This volume has its already distant or1g1n in an inter national conference on Evolutionary Epistemology the editors organized at the University of Ghent in November 1984. This conference aimed to follow up the endeavor started at the ERISS (Epistemologically Relevant Internalist Sociology of Science) conference organized by Don Campbell and Alex Rosen berg at Cazenovia Lake, New York, in June 1981, whilst in jecting the gist of certain current continental intellectual developments into a debate whose focus, we thought, was in (...) danger of being narrowed too much, considering the still underdeveloped state of affairs in the field. Broadly speaking, evolutionary epistemology today con sists of two interrelated, yet qualitatively distinct inves tigative efforts. Both are drawing on Darwinian concepts, which may explain why many people have failed to discriminate them. One is the study of the evolution of the cognitive apparatus of living organisms, which is first and foremost the province of biologists and psychologists (H. C. Plotkin, Ed. , Learning, Development, and Culture: Essays in Evolu tionary Epistemology, New York, Wiley, 1984), although quite a few philosophers - professional or vocational - have also felt the need to express themselves on this vast subject (F. M. Wuketits, Ed. , Conce ts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology, Dordrecht Boston, Reidel, 1984). The other approach deals with the evolution of science, and has been dominated hitherto by (allegedly) 'naturalized' philosophers; no book-length survey of this literature is available at present. (shrink)

Big data biology—bioinformatics, computational biology, systems biology (including ‘omics’), and synthetic biology—raises a number of issues for the philosophy of science. This article deals with several such: Is data-intensive biology a new kind of science, presumably post-reductionistic? To what extent is big data biology data-driven? Can data ‘speak for themselves?’ I discuss these issues by way of a reflection on Carl Woese’s worry that “a society that permits biology to become an engineering discipline, that allows that science to slip into (...) the role of changing the living world without trying to understand it, is a danger to itself.” And I argue that scientific perspectivism, a philosophical stance represented prominently by Giere, Van Fraassen, and Wimsatt, according to which science cannot as a matter of principle transcend our human perspective, provides the best resources currently at our disposal to tackle many of the philosophical issues implied in the modeling of complex, multilevel/multiscale phenomena. (shrink)

This article explores Adorno’s negative dialectics as a critical social theory of economic objectivity. It rejects the conventional view that Adorno does not offer a critique of the economic forms of capitalist society. The article holds that negative dialectics is a dialectics of the social world in the form of the economic object, one that is governed by the movement of economic quantities, that is, real economic abstractions. Negative dialectics refuses to accept the constituted economic categories as categories of economic (...) nature. Instead, the article argues, it amounts to a conceptualized social praxis [ begriffene Praxis] of the capitalistically constituted social relations, which manifest themselves in the form of seemingly independent economic categories. Economic nature is a socially constituted nature, which entails the class antagonism in its concept. The article concludes that for negative dialectics the explanation of real economic abstractions lies in the understanding of the class-divided nature of human practice. (shrink)

According to phenomenal conservatism, seemings can provide prima facie justification for beliefs. In order to fully assess phenomenal conservatism, it is important to understand the nature of seemings. Two views are that (SG) seemings are a sui generis propositional attitude, and that (D2B) seemings are nothing over and above dispositions to believe. Proponents of (SG) reject (D2B) in large part by providing four distinct objections against (D2B). First, seemings have a distinctive phenomenology, but dispositions to believe do not. Second, seemings (...) can provide a non-trivial explanation for dispositions to believe, which wouldn’t be possible if seemings were dispositions to believe. Third, there are some dispositions to believe that are not seemings. Fourth, there are instances of seemings which are not dispositions to believe. I consider and reject each of these objections. The first and third objections rely on a misunderstanding of (D2B). The second objection fails because there are contexts in which an appeal to a previously unknown identity can provide an interesting explanation. The fourth objection overlooks the possibility of finkish and masked dispositions, phenomena which are widely accepted in the dispositions literature. I conclude that (D2B) escapes these common objections unscathed. (shrink)

