In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Signs of Logic: Peircean Themes on the Philosophy of Language, Games, and CommunicationRobert W. BurchAhti-Veikko Pietarinen Signs of Logic: Peircean Themes on the Philosophy of Language, Games, and Communication Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2006. xiv + 496 pp.This compendious volume of fourteen of Pietarinen's essays on Peirce, plus a three-page set of "Final Words" relating to the work of Robert Aumann, is a "must-have" for both the Peirce (...) scholar and any other philosopher who wishes to relate Peirce's thinking on language and logic to other major thinkers and logical themes of the twentieth century (and beyond). The essays extend or complement discussions of Peirce's logic and philosophy of language that have come to be expected from the "Finnish school" of philosophers, which includes Hintikka and Hilpinen, as well as Pietarinen.Nine of the essays (Chapters 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, and 14), comprising about two-thirds of the entire book, are revised and expanded versions of essays that Pietarinen has previously published. The remaining one-third (approximately) of the book is brand new. Chapters 1 and 2 serve as general introductions to the book's major interests. Chapter 6 is on evidence for constructivism in Peirce, as well as several other topics. Chapter 9 compares Peirce's ideas with Wilfred Hodges's "dialogue foundations" and contains a small philosophical dialogue, which has Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Hodges as its characters. Chapter 11 concerns evolutionary semantics and language [End Page 577] games. And the cursory Chapter 15 of "Final Words" predicts that the game-theoretical approach to semantics and Peirce scholarship has an exploding future, like an erupting volcano.From the foregoing one can gather, correctly, that each essay in the book is separately conceived and that the book is not a single continuous line of argumentative development of one or even of a few themes. Still, the essays are similar to one another in two ways, which ways are closely related to each other. First, they all concern the Peircean doctrine that semeiotic and semeiosis constitute the heartland of logic, and that this heartland is vastly richer than the sort of pure mathematical calculi that might mistakenly be taken for logic itself (and were in fact so taken for much of the twentieth century). Second, they all deal with the Peircean insistence that semeiosis is inherently a form of Praxis in which interchanges occur between or among various "agents" or "actors," one of which might be nature itself; so that at the very least logic is dialogic, and so that more generally one may justifiably speak of semeiosis as involving something like a "game." These lines of exploration will surprise no seasoned Peirce scholar, but the special genius of the Finnish "school" of Peirce interpretation from Hintikka forward is to have spotlighted in dramatic fashion the game-theoretical nature of many elements in Peirce's semeiotic.In these essays Pietarinen amply exhibits two attainments of mind that are indispensable for the serious Peirce scholar. One is the object of what we might call "The Eisele Imperative" after the vehement urgings of Carolyn Eisele: this is the possession of some significant degree of sophistication in mathematics. Pietarinen's mathematical skills are plainly sufficient for his discussions of logic and game theory. For example, his Chapter 5 is an excellent technical discussion of Peirce's existential graphs, and his Chapter 7 is an admirable technical discussion of certain aspects of game theory and generalized quantifiers. Another crucial skill needed by the serious Peirce scholar is the object of what we might call "The Pietarinen Corrective" after the practices exemplified in these essays: this is the possession of extremely broad knowledge of recent and contemporary philosophy, especially philosophy of language, logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science.Indeed, the breadth of Pietarinen's acquaintance with twentieth century logic and philosophy of language, both "analytic" and "continental," is breathtaking. This allows him scope for comparisons of Peirce's views with an extraordinarily wide, and not always easily anticipated, range of philosophers and philosophic traditions. Pietarinen's range of reference is so extensive that it would be pointless to attempt to discuss in... (shrink)

[Wilfrid Hodges] During the last forty or so years it has become popular to offer explanations of logical notions in terms of games. There is no doubt that many people find games helpful for understanding various logical phenomena. But we ask whether anything is really 'explained' by these accounts, and we analyse Paul Lorenzen's dialogue foundations for constructive logic as an example. The conclusion is that the value of games lies in their ability to provide helpful metaphors and representations, (...) rather than in any true conceptual analysis. In fact some of the standard explanations of logical notions in terms of competitive games simply don't work. /// [Erik C. W. Krabbe] In an attempt to redeem the Lorenzen-type dialogues from their detractors, it is perhaps best first to provide a survey of the various benefits these dialogues have been supposed to yield. This will be done in Section I. It will not be possible, within the confines of this paper, to scrutinize them all, but in Section II we shall delve deeper into the capacity of this type of dialogue to yield a model for the immanent criticism of philosophical positions. Section III will extend the concept of a dialogue in such a way as to conform better with our intuitive conceptions of what a rational discussion of a position should contain. This will be followed up by a concept of 'winning a dialogue' that takes position midway between the old conception of 'winning one play' and that of the full-fledged presentation of a winning strategy. Concepts of 'rational discussion' are thus shown to be, plausibly, more fundamental than those of proof. In Section IV, I shall discuss the specific problems about dialogical foundations put forward by Wilfrid Hodges. (shrink)

Wilfred Cantwell Smith, maintained in this vastly important work that Westerners have misperceived religious life by making "religion" into one thing.

