Since Hegel, philosophy cannot stop thinking its end. The violent transformations which Hegel's philosophy has uncovered and caused in the structure of philosophical terms and in the terms under which philosophy is possible is Hamacher's topic. Starting from Hegel's commentaries on biblical scripture, Hamacher traces the genealogy and unfolding of Hegel's thought into his mature works--the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Encyclopedia, the Philosophy of History--focusing throughout on the limits and borders, the limitations and extremities of its conceptual and textual movements. (...) Because the concept for Hegel is the end of the thing--the point where it peaks--because it occurs by severance from its representational content, the trace of this splitting appears imprinted into its discursive articulation. The Hegelian text is punctuated by a series of terms and topics that operate according to the logic of the turning point: one function activating its opposite, they serve as pores between mutually exclusive experiences and establish their unity. This dialectical procedure falters, its unity dissolves, the pores turn into aporias, wherever conceptual exigencies surpass the reality they have instilled. Hamacher shows that dialectics, proceeding by way of aporias, remains unable to account for its own movement. Hegel's system must be read from the point where its rupture fails to converge with its end. Analyzing both the historical and the systematic aspects of Hegel's philosophy, addressing Kant and religious fetishism, Nietzsche and the impossible repetition of the same, Marx and the aroma of religion, Freud and the hysterical body, Hamacher's argument is directed toward what in Hegel's philosophy of spirit resists spiritualization and defeats philosophy. Aspiring to be the last philosophy, speculative idealism has to incorporate all previous systems and spiritualize its incorporation. Its logic of ingestion must, however, reject with repulsion and nausea everything that resists appropriation. Emphasizing Hegel's claim to present the political theology of modern society, Hamacher shows that the mechanism of nausea meant to keep the system intact is in fact itself a mechanism foreign to its body; it averts the promised incorporation, defeats idealization, leaves the body politic disintegrated, and voids the claim of the most powerful ontology of modern society to mark the end, the completion and plenitude--the pleroma--of philosophy and history. What remains--the indigestible, the unreadable, the nondiscursive--demands yet another kind of discourse and another practical gesture: toward a pleroma other than Hegel's. (shrink)

The book is the first formulation of a meta-philosophical scheme rooted in the embodied cognition paradigm. The latter views subjects capable of cognition and experience as living, embodied creatures coupled with their environments. On the other hand, the emergence of experimental philosophy has given rise to a new context in which philosophers have begun to search for a more thorough definition of philosophical competence. The time is ripe for these two trends to join their efforts. Therefore, the book discusses what (...) it means for a human being thought of as a living subject to pursue philosophy. In this context, in contrast to the existing literature, philosophical competence must not be conflated with competence in philosophy. The former is a skill or attitude. The book refers to this peculiar attitude as the recognition of one’s epistemic position. (shrink)

In der Technikethik spielt das Konzept der Verantwortung eine zentrale Rolle. ›Verantwortung‹ ist ein Basiskonzept, das, ähnlich wie die Konzepte ›Pflicht‹ oder ›Schuld‹, in vielfältigen Kontexten gebraucht wird. Dennoch lassen sich einige allgemeine Aussagen über seine Bedeutung treffen. Gerade Autoren, die im Bereich der Technik- und Wissenschaftsethik aktiv sind, haben sich nachdrücklich um eine Klärung des allgemeinen Verantwortungsbegriffs und seiner verschiedenen Aspekte und Gebrauchsweisen bemüht.

Non-naturalism is the view that normative properties are response-independent, irreducible to natural properties, and causally inefficacious. An underexplored question for non-naturalism concerns the metasemantics of normative terms. Ideally, the non-naturalist could remain ecumenical, but it appears they cannot. Call this challenge the metasemantic challenge. This chapter suggests that non-naturalists endorse an epistemic account of reference determination of the sort recently defended by Imogen Dickie, with some modifications. An important implication of this account is that, if correct, a fully fleshed out (...) moral epistemology will simultaneously rebut metasemantic objections to non-naturalism. Thus, both the metasemantic and the more widely discussed epistemological challenges in effect amount to one. Before setting out the positive view, the chapter considers why all of the traditional metasemantic theories cause trouble for the non-naturalist. This includes discussions of teleosemantics, conceptual role semantics, as well as Schroeter and Schroeter’s “connectedness” model. (shrink)

