In ____Womanizing Nietzsche,__ Kelly Oliver uses an analysis of the position of woman in Nietzsche's texts to open onto the larger question of philosophy's relation to the feminine and the maternal. Offering readings from Nietzsche, Derrida, Irigaray, Kristeva, Freud and Lacan, Oliver builds an innovative foundation for an ontology of intersubjective relationships that suggests a new approach to ethics.

Studys the philosophy of Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Rousseau, Kant, Hume, Locke, and Hegel and examines their underlying assumptions about women.

Interpreters of Theaetetus are prone to endorse the view that a god gave Socrates maieutic skill. This paper challenges that view. It provides a different account of the skill’s origins, and reconstructs a genealogy of Socratic philosophy that begins and has its end in human experience. Three distinct origins coordinate to bring forth a radically new conception of philosophy in the image of female midwifery: the state of wonder (1. efficient origin), the exercise of producing, examining and disavowing (...) beliefs in the gradual cultivation of human nature’s lack of skill (2. material origin), and Socrates’ understanding of god’s assistance as an endorsement of his mental infertility and the benefit of a particular form of dialectical training (3. formal origin). The paper concludes by arguing that Socrates transforms philosophy into a pursuit of wisdom that has its telos in becoming like a woman. (shrink)

Is a reconciliation possible between Chinese philosophy and woman when taking into account infamous gender-oppressive cultural practices such as foot-binding, concubinage, etc., in premodern Chinese societies? The article tackles the complexity of the subject by calling the readers' attention to texts from Confucian classics that indeed support intellectual equality of the sexes and classless access to education, while noting diverging historical cultural evidences of women's education and their social status in premodern, modern, and postmodern Chinese societies. The article (...) challenges the belief that Confucian philosophy is unequivocally a sexist ideology to be a foregone conclusion. While not intending to exonerate Confucian philosophy from its opponents' charges, the article questions the adequateness of Western liberal feminism as the means to reappropriate Confucian philosophy. It suggests that a more culturally sensitive approach coupling with better historical and contextual analysis would prove to be both helpful and necessary. (shrink)

Aan de orde komen opvattingen over (de rol van) vrouwen in het werk van westerse filosofen, te weten Plato, Aristoteles, St. Thomas Aquinas, Christine de Pisan, Bacon, Descartes, Rousseau, Kant, Wollstonecraft, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Irigaray.

An article publicising the philosophical contributions of German writer Karoline von Günderrode (1780–1806).

This article is a slighty adapted version of my inaugural lecture as Professor of Philosophy presented on 21 June 2024 at the University of Copenhagen. Given my seniority and as the first woman ever to be appointed professor of philosophy at the University of Copenhagen, I decided to take this opportunity to address a broader and more fundamental topic: namely, what is philosophy, what role does philosophy play in today’s university systems, and what kind of (...) history of philosophy do we need for the 21st century. My lecture has three parts. First, I present and defend a specific understanding of philosophy focussing on the notion of knowledge for its own sake. Second, I outline some of the challenges for contemporary and future historiography of philosophy. Third, I conclude with some remarks on the societal relevance of feminist history of philosophy. (shrink)

Thinking Woman examines the lives and ideas of women in the history of philosophy who wished to understand and advocate for themselves as women. The books is fitting both for undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy who are interested in the ontology and ethics of gender.

Irigaray demonstrates that metaphysics depends upon the specific negation and exclusion of the female body. Readings of Irigaray's Speculum of the Other Woman tend to highlight the status of this excluded materiality: is there an essential female body which precedes negation or is the feminine only an effect of exclusion? I approach Irigaray's work by way of another question: is it possible to move beyond a feminist critique of metaphysics and towards a feminist philosophy?

Nature, Woman, and the Art of Politics ambitiously undertakes an examination of the role of women in political life as perceived in the history of philosophic thought broadly construed. Having accepted the basic tenets of liberalism, most human beings believe that they are free. However, as Velásquez notes in his introductory remarks, although we believe ourselves to be entirely free, we impose limits on ourselves by making choices that we hope will be conducive to our good. Indeed, political (...) life necessitates such limits if only to ensure our own safety against the wills of others. Velásquez argues that to understand the good, to understand the limits we justly impose, is to understand nature or more concretely, human nature. The history of political philosophy might be understood as various attempts of determining the limits that nature places on us. (shrink)

v. 1. The Aristotelian revolution, 750 BC-AD 1250 -- v. 2. The early humanist Reformation, 1250-1500.

