Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism. (The latter is, approximately, the view that there is such a thing as knowledge of the extemal world in general, which the skeptic can take as a target). I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the (...) sort of situation the skeptic describes (e.g. having one’s brain manipulated by deceitful experimenters). This point can be upheld without embracing any substantial foundationalist tenet, such as the existence of basic beliefs, the availabiIity of something “given,” or the epistemic priority of experience. As to “epistemological realism,” I find that Williams has offered no principled way to distinguish between ordinary chaIIenges to knowledge and skeptical challenges which, supposedly, have no cIaim on our concem. (shrink)

Review of Don Ihde's TECHNOLOGY AND THE LIFEWORLD and William Leiss's UNDER TECHNOLOGY'S THUMB.

Professor Vogel claims that my responses to scepticism leave the traditional problems standing. I argue in reply that he fails to take sufficiently seriously the diagnostic character of my enterprise. My aim is not to offer direct refutations of sceptical arguments, taking such arguments at face value, but to undermine their plausibility by revealing their dependence on unacknowledged and contentious theoretical presuppositions. Professor Rorty is much more sympathetic to my approach but thinks that there is a simpler and more (...) direct way to get the job done: that sketched by Davidson, who argues that scepticism fails because belief is intrinsically veridical. I doubt this. My approach is to identify the distinctively epistemological presuppositions of sceptical argumentation. If this remains undone, Davidsonian reflections on belief and meaning will seem only to transform sceptical problems about knowledge of the world into problems about knowledge of meaning. (shrink)

This volume explores whether the concept of the common good might be retrieved and become central in contemporary religious social thought. Contributors include: Charles C. West, John J. Collins, Ralph McInerny; J. Philip Wogaman, Charles E. Curran, Richard John Neuhaus, Dennis P. McCann, Ernest Bartell, Michael Novak, Charles K. Wilber, John W. Cooper, Gar Alperovitz, Richard T. DeGeorge, Gerald Cavanagh, William J. Cunningham, Peter Mann, Bette Jean Bullert and David Vogel. Co-published with the Notre Dame Center for Ethics (...) and Religious Values in Business. (shrink)

Professor Vogel claims that my responses to scepticism leave the traditional problems standing. I argue in reply that he fails to take sufficiently seriously the diagnostic character of my enterprise. My aim is not to offer direct refutations of sceptical arguments, taking such arguments at face value, but to undermine their plausibility by revealing their dependence on unacknowledged and contentious theoretical presuppositions. Professor Rorty is much more sympathetic to my approach but thinks that there is a simpler and more (...) direct way to get the job done: that sketched by Davidson, who argues that scepticism fails because belief is intrinsically veridical. I doubt this. My approach is to identify the distinctively epistemological presuppositions of sceptical argumentation. If this remains undone, Davidsonian reflections on belief and meaning will seem only to transform sceptical problems about knowledge of the world into problems about knowledge of meaning. (shrink)

v. 1. William and Henry, 1861-1884 -- v. 2. William and Henry, 1885-1896 -- v. 3. William and Henry, 1897-1910 -- v. 4. 1856-1877 -- v. 5. 1878-1884 -- v. 6. 1885-1889 -- v. 7. 1890-1894 -- v. 8. 1895-June 1899 -- v. 9. July 1899-1901 -- v. 10. 1902-March 1905 -- v. 11. April 1905-March 1908 -- v. 12. April 1908-August 1910.

Smail's "On Deep History and the Brain" is rightly critical of the functionalist fallacies that have plagued evolutionary theory, sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology. However, his attempt to improve on these efforts relies on functional explanations that themselves oversimplify the lessons of neuroscience. In addition, like explanations in evolutionary psychology, they are highly speculative and cannot be confirmed or disproved by evidence. Neuroscience research is too diverse to yield a single picture of brain functioning. Some recent developments in neuroscience research, however, (...) do suggest that cognitive processing provides a kind of “operating system” that can support a great diversity of cultural material. These developments include evidence of “top-down” processing in motor control, in visual processing, in speech recognition, and in “emotion regulation.” The constraints that such a system may place on cultural learning and transmission are worth investigating. At the same time, historians are well advised to remain wary of the pitfalls of functionalism. (shrink)

William Pennel Rock argues with Center fellows about the roles of love and reason in the dialogue.