This book is the first major account of political thought in twentieth-century Europe, both West and East, to appear since the end of the Cold War. Skillfully blending intellectual, political, and cultural history, Jan-Werner Müller elucidates the ideas that shaped the period of ideological extremes before 1945 and the liberalization of West European politics after the Second World War. He also offers vivid portraits of famous as well as unjustly forgotten political thinkers and the movements and institutions they inspired. (...) Müller pays particular attention to ideas advanced to justify fascism and how they relate to the special kind of liberal democracy that was created in postwar Western Europe. He also explains the impact of the 1960s and neoliberalism, ending with a critical assessment of today's self-consciously post-ideological age. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that some truths or facts don’t have a minimal full ground [see e.g. Fine ]. Every full ground of them contains a smaller full ground. In this paper I’ll propose a minimality constraint on immediate grounding and I’ll show that it doesn’t fall prey to the arguments that tell against an unqualified minimality constraint. Furthermore, the assumption that all cases of grounding can be understood in terms of immediate grounding will be defended. This assumption guarantees that (...) the proposed minimality constraint is significant for all cases of grounding. With its help one can get a clear grip on the relevance of grounding, a feature that will be put to use in the penultimate section. (shrink)

Advances in science and technology have added to our insights into the vulnerabilities of human agency as well as to the methods of exploiting them. This has raised the stakes for efforts to clarify the concept and ethics of manipulation. Among these efforts, Robert Noggle’s influencer-centered account of manipulation has been most significant. He defines manipulative acts as those whereby an agent intentionally influences a recipient’s attitudes so that they do not conform as closely as they otherwise would to the (...) pertinent norms and ideals endorsed by the influencer. This provides a relatively simple and in many ways clear definition of manipulation. It sidesteps thorny debates about autonomy, freedom, or practical rationality. It also promises to reveal a conceptual parallel between manipulating and lying, and thus to explain why manipulation is pro tanto wrong. In one respect, however, the account remains ambiguous: It remains unclear whether, and to what extent, it requires that influencers’ beliefs about what is ideal for their recipients to be grounded in some effort on the part of the influencer to identify with or take on the role of her recipient. This paper explains this ambiguity. It argues that influencer-centrism cannot remain indifferent to the validity of an agent’s beliefs about the ideal state of the recipient and provide an identification requirement that would render the whole account plausible and sufficiently determinate. (shrink)

Conceptual research is interdisciplinary in two regards. On the one hand, various disciplines have developed various approaches to conceptual research. These range from conceptual analysis and conceptual history in philosophy, Begriffsgeschichte in historical and literary studies to term-related semantics in linguistics and conceptual research in psychoanalysis. On the other hand, concepts play a key role in any cooperation within interdisciplinary research projects. If they remain undiscussed and unmediated between the participating disciplines, they tend to impede productive cooperation. This contribution provides (...) an overview of different forms of conceptual research and introduces the approach of Experimental Conceptual Research as a technique of conceptual reflection, which unifies approaches of various disciplines by going back to an investigation of those criteria that become effective in the practice of concept formation and usage. As a criterial investigation, it starts at the level of conceptualizing phenomena within the course of research. In this way, premature fixations of conceptually filtered perceptions can be avoided, allowing the discovery of distinguishing features in phenomena to pave the way for forms of interdisciplinary cooperation that are deeply anchored in material content. (shrink)

The later Nietzsche developed the “magic of the extreme” as a special strategy in order to make his philosophical reorientations successful. He needed this strategy not only to be heard at all; also the problems he faced called for it. The article first gives an overview of the most important problems Nietzsche coped with and the extreme solutions he offered. Then, we show how, according to Nietzsche, even Socrates, who stands for the beginning of the European Enlightenment, used the “magic” (...) of extreme irritation and fascination to get this Enlightenment on its way. (shrink)

Querying the Medieval. Texts and the History of Practices in South Asia. Ronald Inden, Jonathan Walters, Daud Ali. Oxford University Press, New York 2000. 235 pp. £32.50. ISBN 0-19-512430-8.

Studies in Mahayana G. C. Pande., Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, Varanasi 1993. xii, 179 pp. No price given. ISBN 81-900149-7-8, 81-900149-8-6.

The Awakening of the West. The Encounter of Buddhism and Western Culture: 543 BCE - 1992. Stephen Batchelor. Aquarian, London 1994. xvi, 416 pp. £12.99.

Zivot v okamziku. Bohumil Houser. Illustrations by Michaela Paskova. Svitani, Prague 1992. 78 pp.

