The past three years saw more suicide attacks than the last quarter century. Most of these were religiously motivated. While most Westerners have imagined a tightly coordinated transnational terrorist organization headed by Al Qaeda, it seems more likely that nations under attack face a set of largely autonomous groups and cells pursuing their own regional aims. Repeated suicide actions show that massive counterforce alone does not diminish the frequency or intensity of suicide attack. Like pounding mercury with a hammer, (...) this sort of top-heavy counterstrategy only seems to generate more dispersed and insidious forms of suicide terrorism. Even with many top Qaeda leaders now dead or in custody, the transnational Jihadist fraternity is transforming into a hydra-headed network more difficult to fight than before. Poverty and lack of education per se are not root causes of suicide terrorism. And Muslims who have expressed support for martyr actions and trust in Osama Bin Laden or the late Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin do not as a rule hate democratic freedoms or Western culture, although many despise American foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. Rising aspirations followed by dwindling expectations – especially regarding civil liberties – are critical factors in generating support for suicide terrorism. The United States, Israel, Russia and other nations on the frontline in the war on terror need to realize that military and counterinsurgency actions are tactical, not strategic responses to suicide terrorism, the most politically destabilizing and psychologically devastating form of terrorism. When these nations back oppressive and unpopular governments this only generates popular resentment and support for terrorism against those governments and their backers. To attract potential recruits away from Jihadist martyrdom – suicide terrorism's most virulent strain - and to dry up its popular support, requires addressing these grievances before a downward spiral sets in where core meaning in life is sought, and found, in religious networks that sanctify vengeance at any cost against stronger powers, even if it kills the avenger. (shrink)

One of the consequences of Al-Qaeda’s terrorism has been its blurring of the distinction between national and international politics, both of which have lost a great deal of their former autonomy by serving as hosts for a set of new global concerns and practices. The Global War on Terror can be seen as an effort to externalize Al-Qaeda’s global threat by internationalizing it in a conventional war, and thus reinforcing both the autonomy of international politics and its separation (...) from that of a national variety. More than a conservative move to protect the international order, however, the War on Terror was also an ambitious attempt to remake global politics in the wake of the Cold War. But despite the transformations it has wrought, the War on Terror failed to create either a new global order or even a new global politics. (shrink)

Serious threats to global order are said to emanate from Al Qaeda, exemplified by bombings and multiple deaths in, inter alia, Bali, Dar es Salaam, Istanbul, Nairobi, New York and Madrid. These outrages raise the question about the ideological assumptions and goals of Al Qaeda ? given that the majority of the dead were not Jews or Christians, but Muslims. What were the bombers trying to achieve? What were their ideological assumptions and goals? This article argues that Al (...) Qaeda first emerged in the late 1980s to challenge the incumbency and authority of rulers in various Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, with the objective of replacing them with more plausibly Islamic leaders. Due to a lack of success in this regard, Al Qaeda's attention shifted from the domestic to the global: a war against ?the West? utilising the weapons of terror to achieve ideological goals relating to both specific religious concerns, as well as a wider concern with a global balance of power between the West and the world of Islam. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between global poverty and terrorism. The approach is built around a concept of ‘social bandit’ developed by Eric Hobsbawm. By social bandits, Hobsbawm refers to those outlaws in pre-capitalist societies who robbed the rich, and gave to the poor. What was common to social bandits is a myth that surrounded their activity, and a strong popular sympathy and support. This article uses Hobsbawm's notion of social bandit to deal with the fact that in today's international (...) setting, particularly in the context of huge international inequality and widespread poverty in the non-western world, violence against western states, particularly the United States, enjoys significant sympathy elsewhere. This is not only an outcome of inequality and has to do with other factors, particularly certain political or military actions of the USA and other western states, but what is important to note here is that violence perpetrated by terrorists is directed at those who are seen as beneficiaries of the existing order, of international inequalities and injustices. In short, the operation of the international order, its asymmetries and inequalities, riches and wealth in developed countries and poverty and misery elsewhere, seems to play a role in the creation of such social bandits, and in providing them with support and legitimacy which they otherwise would not have had. (shrink)

Now we need to bring this perspective to Afghanistan and Pakistan — one that is smart about cultures, customs and connections. The present policy of focusing on troop strength and drones, and trying to win over people by improving their lives with Western-style aid programs, only continues a long history of foreign involvement and failure. Reading a thousand years of Arab and Muslim history would show little in the way of patterns that would have helped to predict 9/11, but our (...) predicament in Afghanistan rhymes with the past like a limerick.... There's a good chance that enough factions in the loose Taliban coalition would opt to disinvite their troublesome guest if we forget about trying to subdue them or hold their territory. This would unwind the Taliban coalition into a lot of straggling, loosely networked groups that could be eliminated or contained. This means tracking down family and tribal networks, gaining a better understanding of family ties and intervening only when we see actions by Taliban and other groups to aid Al Qaeda or act outside their region.... To defeat violent extremism in Afghanistan, less may be more — just as it has been elsewhere in Asia. (shrink)