Traditional accounts of the feminist history of philosophy have viewed reason as associated with masculinity and subsequent debates have been framed by this assumption. Yet recent debates in deconstruction have shown that gender has never been a stable matter. In the history of philosophy 'female' and 'woman' are full of ambiguity. What does deconstruction have to offer feminist criticism of the history of philosophy? _Yielding Gender_ explores this question by examining three crucial areas; (...) the issue of gender as 'troubled'; deconstruction; and feminist criticism of the history of philosophy. The first part of the book discusses the work of Judith Butler, Jacques Derrida, and contemporary French feminist philosophy including key figures such as Luce Irigiray. Particular attention is given to the possibilities offered by deconstruction for understanding the history of philosophy. The second part considers and then challenges feminist interpretations of some key figures in the history of philosophy. Penelope Deutscher sketches how Rousseau, St. Augustine and Simone de Beauvoir have described gender and argues that their readings of gender are in fact empowered by gender's own contradiction and instability rather than limited by it. (shrink)

Interpreters of Theaetetus are prone to endorse the view that a god gave Socrates maieutic skill. This paper challenges that view. It provides a different account of the skill’s origins, and reconstructs a genealogy of Socratic philosophy that begins and has its end in human experience. Three distinct origins coordinate to bring forth a radically new conception of philosophy in the image of female midwifery: the state of wonder (1. efficient origin), the exercise of producing, examining and disavowing (...) beliefs in the gradual cultivation of human nature’s lack of skill (2. material origin), and Socrates’ understanding of god’s assistance as an endorsement of his mental infertility and the benefit of a particular form of dialectical training (3. formal origin). The paper concludes by arguing that Socrates transforms philosophy into a pursuit of wisdom that has its telos in becoming like a woman. (shrink)

Hegel’s admiration for Sophocles’ Antigone is well-known. In the Philosophy of Religion he declares it to be “for me the absolute example of tragedy.” In the Aesthetics he calls it “one of the most sublime and in every respect most magnificent works of art of all time” - and adds : “Of all the splendors of the ancient or modern worlds - and I know nearly all, and one should and can know them - the Antigone seems to me (...) in this respect the most magnificent, most satisfying, work of art.” No less extravagant is Hegel’s praise of Antigone herself: “the heavenly Antigone, the most magnificent figure ever to have appeared on earth” as he puts it in his History of Philosophy. (shrink)

An important work by 20-century philosopher Hans Blumenberg, here translated into English for the first time, The Laughter of the Thracian Woman describes the reception history of an anecdote best known from Plato's Theaetetus dialogue: while focused on observing the stars, the early astronomer and proto-philosopher Thales of Miletus fails to see a well directly in his path and tumbles down. A Thracian servant girl laughs, amused that he sought to understand what was above him when he was (...) not mindful of what was right in front of him. Blumenberg sees the story as a highly sought substitute for our missing knowledge of the earliest historical events that would fit the label "theory." By retelling the anecdote, philosophers reveal their distinctive values regarding absorption in curiosity, philosophy's past, and the demand that theorists abide by sanctioned methods and procedures. In this work and others, Blumenberg demonstrates that philosophers' most beloved images and anecdotes have become indispensable to philosophy as metaphors; that is, as representations whose meanings remain indefinite and invite frequent reinterpretation. (shrink)

A comprehensive account of women in Western thought, from ancient Greece, through the Middle Ages, to today In her sweeping, three-volume study, Sister Prudence Allen examined how women and men have been defined in relation to one another scientifically, philosophically, and theologically. Now synthesized for students, The Concept of Woman is the ideal textbook for classes on gender in Catholic thought. Allen surveys Greek philosophers, medieval saints, and modern thinkers to trace the development of integral gender complementarity. This doctrine--a (...) living idea according to the criteria of John Henry Newman--affirms the equal dignity of men and women and the synergetic relationship between them. Allen pays special attention to John Paul II's contributions to this holistic idea of gender. Readers will gain valuable context for current debates over womanhood and come to a greater appreciation of human personhood. (shrink)