Wilfred Carr; What is an Educational Practice?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 163–175, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14.

This paper argues that the anxieties being expressed in the UK and elsewhere about the lack of impact that philosophy now has on education are nothing other than the inevitable manifestation of a fundamental intellectual disorder deeply rooted in our contemporary understanding of the philosophy of education. In trying to substantiate this claim, the paper offers an historically informed philosophical analysis of how philosophy is related to education and education to philosophy that concludes by clarifying how any debates about the (...) current problems and future development of the philosophy of education ought to proceed. (shrink)

This article concentrates on the Jacobs and Daly criticisms (Environmental Values, Spring 1994) of my earlier article in the same journal (Autumn 1994) criticising the concept of 'sustainable development'. Daly and Jacobs agreed with my criticisms of 'weak' sustainability, but defended 'strong' sustainability on the grounds that natural and manmade capital were 'complements' in the productive process and that economists are wrong, therefore, in assuming that they are infinitely substitutable. This article maintains that they are confusing different concepts of 'complementarity' (...) and 'substitutability'. It is also argued that, in fact, they do both sell crucial passes in their defence of strong sustainability without providing any clear criteria for their abandonment of it in certain cases. It is also denied that the fact that environmental services may provide different satisfactions from those obtained from other goods and services elevates it to the status of some over-riding moral value, or that discounting future costs and benefits is 'unfair' to future generations. (shrink)

The concept of social capital helps to explain relations within and between companies but has not crystallized yet. As such, the nature, development, and effects of such relations remain elusive. How is social capital created, how is it put to use, and how is it maintained? Can it decline, and if so, how? We argue that the concept of social capital remains a black box as the mechanisms that constitute it remain underdeveloped and that it is a black hole as (...) many empirical phenomena are attributed to its presence. We use and develop the literature on gift exchange to provide a firmer theoretical basis for the concept of social capital. (shrink)

Recent research in the cognitive science of religion suggests that humans intuitively believe that others survive death. In response to this finding, three cognitive theories have been offered to explain this: the simulation constraint theory (Bering, Citation2002); the imaginative obstacle theory (Nichols, Citation2007); and terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008). First, I provide a critical analysis of each of these theories. Second, I argue that these theories, while perhaps explaining why one would believe in his own personal immortality, (...) leave an explanatory gap in that they do not explain why one would intuitively attribute survival of death to others. To fill in the gap, I offer a cognitive theory based on offline social reasoning and social embodiment which provides for the belief in an eternal social realm in which the deceased survive—the afterlife. (shrink)

It is recalled that serious doubts can be raised concerning the status of theories such as those pertaining to the rights of future generations, or the constraints imposed on us by theories of intergenerational justice. At the same time, we do have moral obligations to future generations. But these must be based on an appraisal of what are likely to be the main interests that future generations will have and which of these are most likely to be under permanent threat. (...) These, it is argued, will be in the field of human relations rather than in the field of the environment. It is concluded, therefore, that the most important bequest we can make to future generations is to leave them a society in which there is a greater respect for basic human rights than is the case today throughout most of the world. And since the best way of bequeathing a more decent society to future generations is, of course, to improve the respect for human rights today, there is no conflict of interest between the present generation and future generations. Hence, theories of intergenerational distributive justice are not only untenable but are also unnecessary. (shrink)

African philosophy has for long been rejected on the basis that it is not known, or has not been written down. Behind this view is the idealist presumption that for something to exist, it must first be perceived. However, for something to be perceived, it must first exist. African Philosophy: Critical Dimensions examines what constitutes African philosophy in terms of its meaning, foundation, sources, methodology, characteristics, and relevance. The book analyses traditional African philosophy from the political, social, ethical, epistemological and (...) metaphysical angles. The book further critically discusses modern African political philosophy, modern African social philosophy, modern African economic philosophy, and modern African philosophy of religion. It ends with the identification of the different conclusions that were derived from the study and general recommendations, some specifically for researchers and writers, especially in the area of African philosophy. Wilfred Lajul joins other authentic voices examining African Philosophy. (shrink)