Various causal factors have been offered to explain the motives behind the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacs on 9/11 and at various other times and places throughout the world. Quite often the reasons or purposes are said to include political, economic, religious and ethnic factors. Often historical factors, such as colonialism and neo-colonialism, as well as nationalism, poverty, class divisions and modernization, are included. But some scholars and political figures, quite inconsistently at times, assert that there is no discernable purpose or (...) purposes in these attacks. It is argued, for example, that the sheer magnitude of the death and carnage in the 9/11 attacks suggests no rational purpose in the minds of the perpetrators. The implication is that the Al-Qaeda attacks are allegedly purely irrational. In contrast, I argue that there are flaws and inconsistencies with this No Purpose Theory, and that oil, moreover, shouldn’t be omitted from any plausible broad explanation of the complex mix of causal factors. Needless to say, to suggest that Al-Qaeda had reasons is not to suggest that the reasons were necessarily good or morally justifiable. Then again, among these reasons it is necessary to sort out the goals from the violent tactics so as to discover why, in particular, many Arabs and Muslims sympathize with some of the goals.This whole issue is important because, among other things, if the No Purpose Theory is assumed to be accurate, it would, at least for the problem at hand, eliminate from serious consideration in one fell swoop literally all of the other possible factors. This would be so in spite of the initial reasonableness of the notion that many of these factors have at least some weight or other. But if, contrary to what the No Purpose Theory says, items such as oil are shown to be actually causally important, and are consequently on the table for more extended and open discussion, then there at least would be a better opportunity for more successfully tackling these problems and ameliorating the risk of future terrorist attacks. At least so I will argue. (shrink)

: While military and economic power are obviously central instruments of policy in international relations, there are a number of reasons why power alone is insufficient to succeed in fighting terrorism. Three central reasons are discussed in this essay: the limitations and the dilemma of power; the proposition that the most threatening form of terrorism, such as al‐Qaeda's, is conducted by nonstate actors, conventional deterrence against whom is less effective; and the role of motivation in conflicts where the distribution (...) of power is asymmetrical. In addition to these objective reasons, it is argued that the foreign‐policy strategies pursued ultimately affect the actors' own values. (shrink)

The interview revolves around the idea that Al Qaeda is a distinctively modern phenomenon dependent upon modern and Western ideas of transformation of the human condition through mass violence. Meanwhile, the USA and Europe are deeply superstitious about their own unique position in the world. Professor John Gray outlines a clash of modernisms, the one not less ambitious or global in nature than the other. He applies an analysis of modernity upon present phenomena such as the war in Iraq, (...) the failed EU constitution, the debate about Muslims and more broadly religion in secular societies, etc., and sketches an alternative path for the West than the present liberal revolutionary; a path informed by an awareness of limitations. (shrink)

The article examines some recent areas of Al Qaeda and salafi-jihadi ideology and argues that, while there has been an evolution in strategy since 9/11, the core elements of salafi-jihadi ideology have remained unchanged. The article explores ideological, technical and aesthetic aspects of Al Qaeda and salafi-jihadi literature. It is argued that salafi-jihadi ideology is characterized by a particular association between political virtue and visceral violence, an association that dominates the aesthetic and cultural universe created by salafi-jihadis. Existing (...) views that salafi-jihadi thought represents an ethical project or a project for humanity or a response to military occupations are, it is argued, consequences of a broader philosophical and social theory tradition that privileges a specifically theological idea of sacrifice. Instead, it is argued that salafi-jihadi ideology is characterized by an array of sharp oppositions. These contrasting doublets of ideas include ones about the temporal world and the afterlife, authoritarian law and violent chaos, loyalty and enmity, defilement and plenitude, tangible lands and imagined spaces. These severe theoretical oppositions in salafi-jihadi thinking are outlined and considered in relation to broader social theory. The article also considers the sociological importance of ideas of Paradise and the afterlife in salafi-jihadi thought. The distinct nature of salafi-jihadi thought, and the understanding of political violence it contains, are considered in relation to nationalist jihadi and political Islamist tendencies. (shrink)

This article discusses the rights enjoyed by irregular combatants in detention, that is, members of organized groups (who may be fighting an insurgency or engaging in terror attacks) who fail to qualify for POW status. The paradigmatic example of such a detainee would be an al-Qaeda agent.

