In this paper I discuss how descriptive studies of science, increasingly emphasised by philosophers of science, can be used to test normative theories of science. I claim that we can use cases of scientific practice as counter examples; if the practice of a given scientist can be shown to be justified and it diverges from the prescriptions of a scientific theory then the theory should be rejected. This approach differs from those offered by previous philosophers (...) of science and at the same time brings the philosophy of science more into line with other areas of philosophy. (shrink)

The meta-scientific investigation of the various kinds of influence which determine both the establishment of the cultural institution of science and criteria governing its internal operations, including criteria of the concepts of cognition has been termed by Professor Jürgen Habermas as the critical theory of science. The five-fold thesis of his theory treats of what he considers to be the extrascientific interests which determine and accompany our traditional concepts of knowledge as characterized by science. The (...) development of the theses is preceded by his analysis of the faults of "positivist methodology" in which, he argues, distinctions such as that between facts and values are based upon fundamental confusions concerning inerradicable and pervasive practical concerns in terms of which the concepts of cognition are ultimately founded. He identifies the three all-embracing knowledge-guiding interests or concerns as the cognitive interest which determines logical and empirical categories, the practical interest which determines the character of human understanding within the cultural sciences, and the emancipatory interest which determines our concept for freedom and autonomy. The arguments for the critical theory are here analyzed and criticized in terms of their logical shortcomings, while the claims made in favor of the critical theory are found to be based upon inerradicable and pervaisive confusions concerning logical consistency in argumentation. The final section summarizes, moralizes, and speculates upon the criticalness of the critical theory. (shrink)

With his influence on the development of physiology, physics and geometry, Hermann von Helmholtz – like few scientists of the second half of the 19th century – is representative of the research in natural science in Germany. The development of his understanding of science is not less representative. Until the late sixties, he emphatically claimed the truth of science; later on, he began to see the conditions for the validity of scientific knowledge in relative terms, and this (...) can, in summary, be referred to as hypothesizing. Already in the past century, HeImholtz made first approaches to an understanding of science, which were incompatible with his own former position and which pointed to the modern age to an astonishingly large extent. A comparison with Karl R. Popper's logic of research will illustrate how closely he nevertheless approached modern understanding of science. In Popper's logic of research, hypothesizing of scientific knowledge is definitely much more advanced than in Helmholtz's theory of science. What begins vaguely to emerge with Helmholtz has already become an explicitly formulated programme with Popper. Although HeImholtz and Popper are not on a direct line of epistemological development and Popper refers to HeImholtz only rarely and casually, there are in fact surprising points of contact which have not been taken notice of so far and which appear above all if one looks at Helmholtz's understanding of science against the background of Popper's logic of research. (shrink)

Summary A survey of recent work in the philosophy of science in Finland, with a bibliography. The main sources of influence emphasized are Eino Kaila (1890–1958) and G. H. von Wright (b. 1916). The main topics covered are: induction and probability; information and explanation; the acceptance and application of theories; the role of auxiliary (theoretical) terms; measurement; general methodology of social and behavioral sciences; finalistic explanation; methodology of sociology and history.

Whenever an adequate theory is found in science, we will still be left with two questions: why this theory rather than some other theory, and how should this theory be interpreted? I argue that these questions can be answered by a theory of system relations. The basic idea is that fundamental characteristics of systems, viz. those arising from the general systemic nature of those systems, cannot be comprehended with the aid of discipline-specific methods. The (...) systems theory required should commence with an analysis of the qualitatively different relations possible between systems, because it is precisely the nature of those relations that determines the basic structures of systems. That the theory of the fundamental system relations and their ontological and epistemological implications is indeed able to provide the answers sought is demonstrated in theoretical physics and Plessner's analysis of the basic structures of plant, animal and human being. (shrink)

Cassandra Pinnick and George Gale (Journal for General Phisophy of Science 31, 109–125) examined the post-Lakatos period of historical cum philosophical case studies and concluded that a new methodology is required. Lakatos' proposed ‘history2’ (the theory- and value-laden reconstruction of history1, the set of historical events) was criticised. Recently a group of scholars have been pursuing a methodology which could be described as history 3, a history1 account of the interaction between the significant scientific papers published during the (...) time period in question and their scientific audience. (shrink)

