots in modal logic. We will focus on the connections between ultrafilter extensions and ultrapowers. We show that certain structures (called bounded graphs) are elementary substructures of their ultrafilter extensions, moreover their modal logics coincide.

George Molnar came to see that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lay in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. Molnar set about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remained, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Humean assumptions. He succeeded in producing something both highly focused and at the same time wide-ranging. He showed both that the notion of (...) a power was central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems.Molnar's account of powers is as realist as any that has so far appeared. He shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend for their existence on their manifestations. Nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. Molnar thus appropriates the notion of intentionality, from Brentano, and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. He offers a persuasive case for there being some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, he does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, his final position is dualistic.This is contemporary metaphysics of the highest quality. It is a work that was almost complete when its author died. It has been edited for publication by another specialist in the subject, Stephen Mumford, who has also provided an introduction that will allow non-specialists to become acquainted with the issues. David Armstrong, one of the greatest living metaphysicians and personal friend of George Molnar, has provided a Foreword. (shrink)

The classical interpretation of probability together with the principle of indifference is formulated in terms of probability measure spaces in which the probability is given by the Haar measure. A notion called labelling invariance is defined in the category of Haar probability spaces; it is shown that labelling invariance is violated, and Bertrand’s paradox is interpreted as the proof of violation of labelling invariance. It is shown that Bangu’s attempt to block the emergence of Bertrand’s paradox by requiring the re-labelling (...) of random events to preserve randomness cannot succeed non-trivially. A non-trivial strategy to preserve labelling invariance is identified, and it is argued that, under the interpretation of Bertrand’s paradox suggested in the paper, the paradox does not undermine either the principle of indifference or the classical interpretation and is in complete harmony with how mathematical probability theory is used in the sciences to model phenomena. It is shown in particular that violation of labelling invariance does not entail that labelling of random events affects the probabilities of random events. It also is argued, however, that the content of the principle of indifference cannot be specified in such a way that it can establish the classical interpretation of probability as descriptively accurate or predictively successful. 1 The Main Claims2 The Elementary Classical Interpretation of Probability3 The General Classical Interpretation of Probability in Terms of Haar Measures4 Labelling Invariance and Labelling Irrelevance5 General Bertrand’s Paradox6 Attempts to Save Labelling Invariance7 Comments on the Classical Interpretation of Probability. (shrink)

The Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox is typically taken to highlight a tension between our intuition that certain conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero conditioning events are well defined and the mathematical definition of conditional probability by Bayes’ formula, which loses its meaning when the conditioning event has probability zero. We argue in this paper that the theory of conditional expectations is the proper mathematical device to conditionalize and that this theory allows conditionalization with respect to probability zero events. The conditional probabilities (...) on probability zero events in the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox also can be calculated using conditional expectations. The alleged clash arising from the fact that one obtains different values for the conditional probabilities on probability zero events depending on what conditional expectation one uses to calculate them is resolved by showing that the different conditional probabilities obtained using different conditional expectations cannot be interpreted as calculating in different parametrizations of the conditional probabilities of the same event with respect to the same conditioning conditions. We conclude that there is no clash between the correct intuition about what the conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero events are and the technically proper concept of conditionalization via conditional expectations—the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox is just a pseudo-paradox. (shrink)

In this paper we show that the one-generated free three dimensional polyadic and substitutional algebras Fr1PA3 and Fr1SCA3 are not atomic. What is more, their corresponding logics have the Gödel’s incompleteness property. This provides a partial solution to a longstanding open problem of Németi and Maddux going back to Alfred Tarski via the book [12].

In this paper we discuss the ``admissibility troubles'' for Bayesian accounts of direct inference proposed in, which concern the existence of surprising, unintuitive defeaters even for mundane cases of direct inference. We first show that one could reasonably suspect that the source of these troubles was informal talk about higher-order probabilities: for cardinality-related reasons, classical probability spaces abound in defeaters for direct inference. We proceed to discuss the issues in the context of the rigorous framework of Higher Probability Spaces. However, (...) we show that the issues persist; we prove a few facts which pertain both to classical probability spaces and to HOPs, in our opinion capturing the essence of the problem. In effect we strengthen the message from the admissibility troubles: they arise not only for approaches using classical probability spaces---which are thus necessarily informal about metaprobabilistic phenomena like agents having credences in propositions about chances---but also for at least one respectable framework specifically tailored for rigorous discussion of higher-order probabilities. (shrink)

The role of measure theoretic atomicity in common cause closedness of general probability theories with non-distributive event structures is raised and investigated. It is shown that if a general probability space is non-atomic then it is common cause closed. Conditions are found that entail that a general probability space containing two atoms is not common cause closed but it is common cause closed if it contains only one atom. The results are discussed from the perspective of the Common Cause Principle.

