First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Magnetism in meta-semantics is the view that the meaning of our words is determined in part by their use and in part by the objective naturalness of candidate meanings. This hypothesis is commonly attributed to David Lewis, and has been put to philosophical work by Brian Weatherson, Ted Sider and others. I argue that there is no evidence that Lewis ever endorsed the view, and that his actual account of language reveals good reasons against it.

This Element addresses three questions about Kant's guarantee thesis by examining the 'first addendum' of his Philosophical Sketch: how the guarantor powers interrelate, how there can be a guarantee without undermining freedom and why there is a guarantee in the first place. Kant's conception of an interplay of human and divine rational agency encompassing nature is crucial: on moral grounds, we are warranted to believe the 'world author' knew that if he were to bring about the world, the 'supreme' good (...) would come about too. Perpetual peace is the condition that enables the supreme good to be realized in history. (shrink)

This article contributes to the analysis of refusal to license cases as abuse of a dominant position pursuant Article 82 EC from an economic perspective. In the Microsoft case, the European Commission introduced an "Incentives Balance Test" to assess whether the refusal to give access to interface information can be justified by arguing that this information is protected by Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs): The Commission argued that if the overall innovative effects evoked by a compulsory license are significantly higher than (...) without this access, the IPR owner is obliged to license. This should be assessed through balancing the different incentives to innovate between the dominant firm and its competitors. In the paper we pursue two objectives: Firstly, we analyze to what extent the decision of the Court of First Instance, which confirmed the decision of the Commission, helps to clarify the criteria in refusal to license cases; in fact, it is disappointing in this regard. Secondly, we demonstrate that the basic idea of the Incentives Balance Test can be interpreted as a test whether the specific IPRs of the dominant firm can be defended from the perspective of the economics of IPRs. This implies that Article 82 allows competition law to correct economically not optimal IPRs through a specific economic analysis. This is followed by a broad overview on theoretical and empirical insights from economics of IPRs, innovation economics and competition and network economics that can help to develop a more general and sophisticated Innovation Effects Test that can be applied in Article 82 refusal to license cases. (shrink)

Wille und Willensfreiheit sind ein heißes Thema, in der Gehirnforschung ebenso wie in der Philosophie. Wenn der Wille eine Folge biologischer Gehirnfunktionen ist und naturwissenschaftlich beschrieben werden kann, wie muss dann die Frage der ethischen Verantwortung des Einzelnen beantwortet werden? Für Wolfgang Seidel gehören biologisch bedingte Veränderungen auch des Gehirns zu den konkreten Erfahrungen aus der medizinischen Forschung und Praxis - wie auch die Erfahrung, dass nicht alle physiologischen Auswirkungen auf den einzelnen Menschen mit den Mitteln naturwissenschaftlichen Vorgehens kausal (...) absehbar sind. Sein Buch ist eine Kritik an dem alleinigen Erklärungsanspruch eines naturwissenschaftlichen Determinismus, der alles Denken und Verhalten in allen Details kausal aus der Gehirnforschung ableiten will. Seidels spannender alltagsphilosophischer Essay lädt zum entspannten Nachdenken über die Gehirnmechanismen und bewusste Entscheidungsfreiheit ein - wobei wir nebenbei erleben können, dass es letztlich keinen Unterschied macht, ob unser alltägliches Erleben des eigenen Wollens eine Illusion oder freier Wille ist - und dass unser Gehirn auch ethisch gut funktioniert. (shrink)

This paper is the most complete presentation of my views on deterministic causation. It develops the deterministic theory in perfect parallel to my theory of probabilistic causation and thus unites the two aspects. It also argues that the theory presented is superior to all regularity and all counterfactual theories of causation.

We are concerned with modal logics in the class EM0 of extensions of M0 . G denotes re exive frames. MG the modal logic on G in the sense of Kripke. M is nite if M = MG for some nite G. Finite G's will be drawn as framed diagrams, e.g. G = ! ; G = ! ; the latter shorter denoted by . EM0 is a complete lattice with zero M0 and one M . If M M0 M0 (...) is a succ of M. An ip of M is an immediate predecessor of M. E.g. M ! and M are the only ip's of M in ES4. M[P] denotes the extension of M adding P as a \new axiom", e.g. S4 = M0 [p ! p]. M is nitely axiomatizable if M = M0 [P] for some formula P. One easily shows if M is f.a. then each predecessor is separated from M by an ip of M. It is known that each nite M is f.a. and has only nitely many succ's all of which are nite. (shrink)

We show that one can solve Post's Problem by constructing generic sets in the usual set theoretic framework applied to tiny universes. This method leads to a new class of recursively enumerable sets: r.e. generic sets. All r.e. generic sets are low and simple and therefore of Turing degree strictly between 0 and 0'. Further they supply the first example of a class of low recursively enumerable sets which are automorphic in the lattice E of recursively enumerable sets with inclusion. (...) We introduce the notion of a promptly simple set. This describes the essential feature of r.e. generic sets with respect to automorphism constructions. (shrink)

Wittgenstein read and admired the work of John Henry Newman. Evidence suggests that from 1946 until 1951 Newman's Grammar of Assent was probably the single most important external stimulus for Wittgenstein's thought. In important respects Wittgenstein's reactions to G. E. Moore follow hints already given by Newman.

Das Allgemeine und das Einzelne. Das Eidos. 38 V. Die Einheit der Substanz. Leibniz' Monadologie. 45 VI. Philosophie als Letztbegründung. Das Absolute. VII. ...