Many millions of people hold conspiracy theories; they believe that powerful people have worked together in order to withhold the truth about some important practice or some terrible event. A recent example is the belief, widespread in some parts of the world, that the attacks of 9/11 were carried out not by Al Qaeda, but by Israel or the United States. Those who subscribe to conspiracy theories may create serious risks, including risks of violence, and the existence of such (...) theories raises significant challenges for policy and law. The first challenge is to understand the mechanisms by which conspiracy theories prosper; the second challenge is to understand how such theories might be undermined. Such theories typically spread as a result of identifiable cognitive blunders, operating in conjunction with informational and reputational influences. A distinctive feature of conspiracy theories is their self-sealing quality. Conspiracy theorists are not likely to be persuaded by an attempt to dispel their theories; they may even characterize that very attempt as further proof of the conspiracy. Because those who hold conspiracy theories typically suffer from a crippled epistemology, in accordance with which it is rational to hold such theories, the best response consists in cognitive infiltration of extremist groups. Various policy dilemmas, such as the question whether it is better for government to rebut conspiracy theories or to ignore them, are explored in this light. (shrink)

In the decade since Al-Qaeda, led by the late Osama Bin Laden, attacked America, there has been a resurgence in the debate about the relationship between religion and politics. The global Islamic terrorist networks and their successful operations against various targets around the globe increasingly draw attention to what constitutes the core values of Islamic extremism: the logic of evangelistic strategy, the import and relevance of its spiritual message and consideration of the composite view of life that does not (...) distinguish between sacred and temporal mandates. Suspicions have been fuelled that Islam is incompatible with modern democratic systems and pluralist outlooks. The real cause of Islamic militancy is at once universal and particular. The Nigerian experience of this radical Islamism-Boko Haram-brings home the once “distant” threat to global peaceful co-existence. While there exist arguments regarding the raison d’etre and means or methods of the operations of Boko Haram, the end has been normative; to achieve a purely religious nationalistic system on the basis of the sharia code of ethics. This paper, therefore, critically analyses the historical and philosophical interpretations of Islamic history constructed as an infallible corpus, and how it has been impacted by the democratic vision in Nigeria. It concludes with a consideration of the possibility and practicability of a liberal system at once free and religious in a pluralist and global society. (shrink)

In the age of terrorism, the temptations of ruthlessness can be overwhelming. Yet a violent response to violence arguably makes us morally indistinguishable from our enemies. There is perhaps no greater political challenge today than trying to win the war against terror without losing our democratic souls. Michael Ignatieff confronts this challenge head-on, with the combination of hard-headed idealism, historical sensitivity and political judgement that has made him one of the most influential voices in international affairs today. Ignatieff argues that (...) we must not shrink from the use of violence. But its use - in a liberal democracy - must be measured. And we must not fool ourselves that whatever we do in the name of freedom and democracy is good. We may need to kill to fight the greater evil of terrorism, but we must never pretend that doing so is anything better than a lesser evil. In making this case, Ignatieff traces the modern history of terrorism and counter-terrorism, from the nihilists of Czarist Russia and the militias of Weimar Germany to the IRA and the unprecedented menace of Al Qaeda. (shrink)

Extremism is one of the most charged and controversial issues of the 21st Century. Despite myriad programs of deradicalization and prevention around the world, it remains an intractable and poorly understood problem. Yet it can also be regarded as a positive force - according to Martin Luther King Jnr., "the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we will be." In this much-needed and lucid book, Quassim Cassam identifies three types of extremism--ideological; methods; and (...) mindset extremism--and uses them to discuss the following fundamental topics and issues: What is extremism? What are the methods adopted by extremists? Is there an extremist 'mindset' and if so, what is it? What role do ideas of purity, victimhood and humiliation play in understanding extremism? How does extremism differ from fanaticism and fundamentalism? How does one become an extremist and how should we understand deradicalization? Throughout the book, Quassim Cassam uses many compelling examples, ranging from the Khmer Rouge, the IRA, Al-Qaeda, and Timothy McVeigh to Philip Roth's novel American Pastoral and counter-extremism programs, including the UK's 'Prevent' strategy. Clear-headed and engaging, Extremism: A Philosophical Analysis is essential reading for anyone interested in this important topic, not only in Philosophy but related disciplines such as Politics and International Relations, Conflict and Terrorism studies, Law, Education and Religion. It will also be of great interest to policy makers and those engaged in understanding extremism at any level. (shrink)

