The Anthropology of Sport and Human Movement represents a collection of work that reveals and explores the often times dramatic relationship of our biology and culture that is inextricably woven into a tapestry of movement patterns. It explores the underpinning of human movement, reflected in play, sport, games and human culture from an evolutionary perspective and contemporary expression of sport and human movement.

The upcoming Regulation No 536/2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, which will replace the current Clinical Trial Directive at the end of 2021, has triggered a significant reform of research ethics committee systems in Europe. Changes related to ethics review of clinical trials in the EU were considered to be essential to create a more favourable environment to conduct clinical trials in the EU. The concern is, however, that the role of the research ethics committees will (...) weaken in at least some of the Member States because the new Regulation allows narrowing down the scope of ethics review as compared with the currently valid Clinical Trial Directive. Although the new Regulation may lead to faster approval procedures for clinical trials, which is especially relevant in the context of pandemics, high-quality ethics reviews integrating methodological aspects of a clinical trial should nevertheless be ensured. To maintain high research ethics standards as well as to foster measures to mitigate potential negative consequences of the reform, it is therefore of vital importance to start debating and sharing the reflections about the potential consequences of these transformations and trends as soon as possible. (shrink)

Healthcare priority-setting institutions have good reason to want to demonstrate that their decisions are morally justified—and those who contribute to and use the health service have good reason to hope for the same. However, finding a moral basis on which to evaluate healthcare priority-setting is difficult. Substantive approaches are vulnerable to reasonable disagreement about the appropriate grounds for allocating resources, while procedural approaches may be indeterminate and insufficient to ensure a just distribution. In this paper, we set out a complementary, (...) coherence-based approach to the evaluation of healthcare priority-setting. Drawing on Rawls, we argue that an institutional priority-setter’s claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the extent to which its many normative commitments are mutually supportive and free from dissonance; that is, on the ability to establish narrow reflective equilibrium across the normative content of a priority-setter’s policy and practice. While we do not suggest that the establishment of such equilibrium is sufficient for moral justification, we argue that failure to do so might—like the proverbial canary in the coalmine—act as a generalised warning that something is awry. We offer a theoretical argument in support of this view and briefly outline a practical method for systematically examining coherence across priority-setting policy and practice. (shrink)

The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) is the UK’s primary healthcare priority-setting body, responsible for advising the National Health Service in England on which technologies to fund and which to reject. Until recently, the normative approach underlying this advice was described in a 2008 document entitled ‘Social value judgements: Principles for the development of NICE guidance’ (SVJ). In January 2020, however, NICE replaced SVJ with a new articulation of its guiding principles. Given the significant evolution of NICE’s (...) methods between 2008 and 2020, this study examines whether this new document (‘Principles’) offers a transparent account of NICE’s current normative approach. It finds that it does not, deriving much of its content directly from SVJ and failing to fully acknowledge or explain how and why NICE’s approach has since changed. In particular, Principles is found to offer a largely procedural account of NICE decision-making, despite evidence of the increasing reliance of NICE’s methods on substantive decision-rules and ‘modifiers’ that cannot be justified in purely procedural terms. Thus, while Principles tells NICE’s stakeholders much about how the organisation goes about the process of decision-making, it tells them little about the substantive grounds on which its decisions are now based. It is therefore argued that Principles does not offer a transparent account of NICE’s normative approach (either alone, or alongside other documents) and that, given NICE’s reliance on transparency as a requirement of procedural justice, NICE does not in this respect satisfy its own specification of a just decision-maker. (shrink)

Contains contributions from some of the most prominent thinkers and experts in philosophy-driven methods, such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, and semiotics. This international body of scholars discuss the issue of method itself, as well as bring those methods to bear on some of the most prominent issues of our time in the areas of media, culture and criticism.

The laws concerning driving licences and epilepsy in different countries are very diverse with regard to the criteria for issuance or renewal of licences, and also the methods of evaluating fitness. In 2011, a law was issued in Italy implementing the European directives on driving licences, including provisions for mandatory notification that a driver is epileptic. This was established regardless of the European rules that require compulsory notification only of patients. The Federation of Italian Boards of Physicians has made recommendations (...) against mandated physician reporting, resulting in a current confusion between legal and ethical recommendations to medical doctors. The mandatory notification enacted by Italian law raises ethical concerns about disparities in access to care and possible violations of the right to confidentiality of patient information. Moreover, the law discussed here fails to emphasise the importance of physicians ensuring compliance by the patient, by sharing the correct information about the risks associated with illegal driving and by obtaining information from the patient through regular check-ups. An urgent revision of the law is required to implement the duty of the physician to provide information and to ensure that the rule about mandatory notification should be erased in favour of optional self-reporting by epileptics as the preferred way to notify the licensing authority. The implementation of these measures could correct the dichotomy between the law and the ethical recommendations for medical doctors and protect the rights of people with epilepsy as well as those of any other patients whose pathology or impairment could imply a risk to the community. (shrink)

