We consider the role of preferences in the assessment of an agent's freedom, visualized as the opportunity for choice. After discussing several possible intuitive approaches to the problem, we explore an approach based on the notion of preference orderings that a reasonable person may possibly have. Using different sets of axioms, we characterize the rules for ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom. We also show that certain axioms for ranking opportunity sets are incompatible.

The classical theory of rational choice is built on several important internal consistency conditions. In recent years, the reasonableness of those internal consistency conditions has been questioned and criticized, and several responses to accommodate such criticisms have been proposed in the literature. This paper develops a general framework to accommodate the issues raised by the criticisms of classical rational choice theory, and examines the broad impact of these criticisms from both normative and positive points of view.

This paper studies a ranking rule of the following type axiomatically: each voter places k candidates into n categories with ranks from n to 1 attached to these categories, the candidate(s) with the highest aggregate score is (are) the winner(s). We show that it is characterized by a monotonicity condition and a multi-stage cancellation property.

In decision-making involving multiple criteria or attributes, a decision maker first identifies all relevant evaluative attributes in making decisions. Then, a dominance principle is often invoked whenever applicable: whenever an option x is better than an option y in terms of some attribute and no worse than y in terms of any other attributes, x is judged to be better than y. If, however, this dominance principle is not applicable, then the decision maker determines the relative importance between the identified (...) evaluative attributes, consults with contextual features of the options under consideration, and makes a decision. It is shown that the combination of these principles runs into problems in the presence of rationality properties, such as transitivity, and a weak continuity requirement on decisions. The paper gives examples from welfare economics, and theories of individual and group decisions. (shrink)

This paper develops a general and unified framework to discuss individual choice behaviors that are constrained by the individual’s internalized norms. We propose a new notion of rationalizablity of a choice function that incorporates such constraints, and axiomatically study several norm-constrained choice behaviors.

This article uses Lancaster's characteristics approach to rank sets of alternative combinations of commodity characteristics. It is assumed that there exists a reference point or reference level from which the individual evaluates set expansions in appropriate directions. We provide an axiomatic characterization for such a case.

The notions of personal connection and social networks are key ingredients of the increasingly important concept of social capital in social sciences in general and in economics in particular. This paper discusses the problem of measuring personal connection and the extent of social networks that may exist in a society. For this purpose we develop several conceptual and analytical frameworks. In the process, we axiomatically characterize several measures of personal connection and social networks.

This paper develops a conceptual framework, which can accommodate a wide range of value judgements used in ethical evaluations of extended social states and which can be used to differentiate different categories of value judgements by referring to the type of information on which they may be based. The notions of consequentialism, non-consequentialism, exclusive focus on personal well-being, exclusive focus on utility, etc. are conceptualized in operational ways in the framework. The framework and the discussion of different types of ethical (...) criteria that may be used in evaluating extended social states contribute to conceptual clarity about the ethical bases of public policies. (shrink)