In his Florentine Histories, Machiavelli offers an ambivalent portrayal of the revolt of the textile workers in late fourteenth-century Florence, known as the tumult of the Ciompi. On the face of it, Machiavelli's depiction of the insurgent workers is not exactly flattering. Yet this picture is undermined by a firebrand speech, which Machiavelli invents and attributes to an unnamed leader of the plebeian revolt. I interpret this speech as a radical and egalitarian vector of thought opened up by Machiavelli's text. (...) The revolutionary address reveals an untimely and not entirely self-conscious political radicalism, a plebeian politics that repudiates the logic of oligarchic privilege and is simultaneously not available for subsumption under the mantle of civic republicanism. (shrink)

In 2007, a private corporation specializing in deep-sea salvage retrieved a treasure-laden shipwreck in international waters southwest of the Iberian Peninsula. The wreck was that of a Spanish warship that sunk during the Napoleonic wars. Following the discovery, a legal dispute arose in U.S. federal courts, between the corporate salvors, the Kingdom of Spain, and other litigants. At issue in the legal proceedings was the status of the shipwreck and whether it was protected by sovereign immunity. At the heart of (...) this case are differing political imaginations concerning the authority of states and the role of corporations in the contemporary global order. Through a close reading of court documents and the narratives in which the courts’ rulings are embedded, we demonstrate that the case is symptomatic of the tension in neoliberal sovereignty between two overlapping and at times competing political rationalities: the neoliberal logic of capital and commerce and the logic of sovereign prerogative. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide some insights for a normative theory of corporate political activities. Such a theory aims to provide theoretical tools to investigate the legitimacy of corporate political involvement and allows us to determine which political activities and relations with government regulators are appropriate or inappropriate, permissible or impermissible, obligatory or forbidden for corporations. After having explored what I call the “normative presumption of legitimacy” of CPAs, this paper identifies three different plausible strategies to criticize (...) and object to corporate political involvement: the “egalitarian” strategy, the “corporate citizenship” strategy, and the “market failures” strategy. It constitutes an attempt to develop the market failures approach to reflect on CPAs. My main claim is that within such an account, the idea that corporations have a license to operate considerably limits their right to engage in political activities. (shrink)

Les origines des sciences de la communication aux États-Unis sont au moins triples: renouveau de l'enseignement de la rhétorique au début du XXe siècle, volonté de donner une formation universitaire aux journalistes, recherche sur les médias après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. En retraçant à grands traits les voies d'émergence des sciences de la communication aux États-Unis, on saisit mieux, par contraste, la spécificité des Sic à la française.As an academic discipline, Communication originated in at least three loci: the renewal of (...) teaching of rhetoric at the beginning of the 20th century, the need for a university education addressing the requirements of future journalists and, finally, media research and teaching after WWII. A rough delineation of the origins of the discipline of Communication in the United States is a way to grasp constrastively the specificity of its French counterpart. (shrink)

L'article se donne pour objectif de montrer que la notion de rituel chez Goffman est à la croisée de deux grandes traditions intellectuelles : la sociologie religieuse d'inspiration durkheimienne, d'une part, l'éthologie, d'autre part. Dans ses travaux des années 1950 sur les « rites d'interaction », l'inspiration de Goffman est quasi-exclusivement durkheimienne. Les interactions sont des cérémonies que de petits prêtres rendent à de petits dieux. Mais Relations in Public marque un tournant: l'analyse des interactions, sous l'influence de l'éthologie, devient (...) beaucoup plus comportementale. Dans ses tout derniers travaux, l'analyse conversationnelle prend le relais de l'éthologie. Goffman réduit l'interaction à un déroulement de séquences formalisées. Les dieux sont redevenus des primates, mais des primates bavards.The article's objective is to show that the notion of ritual Goffman is at the crossroads of two major intellectual traditions: the sociology of religion inspired Durkheim, on the one hand, ethology, on the other hand. In his work in the 1950s on "interaction ritual" inspiration Goffman is almost exclusively Durkheim. Interactions are small ceremonies that priests to make little gods. But relations in Public marked a turning point: the analysis of interactions under the influence of ethology, behavioral becomes much more. The ritual becomes a ritual. In his latest work, conversational analysis takes over ethology. Goffman reduces the interaction to a sequence of sequences formalized. The gods have returned to primates, but primates much. (shrink)

