In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges (...) a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy. (shrink)

An attempt top reconcile Dworkin with Hart's legal positivism.

An important Belgian avant-garde poet, Daive's investigations alternate between poetry, narration and reflective prose. In addition to translations of Daive's poetry, van Gerven Oei offers a lush presentation of Daive's poetry and its relationship to the production-analysis of signification.

This book develops a general theory of law, inclusive legal positivism, which seeks to remain within the tradition represented by authors such as Austin, Hart, MacCormick, and Raz, while sharing some of the virtues of both classical and modern theories of natural law, as represented by authors such as Aquinas, Fuller, Finnis, and Dworkin. Its central theoretical questions are: Does the existence or content of positive law ever depend on moral considerations? If so, is this fact consistent with legal positivism? (...) The author shows how inclusive positivism allows one to answer yes to both of these questions. In addition to articulating and defending his own version of legal positivism, which is a refinement and development of the views of H.L.A. Hart as expressed in his classic book The Concept of Law, the author clarifies the terms of current jurisprudential debates about the nature of law. These debates are often clouded by failures to appreciate that different theorists are offering differing kinds of theories and attempting to answer different questions. There is also a failure, principally on the part of Ronald Dworkin, to characterize opposing theories correctly. The clarity of Waluchow's work will help to remove the confusion which has hitherto marred some jurisprudential debate, particularly about Dworkin's work. (shrink)

In this paper I defend constitutional review against the charge that it neces- sarily runs afoul of democratic principle. In so doing, I draw both on Dworkin’s theory of constructive interpretation as well as Raz’s theory of detached normative statements and reasoning from a point of view. After arguing that constructive interpretation can be undertaken from a point of view other than that of the interpreter, I go on to argue for the following claims: (1) Constitutional interpretation and review can (...) be undertaken from the point of view of the democratic community and its constitutional morality; (2) This process can be undertaken by a judge without the deliberate intrusion of her own personal moral convictions; (3) When undertaken from this point of view, constitutional interpretation and review can be rendered consistent with democracy; and (4) This is so even when these activities require a good deal of substantive moral reasoning and argument on the part of judges. (shrink)

In his recent book, Harm to Others, Joel Feinberg addresses the question whether a person can be harmed after his or her own death, that is, whether posthumous harm is a logical possibility. There is a very strong tendency to suppose that harm to the dead is simply inconceivable. After all, there cannot be harm without a subject to be harmed, but when death occurs it appears to obliterate the subject thus excluding the possibility of harm. On the other hand, (...) there is an inclination to believe that harmful events can indeed occur posthumously. As Aristotle observed, “a dead man is popularly believed to be capable of having both good and ill fortune—honour and dishonour and prosperity and the loss of it among his children and descendants generally—in exactly the same way as if he were alive but unaware or unobservant of what was happening”. Feinberg sides with Aristotle on this issue and develops an intriguing theory purporting to show how posthumous harms are possible. My intention in this paper is to argue that Feinberg's account meets with such serious difficulties that we must either develop an alternative theory or agree with those who claim that death logically excludes the possibility of harm. I shall begin in §2 with a brief sketch of Feinberg's provocative theory. This will be followed in §3 by my comments and criticisms. Section 4 will close with suggestions about where Feinberg's account goes wrong and how it might be repaired. (shrink)

-/- In his rich and thoughtful paper, Richard Bellamy sketches a theory of individual rights that ascribes to them an inherently democratic character that “is best captured by a republican view of liberty as non-domination, rather than the standard liberal account of liberty as non-interference.” According to this view, “rights involve an implicit appeal to democratic forms of reasoning.” That is, the only justifiable “foundation of rights must be some form of ongoing democratic decision making that allows rights to be (...) claimed under conditions of political equality.” Bellamy uses this particular model of rights to defend a somewhat unique thesis concerning the legitimacy of judicial review under a constitutional charter or bill of rights (henceforth constitutional review). Many legal theorists question whether constitutional review can ever be rendered consistent with the theoretical and practical demands of democracy. According to these theorists, democracy embodies a form of self-rule whereby the members of a society establish and exercise legitimate authority over themselves. But self-rule seems seriously compromised once constitutional review enters the picture. Instead of having the people and their elected representatives setting the basic terms of social cooperation, we have instead a small group of elite, unelected, and unaccountable judges performing this vital task. Constitutional review empowers these individuals, in constitutional review cases, to substitute their own contestable views and preferences with respect to the basic terms of social cooperation for the duly considered views and preferences of the people and those whom they have duly elected to represent them. This is something one simply cannot tolerate in a democracy. (shrink)