The general principle of epistemic closure stipulates that epistemic properties are transmissible through logical means. According to this principle, an epistemic operator, say ε, should satisfy any valid scheme of inference, such as: if ε(p entails q), then ε(p) entails ε(q). The principle of epistemic closure under known entailment (ECKE), a particular instance of epistemic closure, has received a good deal of attention since the last thirty years or so. ECKE states that: if one knows that p entails q, and (...) she knows that p, then she knows that q. It is widely accepted that ECKE constitutes an important piece of the skeptical argument, but the acceptance of an unrestricted version of ECKE is still a matter of debate. On the side of the defenders of ECKE, one finds Stine (1976), Brueckner (1985), Vogel (1990), and Feldman (1995). Others proposed a refutation or a limitation of the principle, like Dretske (1970), Nozick (1981), Hales (1995), Williams (1996), and Sosa (1999). As it turns out, the relevant alternatives view (RAV) elaborated by Dretske, which restricts the scope of ECKE, has been discussed extensively and acknowledged as one of the most important contributions. There is nonetheless a major unsolved difficulty pertaining to Dretske-RAV: the notion of relevant alternatives is defined in such a way that it is bounded by counterfactual possibilities. This ontological import leaves open the door to the skeptic. Some have tried to give more precision to this notion, like Stine (1976), who appealed to a Gricean approach to define relevant alternatives in conversational contexts. My proposal is in accordance with the gist of Dretske’s strategy, i.e. to restrict the validity of ECKE, and I claim that in order to escape the difficulties inherent to RAV one has to introduce a more robust notion, the notion of epistemic context. Epistemic contexts are a subclass of propositional contexts. In that perspective, the closure property is expressed in terms of a property of a relation between epistemic contexts. ECKE holds when and only when either the epistemic context of the premisses is the same as the epistemic context of the conclusion, or the epistemic context change between the premisses and the conclusion is permissible. Permissibility of epistemic context change is a function of consistency. By means of this epistemic context approach, I will show that: (1) epistemic contexts are defined by basic propositions (unchallenged justified beliefs), (2) ECKE holds only under very specific constraints, and (3) the skeptical argument involves a non-permissible change of epistemic context and, by the same token, cannot rely upon ECKE. (shrink)

Emilsen, William W On the cusp of the Second Vatican Council the distinguished American Lutheran historical theologian, Jaroslav Pelikan, then at the University of Chicago, published a groundbreaking volume titled The Riddle of Roman Catholicism. In this book Pelikan gave a sympathetic yet critical examination of the evolution of Roman Catholicism, its distinctive beliefs and, most importantly, he offered a discussion of the theological issues Protestants face in their conversations with Roman Catholics on Christian unity. The Riddle of Roman (...) Catholicism met an obvious need. It was quickly reprinted by Abingdon Press in the United States and published by Hodder and Stoughton in Great Britain the following year. It was also widely acclaimed in both the Protestant and Catholic presses. The Christian Century magazine, representing the voice of mainstream Protestantism in America, published excerpts from the book claiming that it 'sets the stage for realistic discussion of Christendom's sad divisions'. The Presbyterian theologian and ecumenist from Princeton, John A. Mackay, reviewed it in Theology Today as an 'outstanding book', 'the most significant to appear on Roman Catholicism in many years'. Daniel Walther, professor of church history at the Seventh-day Theological Seminary at Andrews University in Michigan extolled Pelikan's book as 'a significant omen of the new Protestant approach', one that attempted 'to end the "hot war" between the confessions'. Catholic scholars, too, were receptive. Bonaventure Schepers's review in the Thomist, for example, thanked Pelikan for his 'courage and honesty' and invited the journal's readers 'to rejoice with us at the appearance of his important work'. Gustave Wiegel's lengthy review in the Jesuit review, America, named it as 'probably the most important' of the many interesting Protestant studies of Roman Catholicism at the time. Although Pelikan was still a relatively young scholar at the time, The Riddle of Roman Catholicism established him as a serious thinker on the topic of Christian unity. (shrink)

Mutual accommodation is about co-operation, compromise, and inclusion. It's a big idea, equal to freedom, science, and compassion. The postwar global economic order led by the United States is one of the greatest historic achievements of mutual accommodation, yet it is now at risk from the centrifugal forces that have led to populism. Today, to many nations and people, Canada is the model country driven by successful mutual accommodation. In Might Nature Be Canadian? William Macdonald explores the theme of (...) mutual accommodation with a close lens on the Canadian experience. Canada has a drive toward mutual accommodation. The United States has a strong drive toward division. There has always been a divergence of ideologies between the two countries. The United States now appears to view the world as a never-ending struggle, which has become greater since 2000, between good and evil, while Canada, by contrast, leans toward the idea that there is an underlying order at the heart of things. Canada has always faced strong limits in creatively overcoming a challenging geography and French/English language differences within its own borders; on the other hand the United States sees itself as a country with virtually no limits. Throughout its history Canada's drive toward mutual accommodation, stronger than that of any other country, has allowed its increasingly diverse citizens to live together peacefully and successfully, even as they retain their own culture, language, and religion. Nature can be described as simultaneously either/or and both/and. Is there something fundamentally Canadian about this? Taking inspiration from British philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, who said that "civilization is the triumph of persuasion over force," Macdonald argues that the urgent spread of mutual accommodation, a charge led by Canada, is central to achieving a bearable world for everyone. (shrink)