This paper formulates a notion of independence of subobjects of an object in a general (i.e. not necessarily concrete) category. Subobject independence is the categorial generalization of what is known as subsystem independence in the context of algebraic relativistic quantum field theory. The content of subobject independence formulated in this paper is morphism co-possibility: two subobjects of an object will be defined to be independent if any two morphisms on the two subobjects of an object are jointly implementable by a (...) single morphism on the larger object. The paper investigates features of subobject independence in general, and subobject independence in the category of C∗ - algebras with respect to operations (completely positive unit preserving linear maps on C∗ - algebras)as morphisms is suggested as a natural subsystem independence axiom to express relativistic locality of the covariant functor in the categorial approach to quantum field theory. (shrink)

In this paper we dispel the supposed ``admissibility troubles'' for Bayesian accounts of direct inference proposed by Wallmann and Hawthorne, which concern the existence of surprising, unintuitive defeaters even for mundane cases of direct inference. We show that if one follows the majority of authors in the field in using classical probability spaces unimbued with any additional structure, one should expect similar phenomena to arise and should consider them unproblematic in themselves: defeaters abound! We then show that the framework of (...) Higher Probability Spaces allows the natural modelling of the discussed cases which produces no troubles of this kind. (shrink)

U clanku autori ispituju tri pozicije u estetickoj raspravi o uzvisenom koja se vodila u 18. veku - Edmunda Berka, Imanuela Kanta i Fridriha Silera. Oni takodje pokusavaju da rekonstruisu politicku pozadinu svake od ovih teorijskih pozicija: starorezimski konzervativizam, republikanski liberalizam i romanticarsku zudnju za 'trecim putem'. Najsofisticiraniju i najzreliju teoriju uzvisenog pronalaze u Silerovim estetickim delima, pogotovo u onima koja su usledila nakon njegovog razocarenja u Francusku revoluciju i u kojima su najtemeljnije razmatrani odnosi izmedju uzvisenog i paradoksa istorijskog (...) nasilja. (shrink)

Autorka u clanku rekonstruise kompleksnu sliku Franca Suberta koju je stvorio Teodor Adorno u nekoliko osvrta na ovog kompozitora, a najvise u clanku?Subert? iz 1928. Adorno je te, 1928. godine doziveo Suberta kao tragicnog kompozitora cija muzika obitava u oblasti htonskih bogova, a da ipak otkriva radost?putujuceg naroda, opsenara i cudotvoraca?. Ipak, nije objasnio kako ova radost moze da prezivi u paklenim pejsazima Subertove htonske muzike. Tek kasnije Adorno je bio spreman da u Subertu prepozna, zahvaljujuci njegovom?habitusu?, i kafanskog sviraca, (...) ne pominjuci vise?putujuci narod, opsenare i cudotvorce?. Te dve predstave Suberta-Subert kao osluskivac htonskih bogova i Subert kao kafanski svirac-pokazale su se kao zanimljiv par vredan dalje teorijske elaboracije koju Adorno, nazalost, nikada nije sproveo. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 177019: Identiteti srpske muzike u svetskom kulturnom kontekstu. (shrink)

We investigate the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where “general Bayesian learning” means inferring a state from another that is regarded as evidence, and where the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a reference probability measure representing the background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent performing the inference. States are linear functionals that encode probability measures by assigning expectation values to random variables via integrating them with respect to the probability measure. If (...) a state can be learned from another this way, then it is said to be Bayes accessible from the evidence. It is shown that the Bayes accessibility relation is reflexive, antisymmetric and non-transitive. If every state is Bayes accessible from some other defined on the same set of random variables, then the set of states is called weakly Bayes connected. It is shown that the set of states is not weakly Bayes connected if the probability space is standard. The set of states is called weakly Bayes connectable if, given any state, the probability space can be extended in such a way that the given state becomes Bayes accessible from some other state in the extended space. It is shown that probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable. Since conditioning using the theory of conditional expectations includes both Bayes’ rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases, the results presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization. (shrink)