Galileo's Philosophy of Science - or: Contra Feyerabend. In analyzing Galileo's methodology, philosophers of science were using, misusing, and abusing his ideas rather unashamedly to suit their own purposes. Like so many others before him, Paul Feyerabend had come to the conclusion that his methodological ideas might gain momentum by demonstrating their compatibility with those of Galileo. The reinterpretation of Galileo as a true, though disguised, anarchist, was considered by Feyerabend as the most forceful, and indeed conclusive, case (...) against rationalism in methodology which might be conceived in view of the privileged position ascribed to Galileo by both philosophers which might be conceived in view of the privileged position ascribed to Galileo by both philosophers and historians of science. The paper argues - against Feyerabend - that Galileo was not a methodological anarchist, neither in theory nor in practice. He had firm methodological convictions that remained basically the same throughout his entire career. In his view, essential and accidental causes of phenomena were not given by experience. Although mathematical and geometrical analysis was needed to discriminate between them, experience and experiment was considered by Galileo from his middle periode on as a means to identify among the set of explanations, demonstrable "ex suppositione" as being mathematically correct, those which could in addition be applied to reality. Thus, Galileo was neither an inductivist nor a naive falsificationist, nor a Copernican zealot adapting his methodology to the needs of his presumed fight for heliocentrism, come what be. Only after the reconstruction of mechanics was in a fairly advanced stage, and after his own telescopic observations had provided independent evidence in favor of the new astronomy, Galileo was in a position to appreciate the Copernican system as a most forceful ally in his fight for the recognition of his physical achievements. Through the end of his life, his view of the heliocentric system remained rather traditional in adhering firmly to the principles of epicyclic and circular motion, as far as the heavens were concerned. (shrink)

This anthology of selections from the works of noted philosophers affords the student an immediate contact with the unique historical background of the philosophy of science. The selections, many of which have not been readily accessible, follow the development of the philosophy of science from 1786 to 1927. Each selection is preceded by a brief introduction by the editor designed to familiarize the reader with a particular philosopher and provide insights into his work. Joseph J. Kockelmans divides the (...) selections into several sections. Part 1, from 17861850, includes chapters by Immanuel Kant, on the metaphysical foundations of natural science, John Frederick William Herschel, on experience and the analysis of phenomena, William Whewell, on the nature and conditions of inductive science, and John Stuart Mill, on induction and the law of universal causation; part 2, from 18701899, includes chapters by Hermann Von Helmholtz, on the origin and significance of geometrical axioms, William Stanley Jevons, on the philosophy of inductive inference, John Bernard Stallo, on the kinetic theory of gasses and the conditions of the validity of scientific hypotheses, Ernst Mach, on the economical nature of physical inquiry, Karl Pearson, on perceptual and conceptual space, Emile Boutroux, on mechanical laws, Heinrich Hertz, on the appropriateness, correctness, and permissibility of scientific theories, and Ludwig Boltzmann, on the fundamental principles and basic equations of mechanics. The third part, covering the first decade of the twentieth century, includes chapters by Henri Jules Poincare, on science and reality, Charles Peirce, on Induction, Pierre Marie Duhem, on the laws of physics, William Ostwald, on energetism and mechanics, Emile Meyerson, on identity of thought and nature as the final goal of science, Ernst Cassirer, on functional concepts of natural science; part 4, from 19101927, includes chapters by Charles Dunbar Broad, on phenomenalism, Alfred North Whitehead, on time, space, and material, Bertrand Russell, on the world of physics and the world of sense, Norman Robert Cambbell, on the meaning of science, Moritz Schlick, on basic issues of the philosophy of natural science, and Percy Williams Bridgman, on the concepts of space, time, and causality. Philosophy of Science provides a concise single volume text to the discipline and enables students to understand and evaluate the various trends in our contemporary philosophy of science. Joseph J. Kockelmans is professor emeritus of philosophy at the Pennsylvania State Univers. (shrink)

This article sketches descriptive and normative components of a theory of ethical value. The normative component, which receives the lion’s share of attention, is developed by adapting Laudan’s levels of scientific discourse. The resulting levels of ethical discourse can be critically addressed through the use of inductive inference, falsification, and causal inference. These techniques are likewise appropriate to the corresponding levels of scientific discourse.

