The findings of our experiments showed that social network sites such as Google Plus, Facebook, and Twitter, have the ability to acquire knowledge about their users’ movements not only within SNSs but also beyond SNS boundaries, particularly among websites that embedded SNS widgets such as Google’s Plus One button, Facebook’s Like button, and Twitter’s Tweet button. In this paper, we analysed the privacy implication of such a practice from a moral perspective by applying Helen Nissenbaum’s decision heuristic derived from her (...) contextual integrity framework in order to answer the question of whether or not an online user’s privacy is being violated by this practice. (shrink)

Plakias has recently argued that there is nothing wrong with publishing defences of philosophical claims which we don't believe and also nothing wrong with concealing our lack of belief, because an author's lack of belief is irrelevant to the merit of a published work. Fleisher has refined this account by limiting the permissibility of publishing without belief to what he calls ‘advocacy role cases’. I argue that such lack of belief is irrelevant only if it is the result of an (...) inexplicable incredulity or the result of a metaphilosophical or epistemic stance that is unrelated to the specific claim. However, in many real-life cases, including Fleisher's advocacy role cases, our doubts regarding the claims we defend arise from reasons that have something to do with the insufficiency of the philosophical evidence supporting the claim, and publishing an unconditional defence of a claim without revealing our doubts is impermissible as it involves withholding philosophically relevant reasons. Plakias has also argued that discouraging philosophers from publishing claims they don't believe would be unfair to junior philosophers with unsettled views. I propose that we should change our academic practices that pressure philosophers to publish articles that pretend to be defences of settled views. (shrink)

Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the representationalist theory, claiming that they are non- representational states or have non-representational aspects, and they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue that these states are fully representational states (...) of a certain kind, which I call “automatically non-endorsed representations”, experiential states the veridicality of which we are almost never committed to, and which do not trigger explicit belief or disbelief in the mind of the subject. By investigating descriptive accounts of afterimages by two qualia theorists, I speculate that the mistaken claims of some anti-representationalists might be rooted in confusing two senses of the term “seeming”. (shrink)

In this study, Kripke's claim, that within the framework of the possible worlds argument, the identification of mental processes by being reduced to physical events doesn't have an imperative base is addressed. Theories of physicalism and identity aims to explain the mental processes in a thoroughly physical way, thus trying to reduce it to the physical one, through brain events. According to Kripke, there must be an imperativeness for the identification of mental states with physical states. According to him, however, (...) it is not possible to show that physical events necessarily reveal mental processes. According to Kripke, in order to be imperatively correct for one statement, it must be correct in all possible worlds. Kripke uses the concept of "rigid designator" to describe this situation. According to Kripke, the thesis of identity between rigid designators must be metaphysically imperative correct. This situation does not apply to mental events. So then, the aim of this article is to reveal why the thesis of identity proposed in the explanation of physical and mental situations in terms of Kripke is not valid. (shrink)

The findings of our experiments showed that social network sites such as Google Plus, Facebook, and Twitter, have the ability to acquire knowledge about their users’ movements not only within SNSs but also beyond SNS boundaries, particularly among websites that embedded SNS widgets such as Google’s Plus One button, Facebook’s Like button, and Twitter’s Tweet button. In this paper, we analysed the privacy implication of such a practice from a moral perspective by applying Helen Nissenbaum’s decision heuristic derived from her (...) contextual integrity framework in order to answer the question of whether or not an online user’s privacy is being violated by this practice. (shrink)

The orthodox reading of Peter Strawson's “Freedom and Resentment” tends to hide interesting elements of its underlying argumentative structure. Recognition of a distinction Strawson draws between two classes of reactive attitudes raises a question about how the distinct discussions are related. The orthodox reading seems to assume the only relevant difference between the two classes is one of perspective; however, this reading obscures the analogical nature of Strawson's argument and encourages a conflation of distinct elements within that argument. In this (...) paper, I show that an analogical interpretation of the relationship between the distinct classes of attitudes reveals differences between them that have interesting implications for the secondary literature that has developed around Strawson's famous essay. (shrink)

The fact that philosophy has not made much progress in finding answers to its big questions is often demonstrated with a comparison to natural sciences. Some have recently argued that the state of progress in philosophy is not so different than the sciences: there are many unresolved big questions in the sciences too, and philosophy has made progress on its smaller questions just like the sciences. I argue that this comparison is misleading: the situation in the two fields looks similar (...) only if we focus on unresolved scientific questions that have philosophical import. The sciences have made progress on many questions that are significant but that are not ‘big’ in a philosophical sense, while philosophy has made less progress on its own significant questions. Moreover, ‘smaller’ questions in the sciences are significant in themselves, while smaller questions in philosophy do not have much significance beyond their contribution to the bigger debates. I conclude with brief remarks about what underlies the disparity between the two fields: to understand the slow pace of progress in philosophy we should pay attention to factors that are at the intersection of the nature of philosophical questions, current philosophical methodology and the sociology of academic philosophy. (shrink)

