Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660 (2019)
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Abstract

This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible.

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Vladimir Krstic
United Arab Emirates University

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5):701-721.
Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.
Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

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