First Published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

If the figure of philosophical sandhogs is appropriately descriptive of this recent work, still one must recognize the manner in which modern philosophers are working away in different caissons; the workers differ in judgment concerning what is hardpan and what bedrock; while some believe only hardpan confronts us all the way down, a philosophic version of the bends would seem not to be uncommon in the analogate. And it is tempting, while possibly not unfair, to think of the linguistic philosopher (...) functioning in the equipment of the skin-diver, boldly setting off destructive charges at the foot of any piling which might be capable of furnishing support to a prospective "metaphysical edifice." Or, more modestly, one might say that whereas both Collins and Tillich are at work on the "foundations of the theory of being" Smart's enterprise, in "a spirit of higher-order neutrality," is directed toward the linguistic foundations of the theory of "being'," carefully bracketed from ontological reference through a rich use of inverted commas. (shrink)

This commentary on blumberg et al. addresses complications associated with diagnostic testing for sympathetic dependence of pain that can lead to inappropriate positive and negative conclusions. In addition, it is suggested that their test be conceived as a test of the effect of local vascular pressure and that the two types of sensory disorders presented may differ primarily in the degree of sensitization of central pain pathways. Detailed reports with functionally-oriented testing like that done by BLUMBERG are essential for an (...) understanding the pathophysiological mechanisms. (shrink)

Lawsuits alleging illegal and unethical insurance sales practices have received widespread publicity in recent years. Although many observers have argued that one source of ethical conflicts for insurance agents is the industry's reliance on straight commission compensation, there remains a paucity of empirical data to support the claim. Therefore, we tested whether different forms of compensation influence insurance agent recommendations of products. We obtained survey responses from 336 insurance agents. Respondents were presented with a composite sketch of a hypothetical client. (...) Following this description, they were asked to identify which one of eight specified life insurance products they would recommend to the client. A between-groups design was employed to manipulate differences in compensation associated with the eight products. Results indicated that neither amount of coverage nor type of coverage (term life versus cash value) recommended was associated with compensation. However, an unanticipated finding was that amount of coverage recommended was significantly higher when the insured was male than when the insured was female. (shrink)

The French philosopher Michel Foucault's work has had a significant impact on feminist and lesbian/gay scholarship in the United States. These explorations of gender and/or sexuality in which feminist, lesbian, and gay scholars rely on Foucault's ideas carry significant implications for the organization of knowledge in our culture beyond the issues of gender and sexuality narrowly defined. Many feminist, lesbian, and gay scholars in the United States initially read Foucault primarily as a historian. Since roughly 1985, many such scholars have (...) increasingly considered and critiqued the philosophical implications of his work, elaborating an account of the assumptions about gender and sexuality that reside at the core of ostensibly universal descriptions of human subjectivity. ;Participants in debates about the "social construction" of sexuality during the 1980s observed that Foucault did not originate social constructionist work in the field, widespread assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, the social constructionist position differs importantly from Foucault's analysis of sexuality as the truth of subjectivity. Historians in the United States have modified many of the substantive claims in Foucault's The History of Sexuality, Volume One: An Introduction. More recently, scholars have attended less to Foucault's substantive claims in favor of his approach to questions of knowledge and subjectivity. ;Feminist, lesbian, and gay scholars have long suspected that gender and sexuality play a major role in authorizing subjects to produce knowledge. Many such scholars continue within existing modes of inquiry to substitute their own, sympathetic versions of their selves for prejudicial, hegemonic versions. Scholars working off of Foucault and other poststructuralist thinkers increasingly suspect that prejudicial assumptions about gender and sexuality lie embedded in the very definition of current modes of inquiry, and thus require a fundamental reconceptualization of knowledge. (shrink)

The present reissue of Wallace's translation of Hegel's Philosophy of Mind includes the Zusatze or lecture-notes which, in the collected works, accompany the first section entitled "Subjective Mind" and which Wallace omitted from his translation. Professor J. N. Findlay has written a Foreword and this replaces Wallace's introductory essays.