Collected here for the first time is a history of images of Oman, one of the most developed and stable countries in the Arab world and among the earliest adherents to Islam. A sultanate, the country sits along the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. From early days of world trade through the port of Muscat to contemporary engagement with international diplomacy and the West, Oman has always evoked beauty and mystery in equal measure. This art-house quality volume reveals an (...) intimate picture of the country as its contours emerged over the last 80 years in the eyes of the West, as captured in images by English explorer Wilfred Thesiger in the 1940s and ‘50s, British Army major Charles Butt in the 1960s, and award-winning American documentary photographer Edward Grazda in the first decade of this new century. (shrink)

This paper proceeds through four stages. First, it provides an account of the origins and evolution of the concept of educational theory. Second, it uses this historical narrative to show how what we now call 'educational theory' is deeply rooted in the foundationalist discourse of late nineteenth and early twentieth century modernity. Third, it outlines and defends a postfoundationalist critique of the foundationalist epistemological assumptions on which our understanding of educational theory has been erected. Finally, it argues that the only (...) conclusion to draw from this postfoundationalist critique is that educational theory has run its course and should now be brought to a dignified end. (shrink)

Wilfrid Hodges; VIII*—Truth in a Structure, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 135–152, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

The man or woman of faith living in today's pluralist world must have a theology that will do justice to his or her own faith, and also to the neighbours' - and to the differences between them. Similarly, humanists must have a theory that does justice to their own vision and also to the fact that for most of their fellows on earth the proper way of being human has been one or another of various `religious' ways. Any interpretation of (...) human history, both past and present, must take into serious account the self-consciousness of each major part, as well as the diversity and the dynamic of the whole. This exciting book, first published in 1981 and now also available in paperback, is perhaps our world's first serious endeavour towards a theology in global perspective. Here is a wrestling with the demands of an authentic theology of the comparative history of religion. (shrink)

This paper addresses the nurse manager's role regarding chemically-dependent nurses in the workplace. The manager may intervene by: terminating the contract of the impaired colleague; notifying a disciplinary committee; consulting with a counselling committee; or referring the impaired nurse to an employee assistance programme. A dilemma may arise about which of these interventions is ethically the best. The ethical theories relevant to nursing involve ethical relativism, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, Kohlberg's justice, and Gilligan's ethic of care. Nurse managers first need to (...) understand these theories in order to clarify their own perceptions and attitudes towards chemical dependency, and then satisfactorily resolve this ethical dilemma. Education and social learning are routes to a better understanding of chemical dependency and to broadening the ethical dimensions of nurse managers. (shrink)

Bioethics committees have issued guidelines that medical interventions should be permissible only in cases of clinically verifiable disease, deformity, or injury. Furthermore, once the existence of one or more of these requirements has been proven, the proposed therapeutic procedure must reasonably be expected to result in a net benefit to the patient. As an exception to this rule, some prophylactic interventions might be performed on individuals “in their best interests” or with the aim of averting an urgent and potentially calamitous (...) public health danger. In order to invoke these exceptions, a stringent set of criteria must first be satisfied. Additionally, where the proposed prophylactic intervention is intended for children, who are unlikely to be able to provide a meaningfully informed consent, a heightened scrutiny of any such measures is required. We argue that children should not be subjected to prophylactic interventions “in their best interests” or for public health reasons when there exist effective and conservative alternative interventions, such as behavioural modification, that individuals could employ as competent adolescents or adults to avoid adverse health outcomes. Applying these criteria, we consider the specific examples of prophylactic mastectomy, immunisations, cosmetic ear surgery, and circumcision. (shrink)

Wilfred Carr; Theories of Theory and Practice, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 177–186, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.146.

This paper takes seriously the claim that postmodernism has seriously undermined our‘modern’ understanding of what the role of education in a democratic society should be. It therefore seeks to reinterpret this role in a way that confronts the challenge that postmodernism has posed. In order to do this the paper clarifies how postmodernism has now discredited the‘modern’ assumptions on which our view of the relationship between education and democracy has been erected. Drawing on the philosophy of John Dewey, it then (...) reconstructs the relationship between education and democracy so as effectively to resist the challenge that postmodernism has posed. (shrink)

Although this paper is a written version of an inaugural lecture given at the University of Sheffield in December 1995, its central thesis is that, in a postmodern age, the practice of professors of education giving inaugural lectures is incoherent. To advance this thesis in an inaugural lecture entails an obvious contradiction which, it is proposed, can only be resolved by examining the historical origins of the inaugural lecture in the early medieval university. What emerges from this examination is not (...) only that there is a pre-modern version of the inaugural lecture but that the virtue-based understanding of education which it presupposed can be revised and advanced in the postmodern world. (shrink)

This volume provides a thought-provoking critique the main, existing school of environmental ethics and seeks to build a more coherent and rigorous philosophical basis for future environmental policy.