La question du nihilisme a une longue histoire. Elle émerge au sein de l'idéalisme allemand, se déploie ensuite dans l'intelligentsia et la littérature russes, puis trouve chez Nietzsche et Heidegger ses explorations les plus influentes. Si le mot semble moins courant depuis un demi-siècle -- comme d'autres termes aussi chargés, pensons à celui d'aliénation -- les enjeux qu'il soulève demeurent toutefois au cœur de la pensée contemporaine. Les risques environnementaux nourrissent d'ailleurs plus que jamais l'inquiétante intuition que de puissantes dynamiques (...) de dévalorisation du réel sont à l'œuvre dans les sociétés modernes. Ces douze essais, qui font largement entendre la voix d'une nouvelle génération, n'ont pourtant pas pour but de défendre une thèse commune. Ils explorent plutôt les multiples aspects du nihilisme et se confrontent à ses grandes interprétations. Sont ainsi proposées autant de pistes pour rejoindre les débats sur le capitalisme, la technique, l'éducation, le patriarcat, le roman ou la démocratie. Pluralité revendiquée, qui illustre néanmoins un même ancrage dans les défis du monde actuel. (shrink)

We analyse the behaviour of definite descriptions and proper names terms in mathematical logic. We show that in formal arithmetic, wether some axioms are fixed or not, proper names cannot be considered rigid designators and have the same behaviour as definite descriptions. In set theory, sometimes two names for the same object are introduced. It seems that this can be explained by the notion of meaning. The meaning of such proper names can be considered as fuzzy sets of equivalent co-designative (...) definite descriptions and their references as sets of all equivalent co-designative definite descriptions. (shrink)

In a first section, we discuss Quine’s claim according to which identity is a logical notion. We point out that Quine mixes up various types of identities: trivial (or diagonal) identity, Leibniz identity, etc.; and this leads him to commit several mistakes. In a second section, we review Quine’s criticisms to various philosophers (Wittgenstein, Whitehead, Leibniz, etc.), who according to him made confusion between names and objects in defining identity. We show that in fact only Korzybski can be accused of (...) such confusion. In a third section, we analyze the relation between identity and entity. We notice that for Quine a river is the result of the identification of river stages, but that he admits it as an entity by opposition to squareness, which according to him is a result of an identification process of higher abstraction. (shrink)

This paper aims to challenge the idea claimed by Putnam in his Dewey Lectures that internal realism presupposed sense data theory so that it would have been unable to account for the fundamental intuition of common sense realism that perception gives us cognitive access to reality. Rather, I argue that Putnam’s writings from the period of internal realism indicate that it (internal realism) already presupposed a form of direct realism of the kind he puts forth in the Dewey lectures. I (...) support my thesis with a demonstration of the implication of direct realism in the refutation of the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis that occurs in the first chapter of Reason, Truth and History, as well as with various passages from the philosopher’s writings of the time when he defended internal realism. I also argue, contrary to what the philosopher seems to assert in his Dewey Lectures, that his model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism does not involve sense data theory. After noting the very strong resemblance between the theses of his common sense realism of the 1990s and those of his internal realism of the 1980s, I hypothesize that Putnam pretended to renounce internal realism in order to allow himself to rephrase his original position so as to avoid being misinterpreted as a form of idealism or fact constructivism, as was the case with his initial statement. (shrink)

Cet article vise à montrer l’extrême proximité entre ces deux mathématiciens-philosophes que furent Gian-Carlo Rota et Gilles Châtelet disparus la même année. Au moins quatre points communs les relient : une philosophie romantique radicale ; une rigueur intellectuelle exemplaire ; une vision affine de la recherche mathématique ; une révolte intérieure exécrant tout sensus communis.This text shows the great proximity between two mathematicianphilosophers, Gilles Châtelet and Gian-Carlo Rota who both died in the same year 1999. There are at least four (...) common points amongst themselves: a radical romantic philosophy; an exemplary intellectual rigor; a great affinity in their vision of mathematical research; an inmost rebellion against all common sense. Quest’articolo tende a mostrare l’estrema prossimità tra due matematici-filosofi che furono Gian-Carlo Rota e Gilles Châtelet che ci hanno lasciato lo stesso anno. Ci sono almeno quattro punti comuni che le legano: una radicale filosofia romantica; un rigore intellettuale esemplare; una visione affine della ricerca matematica; una rivolta intima che esecra ogni senso comune.This article is in French. (shrink)

Allons sans détour au cœur du problème par deux thèses : 1 / il existe une idéologie de l’évaluation ; 2 / cette idéologie est une des grandes impostures de la dernière décennie.Commençons par la première thèse. Le terme « idéologie » est à prendre au sens qu’il a acquis depuis Marx : une vision du monde ou, plus modestement, une représentation illusoire qui..

Il semble que, malgré les nombreuses mises en garde de ces dernières années venant de différents côtés, l’installation de dispositifs d’évaluation s’opère actuellement dans tous les secteurs de la société et les institutions : l’hôpital et le système de santé, les institutions d’éducation et de formation en général, les universités et la recherche en particulier,...

of implication and generalization rules have a close relationship, for which there is a key idea for clarifying how they are connected: varying objects. Varying objects trace how generalization rules are used along a demonstration in an axiomatic calculus. Some ways for introducing implication and for generalization are presented here, taking into account some basic properties that calculi can have.

