Originally published as 「明治の哲学界：有機体の哲学とその系譜」in 井上克人編『豊饒なる明治』, Kansai Daigaku Shuppannbu, 2012, 3–22. Translated by Morisato Takeshi. German Idealism was introduced to Japanese intellectuals in the middle of Meiji era and was mainly received from a mystical or religious perspective, as we see in Inoue Tetsujirō’s “harmonious existence,” Inoue Enryō’s “unity of mind and body,” and Kiyozawa Manshi’s “existentialism.” Since these theories envisioned true reality as a unified and living whole, I group them under the label “philosophy of organism” and from (...) there argue that their conviction that “all is truth and truth is all” was shaped in large part by the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana. The understanding of Buddhist concepts by Meiji philosophers was philosophical in its content, and those who devoted themselves to the study of Western philosophy were encouraged to describe Eastern thought in Western philosophical terms. As a result, the philosophical world of the Meiji era developed an original standpoint that unified Eastern and Western perspectives by means of a logic of “phenomena-in-reality.”. (shrink)

ヒトと自然の交流の産物として生まれた田舎の景色には、どこか安堵する懐かしさがある。しかし、このような田舎、里山は今どれだけ残っているだろうか?21世紀にむかって、ヒトと自然環境、その産物としての文化遺 産のあり方が地球規模で問われている。本書は、21世紀にむかって文化遺産のあり方を問う。.

It is often argued that relational egalitarianism has a fundamental problem with intergenerational justice when compared to other theories of justice such as utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and luck egalitarianism. Recently, Timothy Sommers argued that there is no such comparative disadvantage for relational egalitarianism. His argument is quite modest: it merely aims to reject the claim that there could be no way to extend relational egalitarianism to intergenerational justice. This may be called the ‘No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis’. The present article challenges Sommers’s (...) argument in two ways. First, I show that Sommers fails to provide a reasonable constraint on causal efficacy, which is crucial to his argument for our relation (not relationship) to future generations. Second, I show that the chain-relatedness problem casts a shadow over Sommers’s argument for the No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis. More specifically, compared to the other theories of justice, relational egalitarianism (as it stands) can less easily justify that present persons have duties to future others. This is because relational egalitarianism cannot appeal to a specific principle in regard to the duties in question, because its principle is sensitive to current context and practice. I conclude that the No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis does not hold much promise. (shrink)

明治の世には、西欧的近代化の流れの中にあっても「日本人としての矜持と風格」といったものがあった。それはいわば凜乎とした倫理意識と、土着的な共同体意識である。それらは漢籍の教養に裏打ちされた至高なる精神 性であったと言ってよい。明治は、思想・文化の面において、日本の精神史上、「豊饒の時代」であった。.

This article presents a unified theory of irony which claims, with the help of Fauconnier’s (1985) mental space theory, that an ironical utterance refers to the mental space of a mutually manifest expectation. According to this view, what a typical ironical speaker does is to say without any distinct space builders that something is the case in the mental space of expectation in order to make it mutually manifest that it is not so in the initial reality space. This expectation (...) space theory of irony integrates the explanatory power of Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) echoic interpretation theory with the descriptive power of the view of irony as relevant inappropriateness. (shrink)

In this paper, we shall show that the following translation \(I^M\) from the propositional fragment \(\bf L_1\) of Leśniewski's ontology to modal logic \(\bf KTB\) is sound: for any formula \(\phi\) and \(\psi\) of \(\bf L_1\), it is defined as (M1) \(I^M(\phi \vee \psi) = I^M(\phi) \vee I^M(\psi)\), (M2) \(I^M(\neg \phi) = \neg I^M(\phi)\), (M3) \(I^M(\epsilon ab) = \Diamond p_a \supset p_a. \wedge. \Box p_a \supset \Box p_b.\wedge. \Diamond p_b \supset p_a\), where \(p_a\) and \(p_b\) are propositional variables corresponding to (...) the name variables \(a\) and \(b\), respectively. In the last, we shall give some comments including some open problems and my conjectures. (shrink)

We prove that Flagg and Friedman's translation from epistemic to intuitionistic predicate logics is not faithful.

