Background. Informed consent (IC) is not only a regulatory but also an ethical requirement to participate in any clinical trial. It is essential to determine that research participants understand what they consent to. Studies that evaluate participants’ understanding of IC conclude that recall and understanding of IC is often low, and researchers recommend that interactive multimedia interventions should be implemented to optimise understanding. Objectives. To assess participants’ understanding of IC of the research trial that they agreed to participate in.Methods. A (...) descriptive survey design, within a quantitative research approach, was used to conduct the study at two government hospitals in the Eastern Cape Province. A semi-structured, self-administered questionnaire was used to collect information from 170 participants in research studies. Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the results.Results. Participants were recruited from among women who enrolled in any of the three studies that were ongoing at the two sites during the recruitment period. The study participants had a mean age of 25.9 years. Nearly one-third (30%) could not recall the purpose of the original trial that they consented to. The concept of randomisation was not understood by any of the participants.Conclusion. Regardless of extensive efforts to ensure that participants understood their participation, this study unveiled poor recall of essential information on IC. It is proposed that IC should be short and only address essential components such as purpose, procedure, possible risks or benefits, alternative options if not participating and explaining the concept of voluntary participation. (shrink)

The Essay concerning Human Understanding was published at the end of 1689.1 It sold well, and within three years Locke was planning revisions for a second edition. Among those whose “advice and assistance” he sought was the Irish scientist William Molyneux. Locke had begun a correspondence with Molyneux a few months before, after the latter had lavishly praised the Essay and its author in the Epistle Dedicatory of his own Dioptrica Nova, published early in 1692. Here was a man, Locke (...) concluded, whose judgment one could trust. He returned Molyneux’s compliment in the Essay’s new edition, calling him “that very Ingenious and Studious promoter of real Knowledge, ... whom I am proud to call my friend”. (shrink)

A compact edition of Mr. Beck's excellent translation of the second Critique, slightly revised, together with a helpful short introduction and a bibliography.--V. C. C.

Attention has been drawn, particularly since Kant, to propositions which can not have negative instances. They used to be called a priori, axioms, first principles. Today, they are usually called postulates—C. I. Lewis uses both the old and new terminology—because there is a growing recognition of the fact that at least some of them are not “necessary” in the traditional sense. Kant placed a limitation on the apriorism of the continental rationalists. Current epistemologists and logicians have outstripped Kant in the (...) direction signalled by him. Both he and they, however, concur in the opinion that apriori propositions are subject to negation of a sort. The Kantian dinge-an-sich, though they can not contradict these propositions by being negative instances of them, do nevertheless stand to them in the relation of insubordination, thereby exerting on them a “negative action” of a sort. And, according to current views, there are instances which, though they fall outside the range of significance of a proposition or system and hence can not contradict it, do nevertheless tend to bring about a revision of it by a negative action of some sort. The purpose of this brief essay is to coin a convenient name for such instances and to describe certain properties of their peculiar negative action. (shrink)

V. C. Chappell; IV*—Stuff and Things, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 June 1971, Pages 61–76, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.

Ontology was never Hume's main interest, but he certainly had opinions as to what there is, and he often expressed these in his philosophical works. Indeed it seems clear that Hume changed his ontological views while writing the Treatise, and that not just one but two different ontologies are to be found there. The ontology of Parts I, II, and III of Book I is more or less Lockean. There are minds and their operations and qualities. There are physical entities, (...) bodily actions and qualities if not bodies over and above these. And there are further entities, called ideas by Locke and perceptions by Hume, that represent things other than themselves, both physical and mental, while existing in and being dependent upon minds. In Part IV of Book I, however, and especially in Sections 2 and 6, a new ontology appears, one that differs not only from the doctrine of the earlier sections of the Treatise but also from any that previous philosophers had held. According to this new ontology, there are only perceptions: all other sorts of things are absorbed by or reduced to these, or else simply eliminated. Berkeley had indeed assimilated bodies and the properties of bodies to perceptions, but he had kept minds as a distinct category of entity. Hume went the whole way, making everything perceptions. We might characterise this new ontology as trans-Berkeleyan, or call it, on account of its similarity to later doctrines so named, phenomenalism or neutral monism. (shrink)

Known as the founder of the phenomenological movement, this book examines Husserl's various phases of phenomenology during his realist, transcendental, static, genetic, and post-Crisis (of European Sciences) periods. Consisting of ten carefully researched and thoroughly examined essays, this book describes Husserl's concepts and ideas through numerous examples and diagrammatic representations, in a bid to elucidate the nuances of phenomenology for its readers. Valuable insights into Husserl's realist phase are made in the chapter on Meaning, and the chapters on Natural Attitude, (...) Epoché and Phenomenological Reduction, while the chapter on Noesis & Noema symbolizes the transcendental phase. Thomas points out Husserl's transition from static to genetic phenomenology in the chapter on Lived Body, with the chapters on Lifeworld, and the Notion of the Other, later focusing on this perspective. Husserl's entire phenomenological space, including his pre-phenomenological period, are covered in the chapter on Lived Time. However, the chapters on Phenomenology: The Study of Self and Beyond, and Consciousness and Intentionality are the fulcrums upon which the edifice of phenomenology turns. The final chapter on Presuppositionlessness in phenomenology expresses Thomas' personal enquiries into Husserl's contention that phenomenology is a presuppositionless science. This book will be of particular interest to research scholars and post-graduate students in the areas of Philosophy and Social Sciences, as well as those interested in contemporary Western Philosophy, and the history and development of Ideas. (shrink)