Today a “new” field of philosophy has emerged which can be called simply “The Philosophy of Man and Woman”. Paradoxically, it is a field of study with a long and impressive history which began when the pre-Socratic philosophers first questioned their own identity in the midst of the world. Their questions fall into four broad areas:1. How is the male “opposite” to the female?2. What roles do male and female play in the generation and identity of (...) offspring?3. Are women and men wise in the same or different ways?4. Are women and men good in the same or different ways? (shrink)

What does Martin Heidegger say about sex or gender? According to most accounts, including Derrida’s influential essay “Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference,” Heidegger makes a marginal reference to sex in a 1928 Marburg lecture later translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (GA 26). However, an earlier allusion to sexual difference appears in a 1923 Freiburg lecture, translated as Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity (GA 63) where he explains why he uses the term “Dasein” instead of “man” in his existential analytic. (...) “Man” carries his own historical baggage, representing a living being endowed with reason, as well as a pregiven understanding of what it means to be a person. This latter definition has its roots in a Judeo-Christian tradition where “man” is created in the image of God as the first born of many “brethren.” In a perplexing move, Heidegger then cites biblical passages to highlight the sexed emergence of man in Genesis as he poses the question, “Problem: What is woman?” (GA 63, 22/18). This chapter untangles what it means for Heidegger to ask such a question, particularly as he leaves it unanswered and seemingly negligible in his pursuit of a hermeneutics of facticity. Heidegger states, “Hermeneutics is itself not a philosophy. It wishes only to place an object which has hitherto fallen into forgetfulness before today’s philosophers for their ‘well-disposed consideration’” (GA 63, 20/16). I place the object of sex/gender facticity before today’s philosophers, situating the “Problem: What is woman?” within the context of Heidegger’s larger ontological project, namely to rediscover the question of being. Captured in the eponymous title Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity is the insight that the study of being (ontology) can only be carried out as an interpretive non-objectifying process (hermeneutics) of our existence at a particular time in history (facticity). What does it mean to exist as a certain sex or gender during a particular time? How are sex and gender related to the question of being and the ontological difference? How are we defining sex and gender and to which term does Heidegger refer? Throughout this chapter, I will examine a few instances where Heidegger reckons with the sex/gender question. By posing the inquiry, “Problem: What is Woman?” within the parameters of Heidegger’s larger ontological project, I suggest that sex and gender must be fluid categories insofar as such properties describe the “whatness” of our existence rather than the “how” of our world-forming. That is, Dasein is neutral with respect to these categories as such attributes only show up after a time reckoning with an original position of care-lessness. I also suggest that Heidegger privileges sex/gender facticity in undergirding such neutrality as he contests Christian origin stories of the flesh (GA 63) and evolutionary theories associated with the Lebensphilosophie of his time (GA 26). Finally, I conclude by demonstrating how Heidegger’s distinction between Körper and Leib further upholds sex and gender fluidity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Prisoner of History: Aspasia of Miletus and Her Biographical TraditionSarah B. PomeroyMadeleine M. Henry. Prisoner of History: Aspasia of Miletus and Her Biographical Tradition. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 201 pp. Cloth, $29.95.Pericles declared that the best women are those who are known neither for praise nor blame (Thuc. 2.45.2). Despite the invisibility of respectable women in fifth-century Athens, skeletal biographies including the (...) names of their fathers, husbands, sons, and, occasionally, daughters can be constructed. A vignette in Plutarch or a private oration may flesh out the story. Although etiquette discouraged giving the name of a respectable woman while she was alive, she is named in her epitaph. The historian can narrate the entire life of such a woman in a single paragraph.The most famous woman in classical Athens, the only one who rates an entry in the Oxford Classical Dictionary2 (Oxford, 1970) and could be the subject of a full-length biography, is the hetaira Aspasia. Yet even a book devoted to Aspasia who is named in multiple sources including comedy, philosophy, history, and biography fills only 130 pages of text, most of which treat post-classical traditions about Aspasia rather than the life of the woman herself.Chapter 1, a mere nine pages about “Aspasia in Greek History,” is the only part of this book that discusses Aspasia’s actual biography. Henry accepts P. J. Bicknell’s suggestion that Aspasia was an upper-class Milesian whose older sister was married to the Alcibiades who became the grandfather of the notorious Alcibiades (AC 51 [1982] 240–50). An orphan, when she was an adolescent Aspasia came to Athens with her sister and brother-in-law. If this reconstruction is accurate, we must wonder why her brother-in-law did not secure a proper marriage for his young sister-in-law, rather than permit her to become Pericles’ concubine, but perhaps an alliance with the first man in Athens was attractive to the elder Alcibiades. Furthermore he had no legal obligation to dower his sister-in-law. Estate planning and heirship strategies probably influenced Pericles, on his part (cf. Plut. Pericles 16.3–4), for he already had legitimate sons born from his first wife and had no need of another full-fledged marriage. Despite the affection with which Pericles treated Aspasia (Plut. Pericles 24.5–6), he does not seem to have made any arrangements for her future after his death. Lysicles, in turn, who is reported to have married Aspasia, probably regarded a connection with her as a “dynastic marriage” linking himself in this way with the deceased [End Page 648] Pericles. Aspasia made the best of her situation, attempting to bridge the gap between notoriety and respectability: she seems to have confined her attentions to only one man at a time and bore sons whose parentage was never doubted.The very existence of Poristes (“Provider”), the son of Aspasia and Lysicles, is questioned by Henry (43) who suggests that word was used of Aspasia herself. I think it is at least as likely that Lysicles chose his son’s name as his own epithet to refer to his fatherly concern for the Athenians, much the way that the names of Themistocles’ children testify to their father’s political interests. Furthermore, although Henry does not refer to the larger sweep of women’s history, Aspasia lived during the Peloponnesian War, a watershed in the history of Athenian women, when on account of the absence of men at war and the desertion of slaves, the luxury of secluding respectable women had to yield to harsh necessity (see Sarah B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves [New York, 1975] 66–67). Therefore the traditions that Aspasia lived in the same household with Pericles’ married sons and their wives and that she conversed with married women are believable.In chapter 2, “The Story Told by Comedy,” Henry rejects the testimony of the comic poets, found also in Plutarch (Pericles 24.5), that Aspasia ran a brothel. Yet since her concubinage is evidence of the lack of a dowry, it would have been advantageous for Aspasia to arrange... (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Methodological Challenges to Justifying the Inclusion of Specific Women in Our Histories of Philosophy: The Case of Marie de Gournay Gournay's Text and the Querelle des Femmes Gournay's Method The Skeptical Challenge of Nurture to the Argument from Nature The Skeptical Challenge to the “Might Makes Right” Argument The Skeptical Challenge to the Argument from Woman's Creation The Skeptical Challenge from God's Privileges against the Vanity of Man Concluding Remarks Notes.