The contributors to this volume argue that whilst there is a commonplace superstition conspiracy theories are examples of bad beliefs (and that the kind of people who believe conspiracy theories are typically irrational), many conspiracy theories are rational to believe: the members of the Dewey Commission were right to say that the Moscow Trials of the 1930s were a sham; Woodward and Bernstein were correct to think that Nixon was complicit in the conspiracy to deny any wrongdoing in the Watergate (...) Hotel break in; and if we either accept the terrorist events of 9/11 were committed by Al-Qaeda, or that the Bush Administration was responsible, then it seems we are endorsing some theory about a conspiracy to commit an act of terror on American soil. As such, there is no reason to reject conspiracy theories sui generis. This volume challenges the prima facie that conspiracy theories are irrational beliefs, arguing that we should treat conspiracy theories and the phenomena of conspiracy theories seriously. It presents fresh perspectives from the wider philosophical, sociological and psychological community on what is becoming an issue of increasing relevance in our time. (shrink)

This volume combines rigorous empirical and theoretical analyses with political engagement to look beyond reductive short-hands that ignore the historical evolution and varieties of Islamic doctrine and that deny the complexities of Muslim societies' encounters with modernity itself. Are Islam and democracy compatible? Can we shed the language of 'Islam vs. the West' for new political imaginaries? The authors analyze struggles over political legitimacy since the Arab Spring and the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS in their historical and (...) political complexity across the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. Distinguishing multiculturalism from interculturalism and understanding multiple modernities, philosophers in the volume tease out the complexities of civilizational encounters. The volume also shows how the Paris massacres or the Danish caricature controversy do not remain confined to Europe but influence struggles and confrontations within Muslim societies. Gender and Islam are addressed from a comparative perspective bringing into conversation not only the experience of different Muslim countries with Islamic law but also by analysing Jewish family law. (shrink)

Suicide attack is the most virulent and horrifying form of terrorism in the world today. The mere rumor of an impending suicide attack can throw thousands of people into panic. This occurred during a Shi‘a procession in Iraq in late August 2005, causing hundreds of deaths. Although suicide attacks account for a minority of all terrorist acts, they are responsible for a majority of all terrorism-related casualties, and the rate of attacks is rising rapidly across the globe. During 2000–2004, there (...) were 472 suicide attacks in 22 countries, killing more than 7,000 and wounding tens of thousands. Most have been carried out by Islamist groups claiming religious motivation, also known as jihadis. Rand Corp. vice president and terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman has found that 80 percent of suicide attacks since 1968 occurred after the September 11 attacks, with jihadis representing 31 of the 35 responsible groups. More suicide attacks occurred in 2004 than in any previous year, and 2005 has proven even more deadly, with attacks in Iraq alone averaging more than one per day, according to data gathered by the U.S. military. The July 2005 London and Sinai bombings, a second round of bombings at tourist destinations in Bali in October, coordinated hotel bombings in Jordan in November, the arrival of suicide bombings in Bangladesh in December, a record year of attacks in Afghanistan, and daily bombings in Iraq have spurred renewed interest in suicide terrorism, with recent analyses stressing the strategic logic, organizational structure, and rational calculation involved. Whereas they once primarily consisted of organized campaigns by militarily weak forces aiming to end the perceived occupation of their homeland, as argued by University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape in Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, suicide attacks today serve as banner actions for a thoroughly modern, global diaspora inspired by religion and claiming the role of vanguard for a massive, media-driven transnational political awakening. Living mostly in the diaspora and undeterred by the threat of retaliation against original home populations, jihadis, who are frequently middle-class, secularly well educated, but often “born-again” radical Islamists, including converts from Christianity, embrace apocalyptic visions for humanity's violent salvation. In Muslim countries and across western Europe, bright and idealistic Muslim youth, even more than the marginalized and dispossessed, internalize the jihadi story, illustrated on satellite television and the Internet with the ubiquitous images of social injustice and political repression with which much of the Muslim world's bulging immigrant and youth populations intimately identifies. From the suburbs of Paris to the jungles of Indonesia, I have interviewed culturally uprooted and politically restless youth who echo a stunningly simplified and decontextualized message of martyrdom for the sake of global jihad as life's noblest cause. They are increasingly as willing and even eager to die as they are to kill. The policy implications of this change in the motivation, organization, and calculation of suicide terrorism may be as novel as hitherto neglected. Many analysts continue to claim that jihadism caters to the destitute and depraved, the craven and criminal, or those who “hate freedom.” Politicians and pundits have asserted that jihadism is nihilistic and immoral, with no real program or humanity. Yet, jihadism is none of these things. Do we really understand the causes of today's suicide terrorism? Do suicide attacks stem mainly from a political cause, such as military occupation? Do they need a strong organization, such as Al Qaeda? What else could be done to turn the rising tide of martyrdom? (shrink)

