Scriven’s paradox of predictability arises from the combination of two ideas: first, that everything in a deterministic universe is, in principle, predictable; second, that it is possible to create a system that falsifies any prediction that is made of it. Recently, the paradox has been used by Rummens and Cuypers to argue that there is a fundamental difference between embedded and external predictors; and by Ismael to argue against a governing conception of laws. The present paper defends a new diagnosis (...) of the roots of the paradox. First, it is argued that the unpredictability has to be understood in the light of Turing’s famous results about computability, in particular his proof that there is no solution to the ‘halting problem.’ This allows us to see that previous analyses of the paradox were either mistaken or not fully adequate. Second, the sense of paradox that nevertheless remains is traced to the idea that rational behaviour is not dependent on contingent environmental circumstances: that it is always up to us to engage in activities such as rational prediction or rational belief. The paradox of predictability teaches us that this idea, natural though it may be, is mistaken. (shrink)

Due to its high degree of complexity and its historical nature, evolutionary biology has been traditionally portrayed as a messy science. According to the supporters of such a view, evolutionary biology would be unable to formulate laws and robust theories, instead just delivering coherent narratives and local models. In this article, our aim is to challenge this view by showing how the Price equation can work as the core of a general theoretical framework for evolutionary phenomena. To support this claim, (...) we outline some unnoticed structural similarities between physical theories and evolutionary biology. More specifically, we shall argue that the Price equation, in the same way as fundamental formalisms in physics, can serve as a heuristic principle to formulate and systematise different theories and models in evolutionary biology. (shrink)

Many theists regard the claim that certain fundamental constants of nature are fine-tuned for life as the best scientific argument for the existence of God since Paley’s watch. Even atheist physicists find these so-called “anthropic coincidences” difficult to explain naturally and many think they need to invoke multiple universes and the so-called “anthropic principle” to do so. Certainly if there are many universes, fine-tuning is simple. Our universe is not fine-tuned for life. Life is fine-tuned to our universe. While multiple (...) universes are expected from modern cosmological theories, theists and some scientists object that invoking the unobservable is not science. Of course, God is unobservable too, so the best theists can claim is a standoff. (shrink)

Naturalists who conceive of knowledge as a natural kind are led to treat ‘knowledge’ as a natural kind term. ‘Knowledge,’ then, must behave semantically in the ways that seem to support a direct reference theory for other natural kind terms. A direct reference theory for ‘knowledge,’ however, appears to leave open too many possibilities about the identity of knowledge. Intuitively, states of belief count as knowledge only if they meet epistemic criteria, not merely if they bear a causal/historical relation to (...) the term. I will develop this objection and show that it is grounded in modal considerations central to Kripke’s work on reference. I will also argue that a more plausible externalist semantics for natural kind terms disarms the objection. (shrink)

Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere “armchair knowledge.” Know how is a mental state characterized by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential of know how, but not (...) propositional knowledge, that it makes possible performance errors and has the functional role of guiding action. The theory is attractive, in part, because it allows for propositional, non-propositional and perhaps even non-representational varieties of know how. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the existence of human reason gives us good reason to suppose that God exists. If the world were as the materialist supposes it is, then we would not be able to reason to the conclusion that this is so. This contention is often challenged by the claim that mental and physical explanations can be given for the same event. But a close examination of the question of explanatory compatibility reveals that the sort of explanation (...) that would have to be given for the event of, say, inferring that atheism is true, is incompatible with the event being explicable as a purely physical product of a purely physical universe. (shrink)

This paper considers Gianni Vattimo’s rejection of metaphysical conceptions of being in favor of a hermeneutic ontology developed along the lines of ‘weak thought.’ I argue that Vattimo’s critique neglects an abiding pluralism within the very history of metaphysical thought itself; at least some metaphysical conceptions of being in that history do not fall prey to his critique. To establish my claim I turn to Thomas Aquinas, whose metaphysics is couched within a larger theological context and presents itself dynamically, thereby (...) expressing some of the very features that Vattimo himself accords to Being. (shrink)

Wittgenstein famously regarded philosophy as an activity and not as a body of doctrine. And yet within the secondary literature there is little agreement as to what Wittgenstein took the purpose of that activity to be. In this paper, I claim that the purpose of philosophical activity, at least according to the Later Wittgenstein, was to solve philosophical problems. As support for this claim, I argue that our everyday talk about the mind presents us with a philosophical problem about the (...) mind. Focusing then on what Wittgenstein says about understanding and using his distinction between internal and external relations, I show how we can solve this problem. If my reading is accepted, then the purpose of philosophical activity, according to the later Wittgenstein, was not therapy. As such, later Wittgenstein should not be read as a therapist. (shrink)