In the article [2] a hierarchy of modal logics has been defined to capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in that hierarchy were distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to the modal logics of Medvedev frames it has been shown that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable. However, the infinite case (...) remained open. In this article we prove that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by standard Borel spaces is also not finitely axiomatizable. (shrink)

Thought experiments are widely used in the informal explanation of Relativity Theories; however, they are not present explicitly in formalized versions of Relativity Theory. In this paper, we present an axiom system of Special Relativity which is able to grasp thought experiments formally and explicitly. Moreover, using these thought experiments, we can provide an explicit definition of relativistic mass based only on kinematical concepts and we can geometrically prove the Mass Increase Formula in a natural way, without postulates of conservation (...) of mass and momentum. (shrink)

The literature on antecedents of corporate social responsibility strategies of firms has been predominately content driven. Informed by the managerial sense-making process perspective, we develop a contingency theoretical framework explaining how political ideology of managers affects the choice of CSR strategy for their firms through their CSR mindset. We also explain to what extent the outcome of this process is shaped by the firm’s internal institutional arrangements and external factors impacting on the firm. We develop and test several hypotheses using (...) data collected from 129 Chinese managers. The results show that managers with a stronger socialist ideology are likely to develop a mindset favouring CSR, which induces the adoption of a proactive CSR strategy. The CSR mindset mediates the link between socialist ideology and CSR strategy. The strength of the relationship between the CSR mindset and the choice of CSR strategy is moderated by customer response to CSR, industry competition, the role of government, and CSR-related managerial incentives. (shrink)

Weak and strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle are defined in terms of classical probability measure spaces. It is proved that the Abstract Principal Principle is both weakly and strongly consistent. The Abstract Principal Principle is strengthened by adding a stability requirement to it. Weak and strong consistency of the resulting Stable Abstract Principal Principle are defined. It is shown that the Stable Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent. Strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal principle remains an open (...) question. (shrink)

I leave it open whether the teleological, cosmological and ontological arguments can be held together by simply stating that the common experience of our daily waking from sleep is direct evidence of God's actuality. St. Paul's vision that in God "we live and move and have our being" seems to support directly the practical value of efforts towards a restatement of the traditional arguments. It may be also of significant value for our educational systems, to give a positive content to (...) the somewhat negative term, transcendence. (shrink)

A probability space is common cause closed if it contains a Reichenbachian common cause of every correlation in it and common cause incomplete otherwise. It is shown that a probability space is common cause incomplete if and only if it contains more than one atom and that every space is common cause completable. The implications of these results for Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle are discussed, and it is argued that the principle is only falsifiable if conditions on the common cause (...) are imposed that go beyond the requirements formulated by Reichenbach in the definition of common cause. (shrink)

We continue the investigations initiated in the recent papers where Bayes logics have been introduced to study the general laws of Bayesian belief revision. In Bayesian belief revision a Bayesian agent revises his prior belief by conditionalizing the prior on some evidence using the Bayes rule. In this paper we take the more general Jeffrey formula as a conditioning device and study the corresponding modal logics that we call Jeffrey logics, focusing mainly on the countable case. The containment relations among (...) these modal logics are determined and it is shown that the logic of Bayes and Jeffrey updating are very close. It is shown that the modal logic of belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite or countably infinite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable. The significance of this result is that it clearly indicates that axiomatic approaches to belief revision might be severely limited. (shrink)

We show a somewhat surprising result concerning the relationship between the Principal Principle and its allegedly generalized form. Then, we formulate a few desiderata concerning chance-credence norms and argue that none of the norms widely discussed in the literature satisfies all of them. We suggest that the New Principle comes out as the best contender.

In Bayesian belief revision a Bayesian agent revises his prior belief by conditionalizing the prior on some evidence using Bayes’ rule. We define a hierarchy of modal logics that capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in the hierarchy are distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions on which the agent’s prior is defined. Inclusions among the modal logics in the hierarchy are determined. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to the strongest modal (...) companion of Medvedev’s logic of finite problems it is shown that the modal logic of belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable. (shrink)