In a recent paper, Tim Henning argues that the result that we should save the greatest number in rescue cases can be established on procedural grounds without making use of the aggregation of interests. He first argues that we ought to respect the affected persons' equal claims to have a say in the rescue decision and that this can only be achieved by the majority rule, which consists in giving each affected person an equal vote. Then he argues for the (...) second claim that if everyone votes in their self-interest, then the greatest number will be saved. I present a class of cases in which the second claim fails. This establishes that even if self-interested voting is assumed, the majority rule does not always lead to the greatest number being saved. (shrink)

Temporal loops in which two agents are involved in a circle of reactive attitudes create a puzzle concerning who harms whom. I argue that this puzzle, which has been developed by Stephen Kearns in a recent paper in this journal, should be solved by accepting that the situation involves normative indeterminacy. A supervaluationist treatment of this indeterminacy allows us to maintain that the normative supervenes on the non-normative and that the involved agents are in normatively symmetric situations. It further allows (...) to maintain that it is determinately the case that one agent wrongs the other just in case the latter does not wrong the former. I conclude by tentatively arguing that the indeterminacy involved should not be understood as semantic and that the puzzle provides us with a novel case of indeterminacy in reality. (shrink)

L’unité de la science, telle qu’elle est comprise dans l’image symbolique du monde des primitifs, repose sur le concept de correspondance. Elle suppose que le monde est un organisme dont toutes les parties se correspondent, que tout événement d’une sphère du monde a sa conséquence dans les autres sphères, que le monde est soumis à des lois qui constituent la meilleure des harmonies, d’où dérivent les règles de la conduite morale.

The qualitative and quantitative properties of color sensations and neuronal color coding are discussed in relation to physiological color exchanges and their evolutionary constraints. Based on the identity mind/matter thesis, additional physical measurements on color sensations are described that will allow us, at least in principle, to compare the qualitative properties of color sensations in different brains.

This paper concerns the question of which properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. According to conservatives, only low-level properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. Liberals, on the other hand, claim that high-level properties, such as natural kind properties, artifacts, and even moral properties, can figure in the contents of perceptual experience. I defend a novel argument in favor of liberalism, the Epistemic Argument, which hinges on two crucial claims. The first is that many perceptual experiences of (...) even neurotypical human beings can justify beliefs in high-level properties without providing justification for their low-level constituents. The second claim, roughly, is that any experience that alone provides (defeasible) justification for beliefs about some property p, other things being equal, has p as part of its content. In short, certain perceptual experiences represent high-level but not low-level properties, which entails that liberalism is true. (shrink)

Along with the exploding attention to globalization, issues of global justice have become central elements in political philosophy. After decades in which debates were dominated by a state-centric paradigm, current debates in political philosophy also address issues of global inequality, global poverty, and the moral foundations of international law. As recent events have demonstrated, these issues also play an important role in the practice of international law. In fields such as peace and security, economic integration, environmental law, and human rights, (...) international lawyers are constantly confronted with questions of global justice and international legitimacy. This special issue contains four papers which address an important element of this emerging debate on cosmopolitan global justice, with much relevance for international law: the principle of sovereign equality, global economic inequality, and environmental law. (shrink)

Sören Kierkegaard gilt als „Vater der Existenzphilosophie“. Durch Schwermut bzw. Melancholie „zuinnerst in die Frage nach sich selber geworfen“ (Wilhelm Weischedel), habe er das Thema der Existenz philosophisch entdeckt. Tatsächlich, dies versucht der vorliegende Artikel zu zeigen, war Kierkegaard traumatisiert. Ein Trauma ist, anders als Schwermut oder Melancholie (modern gesprochen: Depression), keine psychische Erkrankung, sondern eine „gesunde Reaktion auf eine kranke Situation“, die die Verarbeitungsmöglichkeiten des Individuums überfordert. Das Selbst wird dabei gefährdet oder gar zerstört. Der Versuch, „für sich selbst (...) durchsichtig zu werden“ ( Joakim Garff ), auf den Kierkegaards Denken hinauslief, kann entsprechend als philosophische Traumabewältigung gelten – jedoch nicht so, dass dabei ein psychisches Problem, sondern Existenzielles verarbeitet wird. Denn: Im Trauma erfährt man die „Abgründigkeit des Seins“, es führt „direkt in die Tiefenstruktur der Existenz“ (A. Längle). Dass Kierkegaard dabei Halt in der Transzendenz gefunden hat, erweist sich als immanent konsequent. (shrink)