By helping us recognize our historical moment as one of « over-exposure » - understood both in the sense of the vain images that blind us with their excess brilliance, and in the sense of bodies exposed without protection to the risk of hostile radiation - Frédéric Neyrat invites us to « bear the world’s emptiness » and to look to « letting-be » for a rampart against overflowing production. It’s time to invent an « ontopolitics of atopic subjects ».

Although the historian confronts the question of what is not known in the same terms as does any other researcher no matter his or her discipline, the conditions of the debate are different for the historian because of the problematic nature of the science of history. While practically all the other sciences, including the social sciences, struggle against ignorance by seeking to discover and establish laws that will govern the facts, history must always face, in spite of its ever more (...) sophisticated techniques, the contingency of its materials, which are fundamentally human. The materials of history can not—in spite of what some have asserted—be contained within any single, all-encompassing mode of reasoning that would allow for the creation of constitutive abstract models. In spite of this reality the historian persists, like Sisyphus, in organizing knowledge. Man apparently has no choice but to believe that his activities have some logical basis. The historian therefore collates facts in order to develop cognitive and interpretive structures that will be durable. What gives the discipline of history its epistemological originality is the painfully central role it accords to the question, “What do we not know?” Man wants to know, believes he knows. The ignorance of historians thus seems especially upsetting when applied to our own century. How could the methodological progress of the science of history, along with the professionalization of the historian's craft, have led to an actual increase of uncertainty concerning a period so close to us in time? Today's man-in-the-street—endowed only with his memory, which seems so rich in “truths”—finds it hard to believe that any event or structure of the twentieth century could remain unknown. Limiting our inquiry to the twentieth century is not, however, justified solely by the practical consideration of trying to gain a better grasp of our times. Indeed in this brief article devoted to the relationship between ignorance and the history and historiography of the twentieth century, we will not attempt to inventory all the events, persons, mentalities or economic facts which historical knowledge has until now been incapable of explaining. Unlike the other sciences, whose struggle against ignorance is accomplished by a gradual process of nibbling at the margins of the unknown, the discipline of history must always keep in mind that the masses of granite that form the foundation of History are in fact but a body of statements that can only aspire to the status of truth. The aim of our inquiry— without of course claiming to be exhaustive—will therefore be to identify the nature of the obstacles that lie in the historian's path. These problems are of three kinds. The first concerns access to knowledge, and is tied—although not exclusively—to problems of the techniques of historical research. The second concerns the difficulties related to conceptualization and therefore to the uses of knowledge. There can be no knowing without know-how. Finally, the third pertains to the lack of permeability between history and the other human and social sciences, which creates for the historian the challenge of interdisciplinary exchange. (shrink)

For many years, M. Jean d'Ormesson has been doing me the honor of asking me to write for Diogenes. More recently, he suggested that I should coordinate an issue of this review that would be devoted to my extended discipline, History, but history in the way in which I understand it. It was certainly not for lack of interest that I did not reply to the first request but, no doubt, because of the sense of a chronic lack of time (...) - almost a pleonasm - from which I, like everyone else, suffer. It was not because I was cured that I accepted the second invitation but probably because I allowed myself, with full knowledge of the facts, to entertain the idea that editing an issue would take up less time than simply contributing. … In fact, as everyone knows, the opposite is true, especially when the occasional editor also volunteers to be one of the contributors. This issue is now completed and I sincerely thank M. Jean d'Ormesson for having wished to entrust me with this task that I have enjoyed very much. (shrink)

In order to tell the story of Man and understand our emergence better, we can readily follow on from Heinz Tobien, though we do not need to go back so far in time - just a few million years.Clearly, our fundamental origin is animal. Thus it is easy to understand that in the great genealogy (known as phylogeny), there was one vital (geological) moment when our line was forever detached from the animal “kingdom.” The evidence of palaeontology, like that of (...) molecular biology, today locates this point - which is, by definition, the very point of origin of our family, the hominids - in Eastern Africa around 8 million years ago. In order to state this, palaeontology rests on two sets of results. All the most ancient hominids, without exception, are East African, and the oldest of all goes back more than 7 million years. Through the study of various characteristics of the cells of contemporary primates, having arranged them in an order of increasing complexity and having hypothesized that this contemporary complexity may be a reflection of that which developed through time, molecular biology has, on the basis of palaeontological dating, calibrated this transformation and its different stages and constructed what is called a molecular clock. In this way, it has arrived at two conclusions. The primates closest to Man are by far the great African apes (chimpanzees, gorillas), and the “distance” that separates us - in other words the degree of difference that exists between them and us - situates the divergence of our two branches at just over 7 million years. (shrink)