The role of measure theoretic atomicity in common cause closedness of general probability theories with non-distributive event structures is raised and investigated. It is shown that if a general probability space is non-atomic then it is common cause closed. Conditions are found that entail that a general probability space containing two atoms is not common cause closed but it is common cause closed if it contains only one atom. The results are discussed from the perspective of the Common Cause Principle.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IS GOD ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM HIS CREATURES? RAHNER'S EXPLANATION FROM REVELATION INTRODUCTION IN THIS PAPER we shall discuss two questions concerning the doctrine of God in the theology of Karl Rahner. What is it? On what is it based? In the process, we shall critically examine the relationship between the doctrine of God and Rahner's view of Christian revelation, focusing on the nature of theological method. Analysis will proceed (...) in two ways: comparison of Rahner's method with what I see as the method of scripture (faith seeking understanding) and with that of traditional Thomism as represented by Etienne Gilson. In Foundatians of Christian Faith, Chapter ~. "Man in the Presence of Absolute Mystery," Theological Investigations, volume 4, "The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology," and Theological ln1Yestigations, volume 11, "The Experience of God Today " Rabner develops his doctrine of God from his concept of absolute mystery which is drawn from human experience of reality according to his transcendental method. This method itself establishes the foundation for answering the first question, as we shall see. In answering the second question it is important that we examine carefully the foundation and determining element for any concept of God and of the creature's relation with God. The following issues will have to be discussed also: the nature of and need for Christian revelation, the role of faith and the kind of relation which exists between the Creator God and creatures. We shall discuss how Rahner deals with the free grace of God's revelation and presence in history while synthesizing creaturely self-tran575 576 PAUL D. MOLNAR scendent experience with grace and revelation according to his transcendental method. Such synthesis perceives the reality of God according to the constructs of natural theology and eliminates any practical need for revelation and faith in the triune God as the only true God. Moreover, we hope to show that the starting point for Rahner's transcendental method [human experience] is the very £actor which causes irreconcilable conflicts for a theology which claims to be a theology based on revelation. Rahner's analysis of experience is profound and has been useful for many in describing the creature's relation with the Creator. But as long as it is thought that our self-transcending experiences provide a point of departure for knowing the true God, Christian theologians will always have difficulty actually distinguishing God from their ideas about Hirn. For scriptural faith the point of departure for knowing the reality of God was and remains God's own free self-manifestation in His historical interventions within the realm of experience. As we shall see, this very point is what Rahner seeks to uphold. But in fact his method causes him to be inconsistent. While he would insist that this historical intervention is what happened in Israel, in Christ and in the Church; his method cannot a11ow him to hold consistently that the only point of departure for knowing the truth about our experiences is the Word of God revealed and active in Christ and the Spirit. Thus, true knowledge of God for Rahner is simultaneously ascribed to the grace of God and to our innate knowledge of absolute being. This claim is actually indebted to the Cartesian method and, as we shall see, it causes logical and theological problems for a theology that claims to be a theology of revelation. Concerning Rahner's doctrine of God, then, we return to the opening questions: What is it? On what is it based? Following Rahner's own outline in Fottndations of Christian Faith these questions can only be answered together by tracing the development of his own logic based upon the transcendental experience of our" horizon." Rahner's doctrine of God begins RAHNER'S EXPLANATION FROM REVELATION 577 from the assumption that an experience of one's "horizon " is an experience of God. And this assumption dictates what it is. Therefore, in Rahner's thought, these two questions cannot in fact be separated. Rahner provides no other foundation for this assumption than the idea that man must think and act in light of this horizon. Instead of pointing beyond the circle of human experience to show us... (shrink)

