Food turns out to be not only the nutrient supplier for our body but also a carrier of regulatory information. Interestingly, a recent study made the discovery that some plant/food‐derived microRNAs (miRNAs) accumulate in the serum of humans or plant‐feeding animals, and regulate mammalian gene expression in a sequence‐specific manner. The authors provided striking evidence that miRNAs could function as active signaling molecules to transport information across distinct species or even kingdoms. Although the mechanism of how miRNAs are shuttled between (...) different organisms is still not well characterized, initial results point to the involvement of microvesicles and specific RNA‐transporter‐like proteins. These findings raise both speculation about the potential impact that plants may have on animal physiology at the molecular level, and an appealing possibility that food‐derived miRNAs may offer us another means to deliver necessary nutrients or therapeutics to our bodies. (shrink)

Suppose we wish to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality. Like several other philosophers, we focus on the intentionality of belief, hoping that we may later supplement our account to accommodate other intentional states like desires and fears. Now suppose that we also take partial beliefs or credences seriously. In cashing out our favoured theory of intentionality, we may for the sake of simplicity talk as if belief is merely binary or all-or-nothing. But we should be able to supplement or (...) modify our account to accommodate credences. I shall argue, however, that it is difficult to do so with respect to certain causal or teleological theories of intentionality-in particular, those advanced by the likes of Stalnaker (Inquiry, 1984) and Millikan (J Philos 86:281–297, 1989). I shall first show that such theories are tailor-made to account for the intentionality of binary beliefs. Then I shall argue that it is hard to extend or supplement such theories to accommodate credences. Finally, I shall offer some natural ways of modifying the theories that involve an appeal to objective probabilities. But unfortunately, such modifications face problems. (shrink)

This paper elucidates the sense in which belief is a question-settling attitude. In her recent work, Jane Friedman suggests that we understand the settledness of belief in terms of a normative principle about belief and inquiry: one ought not inquire into a question and believe the answer to the question at the same time. On the basis of the distinction between dispositional and occurrent belief, I argue against Friedman that there is no principle linking belief and inquiry that is both (...) plausible and normative: on the dispositional reading of ‘belief’, such a principle is implausible; on the occurrent reading of ‘belief’, such a principle is not normative. I argue instead that the settledness should be understood as a descriptive relation between occurrent belief and inquiry: one cannot inquire into whether p while at the same time occurrently believing that p. (shrink)

Biography of a Korean philosopher as a father, based on his correspondence with family members and his writings of inscriptions.

In this paper we prove that any c. e. degree is splittable with an c. e. infimum over any lesser c. e. degree in the class of d-c. e. degrees.

단국대 학생들의 교책과목으로 집필된 책.단국대학교의 역사와 한민족의 가치관,미래부터 교육과 인간화까지 전체 15장에 엮었다.

On an increasingly popular view of rationality, rationality is fundamentally about responding correctly to reasons and there is no independent rational requirement to avoid incoherence: having an incoherent combination of attitudes is irrational not because there is a fundamental requirement of rationality that prohibits it, but rather because you are guaranteed to fail to respond correctly to reasons in having it. This paper argues that any such attempt to explain the irrationality of incoherence in terms of responsiveness to reasons fails. (...) For there is something distinctively irrational about incoherence that is not explained in terms of the guaranteed failure to respond to reasons. Any adequate account of the nature of coherence requirements on belief and intention should take into account the distinctive kind of commitments involved in each type of attitude. (*published with open access). (shrink)

You ought to believe in accordance with available evidence. This evidential norm, as widely recognized, can be implausibly demanding by requiring you to hold pointless beliefs. In this paper, I first consider some seemingly promising versions of the positive evidential requirement to form beliefs in accordance with your evidence and argue that they either fail to avoid the problem of pointlessness or fail to bind you independently of practical requirements. I then show that even the negative requirement not to believe (...) against your evidence falls prey to the same problem: either it enjoins pointlessness or its binding force depends essentially on practical norms. This is puzzling, as our epistemic practice seems to presuppose evidential standards that are independent of practical rationality. I suggest that the alleged evidential “norms” are evaluative ‘ought’-statements about what it would be epistemically ideal for you to do, which, on their own, do not issue any genuine prescriptions or demands. (*published with open access). (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a novel view of the coherence (or structural) requirements on belief and intention, according to which they are not norms, but rather principles describing how your belief and intention operate. I first argue, on the basis of the unintelligibility of some relevant attitudes-reports, that there are conditions under which you simply do not count as believing or intending unless your beliefs and intentions satisfy the requirements: the conditions under which all of your relevant attitudes are (...) occurrent or activated. I then argue that you are subject to a coherence requirement only if your relevant attitudes are all activated, for you are not necessarily subject to the charge of irrationality in violating a coherence requirement when your attitudes are not all activated. If so, however, you satisfy the coherence requirements whenever you are subject to them, which makes it plausible that the “requirements” should be seen as descriptive principles about belief and intention. [*published with open access]. (shrink)