‘Woman questions’ were emphasized in common speech during the time of the party-state in Hungary. In the 1950s this was symbolized by women tractor drivers, Stakhanovites in construction industry, or women who were present in public life and in politics. Mrs Mihály Berki, née Magdolna Szakács was one of the first emblematic female politicians who was appointed the first peasant woman főispán [honorary prefect] from a village at the end of 1948. The central elements of her life story (...) were the social and geographical mobility: how could she adapt to the new roles and environments? What kind of competences did she need? How did she acquire them? Did the image of a peasant woman politician with a kerchief change during her career? I intend to outline a wider social context in connection with the determining features of her career such as her being a female, her peasant background and her institutional socialization. (shrink)

This article explores the connection among woman, sex, and finitude. In stuying finitude, the argument follows the articulation of finitude with woman. In a first part, it discusses three “women” writers—Virginia Woolf, Simone De Beauvoir, and Hélène Cixous—to establish their thoughts on woman in terms of finitude. The three of them are identified as women and yet they problematized what to be a woman is. In tracing their thoughts on finitude and woman, sexual difference –the (...) body as enjoying emerges as an issue. Thus, in a second part, it discusses two seemingly opposed positions—Lacanian psychoanalysis, with Joan Copjec, and deconstruction, with Derrida—to think further about the question of woman, sexual difference, the “two,” and finitude. This study compares the Lacanian feminine side with the movement of deconstruction and establishes the necessity of thinking a “two” beyond the binary of phallogocentrism. My thesis is that thinking finitude with woman leads us to a non-oppositional two that correlates with sexual difference. The Lacanian feminine side, and Derrida’s deconstruction aim to think these two logics, delineating two sides: a male one (comparable with phallogocentrism) and a feminine side (comparable with the movement of deconstruction). If the male side considers finitude (death) as the limit of life, the feminine side opens to death and life, and the in-finitude of the undetermined and undecidable. In thinking finitude with woman, the knowledge of what to be a woman is, becomes undetermined and undecidable. (shrink)

