In einem Brief nennt Adorno die "Negative Dialektik" kurz nach ihrem Erscheinen unter seinen Schriften "das philosophische Hauptwerk, wenn ich so sagen darf“. Dieser herausgehobenen Bedeutung, die das Werk für Adorno hatte, entspricht nicht nur die lange Zeit, die er mit der Abfassung des Buchs beschäftigt war, sondern auch die lange Geschichte, die ihre zentralen Motive in seinem Denken haben. Philosophische Begriffsklärung, die Arbeit an "Begriff und Kategorien“ einer negativen Dialektik, versteht Adorno dabei als dialektischen Übergang in inhaltliches Denken – (...) und so betreibt er sie auch hier. Das hat Konsequenzen für die Form des kooperativen Kommentars, der in diesem Band versucht wird. Adornos "Negative Dialektik" zu kommentieren, kann nur in dem Bewußtsein der unüberbrückbaren Kluft gelingen, die den Kommentar von diesem Text trennt. (shrink)

The following is the transcript of a lecture taken in shorthand by Hans-Georg Backhaus. The transcript was originally published as an appendix in Hans-Georg Backhaus, Dialektik der Wertform. Untersuchungen zur marxschen Ökonomiekritik, a complete translation of which is forthcoming in the Historical Materialism book series.

While a number of classical pragmatists crafted their philosophies in conjunction with a careful study of Hegel's works, others saw their philosophies emerge in antagonism with proponents of Hegel. In this paper, we offer an instance of the latter case. Namely, we show that the impetus for Charles S. Peirce's early articulation and avowal of realism (the claim that some generals are real) was William Torrey Harris's claim that the formal laws of logic lacked universal validity. According to Harris, the (...) leading representative of Hegelism in the United States, the universal validity of the laws of logic rested on a nominalistic metaphysics that a Hegelian-realism showed to be false. In response to this charge, we articulate how Peirce's attempt to prove the universal validity of the laws of logic resulted in avowing a realism that differed from both nominalism and Harris's Hegelian-realism. (shrink)

W. I. Matson; VIII—Against Induction and Empiricism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 143–158, https://doi.org/10.

W. Mays; II—Carnap on Logic and Language, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 21–38, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

W. H. Walsh; I—The Presidential Address: Moral Authority and Moral Choice, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 65, Issue 1, 1 June 1965, Pages 1–24.

W. Stegmüller sees the decisive difficulty of the Laplacean interpretation of Carnaps probability in the lack of the required equiprobable possibilities. It is argued that the required equiprobabilities in physics are given by statistical mechanics and can easily be transferred from physics to general statistical problems.

The two basic forms of action distinguished in the preceding articles, viz., moral action, where praxis is for praxis sake, and action for a good, where praxis is for the sake of theôria, are found in close relationship to one another in human life. The part they play is rather that of abstract moments in a practical process than that of self-contained and isolable bits of conduct. No philosopher is likely to discount the importance of thus analysing the concrete into (...) its factors before he rectifies the abstraction by showing how they co-operate in actual experience. In any individual biography we can find acts and courses of action in which duty is the dominant motive, and others in which the dominant motive is desire of good. Similarly, when we compare different biographies with one another, some exemplify most strikingly the struggle for righteousness against unruly passion, others the spontaneous aspiration of the soul to attain the goal of its desire. But neither the moral law nor the summum bonum wields an exclusive sovereignty. St. Paul and Luther, in their warfare against carnal desire, drew strength from the ideal vision; nor were St. Bernard or Spinoza, for all their absorption upon union with the divine, strangers to the call of moral obligation. In the lives of ordinary men, the types of conduct are, perhaps, more evenly balanced; yet here also the distinction is discernible. Moreover, it is easy to see how, despite their intrinsic difference, they come to be associated and “by just exchange” to effect a mutual enrichment. (shrink)

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

One approach to applied AI is to automate business processes and remove people from the system. Another approach is to use AI methods to model how work actually gets done, so we can understand the essential role of knowledge people have about each other ("social knowledge") in allocating resources, assigning jobs, and forming teams.

Ordinairement les manuels de biologie débutent par une exposition des caractéristiques qui distinguent la nature organique de la nature anorganique. En définissant et en limitant aussi exactement que possible son sujet, la biologie, le biologue ne fait pas autre chose que le mathématicien. La présente étude nous montre les obstacles presque insurmontables auxquels se heurtent le biologue et le mathématicien. A les bien considérer, les anciennes distinctions entre l'organisme d'une part et la matière non-organisée ou un système statique matériel, comme (...) la machine, d'autre part, se basant sur la nutrition, la respiration, les échanges vitaux et le mouvement ne tiennent plus debout. L'auteur allègue les expériences récentes de W. M. Stanley (Rockefeller Institute à Princeton) d'où il appert qu'il peut y avoir aussi génération dans les substances qui se secrètent sous la forme de cristaux (cristaux vivants), et s'en rapporte aux fameuses expériences de Driesch sur la régénération. Il y rattache les conceptions de Jordan (Utrecht) -- rapports entre les enchaînements des causes "d'après leur caractère amboceptor"; "le dessein des causes". Les vitalistes portent surtout leur attention sur "la totalité", les mécanistes sur "les parties". Le naturaliste qui se propose uniquement la recherche des causes physico-chimiques des phénomènes physico-chimiques serait parfaitement en droit de se contenter d'une conception mécaniste de la nature. Mais cette conception mécaniste ne suffirait pas à celui qui, comme l'auteur, aspire à comprendre l'organisme dans son ensemble. (shrink)

In an interesting article entitled ‘XOPOY in the Plutus’ Mr. E. W. Handley questions the accuracy of some observations of mine on this subject, and complains of my ‘failure to state facts’. He quotes my remark that ‘the editors freely insert () in the Plutus; but, according to Weissinger , the only example afforded by the MSS. is after 770; and here there is no lapse of time’. I added in a footnote that R inserts XOPOY after line 801, according (...) to the Oxford text. Handley's own researches have shown him that R has KOMMATION XOPOY between 770 and 771, and that R has inserted XOPOY between 801 and 802. (shrink)

Nature of the problem: Testimony from scientists. Reflex action and theism (1881) by W. James. The organization of thought (1916) by A.N. Whitehead. The changing scientific scene 1900-1950 (1952) by J.B. Conant. A note on methods of analysis (1943) by H.J. Muller. The way things are (1959) by P.W. Bridgman. A definition of style (1948) by J.R. Oppenheimer.--Consequences of the problem: Testimony from artists and writers. Existentialism (1947) by J.-P. Sartre. The testimony of modern art (1957) by W. Barrett. Parts (...) of speech and punctuation (1935) by G. Stein. The waves (1931) by V. Woolf. The imperfect paradise, by W. Stevens. A note on style and the limits of language, by W. Gibson. (shrink)

W. Norris Clarke, S. J.; A Curious Blindspot in the Anglo-American Tradition of Antitheistic Argument, The Monist, Volume 54, Issue 2, 1 April 1970, Pages 181–2.