When Professor Georges Gurvitch, the highly esteemed occupant of the chair of philosophy at the University of Strausbourg before World War ll and the author of a series of brilliant studies in the pluralist philosophy of law, referred to Pierre—Joseph Proudhon as the central figure in the development of modern social and judicial philosophy, the basis of his highly flattering judgment was the philosophy of law that serves as the basis of Proudhon’s mutualism, a socio-legal conceptualization that had not only (...) greatly infiuenced Gurvitch’s own thinking but which had exerted tremendous infiuence as well over the thought of such outstanding social theorists as Herzen, Tolstoi, and Kropotkinl To state, therefore, that Proudhon was not only the first to call himself an anarchist but also “the most important" anarchist thinker of the modern period} is to establish his right to be heard. We are not entitled to skip lightly over his conception of law and justice as past generations have done. After outlining Proudhon’s legal theory and his conception of natural right, this paper will attempt to demonstrate that Proudhon’s thinking on law is an outstanding contribution to modern political theory. It is not too much to say, in fact, that his philosophy of law and natural right stands as a highly suggestive antidote to the hopeless confusion in contemporary political theory, a confusion that stems not only from the cloudy conception of justice posited by the social contract theorists but from the defective conception of justice advanced by the advocates of state socialism as well. (shrink)

If we are capable of changing our minds—of rejecting, that is, one hypothesis for another—the issue becomes one of the criteria which govern our choices. Are they, as [Stanley] Fish would argue, dependent on "beliefs" and "assumptions"? Perhaps, at some very fundamental level, they are. But I do not think Fish has succeeded in showing them to be so. Certainly the criteria are independent of anything so specific as beliefs about the nature of literature or the human mind. Who among (...) us, for example, whatever the object of interpretation, would choose one on the grounds of its greater inconsistency, or on the grounds of its accounting for fewer of the facts that we want to explain, or on the grounds of its being unnecessarily complicated? On the contrary, do we not tend to argue, as Fish does so effectively, as if counterexamples and inconsistencies tell against an hypothesis? It may be the case that our cherished beliefs often make it difficult in practice even to formulate our questions in ways that allow such criteria as I have hinted at to come into play. But why should hard work discourage us? John Reichert is the chairman of the English department at Williams College and the author of Making Sense of Literature. He has contributed "But That Was in Another Ball Park: A Reply to Stanley Fish" to Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

Fish comes dangerously close to identifying the meaning of a statement with its illocutionary force. At one point he says that "the meaning of a sentence is a function of its illocutionary force". At another he says that a move from a situation in which "I have to study for an exam" is heard as a statement to one in which it is heard as a rejection of a proposal is a move "from one meaning that emerges in a set (...) of circumstances to another meaning that emerges in another set of circumstances". Since "meaning" is so tricky a term, it may be well to remind ourselves that in a situation in which the sentences "I have to tie my shoes," "I have to eat popcorn," and "I hate movies" would all be understood as rejections of an invitation to the movies, no one would mistake the meaning of one for that of either of the other two. The three sentences make different statements, convey different information, and offer different reasons for not going to the movies. There is a sense in which Y's saying "I hate movies" means that he rejects the proposal. But even in that situation, the meaning of "I hate movies" isn't reducible to "I reject your proposal." John Reichert, chairman of the English department at Williams College, is the author of Making Sense of Literature. He has contributed "Making Sense of Interpretation" to Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

Analytic theology can flourish in the secular academy, and flourish as authentically Christian theology. Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion explains analytic theology to other theologians and scholars of religion, while simultaneously explaining those other fields to analytic theologians. William Wood defends analytic theology from some common criticisms, but also argues that analytic theologians have much to learn from other forms of inquiry. Analytic theology is a legitimate form of theology, and a legitimate form of academic inquiry, (...) and it can be a valuable conversation partner within the wider religious studies academy. Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion articulates an attractive vision of analytic theology, fosters a more fruitful inter-disciplinary conversation, and enables scholars across the religious studies academy to understand one another better. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that a belief to the effect that the believer is currently in some conscious state is "self-Warranted," in the sense that what warrants it is simply its being a belief of that sort. This position is compared with other views as to the epistemic status of such beliefs--That they are warranted by their truth and that they are warranted by an immediate awareness of their object. In the course of the discussion, Various modes of immediate (...) justification and various types of "epistemic immunities" are distinguished. It is contended that principles of justification are to be evaluated in terms of whether the beliefs they approve are likely to be correct. (shrink)