This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of (...) science as practice and culture. A unifying theme of the survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new directions. (shrink)

Summary A sketch is given of a way of looking at science. Research is viewed as a complex of cognitive processes with a theoretical and experimental sides. A distinction is made between context of discovery and context of presentation. In the latter paragons of science come into play. From this platform the theory of research of Christian Huygens is examined, in its contemporary situation between Baconian empiricism and Cartesian rationalism, and in connection with Galileo's outlook on method. (...) Huygens' attitude on legitimating the results of his research production is also examined. The paper employs a method of case study, which is also discusses. (shrink)

Attention to criticism and growth! It appears Aristotle had a dialectical method with two main phases: a) doxographic induction — a form of re-collecting ideas of previous generations; it is related to Plato'sanamnesis. b) organisation of knowledge by classification (taxonomy); it is natural in view of Aristotle's organismic outlook. Against common misconceptions: Aristotle was not anti-empirical, nor anti-critical (dogmatic). Doxographic induction is a prime example of critical and “empirical” methodology. Against Popper: Aristotle's subscription to the ideal of certainty(episteme) is not (...) the main source of dogmatism in the Aristotelian paradigm. A theory of science has to take cognizance of social settings, how these support or repress critical dialectical method. Against Feyerabend: Galileo's use of re-collection (methodological anamnesis) in his dialogues is not trick persuasion; it is a continaution of an old method, viz., doxographic induction. Granted that it has always had persuasive as well as other psychological aspects. It serves the double function of giving clues, and leading the mind into the frame of a paradigm. Finally, it is proposed that theory of science and classical scholarship must sometimes call on each other, just like theory of science and history of science. (shrink)

It is the purpose of this paper to represent an analysis of four variants of critical philosophy of science: the constructivistic methodology, the reflexion upon science from the viewpoint of the critical theory of society, the ‘social natural science’ as a further development of the finalization conception, and the projective philosophy of science. Special attention is paid to the comparison of these variants. Some points of convergence as well as of divergence among them are revealed. (...) A common shortcoming is indicated. (shrink)

A sketch is given of a way of looking at science. Research is viewed as a complex of cognitive processes with theoretical and experimental sides. A distinction is made between context of discovery and context of presentation. In the latter "paragons of science" come into play. From this platform the "theory of research" of Christian Huygens is examined, in its contemporary situation between Baconian empiricism and Cartesian rationalism, and in connection with Galileo's outlook on method. Huygens' attitude (...) on legitimating the results of his research production is also examined. The paper employs a method of case study, which is also discussed. (shrink)

Norwegian philosophy of science right after the war was empiricistic, scientistic, rather undogmatic and heavily dominated by Arne Næss. The positivistic conception of science has been severely criticized in the last two decades, and the attempts to find viable alternatives have led to a broadening of the perspective, philosophically as well as scientifically. This survey tries to map the main lines of that development. After an account of the rise and fall of Næss' programme for a behaviouristic (...) class='Hi'>theory of science, we outline first the development of the internal philosophical critique and then the parallel story on the social science scene. (shrink)

Eine soziale Wissenschaftstheorie schlägt einen Ausweg aus den aktuellen Kontroversen in der Wissenschaftsforschung vor, der erfordert: a) den nicht unabhängigen Charakter der Wissenschaftsphilosophie anzuerkennen; b) den erkenntnistheoretischen Status der Naturwissenschaften als einziges Erkenntnisideal zu überdenken; c) sich auf der Suche nach einer neuen methodischen Erfahrungauf die Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften zu konzentrieren; d) aufzuhören, Fallstudien als Version der ‚neutralen Sprache der Beobachtung‘ oder als ‚entscheidende Rechtfertigung‘ einer Theorie zu betrachten; und e) die Erklärungskraft der lokalen Kontextualisierung mit der Projektion und (...) Konstruktion zukünftiger Wirkungskontexte wissenschaftlicher Ideen zu verbinden. Die Hinwendung zur Sozialität ordnet die Wissenschaftsforschung keiner Doktrin unter; sie ist vielmehr ein ökumenischer Appell zur Maximierung philosophischer Sensibilität und Offenheit. (shrink)