This is the first of two articles in which I reflect on “generalized Darwinism” as currently discussed in evolutionary economics. I approach evolutionary economics by the roundabouts of evolutionary epistemology and the philosophy of biology, and contrast evolutionary economists’ cautious generalizations of Darwinism with “imperialistic” proposals to unify the behavioral sciences. I then discuss the continued resistance to biological ideas in the social sciences, focusing on the issues of naturalism and teleology. In the companion article (Callebaut, Biol Theory 6. doi: (...) 10.1007/s13752-013-0087-1, 2011, this issue) I assess generalized Darwinism, concentrating on the roles of theory and model building, generative replication, and the relation between selection and self-organization; and I point to advances in biology that promise to be more fruitful as sources of inspiration for evolutionary economics than the project to generalize Darwinism in its current, “hardened Modern Synthesis” form. (shrink)

On the 25th anniversary of Berry’s historic papers on the geometric phase, I discuss here our neutron interferometry experiment in which this phase is clearly separated from the dynamical phase. The connection of this experiment to the observation of the sign reversal of the wave function of a fermion during a 2π precession in a magnetic field by three groups independently in 1975 is discussed.

Concerning the need for a new conception of legal theory one question arises, above all, especially when external and internal observation as well as the critical reflexion on the premises and presuppositions of all dealings with the law permit a degree of distance, the question, namely, whether it is not an increasing application of scientific methods that is needed, in the sense that the development of a theory from the beginning involves the integration of a norm‐descriptive point of view and (...) intellectual standpoint with the norm‐ prescriptive theory of law, by way of complementing each other, as it were (multilevel approach to law). This, at least, appears to be the only way of also clarifying the relationship between legal theory and philosophy and the theory and sociology of law. The inevitable consequences of the development of a theory of norms and action also have to be drawn from this. (shrink)

Die Interpretation der frühen Akademiepläne von Leibniz zielt auf die politischen Implikationen und Konsequenzen dieser z. T. utopischen Projekte. Sie enthüllt das Ideal eines autoritären Wohlfahrtsstaates, in dem die Staatskunst, geleitet von einem metaphysischen, der Absicht nach exakten Herrschaftswissen, zugleich höchster Gottesdienst ist. Auf diese Weise wird ein Zugang zu Leibniz' politischer Philosophie als Beispiel seiner praktischen Philosophie gewonnen und der Absolutismus der Praxis als mögliche Konsequenz einer absolutistischen Theorie sichtbar gemacht. Zugleich erweist sich, wie der Versuch, die Politik der (...) Wissenschaft zu unterwerfen, in den Dienst der Wissenschaft am Staat umschlägt. (shrink)

The concept of revelation through history is not simply a passing theological fad or aberration, but belongs to the core of biblical religion.

Review of "The Timeless Way of Building." Book by Christopher Alexander.

Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates due to their idiosyncratic concerns for the various qualities of the candidates. Our ranking mechanism asks all evaluators to submit individual bids assigning a monetary amount for each possible rank order. The rules specify for all possible vectors of such individual bids the collectively binding rank order of candidates and the payments, due to the different evaluators. Three requirements uniquely determine procedurally fair ranking rules as a game form. Only when additionally (...) assuming exogenously given true evaluations of collective rankings, which may be commonly or only privately known, and—in case of private information—beliefs concerning the evaluations by others, this game form determines proper games and allows for equilibrium analysis. After an illustration, the approach is adjusted to situations where one wants to rank only acceptable sets of candidates thus rendering the mechanism even more attractive. (shrink)

Consistency and optimality together with converse consistency provide an illuminating and novel characterization of the equilibrium concept (Peleg and Tijs, 1996). But (together with non-emptiness) they preclude refinements of the equilibrium notion and selection of a unique equilibrium (Norde et al., 1996). We suggest two escape routes: By generalizing the concept of strict equilibrium we question the practical relevance of the existence requirement for refinements. To allow for equilibrium selection we suggest more complex reduced games which capture the inclinations of (...) ``players who already left''. (shrink)