A new theory of the mind, the predictive processing model, is ascendant in recent work in cognitive science. According to this theory, all the mind ever fundamentally does is make hypotheses about the environment, generate prediction-errors by comparing its predictions with its sensory data, and use these prediction-errors to update its representation of the world. The theory of motivation and action to which the predictive processing model is committed has been the subject of lively debate in the literature. However, the (...) upshots of the predictive processing model for the theory of practical reason have received relatively scant attention. Here I investigate how proponents of predictive processing should conceive of practical reason. The predictive processing model has it that the practical attitudes – desires and intentions etc. – reduce to certain theoretical attitudes – in particular, to beliefs and predictions. I argue that this psychological reduction precipitates a broader normative reduction, in which practical reasoning reduces to a kind of theoretical reasoning about what you will do, and in which practical normativity turns out to really be a species of epistemic normativity. In other words, that practical reason reduces to theoretical reason. If I am correct, the predictive processing model of the mind is committed to – what I am dubbing – a ‘radical cognitivism about practical reason’. (shrink)

The German Stranger provides a guide to Leo Strauss that situates his thought in the context of National Socialism; by destroying any middle ground between 'Athens' and 'Jerusalem, ' Strauss undermined modernity's secular bulwark against political theology. Once National Socialism is understood as an atheistic religion re-enacted by post-Revelation 'philosophers, ' the German avatar of Plato's Athenian Stranger can be recognized as its principal theoreticia.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionWilliam T. Myershenning offers a most significant work that deals with fundamental yet neglected subjects in Dewey's philosophy, and she challenges much of the cognitive and linguistic efforts to recast pragmatism as part of the epistemology industry. She does all of this by asking questions that we have not really engaged before.Henning's central argument is that Dewey's theory of mind offers an implicit theory of the unconscious, one that (...) has more in common with psychodynamic understandings of the self than with the cognitive-behaviorism that has become the dominant model for the American mind. This kinship between Dewey and psychodynamic perspectives is found in its rejection of atomistic experience and its emphasis on the felt dimensions of experience. Although the recent revival of interest in Dewey has most often linked him with a more linguistic pragmatism and epistemology, Henning moves away from that trend to re-engage with Dewey's "cultural naturalism," returns to the question of what Dewey means by "experience," and advocates for the value of the non-linguistic, non-cognitive portion therein.It is through Dewey's theory of quality that Henning finds a clear connection to the unconscious. Dewey holds that we live in a qualitative world, that we experience the world as affectively charged, and he claims that things come together only insofar as they are pervaded by a single unifying quality. The process of knowing anything begins first in an immediate, sensuous, and affective experience, a dimension that eludes linguistic symbols. That is, there is an ineffable portion of experience that supports our discursive practices and can never be exhausted by them. Henning holds that insofar as qualities resist language and are immediately and sensuously available, there is also a sense in which they guide and form experience unconsciously. [End Page 75]Having set forth her background and thesis in the first half of the book, Henning then turns to Dewey's conceptions of aesthetic and religious experience, where she finds the best evidence for an implicit proposal for a theory of the unconscious. She starts with Dewey's notion that we are primarily aesthetic creatures. The aesthetic is the realm of human experience that most effectively communicates its qualitative dimension. Henning then demonstrates the nature of the aesthetic unconscious through encounters with art, desire, and the sacred. [End Page 76]William T. MyersBirmingham-Southern CollegeCopyright © 2024 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois... (shrink)

A rare survival provides unmatched access to the medieval classroom. In the academic year 1330-31, the Franciscan theologian, William of Brienne, lectured on Peter Lombard's Sentences and disputed with the other theologians at the University of Paris. The original, official notes of these lectures and disputes survives in a manuscript codex at the National Library of the Czech Republic, and they constitute the oldest known original record of an entire university course. An analysis of this manuscript reconstructs the daily (...) reality of the University of Paris in the fourteenth century, delineating the pace and organization of instruction within the school and the debates between the schools. The transcription made during William's lectures and the later modifications and additions reveal how the major vehicle for Scholastic thought, the written Sentences commentary, relates to fourteenth-century teaching. As a teacher and a scholar, William of Brienne was a dedicated follower of the philosophy and theology of John Duns Scotus (+1308). He constructed Scotist doctrine for his students and defended it from his peers. This book shows concretely how scholastic thinkers made, communicated, and debated ideas at the medieval universities. Appendices document the entire process with critical editions of William's academic debates (principia), his promotion speech, and a selection of his lectures and sources. (shrink)

This essay deals with epistemological issues concerning perception. These can be briefly indicated by the question: “How, if at all, is perception a source of knowledge or justified belief?” To keep a discussion of a very complex subject matter within prescribed bounds, I will mostly focus on the “justified belief” side of the above disjunction, bringing in questions about perceptual knowledge only when dealing with a position that is specially concerned with knowledge. There are some other housekeeping moves to be (...) made before we can get under way. (shrink)

William Pennel Rock argues with Center fellows about the roles of love and reason in the dialogue.