T. M. Scanlon posits a universal moral relationship in response to the worry that his relational approach to blame cannot answer the question of how strangers can fittingly blame one another. However, commentators have noted that appealing to universal moral standards seems to explicitly deviate from a relational approach’s basis in actual relationship norms. This paper argues that Scanlon’s idea of a moral relationship can nevertheless provide a basis for response to the problem of strangers if we recognize that actual (...) and ideal moral relationships both play a role within the relational approach. An interesting consequence of this recognition is that it seems to undermine the moral relationship’s universality. However, a presumptive case for assuming the relationship exists even between strangers can be found in seeing our blaming practices as akin to public policy nudges, where blame operates like an opt-out choice architecture with respect to the moral relationship. On this understanding, though the moral relationship is escapable, individuals are naturally encouraged to participate through the expression of interpersonal attitudes that communicate relational norms and expectations. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes the relation between brain sciences and philosophy of mind, in order to clarify in what ways philosophy can contribute to neuroscience and neuroscience can contribute to philosophy. Especially since the 1980s and the emergence of “neurophilosophy”, more and more philosophers have been bringing home morals from neuroscience to settle philosophical issues. I mention examples from the problem of consciousness, philosophy of perception and the problem of free will, and I argue that such attempts are not successful in (...) trying to settle questions like whether psychology can be reduced to neuroscience, whether we see the external world directly in perception, or whether we have free will. The failure results from an ability of the philosophical questions to evade the data. What makes these questions persisting philosophical questions is precisely that there is no way to settle them through empirical evidence, as they are conceptual questions and their solution lies in conceptual analysis. (shrink)

Many optimistic responses have been proposed to bridge the threat of responsibility gaps which artificial systems create. This paper identifies a question which arises if this optimistic project proves successful. On a response-dependent understanding of responsibility, our responsibility practices themselves at least partially determine who counts as a responsible agent. On this basis, if AI or robot technology advance such that AI or robot agents become fitting participants within responsibility exchanges, then responsibility itself might be engineered. If we have good (...) reason to think such technological advances are likely, then we should take steps to address the potential for engineering responsibility. (shrink)

Tarih ilmi bir bütünlük ve süreklilik arz eder. Bir olay hakkında başlangıç ve bitiş tarihlendirmeleri izâfidir. Dolayısıyla olayın başlangıcı kabul edilen tarih öncesi bir doğuş ve gelişme sürecinin olduğu, aynı şekilde olayın bittiği zannedilen dönemde de etkilerinin bazen yıllarca devam ettiği görülmektedir. Ancak gerek araştırmacı gerekse okuyucu dikkate alınarak, araştırmanın kolaylaştırılması, derinliği/vukûfiyeti arttırma, anlama, anlamlandırmayı kolaylaştırma gibi sebep ve amaçlar göz önüne alınarak tarih, kısımlara ayrılmıştır. Tarihin kısımlara ayrılmasında savaşlar, bir devletin doğuşu veya yıkılışı gibi dönemin siyasî, sosyal veya dinî (...) hayatın akışını değiştiren, onlara yol veren olaylar veya coğrafya dikkat alınmaktadır. Bu bölümlere ayırma ameliyesinin sonraki araştırmacılar tarafından yapıldığını, geçmişe dönük bir tasarım, yaklaşım olduğunu da söylememiz gerekmektedir. (shrink)

Many critics and defenders of P. F. Strawson’s approach to moral responsibility in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ have attributed to Strawson a claim of psychological incapacity or impossibility with respect to our (in)ability to abandon or radically change the framework of reactive attitudes that constitute (at least) an important part of our responsibility practices. In this essay I show that commentators have conflated two distinct arguments within Strawson’s discussion in a way that increases his susceptibility to a challenge of empirical implausibility. (...) I argue, further, that recognizing the difference between the two arguments has an additional important implication for Strawson’s overall argument, as it reveals that his view involves two types of objectivity. I end by discussing some consequences for both broad applications of Strawson’s moral psychology and narrow discussions within the free will literature. (shrink)