Edinburgh School's theory of natural rationality, enunciated to render symmetrical explanation plausible, thereby providing support for its relativism, is presented and evaluated. I have endeavoured to demonstrate that there are gross misinterpretations of Hesse's theory of science, network model, and her conceptions of classification of objects and of universals; that Edinburgh School's theory of natural rationality suffers from a considerable area of ignorance concerning its foundation. I have further shown that not only the theory is (...) not descriptive of the actuality of people's reasoning, but it in fact is normatively laden. Even if these problems can be overcome, I have shown that it ultimately does not render all beliefs equivalent insofar as rationality status is concerned, and hence symmetrical explanation will still not be possible. Concerning the Edinburgh School's interest theory, I have argued that there are some incoherencies in the proposed positions; and that even if these are rectified the resulting theory leads to grotesque absurdities. (shrink)

Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an (...) analysis of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force as a weapon against incommensurability. (shrink)

A combination of process and counterfactual theories of causation is proposed with the aim of preserving the strengths of each of the approaches while avoiding their shortcomings. The basis for the combination, or hybrid, view is the need, common to both accounts, of imposing a stability requirement on the causal relation.

The aim of this paper is to provide a characterization of ability theories of practice and, in this process, to defend Pierre Bourdieu’s ability theory against Stephen Turner’s objections. In part I, I outline ability theorists’ conception of practices together with their objections to claims about rule following and rule explanations. In part II, I turn to the question of what ability theorists take to be the alternative to rule following and rule explanations. Ability theorists have offered, and been (...) ascribed, somewhat different answers to this question, just as their replies, or positive accounts, have been heavily criticized by Turner. Due to this state of the debate, I focus on the positive account advanced by a single—and highly famous—ability theorist of practice, Pierre Bourdieu. Moreover, I show that despite Turner’s claims to the contrary, his arguments do not refute Bourdieu’s positive account. (shrink)

A monist theory of explanation is one that seeks a common definition for all speech acts answering why-questions. One recent example is the counterfactual theory of explanation, which assumes that an ideal explanation can be characterized by the familiar Hempelian criteria for a scientific explanation plus a certain counterfactual that is supported by the laws mentioned in the explanans. I show that the CTE fails. My discussion leads to a critique of the CTE’s key concept of counterfactual dependence (...) and to the suggestion of an alternative: For an argument to be a scientific explanation, a certain necessary-condition claim must be true. For an answer to a why-question to be an explanation, it must express a certain necessary condition. (shrink)

Researchers in cultural evolutionary theory have recently proposed the foundation of a new field of research in cultural evolution named ‘epistemic evolution’. Drawing on evolutionary epistemology’s early studies, this programme aims to study science as an evolutionary cultural process. The paper discusses the way CET’s study of science can contribute to the philosophical debate and, vice versa, how the philosophy of science can benefit from the adoption of a cultural evolutionary perspective. Here, I argue that CET’s (...) main contribution to an evolutionary model of scientific growth comes from the application of ‘population thinking’ to science. Populationism offers a ‘variation based’ understanding of scientists’ epistemic and socio-epistemic criteria that is able to better accommodate the variegated preferences that intervene in scientific epistemic decisions. A discussion of the so called theory choice context is offered as an example of the way a populationist approach can shed new light on the operation of scientists’ epistemic choices. (shrink)

This paper offers a refutation of J. C. Pinto de Oliveira's recent critique of revisionist Carnap scholarship as giving undue weight to two brief letters to Kuhn expressing his interest in the latter's work. First an argument is provided to show that Carnap and Kuhn are by no means divided by a radical mismatch of their conceptions of the rationality of science as supposedly evidenced by their stance towards the distinction of the contexts of discovery and justification. This is (...) followed by an argument to the effect that the fact that Carnap's own work concentrated on formal aspects of scientific theories does not licence the conclusion that he thought historical investigations and concerns irrelevant for what we nowadays would rightly call "philosophy of science". (shrink)

There is a need to bring about a revolution in the philosophy of science, interpreted to be both the academic discipline, and the official view of the aims and methods of science upheld by the scientific community. At present both are dominated by the view that in science theories are chosen on the basis of empirical considerations alone, nothing being permanently accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Biasing choice of theory in the (...) direction of simplicity, unity or explanatory power does not permanently commit science to the thesis that nature is simple or unified. This current ‘paradigm’ is, I argue, untenable. We need a new paradigm, which acknowledges that science makes a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, theories being chosen partly on the basis of compatibility with these assumptions. Eleven arguments are given for favouring this new ‘paradigm’ over the current one. (shrink)