There is a well-established correspondence between interpolation and amalgamation for algebraizable logics that satisfy certain additional assumptions. In this paper, we introduce the Robinson property of a logic and show that a conditionally algebraizable logic without any additional assumptions has the Robinson property if and only if the corresponding class of Lindenbaum–Tarski algebras has the amalgamation property. Moreover, we give the logical characterization of the strong amalgamation property, solving an open problem of Andréka–Németi–Sain. It is also shown that given the (...) mentioned extra assumptions the Robinson property implies the interpolation property. As conditionally algebraizable logics cover algebraizable logics as well as various quantifier logics such as classical first order logic, our results yield a generalization of some of the results concerning interpolation and amalgamation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:SOME DOGMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF PAUL F. KNITTER'S UNITARIAN THEOCENTRISM PAUL D. MOLNAR St. John's University Jamaica, New York EACTIONS TO Paul Knitter's No Other Nanie? vary from criticizing his "unitarian theocentrism" 1 and his sliding away from "creedal Chrisitology" 2 to unequivocail endorsement of his" less Christocentric approach to a theo1ogy of religions;" 3 this shows the challenge Knitter poses to current dogmatics. This 1arHcile w1ll explore three critical (...) dogmatic issues related to Knitter's non-normative ChristoJogy. First, can the idea that Jesus is one savior among others be defonded froni within the Christian-Catholic 1tradition without yie1ding the truth of Christology? Second, if "Jesus remains universailly normativ ;e " for Christians while " other revelations or rev;ea:lers might also be universaUy normative," then does this not p:vomote some form of docetic Christology and lead to a unitarianism, exduded by the naiture of the God revealed in Christ? Third, on the basis of " l'eligious experience " Knitter olaims to perceive an" evolution from ecolesiocentrism to chrfatocentrism to theocentrism" and finally to "soteriooentrism." 4 Is there 1!1ea1ly such an evolution? And if there is noit, oan those who de- ~end the tradition succeed by arguing from experience and praxis rather than from revelation and faith? 5 Moreover, if 1"Review Symposium: Paul Knitter's No Other Name?: A Critical Survey of OMistian Attitudes toward the World Religions," in Horizons 13 (1986): 116-135. This is the view of Daniel Sheridan, p. llS. 2 This is the view of Denise Carmody. Ibid., p. 122. s This is the view of William Cenkner. Ibid., p. 127. 4 Ibid., pp. 133-34. 5 Denise Carmody, e.g., believes that we should stress praxis more than 449 450 PAUL D. MOLNAR we think the tradition should not be defended, have we not ceased to think about theological truth? Rather, have we not made divinity itself indis:tingiuishab1e from our human experiences and praxis at the outset? And does this not open the door to both polytheism allJd pantheism? By making God hut noit Christ normative, Knitter's " nonnormati ¥e" Christology re-1transiates the truth of Jesus' oonsubstantiality with the Father into the content of a myth, an experienice or a vailue judgment having no re1ality in itseH.6 It then defines :reveiLation and salvation.aocording to a unitarian view of God. While Knitter denies this,7 his reasoning aictuaUy is unitarian: In my proposed model, Jesus remains universally normative, but I am asking whether Christians can recognize that other revelations or revealers might also be universally normative. Could there be a complementary uniqueness among the religious traditions of the world? To try to answer that question, 'intellectual conversion;... is a requisite. But it will have to be an intellectual conversion that walks more than' the way to Nicea and Chalcedon'... only on the basis of the praxis of authentic dialogue-grounded in intellectual, moral, and religious conversion-can we know the unique~ ness of Christ.8 doctrine without relativizing Christ. Thus, for her, Rahner's Christology does not mean " that Christians cannot be open to the Buddha or Lord Krishna," Ibid., p. 126. The problem is that this very thinking already relativizes Christ. 6 Even theologians who do not intend the radical views of John Hick run a similar risk by beginning Christology from below in the manner of Paul Knitter. Cf., e.g., Edward L. Krasevac, O.P., "' Christology From Above' And 'Christology From Below '," The Thomist, 51 (1987) : 299-306, arguing that "Christological faith is an apostolic faith that has its origins in a historical process which began with the public ministry of our Lord...." (p. 300) causes us to ask what makes Christology true? Is it "the actual apostolic process " (306) or is it Jesus as the Lord who is and remains the sole foundation and validation for faith in any age? Does this approach not leave the door open to the kind of evolution which Knitter claims to have discovered in Christianity, which then enables him to move beyond Jesus as the only Lord and Savior? 1 Review Symposium, Horizons, p. 131. s Ibid., p. 133. KNITTER'S UNITARIAN THEOCENTRISM 451 Here the ha:.sis... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MOLTMANN'S POST-MODERN MESSIANIC CHRISTOLOGY: A REVIEW DISCUSSION 1 PAUL D. MOLNAR St. Johns University Jamaica, New York 0 VER TWENTY-FIVE years ago Jiirgen Moltmann's response to Karl Barth's suggestion that it might be wise to " accept the doctrine of the immanent trinity of God " 2 indicated the future of his theology: " in studying C.D. at these points I always lost my breath. I suspect you are (...) right but I cannot as yet or so quickly enter into this right." Moltmann believed he could present the " economic Trinity " in such a way that " in the foreground, and then again in the background, it would be open to an immanent Trinity... the Holy Spirit is first the Spirit of the raising of the dead and then as such the third person of the Trinity." 3 Moltmann's The Way of Jesus Christ reflects the same onesidedness that Barth had criticized in his theology of hope, and this predicament leads to his own distinct messianic christology, as we shall see. This third volume in Moltmann's systematic theology, following his Trinity and the Kingdom and God in 1 The Way of Jesits Christ: Christology fo Messianic Dimensions. By Jiirgen Moltmann. Translated by Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, a division of HarperCollins Publishers, 1990). Pp. vii + 388. $24.95. This volume has a name index only. The Way of Jesits Christ will henceforth be cited in the text of this article by page numbers within parentheses, without further qualification. 2 Karl Barth Letters 1961-1968, ed. Jurgen Fangmeier and Hinrich Stoevesandt, trans. and ed. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981)' p. 175. 3 Ibid., p. 348. Barth's Church Dogmatics is usually abbreviated as C.D. 669 670 PAUL D. MOLNAR Creation,4 is intended to lead to a fourth volume on Redemption. Like Moltmann's other works it is tightly written, difficult, intriguing and informative. His writing is clear and his position certainly is developed with a commendable systematic rigor. Throughout this book, which contains seven chapters with clear headings indicating the topics to be treated, the reader is compelled to admire Moltmann's ability to weave together immense amounts of scriptural and systematic data without losing his own position in the process. While the wealth of information alone makes this book worth studying, there is much more than information here. Yet the problem with this book is apparent throughout, i.e., Moltmann attempts to reconceive christology not from a superior knowledge of the person and work of Jesus Christ as presented in scripture but from the community's experience of Jesus Christ in the present. Hence he begins his own " pneumatological christology " with the experience of discipleship (xiv) and argues against the traditional christologies, on the basis of " Christopraxis " which he says is "the source from which christology springs " (41). But can we say that our discipleship is the "source" of christology when, according to Matt. 16 :17, flesh and blood did not disclose who Jesus was-rather, this was revealed by God? This substitution of experience for a real action of the trinity within history is the weakness of Moltmann's bold attempt to revise christology.5 I hope to show how this problem affects Moltmann's method and conclusions. While I agree with Moltmann's intention to present a christology which makes sense in a post-modern environment, I hope to illustrate that by beginning with experience rather than with the Word of God revealed, 4 Jiirgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. xv-365. Hereafter cited within the text of the article as Creation. J iirgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. xvi-256. Hereafter cited within the text of the article as Trinity. 5 As I indicated in Theological Studies vol. 51 (p. 684), this is also a serious predicament in his theology of the trinity and of creation. MOLTMANN'S POST-MODERN CHRISTOLOGY 671 he is unable to escape the " Jesuology " which he criticizes in Rahner and the metaphysical view that... (shrink)

