Between the two World Wars, in Belgrade and Serbia, seven musical journals were published:?Musical Gazette?,?Music?,?Herald of the Musical Society Stankovic?,?Sound?,?Journal of The South Slav Choral Union?,?Slavic Music? and?Music Review?. The influence of marxism can be observed in?Musical Herald?,?Sound? and?Slavic Music?. A Marxist influence is obvious through indications of determinism. Namely, some writers observed elements of musical art and its history as consequences of sociopolitical and economic processes. Still, journals published articles of domestic and foreign authors who interpreted the relation between (...) music, society and economy in a much more moderate and subtle manner. Editors and associates of these journals also had proscriptive ambitions - they recommended and even determined regulations for composers about what kind of music to write according to social goals and needs. According to tendencies in Marxism, there was a follow up of musical work in the Soviet Union. Editors tried not to be one-sided. There were writings about the USSR by left orientated associates as much as emigrants from that country, and articles of Soviet authors were translated. Also, there were critical tones about musical development in the first country of socialism. Serbian musical periodicals recognized the enormous threat from fascism. Also, there were articles about influence of Nazi ideology and dictatorship on musical prospects in Germany. Since Germany annexed Sudetenland in 1938,?Musical Herald? expressed support to musicians and people of that friendly country by devoting the October and November 1938 issue to Czechoslovak music, along with an appropriate introduction by the editor, Stana Djuric-Klajn. (shrink)

The author's response to Peter Ludlow´s contribution to the special issue on The Indexical Point of View.

One of the biggest contemporary challenges in education is the appropriate application of advanced digital solutions. If properly implemented, AI could benefit students, opening the door for personalized study programs. However, we need to ensure that AI in classrooms is used responsibly and that it does not pose a threat to students in any way. More specifically, we need to preserve the moral and epistemic values we wish to pass on to future generations and ensure the inclusion of underprivileged students. (...) Moreover, there is a huge problem of different accessibility to technology and representation in the educational material between the Global South and the Global North. This can cause both global epistemic and moral injustice. On the other hand, AI has the potential to increase global justice in education. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to use it in accordance with the values of equity, fairness, and inclusion that secure global justice for underprivileged groups. (shrink)

In this paper I argue in favour of Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant's account of objectivity as advocated in the celebrated Second Analogy in Kant's first Critique. The criticism that I am looking at is presented as the first of Schopenhauer's four objections against the Second Analogy deployed in section 23 of his On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Knowledge Some Epistemological Distinctions Non‐Conceptual Knowledge of Objects Non‐Conceptual Knowledge of Causal Relations Causal Regularity and Its Cognitive Status Induction and Scientific Method Empirical Knowledge and Its Experiential Basis Two Related Issues Scientific and Philosophical Knowledge Concluding Remarks References Further Reading.

Focusing on the 'today'/'yesterday' case, I argue that Perry is wrong in accounting for and explaining indexical belief states in terms of Kaplanian characters and in taking these states to be internal (narrow) mental states inside the subject's mind. It is shown that this view is at odds with Perry's own reliance on remembering a past day as a necessary condition for retaining a belief about it. As a better tool for explaining appropriate indexical beliefs, I offer an alternative which (...) is neo-Fregean in that it takes senses or modes of presentation as playing only a cognitive, not a semantic role. It, however, takes remembering a past day as necessary for retaining a belief about it, rather than keeping track of time as urged by Evans. I also consider unfeasible Evans's further requirement which he takes over from Frege: that in order to retain a belief about a certain past day we need to think of it now under the same mode of presentation as we did on that very day. (shrink)

Concerning cases involving temporal indexicals Kaplan has argued that Fregean thoughts cannot be the bearers of cognitive significance due to the alleged fact that one can think the same thought from one occasion to the next without realizing this—thus linking the issue of cognitive significance to that of belief retention. Kaplan comes up with his own version of the Fregean strategy for accounting for belief retention that does not face this kind of a problem; but he finds it deficient because (...) it leads us to implausibly deny that one who is lost in time retains the beliefs one held before this occurred. I take issue with Kaplan though in conformity with his plausible demands about belief retention and argue that a situation does not arise in which one can fail to realize that one is thinking the same thought from one occasion to the next. I also argue that thoughts are the bearers of cognitive significance as well as explanatory of belief retention. (shrink)