In a thought-provoking article – or how she herself named it, ‘a thought experiment’ – the philosopher-medical ethicist Anna Smajdor analyzed in this journal the idea of whole-body gestational donation (WBGD) in brain-dead female patients, as an alternative means of gestation for prospective women who cannot or prefer not to become pregnant themselves. We have serious legal, economical, medical and ethical concerns about this proposal. First, consent for eight months of ICU treatment can never be assumed to be derived from (...) consent for post-mortem organ donation; these two are of an incomparable and entirely different medical and ethical order. Moreover, the brain-dead woman is very likely to be medically unfit for high-tech surrogacy and the brain-dead state poses a high risk for deficient embryo/fetal development. Second, from a scarcity perspective, occupying an ICU bed for eight months appears to be unjust. The costs for eight months of ICU treatment are far too high compared to the costs of surrogacy for a living, selected, and healthy woman. Neither insurance companies nor prospective parents will want to pay these exceptionally high costs for a dead woman if a living surrogate mother can be hired for a considerably lower amount. Third, there is an increased risk for harm of the child to be in WBGD. And finally, WBGD risks violating the brain-dead woman’s dignity and harming the interests of her loved ones. In short, there is simply no need for brain-dead women as surrogates. (shrink)

Unter der Fragestellung "Was sagt denn die Philosophie eigentlich über die Frauen?" beleuchtet der Titel die ganze Geschichte frauenfeindlicher aber auch frauenfreundlicher Statements in der Philosophie. Es wird deutlich, dass es das Bild der Frau nicht gibt. In der Philosophiegeschichte wurden es eine ganze Reihe von Bildern entwickelt, die nach Epoche und Zeitgeist variieren. Under the question "What does philosophy actually say about women?", the title illuminates the entire history of misogynistic but also pro-women statements in philosophy. (...) It becomes clear that the image of women does not exist. In the history of philosophy, a whole range of images have been developed that vary according to time and spirit of the age. (shrink)

The Battered Woman Syndrome, like the Cycle Theory of Violence, helps to illuminate the situation of the person victimized by domestic violence. However, it may also contribute to the violence of the battering situation. In this paper, I explore some of the implications of the Battered Woman Syndrome for domestic violence cases wherein an abused woman kills her abuser. I begin by delineating some of the circumstances of a domestic violence situation. I then discuss the particular moral (...) issue of subjectivity or moral personhood involved in instances wherein a woman victimized by domestic violence responds by killing her batterer. Finally, I argue that the Battered Woman Syndrome and similar alternatives to or qualifications of self-defense are problematic because they strip a woman of her moral subjectivity. I conclude with a brief articulation of a proposal for reform of the criminal justice system specifically aimed at cases wherein there has been a long history of abuse or violence. This reform is unique because it does not rely on a separate standard of reasonableness particular to battered women, but arises out of consideration of the moral implications of legal proceedings involving domestic violence. (shrink)

Der bedeutendste Vertreter der Stoa in Rom, Lucius Annaeus Seneca, der Erzieher Neros, hinterliess ein umfangreiches philosophisches Werk. Es enthalt bemerkenswerte theoretische Ausserungen uber die naturliche Veranlagung der Frau und das Verhaltnis der Geschlechter, eindrucksvolle Frauenportrats sowie zwei Trostschriften, die sich explizit an zwei Frauen richten. Das hier zutage tretende Frauenbild Senecas erscheint auf den ersten Blick zwiespaltig und inkonsequent. Die Untersuchung der einschlagigen Passagen, die traditionelles romisches Denken, stoische Lehre, padagogische Absicht und personliche Erfahrung spiegeln, zeigt aber, dass der (...) Philosoph bei der Beurteilung des menschlichen Sittenverhaltens keine geschlechtliche, sondern eine graduelle Differenzierung vornimmt, die ethische Gleichheit von Mann und Frau, die Forderung nach gleicher Erziehung und Bildung vertritt und der Frau in demselben Masse wie dem Mann die Befahigung zukommen lasst, sich durch die Beschaftigung mit der Philosophie dem stoischen Ideal anzunahern.". (shrink)