The normativity of so-called “coherence” or “structural” requirements of rationality has been hotly debated in recent years. However, relatively little has been said about the nature of structural rationality, or what makes a set of attitudes structurally irrational, if structural rationality is not ultimately a matter of responding correctly to reasons. This paper develops a novel account of incoherence (or structural irrationality), critically examining Alex Worsnip’s recent account. It first argues that Worsnip’s account both over-generates and under-generates incoherent patterns of (...) attitudes, and then proposes an alternative that both avoids these problems and captures a crucial insight behind Worsnip’s account. According to this account, a set of attitudes is incoherent just in case having all of the attitudes in that set is incompatible with reacting to a question in a way that one is, in virtue of having the attitudes, committed to. (shrink)

The following framework of theses, roughly hewn, shapes contemporary discussion of the problem of mental causation: (1) Non-Identity of the Mental and the Physical Mental properties and states cannot be identified with specific physical properties and states. (2) Causal Closure (Completeness) of the Physical The objective probability of every physical event is fixed by prior physical events and laws alone. (This thesis is sometimes expressed in terms of explanation: In tracing the causal history of any physical event, one need not (...) advert to any non-physical events or laws. To the extent that there is any explanation available for a physical event, there is a complete explanation available couched entirely in physical vocabulary. We prefer the probability formulation, as it should be acceptable to any physicalist, though some reject the explanation formulation.) (3) Causal Exclusion There is at most one complete and wholly independent explanation for any given event or sequence of events. (shrink)

In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant famously claims that it is analytic that whoever wills the end also wills the indispensably necessary means to it that is within his control. The orthodox consensus has it that the analytic proposition expresses a normative principle of practical reason. In this paper, I argue that this consensus is mistaken. On my resolute reading of Kant, he is making a descriptive point about what it is to will an end, and not (...) making a normative claim of any sort. Kant’s argument is that when you know that some object is a necessary means to an end, you do not count as willing the end unless you also will the means, because of the distinctive content of willing: when you will an end, what you will is that you do whatever is necessary to bring about the end. I show how the resolute reading of Kant’s analytic proposition explains the possibility of hypothetical imperatives and defend the resolute reading from the charge that it makes instrumental irrationality impossible. (shrink)

Recent years have seen the rise of fittingness-first views, which take fittingness to be the most basic normative feature, in terms of which other normative features can be explained. This paper poses a serious difficulty for the fittingness-first approach by showing that existing fittingness-first accounts cannot plausibly accommodate an important class of reasons: reasons not to believe a proposition. There are two kinds of reasons not to believe a proposition: considerations that are counterevidence; and considerations that count against believing the (...) proposition without indicating that it is false. I will argue that the fittingness- first accounts have trouble accommodating reasons of the latter kind. (*published with open access). (shrink)

洪耀勳是誰？是否有臺灣哲學？何謂臺灣哲學？何以洪耀勳的思想與實存哲學、日本哲學有深刻的關聯？哲學在東亞的接受與發展脈絡和洪耀勳的哲學思想有何關聯？洪耀勳的哲學思想能以何種形式和東亞的哲學發展產生關聯？ 其哲學思想有何種當代性意義？ 本書收錄洪耀勳日治時期的八篇哲學文章，撰寫年代在1934至1943十年之間，其中或隱或顯地援用日本京都學派哲學作為其哲學思索的資源。洪耀勳援引西田幾多郎「我和你」的理論，針對當時哲學發展的脈動，提出貼 近當代哲學需求的歷史實存概念。此外，他在探索臺灣文學創作的哲學理論時，亦以實存概念出發，主張新康德學派的價值哲學應與歷史實存形成呼應，藉以超越形而上學的價值世界。實存概念經洪耀勳的哲學探索，使得和辻哲 郎的風土論、務臺理作「表現世界的邏輯」、田邊元的「種的邏輯」等哲學資源，以一種「個別、特殊、普遍」的臺灣歷史實存姿態出現，並在異文化的臺灣，得到特殊性的發展。 Who is Hung Yao-hsün? Is there Taiwanese philosophy? What is Taiwanese philosophy? Why is Hung Yao-hsün’s thought deeply related to philosophy of existence and Japanese philosophy? What is the relationship between the reception and development of philosophy in East Asia and Hung Yao-hsün’s philosophical thought? In what form can Hung Yao-hsün’s philosophical thoughts be related to the development of philosophy in East Asia? What is the contemporary significance of his philosophical thinking? This book contains eight philosophical articles written (...) by Hung Yao-hsün between1934-1943, when Taiwan was under Japanese rule. These papers show implicit and explicit references to Kyoto School philosophy, which is a resource for his philosophical thinking. In response to the philosophical development at that time, Hung develops the notion of historical existence by citing Nishida’s theory of I and Thou. Besides, he explores the concept of existence as the philosophical foundation of Taiwanese literature, and argues the philosophy of value of Neo-Kantianism should echo the historical reality in order to overcome the metaphysical world of value. Hung’s philosophy deepens the concept of existence, and transforms the philosophical resources of Watsuji’s theory of Fūdo, Mutai Risaku’s logic of world expression and Tanabe’s logic of species into Taiwan’s historical reality of “individuality, particularity and universality;” these philosophies developed into a new dimension in Taiwan, a culture alien to Japan. (shrink)