This book argues that there is a common cognitive mechanism underlying all indexical thoughts, in spite of their seeming diversity. Indexical thoughts are mental representations, such as beliefs and desires. They represent items from a thinker's point of view or her cognitive perspective. We typically express them by means of sentences containing linguistic expressions such as 'this ' or 'that ', adverbs like 'here', 'now', and 'today', and the personal pronoun 'I'. While generally agreeing that representing the world from a (...) thinker's cognitive perspective is a key feature of indexical thoughts, philosophers disagree as to whether a thinker's cognitive perspective can be captured and rationalized by semantic content and, if so, what kind of content this is. This book surveys competing views and then advances its own positive account. Ultimately, it argues that a thinker's cognitive perspective - or her indexical point of view - is to be explained in terms of the content that is believed and asserted as the only kind of content that there is which thereby serves as the bearer of cognitive significance. The Indexical Point of View will be of interest to philosophers of mind and language, linguists, and cognitive scientists. (shrink)

In this paper, we reconsider the notion of epistemic trespassing and attempt to explore possible scenarios in which it could lead to positive outcomes in scientific research and information dissemination. As we will point out, some of the significant discoveries in the history of science would not have been possible were it not for the epistemic trespassers, whose shift in paradigm changed the approach to specific issues for the better. Furthermore, we will present instances where individuals, often labeled as ‘trespassers’ (...) – those who venture into fields outside their expertise – can be considered trustworthy and reliable sources of testimony. Consequently, epistemic trespassing turned out to be essential for the advancement of science. Epistemic trespassing in our age is virtually inevitable – whether it be from a political perspective (to preserve democratic values) or due to purely practical reasons (i.e. searching for information online). There are interdisciplinary fields where a strictly negative characterization of epistemic trespassing would question their methodology since these disciplines rely on experts from various fields. For these reasons, we advocate for a more charitable approach to epistemic trespassing and greater public education to help them distinguish between correct and false information. (shrink)

It is often thought that endowing a demonstrative with a Fregean sense leaves no room for maintaining that it is also a rigid designator. In addition, some philosophers claim that indexicals - surely the paradigms of singular reference - pose a serious threat to the Fregean sense/ reference approach as they do not comply with the view that singular terms have Fregean senses. In this paper I argue that neither of these is true.

John Perry has urged that a semantic theory for natural languages ought to be concerned with the issue of cognitive significance—of how true identity statements containing different (utterances of) indexicals and proper names can be informative, held to be unaccountable by the referentialist view. The informativeness that he has in mind—one that has puzzled Frege, Kaplan and Wettstein—concerns knowledge about the world. In trying to solve this puzzle on referentialist terms, he comes up with the notion of cognitive significance as (...) a special kind of a second-order content which should account for cognitive significance in the former sense. Focusing on his treatment of perceptual demonstratives, I argue that he fails to do so both on the level of second-order contents containing demonstrative utterances and on the level of second-order contents containing perceptual buffers as new notions associated with the perceptions and used to temporarily store ideas we gain from the perceptions, which he holds to be causally connected to each other. (shrink)

It is argued that none of the speaker's referential intentions accompanying his utterance of a demonstrative are semantically significant but rather the associated demonstration (or some other source of salience). It is constitutive of the speaker's having the specifically referential intention - held by Kent Bach to be semantically significant - that the speaker is taking, and relying upon, his accompanying gesture (or some other source of salience) as semantically significant, making it the case that this intention is not even (...) partly semantically significant. The same is then shown to hold for the speaker's remaining referential intentions: his intention aimed at a perceived object, believed by David Kaplan to be semantically significant, as well as the intention to refer to the object that he has in mind. (shrink)