Eileen O'Neill - Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 122-124 Sarah Hutton. Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. viii + 271. Cloth, $75.00. In 1690 a Latin translation of a philosophical treatise, originally written in English by Anne Conway , was published anonymously. The English manuscript did not survive, but in 1692 the Latin version (...) of Conway's text was translated into English as The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Conway was widely known by seventeenth-century philosophers and religious writers, including the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More; Descartes's correspondent, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia; Robert Boyle; physician and vitalist philosopher, Francis Mercury van Helmont; as well as numerous Quaker leaders. And her Principles were read with critical approbation by such figures as Leibniz. Further, Conway's text is probably the most anthologized of the writings of seventeenth-century women philosophers. It is curious, then, to discover a dearth of critical literature on the Principles. When Peter Loptson produced the first modern edition of the Principles , he attempted to interest contemporary philosophers in Conway's essentialist metaphysics. He did a superb job of elucidating Conway's position that: there are individual essences.. (shrink)

In this paper, implicitly starting from the neuralgic epistemological point caused by Kostas Axelos’ question to Gordana Bosanac: “Will a woman manage to think?”, we will analyse The Second Sex (Le Deuxième sexe, 1949) by Simone de Beauvoir, to deliberately dissolve the irony of Axelos’s question by reading and talking to the text of one of the most important woman philosophers in the history of philosophy. We will interpret The Second Sex as a report on the (...) phenomenology of the relationship between the gendered self and the gender-marked world, in which the social ideals of the feminine shape the experience of the female self and the processes of becoming a woman. The paper is structured into three sections. After the introductory notes, in the first section, entitled “Ad feminam criticism and controversies”, we will present only a few paradigmatic examples of controversies and negative reactions that followed the publication of The Second Sex. In the “Phenomenology of Gender”, the second and key section of the paper, we will pay attention to the original reading of The Second Sex, mapping the existentialist-phenomenological theses on gender in the book. Finally, in the concluding remarks, we will only sketch a few more recent readings of The Second Sex, to point out the current and very engaged affirmations and additions to the ideas that Simone de Beauvoir announced with that philosophical classic. (shrink)

Sati as a trope for the general status of women within certain portions of the Hindu cultures of India is examined, with a view toward clarification of its history and current context. The work of Sangari and Vaid, Banerjee and Mala Sen is cited, and the notion that sati is a misappropriated concept is analyzed.

How are ‘philosophy’ and ‘gender’ implicated? Throughout history, philosophers—mostly men, though with more women among their number than is sometimes supposed—have often sought to specify and justify the proper roles of women and men, and to explore the political consequences of sexual difference. The last forty years, however, have seen a dramatic explosion of critical thinking about how philosophy is a gendered discipline; there has also been an abundance of philosophical work that uses gender as a central (...) analytic category. In particular, feminist philosophy has become established as a major field of inquiry, and it is now complemented by related emerging areas, including the philosophy of race and the philosophy of sex and love. For those working in Philosophy and Gender dizzying questions such as the following arise: What justifications were used historically for the exclusion or inclusion of women in political life, and what is their contemporary resonance? How is what counts as knowledge shaped by gender norms? What metaphysical questions about identity are raised by sex change? How might some feminist philosophies risk reproducing racist assumptions about what it means to be a woman, while some critical philosophies of race assume a masculine subject? What does it mean to say that moral theories are gendered? Addressing the need for an authoritative and comprehensive reference work to enable users to answer these and other questions, and to make sense of—and to navigate around—an ever more complex corpus of scholarly literature, Philosophy and Gender is a new title in Routledge’s acclaimed Critical Concepts in Philosophy series. Edited by Cressida J. Heyes, it is a four-volume collection of foundational and the very best cutting-edge scholarship. It features critical analysis of gender as it relates to philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, metaphysics, logic, ethics, social and political thought, aesthetics, and philosophy of science; it is also distinctive in showing how feminist thought has been intertwined in both analytic and continental traditions. The collection reconfigures ‘gender and philosophy’ into an integrated field of inquiry while providing an invaluable resource for scholars in all disciplines who need to know how to think critically about gender. In so doing it responds to recent curriculum developments, while providing a crucial reference guide for theoretically minded scholars across the humanities and social sciences. Supplemented with a full index, and including an introduction, newly written by the editor, which places the assembled materials in their historical and intellectual context, Philosophy and Gender is destined to be valued by scholars and students as a vital research resource. (shrink)