This article explores the fate in Wittgenstein's mature work, of the issue of the unsayable, heart of the Tractatus project. According to the traditional interpretation of his work, he left behind that concern as a product of his early mistakes, later refuted in the Investigations. This article attempts to show that, in a certain sense, it is obvious that the problem of ineffability is still behind all his efforts. That it is constitutive not only of Wittgenstein's conception of language, but (...) is also the point of what he calls the vision of aspects, on which his latest writings focus. (shrink)

La sociologie est née parallèlement à la modernisation occidentale ; ses principales positions héritées de l’ère classique portent sur la modernité et son impact sur les sociétés nationales. Après la décolonisation, la modernisation du « Tiers-Monde » a ouvert la voie à la notion de globalisation. La sociologie de la globalisation est une spécialité actuelle au sein des associations américaines et européennes de sociologie. La promesse d’une sociologie globale est à l’ordre du jour de l’Association internationale de sociologie depuis au (...) moins 1990. À un niveau plus profond, la sociologie globale exige de ne pas penser le rôle de concepts fondamentaux tels que la modernité, la religion ou la société par rapport à leurs origines occidentales. Les études globales et la sociologie postcoloniale, deux des domaines de recherche les plus connus qui revendiquent une visée globale, sont examinées afin de déterminer si elles fournissent des ressources conceptuelles adéquates pour la sociologie globale. Si les programmes de recherche de ces deux disciplines offrent des perspectives prometteuses, l’enquête suggère que toutes deux souffrent d’importants inconvénients. La tradition sociologique se trouve aujourd’hui dans une impasse ; la fragmentation peut persister, mais d’autres possibilités existent également. Aucune solution de grande ampleur n’est peut-être possible. Une sociologie véritablement mondiale pourrait finalement émerger des interprétations originales qui se développent à partir de parcours historiques non occidentaux. (shrink)

In this highly original book, Victor Kestenbaum calls into question the oft-repeated assumption that John Dewey's pragmatism has no place for the transcendent.

Sometimes Strauss argues as if he thought it possible to understand man without raising questions about his relations to other things, and hence about his place in the whole. But when they are viewed in their broader context, such arguments are seen not to be his final word. Man's humanity cannot be understood in its own terms alone. The human soul differs from everything else in that it is "... open to the whole and therefore more akin to the whole (...) than anything else is." In ordinary usage, "whole" implies completeness and autonomy. But the openness of the soul--i.e., of a part--to the whole can only mean that the whole is open to itself. The whole is, then, not, in the ordinary sense of the term, whole. Nor is the soul which is "open" to it. Stripped of myths, "... the human soul is... more akin to the whole than anything else is" because neither of them is whole. The same conclusion follows when one tries to understand the definition of the philosopher as the man animated by quest for knowledge of the whole. Qua philosopher he knows neither that there is a whole, nor what it might be if there were one. To define the philosopher as the man who knows that he does not know only paraphrases the difficulty. It does not solve it. For "know" is here used equivocally. The same equivocation is at play in the comment "... one cannot know that one does not know without knowing what one does not know". Admittedly "knowledge of ignorance is not ignorance." The philosopher believes and perhaps divines more than he actually knows. All men do. The essential difference between the philosopher and other men may well consist in the fact that the philosopher distinguishes more conscientiously than do others between what he knows and what he believes, and that he strives more single-mindedly than do they to transform as large a share of his beliefs as possible into knowledge. He may conceivably at some point be said to have reached the stage where his aspirations have become reasoned expectations. But that is as far as he can possibly go as long as he remains a philosopher and has not become a wise man or a god. Until and unless the philosopher knows, in the strong sense of the term, he can no more decide whether his aspirations could be fulfilled than he can swim before getting wet. (shrink)

This article clarifies and further defends the view that the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, protected by Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights has implications for the substantive law. It is shown that a ‘purely procedural’ conception of the presumption of innocence has absurd implications for the nature of the right. Objections to the moderate substantive view defended are considered, including the acceptability of male prohibits offences, the difficulty of ascertaining intentions of legislatures and (...) the proper role of prosecutorial discretion. (shrink)

KANT HELD THAT NEWTON AND ROUSSEAU HAD REVEALED the ways of Providence: “After Newton and Rousseau, God is justified, and Pope’s thesis is henceforth true.”.

-- 2. Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot.