Philosophy is for Schopenhauer not a sort of scientific pursuit nor is science a sort of philosophical pursuit, and it is in this context that he propounds his view of scientific knowledge and of knowledge in general. Those few philosophers who have given it proper consideration, notably Gardiner (1967) and Hamlyn (1980, 1999), and more recently Young (2005), have pointed out that Schopenhauer's view presents some serious, seemingly insurmountable, difficulties. In this chapter I try to redress the balance by arguing (...) that Schopenhauer can be credited with a coherent and viable, in some respects indeed very perceptive view of (scientific) knowledge once a couple of misconceptions, which are the source of these difficulties but which are neither required by this view nor are of any use to it, are disposed of. I offer instead some adequate replacements which are to its benefit, much as they are in line with the overall framework and the objectives of his philosophy. This will also enable us to assess this view in the context of the debates that have emerged in the modern-day philosophy of science and epistemology. (shrink)

Examines semantic features of perpetual demonstratives.

Avtor obravnava Serresovo kritiko koncepta globalne zgodovine na eni strani in njegovo relati-viziranje koncepta rekurentne zgodovine znanosti na drugi strani. Iz dejstva, da je mogoče v realni zgodovini znanosti odkriti vsaj dva osnovna tipa temporalnosti: sekano, diskontinuirano temporalnost invencije in kontinuiteto tradicije, izpelje Serres trditev, da lahko kompleksnost zgodovinskega razvoja znanosti pojasnimo le s kombinacijo zveznih in nezveznih modelov zgodovine znanosti.

According to a criterion of difference for thoughts derived from Frege, two thoughts are different if it is at the same time possible for a rational subject to take conflicting epistemic attitudes toward them. But applying this criterion to perception-based demonstrative thoughts seems to slice thoughts too finely and lead to their proliferation which makes the criterion implausible. I argue that such a proliferation of thoughts is blocked by transforming this criterion into a related one that is shown to be (...) essential in individuating thoughts as they are conceived of in this paper. This has to do with the fact that what makes demonstrative sense synchronically or diachronically the same is the subject’s unreflective taking-for-granted that the object that she is perceiving is a single object that does not require her to keep track of it in the sense supposed by Evans and Campbell. (shrink)

Anti-individualists hold that having a thought with a certain intentional content is a relational rather than an intrinsic property of the subject. Some anti-individualists also hold that thought-content serves to explain the subject’s cognitive perspective. Since there seems to be a tension between these two views, much discussed in the philosophical literature, attempts have been made to resolve it. In an attempt to reconcile these views, and in relation to perception-based demonstrative thoughts, Stalnaker (Our knowledge of the internal world, Oxford (...) University Press, Oxford, 2008) argues that an anti-individualist account of the facts that determine thought-content can be reconciled with a suitably qualified version of a principle of epistemic transparency. Acknowledging this, and in agreement with the view that thought-content should serve to explain the subject’s cognitive perspective, I argue that, his intentions notwithstanding, this view of transparency of thought-contents does not serve to explain the subject’s cognitive perspective on Stalnaker’s own terms and that the intricacies involved in his argumentation for saving his anti-individualist project are indirectly supportive of an individualist account of the subject’s cognitive perspective. In so doing, I leave intact some of his key claims that are plausible in their own right. (shrink)

Though a common language of science allows for easier communication of the results among researchers, the use of lingua franca also comes with the cost of losing some of the diverse ideas and results arising from the plurality of languages. Following Quine’s famous thesis about the indeterminacy of translation, we elaborate on the inherent loss of diverse ideas when only one language of science is used. Non-native speakers sometimes experience epistemic injustice due to their language proficiency and consequently, their scientific (...) insights get marginalized. Thus, it is important epistemically to include the results of all researchers independent of their native language. As a solution, we promote epistemic equity and inclusion both on the individual level and on the level of the scientific community. Epistemic equity means that researchers who suffer disadvantages because of their language skills get support from the rest of the scientific community that will compensate for their disadvantage and at the same time facilitate their epistemic inclusion. This can be achieved through the introduction of mitigating agents – the individuals and organizations that ought to serve as a communication bridge between individual researchers and the scientific community. (shrink)

The author's response to Eduarda Calado´s contribution to the special issue on The Indexical Point of View.