A recent review of his work describes Wilfred Carr as 'one of the most brilliant philosophers now working in the rich British tradition of educational philosophy ... His work is rigorous, refreshing and original ... and examines a number of fundamental issues with clarity and penetration'. In For Education Wilfred Carr provides a comprehensive justification for reconstructing educational theory and research as a form of critical inquiry. In doing this, he confronts a number of important philosophical questions. What (...) is educational theory? What is an educational practice? How are theory and practice related? What is the role of values in educational research? Is a genuinely educational science possible? By appealing to developments in critical theory, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of the social sciences, Wilfred Carr provides answers to these questions which vindicate the idea of an educational science that is not 'on' or 'about' education but 'for education' - a science genuinely committed to promoting educational values and ideals. (shrink)

The phenomenon of consumption has increasingly drawn attention from economists. While the ‘sole purpose of production is consumption’, as Adam Smith has claimed, economists have up to recently generally ignored the topic. This book brings together a range of different perspectives on the topic of consumption that will finally shed the necessary light on a largely neglected theme, such as Why is the consumption of symbolic goods different than that of goods that are not constitutive of individuals’ identity? How does (...) the consumption of symbolic goods affect social processes and economic phenomena? Will taking consumption seriously impact economics itself? The book discusses these issues theoretically, and, through analyses of such cases as food, religion, fashion, empirically as well. It also discusses the possible role in the future of consumption. This book was previously published as a special issue of _Review of Social Economy_. (shrink)

Poses four questions about human persons: 1) Who am I in this world wherein I try to live well? 2) What is the meaning in trying to live well in this world? 3) Am I able to make free decisions about living well in this world? and 4) What is the way I am to live well in this world?

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Farting for Dollars:A Note on Agyrrhios in Aristophanes Wealth 176Wilfred E. MajorEarly in aristophanes wealth,1 Khremylos and his slave, Karion, are trying to persuade the blind god of Wealth that he is the mightiest of all divinities. Men sacrifice to Zeus but for wealth. All professions exist for the pursuit of wealth. The mighty King of Persia grooms himself because of it. Karion next focuses on Athens in particular:(171)Doesn't (...) the Assembly meet because of it (wealth)?Karion follows with examples of money supporting military efforts and then returns to the formula:(174)Won't Pamphilos suffer because of it?Scholia explain that Pamphilos had a reputation, at least in comedy, for demagoguery and embezzlement. Around this time, he was facing a trial. Karion's next example is more enigmatic:(176)Doesn't Agyrrhios fart because of it?Precisely why Agyrrhios should fart on account of wealth has eluded critics and commentators. While modern scholars have long recognized that the scholia to this line contain no reliable information, interpretations still rely on the scholiasts' best guesses. Comparison with other comic [End Page 549] references to farting, however, and to Agyrrhios and his philoi, suggest that farting here refers not directly to his excessive wealth, as is generally supposed, but to his activity as a corrupt orator.Agyrrhios (PA 179, PAA 107660) is known for several key events in his political career, including his role in instituting pay for attending the Ekklesia and his generalship of 389.2 His skill in tax farming made him wealthy, but his financial dealings also landed him in prison for a time (Dem. 24.135). Why he should be associated with the troubles of wealth is clear enough, but not why he should fart on its account. The scholiasts clearly had no more context for the line than we possess now. Older scholia offer two categories of explanations for Agyrrhios' incontinence. It may have resulted from Agyrrhios' extravagant living, perhaps from the overeating characteristic of the rich. On the other hand, it may refer to Agyrrhios' sexual perversions.3 Later scholia expand on the latter explanation, probably by comparing this line with the reference to Agyrrhios' sexuality at Ecc. 102.4 In no case, however, do the scholiasts seem to operate on information unavailable to us. Indeed, modern scholars have rightly dismissed the scholia altogether but have tended to fall back on the older scholia's suggestion of farting as a mark of extravagant living.5 Confidence in this interpretation erodes in the face of comparisons with other instances of farting in Greek comedy.This explanation can appear logical enough, and it is often assumed that the reference thus fits an established typology of the overstuffed rich man farting from excess, but, in fact, there is no parallel in ancient Greek comedy for farting in this context. Forms and variations on occupy a wide semantic range in Greek comedy, but some groups and trends can be usefully demarcated. For example, the similarity [End Page 550] in sound of snoring and farting means sleeping people fart (an equation explicit at Kn. 115 and implied at Cl. 9). Farting can come as a surprise substitute in a mock religious ritual (as part of an oath at Wa. 394; as a good omen in place of a sneeze at Kn. 639). Although religious fear leads Strepsiades to fart at Cl. 293, more properly covers semantic ranges associated with fear.6 The frightening bogey Lamia, however, is associated with (Ecc. 78, 1177). Collapse from physical pain can also result in farting (Fr. 10 and 1097). Farting can accompany idleness and boredom (Ach. 30; Ecc. 464). More often, however, someone farts as part of a triumphal celebration, which may include aggressively farting on or at one's opponent (Wa. 1305; Pc. 335, 547; We. 618; Cratinus fr. 6.3; Epicrates fr. 10.29; Sosipater fr. 1.12). Isolated jokes specific to context also occur (a joke about conditions for rowers at Fr. 1074; a homely example of physics at Cl. 392; a feed for a joke about physicians at We. 699). All of these instances showcase a lower class, rustic, or foolish individual farting... (shrink)

