Philosophers have argued that stakes affect knowledge: a given amount of evidence may suffice for knowledge if the stakes are low, but not if the stakes are high. By contrast, empirical work on the influence of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascriptions has been divided along methodological lines: “evidence‐fixed” prompts rarely find stakes effects, while “evidence‐seeking” prompts consistently find them. We present a cross‐cultural study using both evidence‐fixed and evidence‐seeking prompts with a diverse sample of 17 populations in 11 countries, speaking (...) 14 languages. Our study is the first to use an evidence‐seeking prompt cross‐culturally, and includes several previously untested populations (including indigenous populations). Across cultures, we do not find evidence of a stakes effect with our evidence‐fixed prompt, but do with our evidence‐seeking prompt. We argue that the divergent results reveal a tension within folk epistemology: people's beliefs about when it is appropriate to ascribe knowledge differ significantly from their actual practice in ascribing knowledge. (shrink)

"Paradox drives a good deal of philosophy in every tradition. In the Indian and Western traditions, there is a tendency among many philosophers to run from contradiction and paradox. If and when a contradiction appears in a theory, it is regarded as a sure sign that something has gone amiss. This aversion to paradox commits them, knowingly or not, to the view that reality must be consistent. In East Asia, however, philosophers have reacted to paradox differently. Many East Asian philosophers-both (...) in the Daoist and the Buddhist traditions-have openly embraced paradox. They have taken compelling arguments for contradictory positions to suggest that the world is-at least in some respects, and often in very deep respects-inconsistent, and that our best theories of the world will therefore be inconsistent. This book is an initial survey of the writings of some influential East Asian thinkers who were committed to paradox, and for good reason. Their acceptance of contradiction allowed them to develop important insights that evaded those who consider paradox out of bounds"--. (shrink)

In his article in this issue, " 'How do Mādhyamikas Think?' Revisited," Tom Tillemans reflects on his earlier article "How do Mādhyamikas Think?" (2009), itself a response to earlier work of ours (Deguchi et al. 2008; Garfield and Priest 2003). There is much we agree with in these non-dogmatic and open-minded essays. Still, we have some disagreements. We begin with a response to Tillemans' first thoughts, and then turn to his second thoughts.Tillemans (2009) maintains that it is wrong to attribute (...) to Nāgārjuna or to his Mādhyamika followers a strong dialetheism, according to which some contradictions of the form p ∧ ¬p are to be accepted. He argues that, nonetheless, a weak dialetheism may be implicit in the .. (shrink)

In one of his last works, “Emptiness and That-is-ness”, Keiji Nishitani, the main figure of the postwar Kyoto school, tried to construct an alternative logic to the Western classical logic. This chapter aims to advance or restructure his unfinished project by means of paraconsistent logic—a contemporary nonclassical logic. In so doing, some ideas of Jízāng, a great master of the Sānlùn school of classical Chinese Buddhism, are consulted and analyzed in terms of contemporary logic and analytic philosophy. Finally, as a (...) candidate of the logic of emptiness, that is, the logic that incorporates the philosophies of emptiness, this chapter proposes a three-valued system which has a fixed point of negation that is taken to be a designated value. (shrink)

This paper aims to construct a logic of alternative-I that provides a proper conceptual framework for talk of possible-I in decision-making context, and thereby solves what we call the paradox of possible-I. The model of our logic, Alt-I model, is an adaptation of N. Belnap’s branching-time model, and the STIT (see to it that) operator defined on the model serves to represent choices and decisions made by actual and counterfactual agents. We conclude this paper by discussing the application of Alt-I (...) model to the case of digital twins, digital copies of a person. (shrink)

The Moon Points Back comprises essays by both established scholars in Buddhist and Western philosophy and young scholars contributing to cross-cultural philosophy. It continues the program of Pointing at the Moon, integrating the approaches and insights of contemporary logic and analytic philosophy along with those of Buddhist Studies in order to engage with Buddhist ideas in a contemporary voice.The essays in the volume focus on the Buddhist notion of emptiness, exploring its relationship to core philosophical issues concerning the self, the (...) nature of reality, logic, and epistemology. The volume closes with reflections on methodological issues raised by bringing together traditional Buddhist philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy.The Moon Points Back demonstrates convincingly that integration of Buddhist philosophy with contemporary analytic philosophy and logic allows for novel understandings of and insights into Buddhist philosophical thought. It also shows how Buddhist philosophers can contribute to debates in contemporary Western philosophy and how contemporary philosophers and logicians can engage with Buddhist material. (shrink)

In this issue, Constance Kassor describes Gorampa's attitude to contradictions as they occur in various contexts of Buddhist pursuit. We agree with much of what she says; with some things we do not.First, some preliminary comments, and a fundamental disagreement. Kassor says:Based on . . . [the assumption that Nāgārjuna has a coherent system of thought] one must resolve apparent contradictions in Nāgārjuna's texts in order to maintain the coherency of his logic. The problem with contradictions is that if they (...) are introduced into a classical logical system, that entire system can break down. This is because of the law of explosion—the principle that everything can follow [DGP: does follow] from a contradiction.One .. (shrink)

This paper contrasts and illustrates two types of breakthroughs in philosophy; i.e., external and internal ones. Both are made possible through its application to a newfield. In the external breakthrough, a new field is discovered by such factors without philosophy as encounters with different traditions of thought and advance in technology. In the internal one, a new field is brought into attention by critical examination of one or another assumption within philosophy that has once dismissed the field as too trivial (...) or insignificant to be its proper subject. Based on this distinction, a research guideline for philosophy is proposed that one must always seek the possibility of its internal breakthrough. It is also suggested that the philosophy of science and epistemology can be innovated internally when they are applied to a new field, that is, statistics. Finally the distinction between pure and applied philosophy is reinterpreted in the light of the internal breakthrough. (shrink)