The author's response to Ludovic Soutif & Carlos Márquez's contribution to the special issue on The Indexical Point of View.

The 2-c debate between the Greek Apologists and the pagan Graeco-Roman tradition is multifaceted and complex. Common ground can be found in the mutual commitment to reason as a reflection of the Logos: Reason, or the rationality embedded in things. Logos, in this picture, is participated in through a performance of reasoning whose reliability is presupposed in the discourses of both debating parties—contextualized here as the presupposition that the deliverances and activity of reason are reliable for uncovering reality. Presuppositions are (...) starting points and driving principles of inquiry, here designated as first principles. One presuppositional conflict between 2-c Greek Apologists, taking the apologetic works of Justin, Theophilus, Athenagoras, and the author of the Epistle to Diognetus as a sample, and the pagan tradition, taking Celsus as its 2-c culmination, is over how to justify the commitment to reason’s reliability in the above sense. My claim in this paper is twofold: first, that the pagan position is unable in principle to demonstrate the reliability of its own reasoning and that all such inquiry is circular: it is always a further question for the pagan why reasoning reveals reality. I propose that what would count as an answer to this challenge is a metaphysical ‘fit’ between human embodiment and reality. And second, that the Apologists avoid this unhappy conclusion by committing themselves to the embodiment of Reason in Jesus—that the embodied act of human reasoning reveals reality because Reason itself is embodied in the same way. The upshot is that unless the pagan abandons his position, he is trapped in a circular epistemology and cannot encounter the Christian witness on its own terms. (shrink)

Cilj ovoga istraživanja bio je ispitati povezanost osobina ličnosti, motivacije i strategija učenja kod učenika osnovnoškolske dobi. Ukupno 193 učenika ispunilo je Upitnik za ispitivanje osobina ličnosti kod djece, Upitnik za ispitivanje ciljnih orijentacija i Upitnik za ispitivanje strategija učenja. Rezultati istraživanja pokazali su da su učenici, u odnosu na učenice, skloniji ciljevima usmjerenima na druge i neakademskim ciljevima. Učenice, u odnosu na učenike, češće koriste meta-kognitivnu kontrolu i dubinsko procesiranje. Mlađi učenici važnijima su procijenili i ciljeve usmjerene na sebe (...) i na druge, a češće koriste i sve tri strategije učenja. Regresijske su analize pokazale da i osobine ličnosti i ciljne orijentacije učenika zasebno doprinose objašnjenju dijela varijance svih strategija učenja pri čemu su se od osobina ličnosti najvažnijim prediktorima pokazale savjesnost i emocionalna stabilnost. Ciljevi usmjereni na sebe značajni su prediktori meta-kognitivne kontrole i dubinskog procesiranja, dok su ciljevi usmjereni na druge značajan prediktor površinskog procesiranja. (shrink)

PURPOSE: The aim of this study was to assess the reliability and validity of the new judging system in DanceSport. METHODS: Eighteen judges rated the 12 best placed adult dancing couples competing at an international competition. They marked each couple on all judging criteria on a 10 level scale. Absolute agreement and consistency of judging were calculated for all main judging criteria and sub-criteria. RESULTS: A mean correlation of overall judging marks was 0.48. Kendall’s coefficient of concordance for overall marks (...) (W = 0.58) suggesting relatively low agreement among judges. Slightly lower coefficients were found for the artistic part (Partnering skills (W = 0.45) and Choreography and performance (W = 0.49)) compared to the technical part (Technical qualities (W = 0.56) and Movement to music (W = 0.54)). ICC for overall criteria was low for absolute agreement (ICC(2,3) = 0.62) but higher for consistency (ICC(3,3) = 0.80). CONCLUSION: The relatively large differences between judges’ marks suggest that judges either disagreed to some extent on the quality of the dancing or used the judging scale in different ways. The biggest concern was standard error of measurement (SEM) which was often larger than the difference between dancers scores suggesting that this judging system lacks validity. This was the first research to assess judging in DanceSport and offers suggestions to potentially improve both its objectivity and validity in the future. (shrink)