Under current UK legislation, only a man can commit rape. This paper argues that this is an unjustified double standard that reinforces problematic gendered stereotypes about male and female sexuality. I first reject three potential justifications for making penile penetration a condition of rape: it is physically impossible for a woman to rape a man; it is a more serious offence to forcibly penetrate someone than to force them to penetrate you; rape is a gendered crime. I argue that, (...) as these justifications fail, a woman having sex with a man without his consent ought to be considered rape. I then explain some further reasons that this matters. I argue that, not only is it unjust, it is also both a cause and a consequence of harmful stereotypes and prejudices about male and female sexuality: men are ‘always up for sex’; women’s sexual purity is more important than men’s; sex is something men do to women. Therefore, I suggest that, if rape law were made gender neutral, these stereotypes would be undermined and this might make some difference to the problematic ways that sexual relations are sometimes viewed between men and women more generally. (shrink)

What is beauty? What is art? What is taste and fashion? Is beauty something to be observed coolly and rationally or is it something dangerously involving? So begins Umberto Eco's intriguing journey into the aesthetics of beauty, in which he explores the ever-changing concept of the beautiful from the ancient Greeks to today. While closely examining the development of the visual arts and drawing on works of literature from each era, Eco broadens his enquiries to consider a range of concepts, (...) including the idea of love, the unattainable woman, natural inspiration versus numeric formulas, and the continuing importance of ugliness, cruelty, and even the demonic. Professor Eco takes us from classical antiquity to the present day, dispelling many preconceptions along the way and concluding that the relevance of his research is urgent because we live in an age of great reverence for beauty, "an orgy of tolerance, the total syncretism and the absolute and unstoppable polytheism of Beauty." In this, his first illustrated book, Professor Eco offers a layered approach that includes a running narrative, abundant examples of painting and sculpture, and excerpts from writers and philosophers of each age, plus comparative tables. A true road map to the idea of beauty for any reader who wishes to journey into this wonderful realm with Eco's nimble mind as guide. (shrink)

The article draws on critiques in political theory and morality to argue that womanism, a worldview rooted in Black women's lives and history, provides an alternative conceptual framework to prevailing Eurocentric thinking, for promoting socially just institutions of higher education. Presupposing a positioned, encultured, and embodied account of identity, womanism’s social change perspective holds transformative promise. It foregrounds Black women’s penchant for reaching solutions that promote communal balance, affirm one’s humanity and attend to the spiritual dimension (Phillips, 2006 Phillips, (...) L. (Ed.). (2006). The womanist reader. Routledge.[Crossref], [Google Scholar]). Directed first towards scholars of color, fostering inclusivity, communalist values and acknowledged intersectionality offers an ethic of the embodied self. As a corollary, it argues for a universal that recommends at least two guiding principles for a pedagogical philosophy. It is, first oriented towards a love of self and second towards placing all disciplines within a cultural-historical context. In the first claim, there is potential for nothing less than suspending the symbolic and ontological violence to one’s sense of belonging in academia. In the second claim, such an understanding can position scholars of color to actively re-narrate their fields. As illustrations, we focus on three academic fields of education, theology in higher education, and criminal justice. (shrink)

The works of Mary Wollstonecraft ranged from the early Thoughts on the Education of Daughters to The Female Reader, a selection of texts for girls, and included two novels. But her reputation is founded on A Vindication of the Rights of Woman of 1792. This treatise is the first great document of feminism—and is now accepted as a core text in western tradition. It is not widely known that the germ of Wollstonecraft's great work came out of an earlier (...) and much shorter vindication—A Vindication of the Rights of Men , written in the context of the issues raised by the French Revolution. This edition, which follows the model of other Broadview Editions in including a range of materials that help the reader to see the work in the context of its era out of which it emerged, is arranged chronologically, opening with Wollstonecraft's "other vindication." It also includes a wide range of other documents in appendices, as well as a comprehensive and authoritative introduction, chronology, and full index. (shrink)

Aquinas has been accused of being a sexist for making the following four claims about woman: (1) woman is a deficient male; (2) woman was created only for the purpose of procreation; (3) woman is inferior to man; (4) woman must submit to man. Some scholars, notably Michael Nolan, have attempted to defend Thomas, and a few have even gone so far as calling him a feminist. The aim of this paper is to show that (...) Aquinas did hold these four claims throughout his career, and to show in what sense he held them, thus revealing how well-founded the accusations remain, given the assumptions of feminism. Finally, the authors propose that any future attempt to exonerate Aquinas from the charge of sexism must grapple with the question of how these claims are compatible with a gender-equality view. (shrink)