This paper aims to specify the precise conditions under which an agent is responsible for inequalities. Admittedly, the careful examination of the conditions in question has been the main focus of contemporary egalitarianism. As a matter of fact, contemporary political philosophers take responsibility to be a core conception which in principle justifies inequalities. In particular, they tend to flesh out the conception of responsibility in terms of choice, in such a way that we should hold individuals responsible for chosen inequalities (...) but not for unchosen inequalities. This core idea is intuitively appealing because, on the one hand, alleviation of inequalities that people do not choose would thereby be encouraged, and on the other hand, it avoids an egalitarian ‘moral hazard’: the situation in which people need care nothing for the consequences (economic or otherwise) of their own choice. G. A. Cohen thus goes so far as to say that egalitarianism successfully incorporates “within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility.”. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the formation of sect Shinto in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is pointed out that the Shinto sects that constituted sect Shinto were constructed on the basis of preexisting infrastructures, which had developed in response to the profound social changes accompa- nying the modernization process of the Bakumatsu and Meiji periods. Sect Shinto took shape in a cross3re between the impact of modernization from below, and the vicissitudes of Meiji religious policy from above. The (...) essay further proposes to distinguish between two types of Shinto religious move- ments: Shinto sects, characterized by a typical “dish-structure,” and Shinto- derived New Religions, displaying a “tree-structure.” Of these two types, groups of the 3rst type were shaped more directly by Meiji religious policy than the latter, which 3rst arose as “founded religions” and adapted to Meiji policy only later, in the course of their institutionalization. (shrink)

なぜ脳死が人の死とされるのか、なぜ尊厳死が推進されるのか。「人間の尊厳」の系譜を、ギリシア哲学やキリスト教神学からたどり直し、生権力の淵源に迫る画期的な著作。.

This paper examines whether Kok-Chor Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism is successful as a pluralist luck egalitarian theory of justice and morality. In recent years, pluralist luck egalitarianism has become a salient theory of justice. Tan’s pluralist proposal for institutional luck egalitarianism is attractive because it seems to refute the metaphysical and practical challenges against luck egalitarianism. This paper demonstrates that, although Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism is indeed a most sophisticated systematic pluralist theory of justice and morality, his argument fails because (...) the application of luck egalitarianism to the domain of distributive justice and to the basic institutions of society is not justified from the luck egalitarian point of view. This paper concludes that Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism does not succeed in demonstrating that his theory is an outstanding achievement of luck egalitarianism. (shrink)

冷戦終焉の直後から大震災の直前まで、世紀をまたぎ『現代思想』に毎月書き続けられた編集後記。世界の哲学・思想の最先端から政治・社会・文化の現状に鋭く斬りこみ、ネオリベラリズムにいち早く警鐘を鳴らし、「他 者」「マイノリティ」の声に耳を澄ませながら新しい理論、運動、文化を次々に導入した旺盛にしてスリリングな活動の軌跡。.

This article aims to defend responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism by arguing for the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility as a plausible conception of an agent's responsibility for inequalities caused by his or her choice in responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. I show that the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility is not only philosophically defensible as a conception of genuine choice, but also promising enough to ward off two common worries which cast doubt on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (qua luck egalitarianism): first, the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility (...) allows the assignment of differential degrees of responsibility to rational agents in proportional terms, which may make it echo the adverse effects of their childhood environments. Second, its proportional construal essentially allows that nobody possesses a full degree of rational capacities. This enables responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism to refute the harshness objection. (shrink)

暴走する世界と迷走する日本への反時代的「檄」。実践と原理を結ぶ、40年間の知の行路、その「回顧的総括」と、「未来への提言」。.

In recent years many essays have been made public and various opinions have been advanced on youth. I would like to conceive one of the salient characteristics in the consciousness and the behavior pattern of today's youth as “play-orientedness” and center my discussion on that particular inclination. “Play-orientedness” here is not intended to mean merely “activeness in sports and hobbies,” nor is it synonymous with “pleasure-orientedness.” It is a broader term and is rather close in meaning to what is commonly (...) called “the spirit of play.” We might perhaps define it as “play as a way of life,” or an inclination to introduce elements of “play” into one's daily life and make his actual life “play-like.”. (shrink)