_Imagination_ is an outstanding contribution to a notoriously elusive and confusing subject. It skillfully interrelates problems in philosophy, the history of ideas and literary theory and criticism, tracing the evolution of the concept of imagination from Hume and Kant in the eighteenth century to Ryle, Sartre and Wittgenstein in the twentieth. She strongly belies that the cultivation of imagination should be the chief aim of education and one of her objectives in writing the book has been to put forward reasons (...) why this is so. Purely philosophical treatment of the concept is shown to be related to its use in the work of Coleridge and Wordsworth, who she considers to be the creators of a new kind of awareness with more than literary implications. The purpose of her historical account is to suggest that the role of imagination in our perception and thought is more pervasive than may at first sight appear, and that the thread she traces is an important link joining apparently different areas of our experience. She argues that imagination is an essential element in both our awareness of the world and our attaching of value to it. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that if normative terms are analyzable in descriptive terms, as claimed by analytic reductionists, this provides an easy explanation why normative supervenience would be a conceptual truth. This chapter argues that our knowledge of normative supervenience has two important features this explanation fails to account for: first, the idea that normative properties supervene on descriptive properties seems obvious to us and, secondly, we don’t come to accept this thesis distributively by finding it plausible in each of (...) its particular instances but rather by seeing a pattern that all normative properties must conform to. An alternative is suggested, an expressivist account of normative supervenience that allows us to explain both of these features. The chapter closes by arguing that they require explanation even on the assumption that normative supervenience is not a conceptual truth. This makes the explanation problem concerning our knowledge of normative supervenience more general than previously thought. (shrink)

No início dos anos 40, Gilda de Mello e Souza publicou contos, dando início a uma experiência na ficção brasileira posteriormente interompida. Este ensio procura mostrar as razões da incompreensão com que foram recebidos esses contos e lamenta a perda que significou a desistência da criação literária por parte da autora.

New Blackfriars, Volume 103, Issue 1107, Page 607-621, September 2022.

A common worry regarding normative supervenience theses is that they are easily trivialized unless we somehow restrict the set of descriptive base properties on which the normative properties supervene. The idea is that if all descriptive properties are included in the base, any two individuals that share all their base properties must be the same individual in the same world, from which it follows that they have the same normative properties. We argue that this trivial explanation for unrestricted normative supervenience (...) fails. Moreover, we argue that even if it succeeded, this wouldn’t undermine the explanation challenges associated with normative supervenience. (shrink)

Why do some philosophers, despite all we know about evolution and embryology, think that consciousness makes the mind-body relation a problem still unsolved and perhaps insoluble by those with human brains? They ask how consciousness arises in matter, not in living organisms, whereas non-philosophers ask how far down the ladder of life it extends and when it arises in individuals of sentient and intelligent species. They desire the privacy of Locke's closet, furnished with phenomenological properties; and besides replacing Aristotle's ‘folk’ (...) conception of causation by Hume's, they mathematicise physical explanation in line with Newton's First Law of Motion. Non-philosophers operate with ‘vague’ concepts of life, sentience and intelligence which allow them to treat these things as truly and naturally emergent. Machines that perform intelligent tasks are no more conscious of the reasons for their movements than actors performing them on the stage. (shrink)

A study of the relation of metaphysics to grammar, placing the central topics of philosophy in an entirely new light.

After a brief introduction I compare accounts of what it is to say something I find in Plato, Frege and Grice, and I distinguish linguistic from practical meaning and words that signify things from ‘syncategorematic’ or ‘grammatical’ words. I then argue that the relation between a signifying word and what it signifies must be understood in terms of two complementary acts, already recognised in antiquity, quantifying and predicating. Discussing quantification, I show how problems about universals can be avoided by accepting (...) Aristotle's distinction between possible and actual existence. Discussing predication, I defend Aristotle's view that there are more forms of predication than one, and consider this issue in connection with non-mathematical discourse. (shrink)

Systems Theory analyses the world in terms of communications and divides the natural world into environment and systems. Systems are characterised by their high density of communications and tend to become more complex and efficient with time, usually by means of increased specialisation and coordination of functions. Management is an organisational sub-system which models all necessary aspects of organisational activity such that this model may be used for monitoring, prediction and planning of the organisation as a whole. The function of (...) a specific management system depends on its history of selection by interactions with the environment (which includes other systems). The main function of a management system will be a consequence of the most powerful and sustained selection pressure it has experienced. Systems Theory implies a management science which is quantitative and comparative. It is quantitative because it is based upon the measurement and mapping of communications as the basis of analysis; it is comparative because evaluations relate to specific variables measured in a specific spatio-temporal context and subjected to analytic processes of constrained complexity. Selection processes are broadly responsible for the dominance of management in contemporary Western societies. The complexity of management systems will probably continue to increase for as long as the efficiency-enhancing potential of complexity outweighs its increased transaction costs. (shrink)

The paper presents goodness and truth as analogous formal concepts. I first argue that saying something is true of something and saying it is false of it are basic ways of speaking truly or falsely. I then consider thinking a property a good one for something to acquire and thinking it a bad, equate this with having something as a positive or negative objective, an object of desire or aversion, and argue that these are basic ways of thinking rightly or (...) wrongly. Finally I discuss the notions of a way of speaking or thinking, making special reference to Frege’s ‘Negation’ and ‘The Thought.’. (shrink)

Defends a unified conception of human nature and a view of what is natural that can cover both the physical and the psychological worlds.

The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, the UK’s main healthcare priority-setting body, recently reaffirmed a longstanding claim that in recommending technologies to the National Health Service it cannot apply the ‘rule of rescue’. This paper explores this claim by identifying key characteristics of the rule and establishing to what extent these are also features of NICE’s approach to evaluating ultra-orphan drugs through its highly specialised technologies programme. It argues that although NICE in all likelihood does not act because (...) of the rule in prioritising these drugs, its actions in relation to HSTs are nevertheless in accordance with the rule and are not explained by the full articulation of any alternative set of rationales. That is, though NICE implies that its approach to HSTs is not motivated by the rule of rescue, it is not explicit about what else might justify this approach given NICE’s general concern with overall population need and value for money. As such, given NICE’s reliance on notions of procedural justice and its commitment to making the reasons for its priority-setting decisions public, the paper concludes that NICE’s claim to reject the rule is unhelpful and that NICE does not currently meet its own definition of a fair and transparent decision-maker. (shrink)