The theory of fiction is systematically locatedbetween different types of discourse, of which philosophy, literary criticism and psychology/psychoanalysis are perhaps the most important. Mythesis is thatempiricist, mainly British philosophical approaches provide fascinatinghistorical models for an analysis of the situation in which we seem caught today between tendencies towards panfictionalization (since Vaihinger) and towards fairly rigid distinctions between fiction and reality. In my perspective, empiricist philosophy is not so much concerned with what isgiven, but with thecontrol of distinctions between the (...) real and the imaginary under complex social conditions. In that sense, it constitutes striking anticipations of present discussions in evolutionary epistemology, cultural anthropology and psychoanalysis. Here the question is whether we can replace the semantics of fiction and reality by a series of distinctions between the experience of what might be called concrete and what might be called abstract. (shrink)

This paper gives a survey of the philosophy of science in Finland during the two decades 1970-90. Topics covered include the background (earlier studies by Eino Kaila, G. H. von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka), the main areas of research (inductive logic, probability, truthlikeness, scientific theory, theory change, scientific realism, explanation and action, foundations of special disciplines), and the cultural impact of science studies.

What is commonly known as neo-Kantianism is in fact a philosophical movement comprising many philosophers and different approaches. This movement established itself in the 1870s and dominated the philosophical developments and debates until the 1930s. The label ‘neo-Kantianism’ or ‘critical philosophy’ is unanimously and unquestionably applied to the Marburg School—whose main representatives are Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer—and the Southwest German School, also called the Baden School or Heidelberg School—whose protagonists are Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask, Jonas (...) Cohn and Bruno Bauch. Although these two schools represent what may be called the main theories of neo-Kantian philosophy, there has always been discussion about the main features of neo-Kantianism and the philosophers fitting this label. Even the view that the Marburg and the Southwest German Schools are the essential r .. (shrink)

We argue that inductive analysis and operational assessment of the scientific process can be justifiably and fruitfully brought together, whereby the citation metrics used in the operational analysis can effectively track the inductive dynamics and measure the research efficiency. We specify the conditions for the use of such inductive streamlining, demonstrate it in the cases of high energy physics experimentation and phylogenetic research, and propose a test of the method’s applicability.

A general theory of acts leads to a theory of cognition distinguishing between formation of apriorical knowledge about values, norms, and cognitive beliefs, based on conditioning by means of rewards and punishments, and formation of aposteriorical knowledge based on conscious, theoretical analysis of observations. The latter, rational layer of consciousness can be built on the former, irrational layer only, if certain conditions are fulfilled. It is shown that rational cognition of values presupposes a notion of aposteriorical value, which (...) challenges some conventions of the 'value-free' social science, in particular, the so called guillotine of Hume. (shrink)

The developmental trend in many fields of contemporary science is toward integrated general theories. These trends are viewed as essential components of the nature of science rather than expressions of arbitrary preferences of scientists. The law-like factors which lead science toward reliance on general theories include empirical as well as rational components. A model is proposed which exhibits the balance of the relevant factors as calling for increasing use of theories the primitive terms of which are progressively (...) more abstract and general, though no less precise and empirically adequate. (shrink)

Fundamentismus und Skeptizismus-Anarchismus sind zwei entgegengesetzte Positionen in der traditionellen Erkenntnistheorie und in der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie. Zwischen ihnen gibt es einen dritten Standpunkt, den Evolutionismus. Beispiele sind zwei neuere Arbeiten von Putnam und Stegmüller . Im Gegensatz zum logisch-statischen Fundamentismus berücksichtigt der Evolutionismus auch dynamische und naturalistische Ansätze. Stegmüller folgend entlehnen wir in der vorliegenden Untersuchung aus der Sprachphilosophie pragmatische Gesichtspunkte, um die logische Syntax und Semantik, die Werkzeuge des Fundamentismus, zu ersetzen. Wir zeigen die Kraft der Pragmatik bei (...) der Behandlung von Problemen wie Erkenntniswachstum, Begriffswechsel, Theorien- und Bedeutungsdynamik, wissenschaftliche Entdeckung und besonders beim Problem der Inkommensurabilität. Unser nicht-fundamentistischer Vorschlag ist ein heuristisches Modell, das auf der modernen genetischen Theorie basiert. (shrink)