We are again going through a period of expansion in biographical literature. There is an ever greater number of publications, demonstrating the libido biographica of the reading public and also showing the interest of authors for a genre that is often treated with a great deal of care and rigor. This is not the first time in the history of letters, and each of us can find in his library a quantity of ancient, classic or modern works proving the constancy (...) of this production. However, the contemporary phenomenon takes on a different meaning. The appetite for the biographical seems to be directly linked to its value as testimony. We are living in an era of distrust with regard to rules and codes. Every individual is called on to organize his conduct and invent his existence, from which comes, it seems, this need for an example that also expresses a taste for history and a need for more truth than entertainment from the author of biographies. (shrink)

Constitué d'analyses et de réflexions sur les méthodes pratiquées aujourd'hui dans l'écriture de l'histoire de la philosophie, cet ouvrage vise à rendre compte de la différence des pratiques existant selon les traditions et à interroger l'existence d'une démarche historique spécifique au domaine de la philosophie. L'enjeu fondamental est donc de savoir s'il existe une historiographie propre à la philosophie. Les interrogations portent en particulier sur les questions des critères d'exactitude, de vérification, de crédibilité qui permettraient de distinguer et de décider (...) entre les interprétations. Si le travail de l'interprétation est infini, toujours à refaire, reprendre et corriger, cela n'implique nullement l'abandon des exigences qui fondent la pertinence historique. Une introduction indispensable à toute pratique de l'histoire de la philosophie. L'ouvrage comporte notamment des textes de : P. Aubenque (Paris IV), J. Biard (Tours), B. Bourgeois (Paris I), C. Coutel (Artois), Th. De Koninck (Laval, Québec), D. Deleule (Paris X), D. Garber (Chicago), P. Magnard (Paris IV), J.-M. Narbonne (Laval, Québec), E. Nuzzo (Salerne), John Rogers (Keele), J. B. Schneewind (Johns-Hopkins, Baltimore), Tom Sorell (Essex), J.-L. Vieillard-Baron (Poitiers), Y. C. Zarka (CNRS, Paris), mais aussi de F. P. Adorno (Salerne, CNRS), P. Caye (CNRS), P. Destrée (CNRS, Belgique), T. Gontier (CNRS), J.-B. Gourinat (CNRS), E. Picavet (Paris I), I. Radrizzani (Munich), C. Viano (CNRS), A. Vasiliu (CNRS). (shrink)

Résumé Le principe de précaution est un principe pragmatique qui a trouvé une expression juridico-politique. C’est la réponse des sociétés démocratiques à de nouveaux risques. Cette intervention du principe de précaution dans la sphère démocratique explique également les controverses auxquelles il a pu donner lieu. Mais il n’est pas possible de s’en tenir aux controverses, car il y a aussi des enjeux proprement philosophiques du principe de précaution autour de trois questions majeures : le savoir, le temps et la Terre. (...) Si le principe de précaution, dans la forme constitutionnelle qu’il a prise en France, est bien la traduction, encore imparfaite et précaire, d’un principe cosmopolitique, dans le cadre d’un État particulier, on peut dire qu’il constitue un moment important dans la prise en charge politique et historique d’une responsabilité pour l’humanité. (shrink)

« En vertu de quoi la catégorie de l’Utopique possède donc à côté de son sens habituel et justement dépréciatif, cet autre sens qui, loin d’être nécessairement abstrait et détourné du monde, est au contraire centralement préoccupé du monde : celui du dépassement de la marche naturelle des événements »« Il n’y a guère, même parmi les économistes bourgeois, un savant..

Le divertissement a deux significations : 1 / se divertir par des amusements et des réjouissances dans des activités principalement ludiques ; 2 / se détourner de ce qui fait le sérieux de l’existence individuelle ou sociale pour se livrer à des activités légères ou frivoles.Au premier sens, le divertissement est une façon de se retrouver, de revenir sur soi-même, de s’éprouver...

« Nous ne nous sentons pas hors de notre époque, au contraire nous ne cessons de passer avec elle des compromis honteux. Ce sentiment de honte est un des plus puissants motifs de la philosophie » L’un des compromis les plus honteux de notre époque est celui qui a marqué la philosophie elle-même depuis le milieu des années 1970 selon un mécanisme très puissant que Deleuze a analysé..

Il s’agit de déduire le concept de cosmopolitisme à partir de la notion d’humanité et de montrer le champ considérable qui s’ouvre ainsi à la pensée : le rapport à la nature et au monde vivant, l’idée d’une justice universelle pensée à partir de l’humanité comme sujet supérieure au peuple ou à l’État comme sujet. De cette hiérarchie peut être tirée l’idée d’un droit de résistance des peuples contre l’oppression, l’équité territoriale, le droit de vivre dignement des fruits de la (...) Terre au lieu où l’on habite. (shrink)