This book assembles leading legal, political, and moral philosophers to examine the legacy of the work of Ronald Dworkin. They provide the most comprehensive critical treatment of Dworkin's accomplishments focusing on his work in all branches of philosophy, including his theory of value, political philosophy, philosophy of international law, and legal philosophy. The book's organizing principle and theme reflect Dworkin's self-conception as a builder of a unified theory of value, and the broad outlines of his system can be found throughout (...) the book. The first section addresses the most abstract and general aspect of Dworkin's work--the unity of value thesis. The second section explores Dworkin's contributions to political philosophy, and discusses a number of political concepts including authority, civil disobedience, the legitimacy of states and the international legal system, distributive justice, collective responsibility, and Dworkin's master value of dignity and the associated values of equal concern and respect. The third section addresses various aspects of Dworkin's general theory of law. The fourth and final section comprises accounts of the structure and defining values of discrete areas of law. (shrink)

The Dimensions of Ethics offers a concise but wide-ranging introduction to moral philosophy. In clear and engaging fashion, the author first examines the scope of ethical theory, and explores central metaethical questions such as the issue of relativism, and the relationship between morality and religion. He then turns to an exploration of five theoretical approaches, in each case providing a consideration of various objections that have been advanced as well as a sympathetic exposition of the core principles of each approach. (...) Throughout he uses a wide range of examples, and integrates references to issues in applied ethics with his discussions of ethical theory. (shrink)

A distinctively Canadian text which provides theory and practice in case studies. More on Milton Friedman's views, ethics and the professions, South Africa, the environment.

Part I The Unity of Value -- A hedgehog's unity of value / Joseph Raz -- Part II Political Values : Legitimacy, Authority, and Collective Responsibility -- Political resistance for hedgehogs / Candice Delmas -- Ronald Dworkin, state consent, and progressive cosmopolitanism / Thomas Christiano -- To fill or not to fill individual responsibility gaps? / Franðcois Tanguay-Renaud -- Inheritance and hypothetical insurance / Daniel Halliday -- Part III General Jurisprudence : Contesting the Unity of Law and Value -- Putting (...) law in its place / Lawrence G. Sager -- Dworkin and unjust law / David Dyzenhaus -- The grounds of law / Luâis Duarte d'Almeida -- Immodesty in Dworkin's theory : the lines dividing different kinds of conceptual theory of law / Kenneth Einar Himma -- Imperialism and importance in Dworkin's jurisprudence / Michael Giudice -- A theory of legal obligation / Christopher Essert -- Part IV Value in Law -- Originalism and constructive interpretation / David O. Brink -- Was Dworkin an originalist? / Lawrence A. Alexander -- The moral reading of constitutions / Connie S. Rosati -- Authority, intention, and interpretation / Aditi Bagchi -- Concern and respect in procedural law / Hamish Stewart. (shrink)

Courts are sometimes called upon to review a law or some other official act of government to determine its constitutionality, its reasonableness, rationality, or its compatibility with fundamental principles of justice. In some jurisdictions, this power of judicial review includes the ability to ‘strike down’ or nullify a law duly passed by a legislature body. This article examines this practice and various criticisms of it, including the charge that it is fundamentally undemocratic. The focus is on the powerful critique mounted (...) by Jeremy Waldron, the foremost philosophical opponent of judicial review. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend H. L. A. Hart against two prevalent criticisms of his views on social rules and the obligations with which these rules are often associated. These criticisms, I argue, rely on misunderstandings ormischaracterizations of what Hart actually intended. These misunderstandings are plausibly explained by a failure on the part of his critics to appreciate fully two of the valuable lessons Hart sought to communicate in his inaugural lecture. First, words like ‘rule’ and ‘obligation’ should not be (...) removed from their various contexts of use and subjected to abstract philosophical definition and analysis. Second, when analyzing assertions in which such words figure in both legal practice and theory, it is crucial to bear in mind the different functions these assertions can be made to serve and the different purposes to which they can be putResumen:En este ensayo el autor defiende a H. L. A. Hart de dos críticas recurrentes a su teoría de las normas sociales y a las obligaciones que regularmente acompañan a estas normas. Ambas críticas, sostiene el autor, descansan sobre malos entendidos o caracterizaciones equivocadas de lo que Hart en realidad se propuso. Estos malentendidos son explicados plausiblemente a través de la falta de capacidad de los críticos de apreciar plenamente dos de las valiosas lecciones que Hart deseaba expresar en su lectura inaugural. En primer lugar, palabras como “norma” y “obligación” no deberían ser sacadas de sus distintos contextos de uso para someterlas a definiciones abstractas y al análisis filosófico. En segundo lugar, cuando se analizan enunciados en los cuales figuran tales palabras, tanto en la teoría como en la práctica del derecho, resulta primordial tener en mente las diversas funciones que esos enunciados puedan tener y los diferentes propósitos para los cuáles esos enunciados fueron proferidos. (shrink)

This paper is an exploration of the concept equal value as it applies to pay equity. Following a brief discussion of several standard objections to pay equity legislation, the paper considers a number of different criteria which are employed in determining equal value or worth. Two in particular are isolated for extended discussion: the desert and the contribution criteria. The paper concludes with a major concern about the phrase equal value to the employer. This concern becomes pressing once the desert (...) and contribution criteria are distinguished. (shrink)