The focus of this paper is on the network aspect of Islamic movements, i.e. what networks are, what their structure is and what some of their properties are. The discussion focuses on scale-free networks, their properties and networks value expressed in social capital and formulated in the Strength of Weak Ties theory by Granovetter. Al-Qaeda has been the most frequent reference in the research on the transnational Islamic networks, so somewhat unintentionally al-Qaeda’s example often appears in this paper (...) as well. (shrink)

The mass popular dissent which has marked the early twenty-first century, from al-Qaeda to the Arab Spring to the Occupy movement, can be read as expressions of collective, subjective, existential mutation. This reading is inspired by Félix Guattari, who described the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Polish Solidarity movement and the 1989 Chinese student demonstrations as demands for subjective singularisation. In each of these examples of social discontent, past and present, demands vary widely even within the same movement, spanning economics, (...) lifestyle, religion and politics, and ranging from cries for liberation to conservative returns to ancient tradition. In order to perform a schizoanalysis of such amorphous movements, Guattari developed a four-part ecosophic object, composed of existential Territories, Universes of value, material-energetic Flows and machinic Phyla. Assemblages can be dynamically mapped along these four dimensions. Of crucial importance in the age of extreme deterritorialisation is the existential Territory, which could potentially take the form of a homeland based on poetry or music rather than on ethnicity or even place. Such portable homelands would characterise the dissensual processual post-media era for which Guattari longed. (shrink)

Half of this piece appeared under the title “Postscript on Cultivation: Editorial Note” in Common Knowledge 8, no. 2 (spring 2002), and half was written in 2023 by one of the coauthors as a posthumous tribute to the other. The historian Natalie Zemon Davis died on the fourteenth day of the latest war between Hamas and Israel in Gaza. The relevance of “Postscript,” which was written following the attacks by al-Qaeda in the United States on September 11, 2001, is (...) that it redirects the attention of scholars from the battlefield and mass media to the ivory towers in which intellectuals are sometimes said to hide. Cultivated civilians ought to know that cultures strive to erase one another in ways vile but unsurprising. Those who learn history expect atrocity and should busy themselves less with assignment of blame than with archaeology, the preservation of objects, the collection of reports and stories, and the reinforcement — by retiring from the streets into libraries and other spaces of patient cooperation — of the partition between barbarism and civilization. With reference to the religious wars of the sixteenth century, during which — Davis showed in a famous essay — Catholics and Protestants fought each other by day but met by night to collect and distribute alms, Perl commends the urge to withdraw from both combat and protest into institutions doing good works quietly. (shrink)

Author Rizwaan Sabir, as a then-MA student at Nottingham University, became known as one-half of the “Nottingham Two” following his arrest along with Hicham Yezza in May 2008. They were detained for six days without charge on suspicion of terrorism for the possession of a document titled the Al Qaeda Training Manual, which was freely available on the internet and from bookstores. Sabir had downloaded it from a US government website for use as primary source material in his proposed (...) PhD research on armed Muslim groups. But Sabir’s arrest, detention, interrogation, and release without charge takes up only about one-fifth of the pages; the remainder covers subsequent events revealing the extent of the surveillance to... Read More. (shrink)

NOT all groups that the United States government classifies as terrorist organizations are equally bad or dangerous, and not all information conveyed to them that is based on political, academic or scientific expertise risks harming our national security. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, which last week upheld a law banning the provision of “material support” to foreign terrorist groups, doesn't seem to consider those facts relevant.... The two of us are social scientists who study and interact with violent groups in order (...) to find ways out of intractable conflicts. In the course of this work and in our discussions with decision makers in the Middle East and elsewhere we have seen how informal meetings and exchanges of knowledge have borne fruit. It's not that religious, academic or scientific credentials automatically convey trust, but when combined with a personal commitment to peace, they often carry weight beyond mere opinion or desire.... In our own work on groups categorized as terrorist organizations, we have detected significant differences in their attitudes and actions. For example, in our recent interactions with the leader of the Palestinian militant group Islamic Jihad Ramadan Shallah, we were faced with an adamant refusal to ever recognize Israel or move toward a two-state solution. Yet when we talked to Khaled Meshal, the leader of Hamas, he said that his movement could imagine a two-state “peace”. In our time with Mr. Meshal's group, we were also able to confirm something that Saudi and Israeli intelligence officers had told us: Hamas has fought to keep Al Qaeda out of its field of influence, and has no demonstrated interest in global jihad. Whether or not the differences among Al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hamas and other violent groups are fundamental, rather than temporary or tactical, is something only further exploration will reveal. But to assume that it is invariably wrong to engage any of these groups is a grave mistake.... (shrink)