In a way similar to classical mechanics where we have the concept of inertial time as expressed in the motions of bodies, in the theory of relativity we can regard the inertial time as the only notion of time at play. The inertial time is expressed also in the propagation of light. This gives rise to a notion of clock—the light clock, which we can regard as a notion derived from the inertial time. The light clock can be seen (...) as a solution of the theory, which complies with the requirement that a clock to be so must have a rate that is independent from its past history. Contrary to Einstein’s view, we do not need the concept of “clock” as an independent concept. This implies, in particular, that we do not need to rely on the notions of atomic clock or atomic time in the theory of relativity. (shrink)

We review publications in automated scientific discovery using deep learning, with the aim of shedding light on problems with strong connections to philosophy of science, of physics in particular. We show that core issues of philosophy of science, related, notably, to the nature of scientific theories; the nature of unification; and of causation loom large in scientific deep learning. Therefore, advances in deep learning could, and ideally should, have impact on philosophy of science, and vice versa. We (...) suggest lines of further research, and highlight the role ‘theory-based’ AI could have in future developments of the field. (shrink)

Professor Schurz has written a book that is ambitious in both scope and aims. It begins with an introductory chapter on the historical development and general aims of the philosophy of science itself, moves on to issues associated with establishing a basis for a unified approach to science, with extensive consideration of the conceptual toolkit required, then takes us through chapters on laws and empirical testing, the empirical evaluation of theories more generally, including issues of realism and empiricism, (...) before concluding with an extensive and technically detailed account of causation and explanation. Chapters are divided into core and ‘complementary and advanced’ topics—so, ‘Methodological Features of Scientific Theories’ is included under the former, whereas ‘Instrumentalism and Realism—The Ontology of Scientific Theories’ is placed in the latter—and relevant case studies go beyond the usual run of examples from physics to include Piaget’s Theory of Cognitive Development .. (shrink)

In the wake of recent attempts at alternate history (Bowler 2013), this paper suggests several avenues for a pluralistic approach to Charles Darwin and his role in the history of evolutionary theory. We examine in what sense Darwin could be described as a major driver of theoretical change in the history of biology. First, this paper examines how Darwin influenced the future of biological science: not merely by stating the fact of evolution or by bringing evidence for it; (...) but by discovering natural selection, and giving it pre-eminence over any other mechanism for evolution; and also by proposing a masterful and quite unique synthesis of many scientific fields. Contrasting Darwin’s views with those of A.R. Wallace, I conclude that “natural selection” is clearly an original contribution, that it had no forerunners or co-discoverers, and could barely have appeared after Darwin conceived of it. This specificity of Darwin’s contribution is an invitation to be strongly presentist (Loison 2016) and to adopt only weak counter-factuals. In contrast, there are possible ways to use strong counter-factuals as attempts to “pluralize” the history of biological theory: i.e. imagine new possible avenues for the development of evolutionary biology. The idea that evolution was a theory “in the air” suggests that evolutionary theory could have developed in a world without Darwin, especially if we accept to delete not only “Darwin” but “England”. France and Germany are examined as possible countries where evolutionary ideas would have thrived even with no contribution from the English scientists. Finally, the paper suggests another counter-factual hypothesis: deleting not Darwin and his Origin but the Darwin Industry itself. This may allow us to read the Origin of Species with fresh eyes and to discover Darwin’s life-long interest in variation and its laws, as many of his early readers did. (shrink)

Charles Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science is an early work in the philosophy of science and the official birthplace of pragmatism. It contains Peirce’s two most influential papers: “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” as well as discussions on the theory of probability, the ground of induction, the relation between science and religion, and the logic of abduction. Unsatisfied with the result and driven by a constant, almost feverish urge (...) to improve his work, Peirce spent considerable time and effort revising these papers. After the turn of the century these efforts gained significant momentum when Peirce sought to establish his role in the development of pragmatism while distancing himself from the more popular versions that had become current. The present edition brings together the original series as it appeared in Popular Science Monthly and a selection of Peirce’s later revisions, many of which remained hidden in the mass of messy manuscripts that were left behind after his death in 1914. (shrink)