An account, systematically presented, of Plato's views on the subjects covered in the author's earlier books-ethics, aesthetics and philosophy of education--with only passing mention of Platonic logic, epistemology and metaphysics. The Platonic views are set against the views of Plato's Greek predecessors, and a final chapter discusses "Plato and Modern Philosophy." Mr. Lodge writes engagingly, but somewhat informally too; his book is intended more as an essay in appreciation than as a work of philosophical interpretation.--V. C. C.

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a measure of analytical reasoning that cues an intuitive but incorrect response that must be rejected for successful performance to be attained. The CRT yields two types of errors: Intuitive errors, which are attributed to Type 1 processes; and non-intuitive errors, which result from poor numeracy skills or deficient reasoning. Past research shows that participants who commit the highest numbers of errors on the CRT overestimate their performance the most, whereas those with the lowest (...) error-rates tend to slightly underestimate. This is an example of the Dunning-Kruger Effect (DKE). The present study examined how intuitive vs. non-intuitive errors contribute to overestimation in the CRT at different levels of performance. Female undergraduate students completed a seven-item CRT test and subsequently estimated their raw score. They also filled out the Faith in Intuition (FI) questionnaire, which is a dispositional measure of intuitive thinking. Data was separated into quartiles based on level of performance on the CRT. The results demonstrated the DKE. Additionally, intuitive and non-intuitive errors predicted miscalibration among low, but not high performers. However, intuitive errors were a stronger predictor of miscalibration. Finally, FI was positively correlated with CRT self-estimates and miscalibration, indicating that participants who perceived themselves to be more intuitive were worse at estimating their score. These results taken together suggest that participants who perform poorly in the CRT and also those who score higher in intuitive thinking disposition are more susceptible to the influences of heuristic-based cues, such as answer fluency, when judging their performance. (shrink)

Another volume in the fine "New Critical Edition" of Hegel's works, containing documents dating from Hegel's Berlin period. The documents include speeches, pieces from journals, reviews, and intra-University "memos," offering a wealth of information relating to Hegel's life and thought during these fruitful last years. --V. C. C.

Mr. Berlin offers, with characteristic brilliance and insight, a compelling indictment of the modern tendency to deny the relevance of moral considerations to history: to minimize the influence of human individuals upon--and their responsibility for--historical events, as well as to eliminate evaluation and moral judgment from the writing of history. History, it is maintained, neither can be nor should try to be "objective," i.e., free from evaluations, in the way that physics is "objective." Mr. Berlin's points are not always clearly (...) organized, but they are sensible and telling; his running critique of the prevalent naive "scientism" of contemporary social scientists is especially effective.--V. C. C. (shrink)

An elementary textbook in Thomistic Metaphysics designed for use in Catholic colleges and seminaries. Strictly traditional in content and terminology, the book attempts nevertheless to argue its points in ways convincing to beginning students.--V. C. C.

A section of Emile, newly translated, setting forth Rousseau's influential version of eighteenth-century Deism. --V. C. C.

An attempt to present Kant's Critical Philosophy in a non-technical and up-to-date manner. The author is largely successful in translating complex doctrines into simple language and in relating Kant's thought to contemporary developments in philosophy, science, morals and theology. He stresses the continuity of Kant's thinking with our own, and expounds the Kantian position in the light of the criticisms which have been directed against it, in our and other times. Despite the simplicity of its language, however, the book is (...) not always as clear in meaning or content as one might wish, and some of the interpretations--as when, in Chapter 2, space and time are made out to be "particulars"--are decidedly strange.--V. C. C. (shrink)

Though intended as an introductory textbook of Thomistic metaphysics, this work offers a fairly detailed treatment of a number of important problems, presented in systematic and well-ordered fashion. Father Klubertanz rejects the a priori procedure of some recent Thomists, and endeavors to reconstruct the Thomistic synthesis by beginning with immediate sense experience. This and other "departures from systematized Thomism" give the book a certain originality, and raise it somewhat above the usual textbook level.--V. C. C.

The thesis of this brief but suggestive essay in interpretation is that Kant's critical works express a unified "Weltanschauung" whose determining principles are ethical rather than epistemological. The argument is subtle and complex, and is supported by references more to the spirit than to the letter of the Kantian writings; its consequent difficulty, however, is more than outweighed by its breadth and illuminatory power. In his concern with the relations between morals and religion for Kant, and in his emphasis upon (...) the voluntaristic and subjective element in the Critical philosophy, Kroner draws a Kant who often looks like Kierkegaard. The result is challenging and, if nothing else, provides a useful contrast to the predominant "piecemeal" interpretations of the epistemologically oriented Marburg school.--V. C. C. (shrink)