In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides comprehensive rules for the processing of personal data. In addition, the EU lawmaker intends to adopt specific rules to protect confidentiality of communications, in a separate ePrivacy Regulation. Some have argued that there is no need for such additional rules for communications confidentiality. This Article discusses the protection of the right to confidentiality of communications in Europe. We look at the right’s origins to assess the rationale for protecting it. (...) We also analyze how the right is currently protected under the European Convention on Human Rights and under EU law. We show that at its core the right to communications confidentiality protects three individual and collective values: privacy, freedom of expression, and trust in communication services. The right aims to ensure that individuals and organizations can safely entrust communication to service providers. Initially, the right protected only postal letters, but it has gradually developed into a strong safeguard for the protection of confidentiality of communications, regardless of the technology used. Hence, the right does not merely serve individual privacy interests, but also other more collective interests that are crucial for the functioning of our information society. We conclude that separate EU rules to protect communications confidentiality, next to the GDPR, are justified and necessary. (shrink)

It is argued that 'sustainable development' has been defined in such a way as to be either morally repugnant or logically redundant. 'Strong' sustainability, overriding all other considerations, is morally unacceptable as well as totally impractical; and 'weak' sustainability, in which compensation is made for resources consumed, offers nothing beyond traditional economic welfare maximisation. The 'sustainability' requirement that human well-being should never be allowed to decline is shown to be irrational. Welfare economics can accommodate distributional considerations, and, suitably defined, the (...) concept of welfare can include the subjective effects of changes in – as well as the levels of – well-being. Hence there is no reason why welfare maximisation should not remain an overriding policy objective. Nor can sustainability be regarded as a 'constraint' on welfare maximisation unless there is a clear conflict between the two – which has yet to be demonstrated. This is not to deny the importance of intergenerational justice, nor the need for economic incentives to correct market imperfections if the environment is to be managed in a socially optimal manner. Apart from a few small developing countries heavily dependent on minerals or other finite primary products, the measurement of some wider concept of 'sustainable' GNP is a waste of time and such estimates as have been made are virtually worthless. (shrink)

The laws of distribution follow at once from Lyndon's interpolation theorem and the fact that the fallacy of many terms is a fallacy.

A deluge of state “anti-equity” legislative bills seek to reverse prevailing trends in diversity, equity, and inclusion; withdraw protections of LGBTQ+ communities; and deny access to gender-based care for trans minors and adults. While the political and constitutional fate of these acts is undetermined, profound impacts on patients and their providers are already affecting the delivery of health care and public health services.

Wilfred Carr; The Idea of an Educational Science, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 29–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14.

It is widely believed that environmental conservation has to be guided by respect for the ‘rights’ of future generations. But it is argued in this chapter that it may not be plausible to think in terms of the ‘rights’ of future generations in general or their rights to any specific environmental assets. Future generations may well have rights when they come into existence, but these will only be rights that can be satisfied at the time. But ‘rights’ do not exhaust (...) the whole of morality, and future generations will certainly have interests, which means that we are under moral obligation to take account of them and of the effect that our environmental policies may have on them. Thus, the problem is to predict what the main interests of future generations will be and how to weigh them up against the interests of people alive today. It is argued that this approach will lead to a very different ranking of priorities among our moral obligations to future generations. (shrink)