This edition provides the first complete English translation of Bernard Bolzano's four-volume Wissenschaftslehre or Theory of Science, a masterwork of theoretical philosophy. First published in 1837, the Wissenschaftslehre is a monumental, wholly original study in logic, epistemology, heuristics, and scientific methodology. Unlike most logical studies of the period, it is not concerned with the "psychological self-consciousness of the thinking mind." Instead, it develops logic as the science of "propositions in themselves" and their parts, especially the relations between (...) these entities. It offers, for the first time in the history of logic, a viable definition of consequence, and a novel view of probability. Giving constant attention to Bolzano's predecessors and contemporaries, with particular emphasis on Kant, this richly documented work is also a valuable source for the history of logic and philosophy. (shrink)

Kant's theory of arithmetic is not only a central element in his theoretical philosophy but also an important contribution to the philosophy of arithmetic as such. However, modern mathematics, especially non-Euclidean geometry, has placed much pressure on Kant's theory of mathematics. But objections against his theory of geometry do not necessarily correspond to arguments against his theory of arithmetic and algebra. The goal of this article is to show that at least some important details in Kant's (...) theory of arithmetic can be picked up, improved by reconstruction and defended under a contemporary perspective: the theory of numbers as products of rule following construction presupposing successive synthesis in time and the theory of arithmetic equations, sentences or "formulas"—as Kant says—as synthetic a priori. In order to do so, two calculi in terms of modern mathematics are introduced which formalise Kant's theory of addition as a form of synthetic operation. (shrink)

In this ground-breaking new text, Patrick Baert analyses the central perspectives in the philosophy of social science, critically investigating the work of Durkheim, Weber, Popper, critical realism, critical theory, and Rorty's neo pragmatism. Places key writers in their social and political contexts, helping to make their ideas meaningful to students. Shows how these authors’ views have practical uses in empirical research. Lively approach that makes complex ideas understandable to upper-level students, as well as having scholarly appeal.

This paper reconsiders the relation between Kantian transcendental reflection and 20th century philosophy of science. As has been pointed out by Michael Friedman and others, the notion of a "relativized a priori" played a central role in Rudolf Carnap's, Hans Reichenbach's and other logical empiricists' thought. Thus, even though the logical empiricists dispensed with Kantian synthetic a priori judgments, they did maintain a crucial Kantian doctrine, viz., a distinction between the level of establishing norms for empirical inquiry and the (...) level of norm-governed inquiry itself. Even though Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is often taken to be diametrically opposed to the received view of science inherited from logical empiricism, a version of this basically Kantian distinction is preserved in Kuhn's thought. In this respect, as Friedman has argued, Kuhn is closer to Carnap's theory of linguistic frameworks than, say, W.V. Quine's holistic naturalism. Kuhn, indeed, might be described as a "new Kant" in post-empiricist philosophy of science. This article examines, first, the relativization of the Kantian a priori in Reichenbach's work, arguing that while Reichenbach criticized "transcendentalism", he nevertheless retained, in a reinterpreted form, a Kantian-like transcendental method, claiming that the task of philosophy is to discover and analyze the presuppositions underlying the applicability of conceptual systems. Then, some reflections on Kuhn's views on realism are offered, and it is suggested that Kuhn can be reinterpreted as a Kantian transcendental idealist. Given the central importance of Kuhnian themes in contemporary philosophy of science, it is no exaggeration to claim that Kantian transcendental inquiry into the constitutive principles of empirical knowledge, and even transcendental idealism, still have a crucial role to play in this field and deserve further scrutiny. (shrink)

Theory‐of‐mind (ToM) is an integral part of social cognition, but how it develops remains a critical question. There is evidence that children can gain insight into ToM through experience, including language training and explanatory interactions. But this still leaves open the question of how children gain these insights—what processes drive this learning? We propose that analogical comparison is a key mechanism in the development of ToM. In Experiment 1, children were shown true‐ and false‐belief scenarios and prompted to engage (...) in multiple comparisons (e.g., belief vs. world). In Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3, children saw a series of true‐ and false‐belief events, varying in order and in their alignability. Across these experiments, we found that providing support for comparing true‐ and false‐belief scenarios led to increased performance on false‐belief tests. These findings show that analogical comparison can support ToM learning. (shrink)