P. F. Strawson famously gives pride of place to the reactive attitudes in his account of moral responsibility, though he says little about guilt or any other self-reactive attitudes. This inattention is curious, given that on his view lacking capacity for self-reactive attitudes is grounds for exemption from the moral community. Perhaps because of Strawson’s limited remarks regarding them, the self-reactive attitudes have not received much attention in commentaries on his view. In this paper, I will attempt to fill this (...) lacuna by examining the role of the self-reactive attitudes within his approach to moral responsibility. I will focus in particular on reactive guilt to show that it plays a number of roles in our interpersonal lives, from reinforcing our important personal relationships to holding ourselves accountable with respect to our own personal ideals. A better understanding of these roles, I will argue, helps to clarify Strawson’s notion of reactive attitude and to strengthen his overall argument, in addition to revealing some interesting aspects of the way various self-reactive attitudes operate within our lives. (shrink)

Many philosophers think the non-identity problem undermines the ability for future generations to have been wronged by past ones. This problem has prompted a number of responses, some of which purport to vindicate the relevant claims of wrongdoing. However, I argue that a closely related issue remains even for those convinced by these responses. It is commonly thought that wrongdoing makes certain retrospective attitudes, such as resentment, fitting toward the wrongdoer. In this paper, I shift a familiar problem of future (...) generations from wrongdoing to the fittingness of retrospective attitudes, and I show that a narrative sense of identity provides one means of addressing the puzzle of how these attitudes can be fi tting in non-identity cases. (shrink)

Although philosophers sympathetic to Peter Strawson's view in “Freedom and Resentment” tend to be compatibilists, they need not be. This paper develops a recent suggestion that Strawson's view can be read as consistent with libertarianism by showing that an important distinction Strawson makes between personal and moral reactive attitudes leaves room to be a Strawsonian compatibilist with respect to personal responsibility and a Strawsonian incompatibilist with respect to moral responsibility. Understanding this possibility reveals a potential gap within Strawson's argument that (...) should be of interest to both Strawsonians and their critics. (shrink)

Various well-controlled studies have suggested that practitioners in mindfulness can be prone to patient drop-out, despite researchers having identified the underlying mechanisms that link mindfulness to mental health. In this article, a framework for physical exercise augmented mindfulness is proposed, which posits that consistently practiced PE before meditation can support mindfulness. Neurocognitive research shows PE and mindfulness to impact similar pathways of stress regulation that involve cognitive control and stress regulation, thereby supporting the proposed synergistic potential of PE augmented mindfulness. (...) Research focused on the psychophysiological impact of PE, showed its practice to promote short-term neurocognitive changes that can promote both cognitive control and the attainment of mindful awareness. In order to chart dose responses required for protocol development, further research will be presented. Together these findings are discussed in light of future research on this multidisciplinary topic, protocol development, mindful walking, and further application in healthcare and beyond. (shrink)

Recent philosophy has seen a resurgence of the realist view of sensible qualities such as colour. The view holds that experienced qualities are properties of the objects in the physical environment, not mentally instantiated properties like qualia or merely intentional, illusory ones. Some suggest that this move rids us of the explanatory gap between physical properties and the qualitative features of consciousness. Others say it just relocates the problem of qualities to physical objects in the environment, given that such qualities (...) cannot be derived from the non-qualitative properties of objects, and it does not resolve the problem of consciousness either. I argue that such an outcome is welcome: if the physical world is full of explanatory gaps, then the mind–body explanatory gap is not so special. Moreover, the explanatory gaps regarding qualities of objects are less puzzling than the brain-qualia gap. In order to counter the usual worries concerning realism about objective qualities, I introduce ‘imperfect realism’ as an alternative to colour pluralism and complex reductionism, which accommodates realism in the face of widespread perceptual error. I conclude with a discussion of how this ‘multiple-gaps view’ sits better with a naturalistic framework compared to the Galilean-Cartesian account of qualities. (shrink)

In ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Peter Strawson presents a compelling dichotomy between a ‘participant stance’ and an ‘objective stance’ that has been influential in a variety of contemporary discussions. Commentators have tended to understand Strawson's overall argument in terms of a stark opposition between these stances; however, doing so hides the possibility of multiple senses of objectivity. This paper argues that an expanded understanding of the ‘objective stance’ can increase the appeal of a broadly Strawsonian moral psychology and uses Kate Manne's (...) recent approach to misogyny to support the proposed revision. Additionally, the paper shows that grounds for such an expanded understanding can be found within Strawson's own work and that a revised Strawsonian moral psychology need not undermine the widespread influence of Strawson's project in ‘Freedom and Resentment’. (shrink)