For the last three decades or so, Pakistan has been a severe victim of sectarian violence. Although the roots of sectarian violence in the Pakistani society could be traced to various political developments in the country and the region, such as, Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization process, Iranian Revolution and the anti-Soviet Afghan war, during the late 1970s, the dangerous phase of sectarian menace began after the 9/11 incident when the domestic sectarian militant organizations established their links with international terrorist groups, e.g., Al- (...) class='Hi'>Qaeda and then the self-styled Islamic State, and started playing the role of a facilitator as well as becoming the part of global Jihadism. Against this background, the paper analyzes the origins of sectarianism in Pakistan and threats which it poses to the integrity of the country. In the concluding analysis, the paper argues that the violent extremist ideology that creates ideologically-motivated committed terrorists may be countered if Pakistan reorients its strategic policies vis-à-vis its eastern and western neighbors – India and Afghanistan – by discouraging the use of proxies for pursuing its strategic interests in the region. (shrink)

THE ATTACKS in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 were terrible events, they were also acts of barbarism. The deaths (and the manner of the deaths) of so very many people on the ground, in the buildings, and on the airliners were atrocious. Many of those who died were of course those who responded out of feelings of duty or altruism to the initial event. In attacking New York, the Islamo-fascists of Al Qaeda attacked one of the (...) most cosmopolitan cities in the world, a city of immigrants (both now and Christopher Bertram is a member of the historically) and a city which many great cultural and artistic figures have made their home (DaPonte. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to describe the social networks of the Maghrebis in Alicante, some of the problems they face in their daily life, and the role played by the “mosque” as a place not only of prayer but also of mutual help and support. At the same time, the analysis shows that Islamophobia has increased in the city, as it has done in other places in Spain and Europe following the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, with the resulting (...) rejection of the Maghrebis clearly seen in their relationship with local inhabitants and in some of the local authorities’ political decisions. (shrink)

Two centuries after Carl von Clausewitz wrote On War, it lines the shelves of military colleges around the world and even showed up in an Al Qaeda hideout. Though it has shaped much of the common parlance on the subject, On War is perceived by many as a “metaphysical fog,” widely known but hardly read. In War as Paradox, Youri Cormier lifts the fog on this iconic work by explaining its philosophical underpinnings. Building up a genealogy of dialectical war (...) theory and integrating Hegel with Clausewitz as a co-founders of the method, Cormier uncovers a common logic that shaped the fighting doctrines and ethics of modern war. He explains how Hegel and Clausewitz converged on method, but nonetheless arrived at opposite ethics and military doctrines. Ultimately, Cormier seeks out the limits to dialectical war theory and explores the greater paradoxes the method reveals: can so-called “rational” theories of war hold up under the pressures of irrational propositions, such as lone-wolf attacks, the circular logic of a “war to end all wars,” or the apparent folly of mutually assured destruction? Since the Second World War, commentators have described war as obsolete. War as Paradox argues that dialectical war theory may be the key to understanding why, despite this, it continues. (shrink)

The immediate perception after 9/11 was that we were entering a world of “new terrorism”: new actors, new tactics, new responses. And yet more than a decade later, it seems that not much has really changed, or that the changes have been contextual rather than structural. Authors have used the modifier “new” in many different ways, creating a contested and confused understanding of what terrorism is and how it appears in the world. The same applies to how one defines terrorism, (...) examines its domains and forms, delineates its actors and strategies, or compares it to state violence and fear in international relations. This raises the question of why scholars, rather than agreeing on a definition of terrorism, have focused on its many contexts, applications, and psychologies, concluding that there is a substantial and significant difference between the old and the new terrorism. However, when one tests this notion of the “new terrorism” against the case of Al-Qaeda, one finds that the tactical changes, primarily technological, as well as those in motivation and organization, are hardly new, and that the structural, ideological, and political features of terrorism have remained fundamentally the same. (shrink)