This paper explores the sense in which rational requirements govern our attitudes like belief and intention. I argue that there is a tension between the idea that rational requirements govern attitudes understood as standing states and the attractive idea that we can directly satisfy the requirements by performing reasoning. I identify the tension by (a) illustrating how a dispositional conception of belief can cause trouble for the idea that we can directly revise our attitudes through reasoning by considering John Broome's (...) view, and (b) advancing a general argument that a standing state cannot be directly affected by reasoning. I then propose a solution: by recognizing the proper targets of rational requirements as occurrent, rather than dispositional attitudes, we can preserve the idea that we can directly satisfy rational requirements through reasoning. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that there is a rational requirement, “Enkrasia”, which requires that you intend what you believe you ought to do. This paper argues that Enkrasia is not an independent requirement of practical rationality: it is a special case of the requirement to be instrumentally rational. I argue for this view of Enkrasia through an analysis of an all‐things‐considered belief about what you ought to do. Believing, all‐thing‐considered, that you ought to φ implies being settled on a set (...) of options from which to take an option. I argue that this state of being settled on a set of options cannot be a matter of believing. Rather, it should be understood as intending that you do what you ought to do out of that set. If an all‐things‐considered belief implies such an intention, however, satisfying Enkrasia is a matter of satisfying the requirement to intend a necessary means to an end that you intend [*published with open access]. (shrink)

An increasingly popular view in the literature on rationality attempts to vindicate the strong normativity of rationality by giving a unifying account of rational requirements and what one ought to do in terms of reasons that fall within one’s perspective. In this paper, I pose a dilemma for such a view: one’s rationality is determined by a narrower set of reasons, such as the set of reasons that one is attending to, whereas what one ought to do is determined by (...) a broader set of reasons that comprises reasons one is not attending to. Thus, no single set of reasons can play the dual role of determining what one is rationally required to do and determining what one ought to do: either it is too broad to determine what one is rationally required to do or it is too narrow to determine what one ought to do. [*published with open access]. (shrink)

The final volume (XXVI) of Princeton's Kierkegaard's Writings series, the Cumulative Index provides wide-ranging navigation to the preceding twenty-five volumes in the series. Composed of over 90,000 entries, the Cumulative Index offers access to Kierkegaard's complex authorship and the extraordinary range of subjects he addressed in his writing. Covering the series' historical introductions, primary works, supplementary material (journal entries), and footnotes, the Cumulative Index provides a comprehensive entryway to the series' more than 11,000 pages of text. Readers are able to (...) survey via extended entries Kierkegaard's dual authorship(pseudonymous and signed), his frequent biblical references and allusions, his references to Christianity, God, and love, and his frequent use of analogies. A cumulative collation of the extensive supplementary material (over 4,000 journal entries) is also included, giving researchers and avid readers the opportunity to correlate and examine items from the current series, Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers , and the original Danish Søren Kierkegaards Papirer. (shrink)

Kripke's argument for the rigid designation of natural kind terms is fallacious because he does not distinguish natural kinds from second-order functional properties; by clarifying the concepts of natural kind and functional property, we can show that natural kind terms do designate their referents rigidly, but that functional property terms are not rigid designators. My discussions of functional property will also help dispel the worry about the alleged cases of contingent identity with regard to theoretical statements in science. There is (...) no contingent identity even in the form of second-order logic: Property identity is also a necessary identity. The principle of necessary identity rules relentlessly. (shrink)

Recent research suggests there may be a link between religiousness and business ethics. This study seeks to add to the understanding of the relationship through a questionnaire survey on Malaysian Christians in business. The questionnaire taps into three different constructs. The religiousness construct is reflected in the level of participation in various common religious activities. The love of money construct is captured through the Love of Money Scale as used in Luna-Arocas and Tang [Journal of Business Ethics 50 (2004) 329]. (...) Response to 25 business vignettes taken from Conroy and Emerson [Journal of Business Ethics 50 (2004) 383] would surface ethical attitudes. A convenience sample of 300 was drawn from three large churches in the Kuala Lumpur area each with a congregation exceeding 1000 together with some representation from the smaller churches. The study finds some differences in the ethical attitudes of Malaysian Christians in business with different levels of religiousness. The study also finds that those longer in the faith are less accepting of unethical behavior. As such it can be concluded that there are ethical attitude differences between Christians in business with different levels of religiousness. This lends support to the claim of a positive relationship between religion and business ethics. The more significant finding is that even within a somewhat homogenous religious group there are different love of money profiles resulting in significant differences in ethical attitudes. This suggests that moderating money attitudes can contribute towards stronger ethical attitudes. (shrink)