From 1945 on for two decades, Father William Wade was Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at St. Louis University. This volume, a recovery of his own 1935 Ph.D dissertation, was originally written under the direction of Vernon J. Bourke, later himself a renowned interpreter of both St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. In his dissertation, Wade displays deep understanding of relationships between Greek and medieval thought as well as of the different influences of Plato and Aristotle by way (...) of Augustine and Thomas. (shrink)

Conceived as the sequel to Alan Badiou's Being and Event, Logics of Worlds stands as one of the most important texts in contemporary thought. As a complex theory of worlds, the text has, for the most part, been misunderstood. Yet, through William Watkin's diligent and critical close--reading, he guides the reader through the Badiouan text, whilst demonstrating how Logics of Worlds is the essential book for anyone interested in existence, meaning and the potential for radical change.

The nineteenth century background -- Kant, God, and immortality -- Newman and the argument from conscience -- The argument from the objectivity of value -- The euthyphro problem -- Two recent divine command theories -- Objections to divine command theory -- The case for divine command theory -- Religious ethics and rational morality -- Abraham and the binding of Isaac -- Mysticism and morality.

The strong tree property and ITP (also called the super tree property) are generalizations of the tree property that characterize strong compactness and supercompactness up to inaccessibility. That is, an inaccessible cardinal $\kappa $ is strongly compact if and only if the strong tree property holds at $\kappa $, and supercompact if and only if ITP holds at $\kappa $. We present several results motivated by the problem of obtaining the strong tree property and ITP at many successive cardinals simultaneously; (...) these results focus on the successors of singular cardinals. We describe a general class of forcings that will obtain the strong tree property and ITP at the successor of a singular cardinal of any cofinality. Generalizing a result of Neeman about the tree property, we show that it is consistent for ITP to hold at $\aleph _n$ for all $2 \leq n < \omega $ simultaneously with the strong tree property at $\aleph _{\omega +1}$ ; we also show that it is consistent for ITP to hold at $\aleph _n$ for all $3 < n < \omega $ and at $\aleph _{\omega +1}$ simultaneously. Finally, turning our attention to singular cardinals of uncountable cofinality, we show that it is consistent for the strong and super tree properties to hold at successors of singulars of multiple cofinalities simultaneously. (shrink)

Smail's "On Deep History and the Brain" is rightly critical of the functionalist fallacies that have plagued evolutionary theory, sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology. However, his attempt to improve on these efforts relies on functional explanations that themselves oversimplify the lessons of neuroscience. In addition, like explanations in evolutionary psychology, they are highly speculative and cannot be confirmed or disproved by evidence. Neuroscience research is too diverse to yield a single picture of brain functioning. Some recent developments in neuroscience research, however, (...) do suggest that cognitive processing provides a kind of “operating system” that can support a great diversity of cultural material. These developments include evidence of “top-down” processing in motor control, in visual processing, in speech recognition, and in “emotion regulation.” The constraints that such a system may place on cultural learning and transmission are worth investigating. At the same time, historians are well advised to remain wary of the pitfalls of functionalism. (shrink)

Substantial discussion in the neuroethical literature has addressed the possibility that deep brain stimulation (DBS) and adaptive DBS (aDBS) could result in changes in personality, agency, and ide...

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 11, Page 24-25, November 2011.

Vīmśatikā ranks among the world's most misunderstood texts but Kumārila's historic refutation allows Vīmśatikā to be read in its own text-historical context. This compelling, radically revolutionary re-reading of Vīmśatikā delineates a hermeneutic of humor indispensable to discerning its medicinal message.

[Alethic Realism] 1. The sense of ‘true’ and ‘false’ in which such items as beliefs, statements, and propositions can be evaluated as true or false. 2. It is important to determine the truth-value of such items in this sense.