In spite of the constant disdain of conservatives for utopias, they continued the Greek tradition of reflection on the good regime. The good regime for Oakeshott contained the possibility of a decent life and freedom, potentially resulting in conflicts. For him the good regime does not prevent fights, but it provides some solution to settle them. This logic involves the need for enforcement. The authority for many people on the Right seems to be a plausible and convenient solution for the (...) problem of conflicts, emerging from freedom. For Oakeshott, too, authority is a keystone of good order. What is more, authority—just like Sittlichkeit/tradition/practice—is a sui generis reality. It cannot be rationally created, but it can be demolished. (shrink)

Event-related potentials (ERPs) – neglected almost entirely by Wright & Liley – allow objective investigation of information processing in the brain. The application of chaos theory to such an analysis broadens this possibility. Through the use of the point correlation dimension (PD2) accurate dimensional analysis of different Event-Related Potential components such as the P3 wave is possible.

We report a solution to an open problem regarding the axiomatization of the convex hull of a type of nonclassical evaluations. We then investigate the meaning of this result for the larger context of the relation between rational credence functions and nonclassical probability. We claim that the notions of bets and Dutch Books typically employed in formal epistemology are of doubtful use outside the realm of classical logic, eventually proposing two novel ways of understanding Dutch Books in nonclassical settings.

We extend a result by Gallow concerning the impossibility of following two epistemic masters, so that it covers a larger class of pooling methods. We also investigate a few ways of avoiding the issue, such as using non-convex pooling methods, employing the notion of imperfect trust or moving to higher-order probability spaces. Along the way we suggest a conceptual issue with the conditions used by Gallow: whenever two experts are considered, whether we can trust one of them is decided by (...) the features of the other! (shrink)