According to a family of metasemantics for demonstratives called intentionalism, the intentions of speakers determine the reference of demonstratives. And according to a sub-family I call proximal intentions (PI) intentionalism, the intention that determines reference is one that occupies a certain place—the proximal one—in a structure of intentions. PI intentionalism is thought to make correct predictions about reference where less sophisticated forms of intentionalism make the wrong predictions. In this article I argue that this is an illusion: PI intentionalism also (...) suffers from predictive inadequacy. In Sect. 1, I present the problem of predictive inadequacy for intentionalism and an ad hoc response to it. In Sect. 2, I sketch a version of PI intentionalism that aims to provide the most principled response to this problem. In Sect. 3, I explain why PI intentionalism cannot solve the problem after all. In Sect. 4, I indicate where I think metasemanticists should go next. (shrink)

The methodological premise of the investigation is the meta-difference between foreground and background as a necessary element of any difference, including the difference between conceptual and terminological types of analysis of philosophical texts. The topic of terminological analysis is the function of the terms that make up the framework of concepts, the methods and justifications for their introduction. The role of D.Hume, who was the first to draw attention to the difference in the meaning of the same word in natural (...) and philosophical languages, is noted. More general questions are formulated regarding the prerequisites of terminological analysis: what is a term, what experience underlies the very process of introducing terms, are terms a necessary building material of philosophical texts or a necessary evil? The prerequisites for terminological analysis include the differences between a term and a word, as well as a term and a metaphor. Husserl’s concept of noetic-noematic structures is considered in terms of the difference between conceptual and terminological dimensions. The research focuses on the functions of “sense” as an intermediary between natural language and philosophical terminology. The prerequisites for the introduction of the terms “noesis” and “noema” are identified; in the first case, this is the traditional scheme of hylomorphism, in the second, the postulate of the identity of what is perceived during normal and abnormal perception. A comparison is made between Husserl’s expression “sense does not burn” with M.Bulgakov’s aphorism “manuscripts do not burn.” Husserl’s division of two types of consciousness (positional and neutral or shadow) reveals the incorrectness of Husserl’s description of the difference between the foreground and background of perception. Husserl’s description of “neutralization” is subjected to critical analysis using the example of the perception of Durer’s engraving. The final section of the article examines attempts to correlate the meaning of the word “sense” with experience, compares the role of the terms “sense” and “concept,” and also analyzes Husserl’s “generalization of the idea of meaning,” or expansion of the meaning of the term “sense.” Finally, a distinction is made between a methodology of separation, which corresponds to the boundary-setting function of terms, and a methodology of differentiation of differences, which implies the differentiating function of terms. (shrink)

Sociology emerged in the course of Western modernization; its major classical-era statements are preoccupied with modernity and its impact on national societies. After decolonization, ‘Third World’ modernization paved the way for the notion of globalization. The sociology of globalization is a current specialty within US and European sociological associations. The promise of global sociology has been on the agenda of the International Sociological Association since at least 1990. At a deeper level, global sociology requires un-thinking the role of core concepts (...) such as modernity or religion or society vis-à-vis their Western origins. Global Studies and post-colonial sociology, two of the most widely known research fields claiming global intent, are examined with respect to whether they provide adequate conceptual resources for global sociology. While the research agendas of both offer promising insights, inquiry suggests that both suffer from important drawbacks. The sociological tradition is now facing an impasse; fragmentation may persist, but other possibilities also exist. No grand solution is perhaps possible. A truly global sociology may eventually emerge from the original interpretations that develop from non-Western historical paths. (shrink)

is conscious of a beginning and end calls change time. But in reality there is no time, there is only change. The universe had no beginning and has no ending, it just is. Time to man is an illusion. Just as man once thought that the world was flat, that Earth was the center of the universe, that the sun rose and set and that he had free will, so he thinks that there is a beginning..

Following World War I, a new artistic-social avant-garde emerged with the ambition to engage the artist in the building of social life. Through close readings of the works of Alexander Rodchenko, El Lissitzky, and László Moholy-Nagy whose careers covered a broad range of artistic practices and political situations, Victor Margolin examines the way these three artists negotiated the changing relations between their social ideals and the political realities they confronted. Focusing on the difficult relationship between art and social change, (...) Margolin brings important new insights to the understanding of the avant-garde's role in a period of great political complexity. "An ambitious effort. This book puts the masters of European Modernism into perfect focus as inventors, propagators, and practitioners of a visual language that continues to hold sway over contemporary graphic style."—Steven Heller "Worth the wait.... Margolin usefully presents what he calls the 'failed hope' of this movement in this valuable effort."—Publishers Weekly. (shrink)

Données en 1912-1913 à la Sorbonne, ces leçons permettent d'aborder la pensée de Spinoza, de comprendre les concepts fondamentaux qui structurent cette philosophie et de saisir les enjeux soulevés dans les débats avec Descartes, Leibniz, Kant...