Occasionally you will hear it said that the violence perpetrated by organizations such as Al Qaeda is “nihilistic.” The senses of the term as thus employed seem to be largely intuitive, and involve a cluster of notions. The journalist and pundit Christopher Hitchens, for example, offers up such descriptions as “sinister grandiosity,” “pointless nastiness,” and “the tactic of demanding the impossible and demanding it at gun- point.”1 The idea is that contrary to the revolutionary, idealist rhetoric of those enacting (...) the violence, there is something hollow, cruel, and irratio- nal at the center of such actions. This intuitive application of the term “nihilistic” to organizations such as Al Qaeda has substantial merit, and it is in fact possible to specify a more detailed philosophical and psycholog- ical basis to the concept.2 A properly elaborated concept of nihilism is of considerable interpretive utility where some of the familiar socio-political concepts like “colonialism,” “globalization,” and the like have demon- strable shortcomings. Hegel and Nietzsche have, in separate ways, devel- oped the sort of philosophical and psychological basis to the notion of nihilism as discussed here. (shrink)

Today, public health regulation at all levels faces unprecedented challenges both at home and abroad. The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., by the Al Qaeda terrorist network and the anthrax bioterrorism that followed shortly thereafter have put public health regulation at the forefront of homeland security. The anthrax scare, in particular, has greatly tested the American public health system, calling into question whether the United States and its component states and localities are prepared to (...) handle a major outbreak of infectious disease, such as smallpox, in a future bioterrorist action. While the response of public health agencies was commendable, especially in light of the magnitude of the assaults, it is manifestly clear that the American public health system will be hard pressed to meet similar challenges that may lie ahead.The events of fall 2001 follow a period of major challenges for public health. The AIDS pandemic has killed millions of people throughout the globe, especially in Africa and other parts of the developing world. (shrink)

Over the last years, there has been a steady stream of books published on deconstruction and the work of Jacques Derrida in addition to the many books by Derrida himself. Derrida’s death on 8 October 2004 in no way stopped this wealth of publications, including texts on Derrida, deconstruction, and politics. There have been a number of books on Derrida,1 including edited volumes,2 and there is now a Derrida journal, Derrida Today. This is in addition to posthumously published works by (...) Derrida himself, of which The Beast and the Sovereign will be of most interest to this journal’s readers.3 Much of this literature links deconstruction and Derrida’s writings to politics. This may be in part because of Derrida’s own engagement with political concepts and institutions in his later work, but may also be a reaction to the emergence of new political phenomena (e.g. international terrorism of the al-Qaeda type) which in turn creates a need to rethink traditional concepts (e.g. sovereignty). Interestingly much of this literature on deconstruction and politics comes not from political scientists, but from other disciplines, including philosophy, comparative literature, and law. This includes the two books under review here*Mustapha Che´rif ’s Islam and the West and Martin McQuillan’s Deconstruction After 9/114*neither of which is written by a political scientist. As is the case with many other contemporary texts on Derrida, these two books examine how Derrida and deconstruction can help us understand contemporary political phenomena. The two books both address issues related to the signifiers ‘9/11,’ ‘Islam,’ and ‘the West,’but they also question the received meanings of those signifiers, for instance, the idea of ‘Islam’ as a monolith and as the Other of ‘the West.’ (Published: 4 December 2009) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2009, pp. 383–388. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i4.2108. (shrink)

The theme of this article is the threat—and the opportunities—posed to progressive aspirations by the phenomenon that has come to be known as globalization. A decade ago the term globalization was a novelty both in academic circles and in the popular press. Now, no discussion of economics or political debate seems complete without reference to it. And the recent attacks of Al Qaeda and the invasion of Iraq push the problems of an international legal order and the potential universality (...) of the rights of man to the top of the agenda. Yet in its essence globalization is not a recent—or even a 20th century—phenomenon. The view that globalization is no new phenomenon has some substance. (shrink)

This article is a reply to Alan Rosenbaum’s reply to my reply to his orginal article on terrorism and collective responsibility. As before, and contra Rosenbaum, I argue that some forms of terrorism in some circumstances might be morally justified. This position is consistent with holding the terrorist acts of groups such as Hamas and al-Qaeda to be morally unjustifiable. An example of a possibly morally justifiable form of terrorism was that practised by the African National Congress in its (...) armed struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa. (shrink)