The sense-datum theory of perception has been under heavy attack in the last two decades. Recently, by way of counterattack, some of its defenders have accused what they take to be its chief rival, the “theory of appearing”, of various deficiencies. In particular, they have claimed that there are some perceptual, or pseudo-perceptual, situations, such as hallucinations and dreams, of which the theory of appearing can give no adequate account. For in these cases, they argue, the question, “What is it (...) that is appearing?”, can be given no satisfactory answer. The conclusion is then drawn that only a language containing sense-datum terms is generally adequate to our perceptual experience. Moreover this line of argument has been taken seriously by at least one partisan of the theory of appearing, Professor Virgil C. Aldrich, who has been driven to the expedient of suggesting that in these cases it is an image which appears. (shrink)

Theism is a metaphysical theory. But the typical adherent of a theistic religion does not hold theism as a theory, even though she is committed to various propositions that could enter into such a theory. Attention is given to the kind of theory theism is, when it is a theory. As far as religion is concerned, the main importance of the question as to whether theism is a theory concerns the issue as to whether the success of theism as a (...) theory is relevant to the justifiability of the beliefs of a theistic religion. I argue that there is such a relevance. But whether, more specifically, such beliefs are unjustified unless theism can provide an adequate explanation of evil depends on whether theism is responsible for providing such an explanation. I argue that it is not. (shrink)

With both the Roman Empire and contemporary scholarship as backdrop, this book contrasts the Imperial Platonism of Plotinus with Plato's own by distinguishing one as a master enlightening disciples, and the other as an Athenian teacher who taught students to discover the truth for themselves in the Academy.

Bringing continental sensibilities and skill to his project, David Janssens has abandoned the line of defense heretofore used by North American intellectuals to shield Leo Strauss from criticism: Janssens wastes no time trying to prove Strauss was a liberal democrat, frankly admits his atheism, and emphasizes the continuity and European origins of his thought. Nevertheless committed to defending Strauss even at his most vulnerable points, Janssens is compelled to anchor his new defensive position on a misreading of what he calls (...) "an inconspicuous footnote" in Philosophie und Gesetz (1935). (shrink)

This essay, which traces the development of Newman’s thinking on the role of the laity in the Christian Church, is a sequel to an earlier study showing that the underlying image of his development of doctrine is his own personal development; accordingly, it is impossible to separate the events of Newman’s biography from his teaching on the role of the laity.

Emilsen, William W On the cusp of the Second Vatican Council the distinguished American Lutheran historical theologian, Jaroslav Pelikan, then at the University of Chicago, published a groundbreaking volume titled The Riddle of Roman Catholicism. In this book Pelikan gave a sympathetic yet critical examination of the evolution of Roman Catholicism, its distinctive beliefs and, most importantly, he offered a discussion of the theological issues Protestants face in their conversations with Roman Catholics on Christian unity. The Riddle of Roman (...) Catholicism met an obvious need. It was quickly reprinted by Abingdon Press in the United States and published by Hodder and Stoughton in Great Britain the following year. It was also widely acclaimed in both the Protestant and Catholic presses. The Christian Century magazine, representing the voice of mainstream Protestantism in America, published excerpts from the book claiming that it 'sets the stage for realistic discussion of Christendom's sad divisions'. The Presbyterian theologian and ecumenist from Princeton, John A. Mackay, reviewed it in Theology Today as an 'outstanding book', 'the most significant to appear on Roman Catholicism in many years'. Daniel Walther, professor of church history at the Seventh-day Theological Seminary at Andrews University in Michigan extolled Pelikan's book as 'a significant omen of the new Protestant approach', one that attempted 'to end the "hot war" between the confessions'. Catholic scholars, too, were receptive. Bonaventure Schepers's review in the Thomist, for example, thanked Pelikan for his 'courage and honesty' and invited the journal's readers 'to rejoice with us at the appearance of his important work'. Gustave Wiegel's lengthy review in the Jesuit review, America, named it as 'probably the most important' of the many interesting Protestant studies of Roman Catholicism at the time. Although Pelikan was still a relatively young scholar at the time, The Riddle of Roman Catholicism established him as a serious thinker on the topic of Christian unity. (shrink)

The problem of mental causation epitomizes problems in the metaphysics of mind. Tyler Burge once suggested that it could be solved by taking ordinary explanatory practice more seriously. Jaegwon Kim criticized this suggestion: a solution to the problem requires a workable metaphysics of mental causation, and taking ordinary explanatory practice seriously falls short of providing that. Burge replied by gesturing toward a metaphysics that takes mental and physical causation to be different, noncompeting forms of causation. But what does it mean (...) for there to be different forms of causation? How are they identified and distinguished? And what ensures that mental and physical causation are different and noncompeting? I attempt to answer these questions by appeal to hylomorphism, a metaphysical framework that takes structure to be a basic ontological and explanatory principle. I argue that hylomorphism enables us to develop Burge’s basic insights into a workable metaphysics of mental causation that solves the problem. (shrink)