Hong Kong is undergoing a public debate on the need to reform and future directions of reforming its health care system. This paper highlights the debates and considerations brought up by the Hospital Authority, the largest provider of public health care in Hong Kong, on the ethical principles and societal values underlying the upcoming reform. It is recognized that the exact meanings behind each ethical principle and value must be debated and clarified during the reform process. In a (...) modern day society like Hong Kong, societal values are likely to be diversified. A health care system also has to fulfil different and often conflicting objectives of equity, efficiency, quality and choice. It would be difficult for a health care system to satisfy these different values and objectives based on a single value parameter. The Hong Kong experience shows that a society may prefer a combination of strategies in addressing different societal values. The re-structuring of the health care system in Hong Kong should therefore be based on a balanced and optimum combination of various financing and delivery strategies. (shrink)

Emergence is a notorious philosophical term of art. A variety of theorists have appropriated it for their purposes ever since George Henry Lewes gave it a philosophical sense in his 1875 Problems of Life and Mind. We might roughly characterize the shared meaning thus: emergent entities (properties or substances) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them. (For example, it is sometimes said that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain.) Each (...) of the quoted terms is slippery in its own right, and their specifications yield the varied notions of emergence that we discuss below. There has been renewed interest in emergence within discussions of the behavior of complex systems and debates over the reconcilability of mental causation, intentionality, or consciousness with physicalism. (shrink)

Recent research on proprioception reveals that it relies on a systematically distorted model of bodily dimensions. This generates a puzzle about proprioception in action control: action requires accurate bodily parameters. Proprioception is crucial for ordinary action, but if it relies on a systematically distorted body model, then proprioception should contain systematic errors. But we cannot respond by discarding proprioception from motor control, since we know from the severe problems deafferented agents face in acting that ordinary action requires proprioception. The solution (...) is that the possibility of bodily action is provided for by multimodal body representations for action. (shrink)

Although a substantial literature in anthropology and comparative religion explores divination across diverse societies and back into history, little research has integrated the older ethnographic and historical work with recent insights on human learning, cultural transmission, and cognitive science. Here we present evidence showing that divination practices are often best viewed as an epistemic technology, and we formally model the scenarios under which individuals may overestimate the efficacy of divination that contribute to its cultural omnipresence and historical persistence. We found (...) that strong prior belief, underreporting of negative evidence, and misinferring belief from behavior can all contribute to biased and inaccurate beliefs about the effectiveness of epistemic technologies. We finally suggest how scientific epistemology, as it emerged in Western societies over the past few centuries, has influenced the importance and cultural centrality of divination practices. (shrink)

Emotional creativity refers to a set of cognitive abilities and personality traits related to the originality of emotional experience and expression. Previous studies have found that emotional creativity can positively predict posttraumatic growth and mental health. The outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has posed great challenges to people’s daily lives and their mental health status. Therefore, this study aims to address the following two questions: whether emotional creativity can improve posttraumatic growth and mental health during the COVID-19 pandemic and (...) how it works. To do this, a multiple mediation model has been proposed, which supposes that emotional creativity is associated with posttraumatic growth and mental health through perceived social support and regulatory emotional self-efficacy. The study involved 423 participants from multiple regions with different COVID-19 involvement levels. Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire with six parts, which included Emotional Creativity Inventory (ECI), Regulatory Emotional Self-Efficacy Scale (RES), Stress-Related Growth Scale-Short Form (SRGS-SF), Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support scale (MSPSS), Brief Symptom Inventory-18 scale (BSI-18), and COVID-19-related life events questionnaire. Path analysis used to examine the mediation model indicated that under the control of COVID-19-related life events and age, perceived social support mediated a positive association between emotional creativity and posttraumatic growth as well as a negative association between emotional creativity and all mental health problems, including somatization, depression, and anxiety. Regulatory emotional self-efficacy mediates the association between emotional creativity and posttraumatic growth, emotional creativity and anxiety, and emotional creativity and depression. The results suggest that emotional creativity plays an important role in coping with stressful events related to COVID-19. Furthermore, these results might provide a better understanding of the possible paths through which emotional creativity is related to psychological outcomes, such as mental health and posttraumatic growth. (shrink)