Given certain well-known empirical facts–including the Bush II administration’s motivations and its actions initiating the war – the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (and its continuing war of occupation) is not just (i.e., is not morally justified), on any standard interpretation of Just War Theory criteria for jus ad bellum. Since there was no imminent threat of attack by Iraq against the U.S., the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a Preventative or Merely Precautionary War (which is notrecognized by either (...) Just War Theory or international law as a legitimate basis for initiating a war) rather than a Preemptive War (which may sometimes be justified, if there is a real threat of imminent attack) or a Reactive War (responding to an unjustified attack from an aggressor, which is always justified). Moreover, the neo-conservative program for perpetual U.S. world domination by the weakening of other nations and the invasions of weaker nations for purposes of U.S. economic and geopolitical advantage (behind the facade of “spreading democracy and freedom”) is not morally justified. However, the moral status of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan is much less clear. Many argue that is was morally justified according to both Just War Theory and international law, given certain well-established empirical facts; particularly, al-Qaeda’s involvement with the events of 9-11 and the Taliban government’s protection of al-Qaeda and its terrorist infrastructure within Afghanistan. On this analysis, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was justified as both a Reactive War (responding to an unjustified attack against primarily civilian targets) and a Preemptive War (to try to make sure that al-Qaeda did not have the opportunity to use its infrastructure in Afghanistan to arrange other attacks on civilian targets in the U.S. or other nations). But the cogency of this analysis depends on whether there were any realistic alternatives fordisrupting al-Qaeda and bringing its leaders to justice; and some argue that such alternatives did exist. Moreover, even if U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan was morally justified it is arguable that the amount and type of force used – e.g. intensive, wide-spread bombing campaigns that killed many civilians – were not justified. (shrink)

More than a decade has passed since the tragic events that took place in America in the dramatic day of September 9th 2001. For the first time since the end of the second World War, the United States were being attacked on their own territory, without prior notice, by a non-state military force which was globally organised, for religious and ideological reasons. The terrorist attacks planned and executed by the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda on American military and civilian targets have (...) reconfigured the international security environment. The author remarks that the security of the European continent is inextricably linked to what happens outside its external borders. Transnational organized crime, illegal human trafficking, illegal migration, traffic of drug, weapons, ammunition and portable vectors, the proliferation of illegal trade of radioactive and other "sensible" technologies, the expansion of terrorist networks – they all represent threats to the Eastern border of Romania and concern the security of the EU Eastern neighbourhood. (shrink)

This contribution consists in an attempt to make sense of one central aspect of the present worldwide turbulence, one which might well be called the contemporary, perfect, global storm. A pivotal problem that will be interrogated is the issue of the circumstances that have produced this phenomenon in most parts of the world, although it should be emphasized that the term populism is, more often than not, applied to the Western world rather than the East or, for the most part, (...) the global South. However, this reservation does not amount to a severe caveat, since all the contemporary signs are that what is here called populism is sweeping across the entire world as a whole, even though it is not necessarily given this name in non-Western regions. To this generalization it should be added that there are, rather obviously, parallels to what has become known as populism in the West. Examples of this are anarchism in nineteenth century Russia and the movement known as the Long March under the leadership of Mao Zedong in the years 1934 and 1935 particularly, as well as al Qaeda and its various offshoots. (shrink)

This essay explores how the garden (in Persian, pairadaeza) may function as an image of flourishing pluralism among theists and naturalists. Initially, the essay draws upon A Thousand Plateaus to formulate the principles of a Deleuzian comparative political theory. Next, the essay interprets and evaluates the work of the Sufi scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr, the al-Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the Shi'i political reformer 'Abdolkarim Soroush. The essay concludes by considering how diverse existential faiths (or flowers) in the garden (...) may collaborate to address the ecological crisis. (shrink)

Ways of prediction, ways of rhetoric? Let me begin by placing side-by-side two statements that, at face value, have nothing in common. The first comes from a report by a world leader in forecasting, Stratfor: Forecasting world events is a difficult task that takes guts and discipline. Though you can find endless scenarios and speculation almost anywhere, Stratfor gives you forecasts. These are a few of the unlikely predictions we made long before the headlines caught up: 1995—Disparity between net creditor (...) and debtor states in Europe will make it difficult to sustain a unified currency. 2005—The center of gravity will shift from al Qaeda's core group to regional spinoffs and grassroots jihadists. 2008—NATO will... (shrink)

This paper analyses the reemerging concept of evil in political science and international relations. Evil is approached as the link between the metaphorical and the metaphysical that is used to sacralize politics. After introducing the concepts of metaphor, metaphysics and the sacred, we expand on the definition of evil by drawing on existing philosophical and theological literature. We proceed to analyze its effects in politics by applying our findings to examples from the United States, Russia, India, Myanmar, Israel, ISIS and (...) Al-Qaeda. The paper addresses the political potential of the common evil for building international communities in the third section. We conclude that the concept of evil achieves the sacralization of politics by effacing itself, that is, by becoming metaphysical. The metaphor of evil, then, is most successful precisely when it is no longer a metaphor at all but deemed a metaphysical reality. (shrink)