French mathematician Michel Chasles, a staunch defender of pure geometrical methods, is now mostly remembered as the author of the Aperçu historique. In this book, he retraced the history of geometry in order to expound epistemological theses on what constitutes a virtuous practice of geometry. Amongst these stands out the assertion that the values of generality and simplicity in mathematics are intimately connected. In this paper, we flesh out this claim by analysing Chasles’s geometrical solutions to the century-old problem of (...) the attraction of the ellipsoids. We show how these solutions echo Chasles’s evaluation of the relative strengths of geometrical and analytical methods, and how they embody a set of normative rules for the geometer’s practice whose observance Chasles deemed necessary and sufficient for the development of general methods and theories. (shrink)

Some of the problem areas in which British philosophers of science have recently been engaged are described and some of the major contributions noted. Two sets of problems are given special attention: one concerned with the analysis of probability statements and one concerned with the appraisal of scientific theories. Three traditions in the approach to this second set of problems are distinguished. These might be called the Carnapian, the Popperian and the Wittgensteinian traditions.

Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Theologie und Philosophie ist so alt wie das Christentum. Im Mittelalter wurde der Streit weitgehend zugunsten der Theologie entschieden. Die Philosophie, verstanden als Metaphysik, wurde ancilla theologiae, Magd der Theologie. Im Zeitalter der Aufklärung drehte sich jedoch der Spieß um, die Theologie wurde nun zur Magd der Philosophie. Später, unter dem wachsenden Einfluss der empirischen Wissenschaften und der Technik, verlor die Philosophie ihren metaphysischen Charakter und wurde weitgehend eine Theorie der Wissenschaften, die schließlich in einer Selbstkritik des (...) empirisch-wissenschaftlichen Denkens überhaupt gipfelte. Diese letzte Entwicklung wird in dem folgenden Artikel skizziert. Es wird gezeigt, wie gegenwärtig Theologen, die diese Entwicklung nicht erkannt haben und von einem heute überholten Wissenschaftsbegriff ausgehen, immer noch versuchen, ihn mit dem theologischen Denken zu versöhnen. So werden sie mehr und mehr gezwungen, das, was sie für einen »dogmatischen Ballast« halten, über Bord zu werfen mit der Folge, dass sie das Wesen der christlichen Offenbarung weitgehend verfremden.The struggle between theology and philosophy is as old as Christianity. In the middle age this struggle ended in favour of theology. Philosophy, understood as metaphysics, was called ancilla theologiae. However, in the age of enlightenment the tables were turned: Now, theology became the ancilla of philosophy. Later, under the growing influence of the empirical sciences and technology, philosophy lost its metaphysical character and widely became a theory of sciences which culminated in self-criticism of scientific thinking. Now, this last development will be sketched in the following article. It will be shown how at present theologians who ignore this development and proceed from an antiquated concept of science still try to reconcile it with theological thinking. Thereby, they are more and more compelled to throw off what is deemed to be »dogmatic ballast« with the consequence that they alienate the essence of christian revelation. (shrink)

It is getting increasingly difficult to comprehend the history of ideas of the Vienna Circle and only a clear and critical exposition of it will save it from total oblivion; an apologetic presentation will not be understood. Now that the positivist theory of meaning is no longer accepted, only an honest presentation of this fact will enable us to comprehend it and its transformations. An analysis of a paper by Otto Neurath illustrates this: Neurath's inability to present fairly his (...) critics' ideas and to do them justice then, makes him incomprehensible to us now. (shrink)

Imagination can be seen 1) as a mental faculty common to all people to some degree and 2) as an important principle in literary theory. We must think of imagination not as a simple power but a complex series of processes, involving the impression-idea-relationship and memory. The data derived thus are still bound to their epistemological context, and only imagination provides the possibility to transcend the space-time-determination and the cause-effect-relationship, so that it allows a freer display of the sense-data. (...) This structural and functional analysis of imagination tries to show its immense importance in everyday-life as well as in literary production and reception. (shrink)