As philosophers of mind we seem to hold in common no very clear view about the relevance that work in psychology or the neurosciences may or may not have to our own favourite questions—even if we call the subject ‘philosophical psychology’. For example, in the literature we find articles on pain some of which do, some of which don't, rely more or less heavily on, for example, the work of Melzack and Wall; the puzzle cases used so extensively in discussions (...) of personal identity are drawn sometimes from the pleasant exercise of scientific fantasy, at times from surprising reports of scientific fact; and there are those who deny, as well as those who affirm, the importance of the discovery of rapid-eye-movement sleep to the philosophical treatment of dreaming. A general account of the relation between scientific, and philosophical, psychology is long overdue and of the first importance. Here I shall limit myself to just one area where the two seem to connect, discussing one type of neuropsychological research and its relevance to questions in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology. (shrink)

The bourgeois mind rejects the laws of the present epoch. It does not regard them as valid or, so to speak, rational. Therefore the problem of the absurd has recently been gaining ever increasing attention in contemporary bourgeois ideology. It is dealt with in the most diverse fields, to wit: philosophy of history , esthetics ; as the principle of a relativist axiology ; finally, as a conception in philosophical anthropology . It is, specifically, the last-named, anthropological interpretation of this (...) problem that underlies all its other aspects, inasmuch as the individual personality is regarded by bourgeois ideologists as the creator of cultural values, as the active subject in the process of cultural history and the active subject in all history whatsoever, so that the understanding of the behavior of the personality and all its activity depends upon the conception of that personality. (shrink)

We define proof nets for cyclic multiplicative linear logic as edge bi-coloured graphs. Our characterization is purely graph theoretical and works without further complication for proof nets with cuts, which are usually harder to handle in the non-commutative case. This also provides a new characterization of the proof nets for the Lambek calculus (with the empty sequence) which simply are a restriction on the formulas to be considered (which are asked to be intuitionistic).

This work is devoted to the relations between Lambek’s Syntactic Calculus and noncommutative variants of Girard’s Linear Logic; in particular the paper will consider: the geometrical representation of the laws of LC by means of proof-nets; the discovery - due to such a geometrical representation - of some laws of LC not yet considered; the discussion of possible linguistic uses of these new laws.

1. The characterization of Hegel's teaching as dialectical is usually associated with a critique of the logic that preceded his and that was dominant in his time: that of the Wolffians and, in particular, of Kant and the Kantians. All in all, to characterize Hegel's teaching in this way is entirely in accord with the facts. However, when stated in so general a form, it leaves much unclarified and undoubtedly demands further concreteness. The article we offer here for the reader's (...) consideration is an attempt at a concretization of this order. Central to this matter is the question of formal thinking: did Hegel accept the rights of formal thinking, and, if so, to what degree? (shrink)

This volume brings together the primary challenges for 21st century cognitive sciences and cultural neuroscience in responding to the nature of human identity, self, and evolution of life itself. Through chapters devoted to intricate but focused models, empirical findings, theories, and experiential data, the contributors reflect upon the most exciting possibilities, and debate upon the fundamental aspects of consciousness and self in the context of cultural, philosophical, and multidisciplinary divergences and convergences. Such an understanding and the ensuing insights lie in (...) the cusp of philosophy, neurosciences, psychiatry, and medical humanities. In this volume, the editors and contributors explore the foundations of human thinking and being and discuss both evolutionary/cultural embeddedness, and the self-orientation, of consciousness, keeping in mind questions that bring in the interdisciplinary complexity of issues such as the emergence of consciousness, relation between healing and agency, models of altered self, how cognition impacts the social self, experiential primacy as the hallmark of consciousness, and alternate epistemologies to understand these interdisciplinary puzzles. (shrink)

Chastʹ I. Ėsteticheskie uchenii︠a︡ filosofov antichnogo mira -- Chastʹ II. Iskusstvo v suzhdenni︠a︡kh pisateleĭ antichnogo mira.

In contemporary human sciences, the concept of activity continues to play a key, methodologically central role, since it is used in attempts to give a universal characterization of either the whole human world or the inner world of a concrete individual . In either case, the category of activity is elevated to the level of a universal, ultimate abstraction, which, in E.G. Iudin's words, "combines empirical certainty with theoretical depth and methodological constructiveness" [11, p. 249].