Eco–spiritualism is not a new idea; in fact, it has a long history in the Vedic tradition. ‘Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam’ in the mantra of Mahā–Upaniṣad of the Sāmaveda tradition presents us with a thought–provoking message, namely, that every being or entity on this earth is one family [अयं बन्धुरयं नेति गणना लघुचेतसाम् ।उदारचरितानां तु वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् ॥७१॥]. In the Vedic civilization the realm of ethical thinking was extensive. The Vedic science of ecology addresses eco–spiritualism from the perspective of the cosmological and (...) the ontological unity of nature. However, the ethics of natural laws, such as ṛta, satya and dharma, plays a very vital role in the human being’s environmental actions. Firstly, this paper intends to trace and identify the ecological divinity of the Vedas. Secondly, the paper shall endeavour to apply and evaluate ancient scriptures and their understanding of the environment in terms of its intrinsic value and its relation to human beings. We conclude with the discussion on the problems of eco–spiritualism in the contemporary world. (shrink)

Hatred: Understanding Our Most Dangerous Emotion The first in-depth philosophical analysis of personal hate and group hate, Hate: Understanding Our Most Dangerous Emotion explores how personal hatred can foster domestic violence and emotional abuse, how hate-proneness is a main contributor to the aggressive tendencies of borderlines, narcissists and psychopaths, how seemingly ordinary people embark on some of history's worst hate crimes, and how cohesive groups, subjected to spontaneous forces of group polarization, can develop extremist viewpoints of the sort (...) that motivate hate crimes, mass shootings, and terrorism. The book's first part explores hate in intimate relationships, looking for an answer to the question of why our intimate relationships can survive hate and resentment, but not disrespect or contempt. Berit "Brit" Brogaard shows that where contempt creates an irreparable power imbalance, hate is tied to fear, which our brains may reinterpret as thrill, attraction and excitement. But this can also make hate a dangerous emotion that convinces people to hang onto abusive relationships. When tied to vengeance and the dark triad of personality, hate is not only dangerous but also dehumanizing. Vengeance and the dark personalities are not essential to hate, however. Without them, hate can have more admirable ends. The book's second part explores the polarizing forces that can bias cohesive groups of like-minded individuals and contribute to what is effectively a hate crisis. Drawing on history, politics, legal theory, philosophy, and psychology, Brogaard shows how cultural myths about femininity, ethnic groups, and the land of opportunity perpetuate misogyny, white supremacy and anti-Semitism. But, she argues, politicians and policymakers have it in their power to address the hate crisis through legislation that preserves the original incentive behind the first-amendment right to free speech. (shrink)

My interest is in an apparent tension between two epistemological theses. The first is veritism, which is roughly the claim that truth is the fundamental epistemic good. The second is the idea that understanding is the proper goal of inquiry. The two theses seem to be in tension because the former seems to imply that the proper goal of inquiry should be truth rather than understanding. And yet there is a strong prima facie case to be made for (...) thinking that properly conducted inquiry aims at an elevated epistemic standing like understanding rather than merely true belief. I suggest that this putative tension is one of the reasons why veritism is these days not widely endorsed. As I show, however, there is in fact no tension between these two claims, at least once they are each properly understood. Indeed, I will be suggesting that there is a plausible conception of veritism which would explain why intellectual exemplars seek out understanding in inquiry. (shrink)

Principle-based formulations of bioethical theory have recently come under increasing scrutiny, particularly insofar as they give prominence to personal autonomy. This essay critiques the dominant conceptualization of autonomy and urges an alternative formulation freed from the individualistic assumptions that pervade the prevailing framework. Drawing on feminist perspectives, I discuss the need for a vision of patient autonomy that joins relational experiences to individuality and acknowledges the influence of patterns of power and authority on the exercise of patient agency. Deficiencies in (...) the current models of science and social relations guiding medical practice are analyzed, particularly (1) the tendency to disregard the patients self-knowledge and (2) failure to recognize limitations on the generalizability of medical knowledge. Models of social relations such as mothering and friendship are explored to advance a conception of autonomy better suited to the practical activities of medicine. In conclusion, I consider how acknowledgement of the specificity and complexity of social relations can contribute to reconfiguration of other principles comprising the standard framework of bioethics, particularly beneficence, justice, and equality. (shrink)

The philosophy of mathematics has long been concerned with deter- mining the means that are appropriate for justifying claims of mathemat- ical knowledge, and the metaphysical considerations that render them so. But, as of late, many philosophers have called attention to the fact that a much broader range of normative judgments arise in ordinary math- ematical practice; for example, questions can be interesting, theorems important, proofs explanatory, concepts powerful, and so on. The as- sociated values are often loosely classied as (...) aspects of \mathematical understanding." Meanwhile, in a branch of computer science known as \formal ver- ication," the practice of interactive theorem proving has given rise to software tools and systems designed to support the development of com- plex formal axiomatic proofs. Such eorts require one to develop models of mathematical language and inference that are more robust than the the simple foundational models of the last century. This essay explores some of the insights that emerge from this work, and some of the ways that these insights can inform, and be informed by, philosophical theories of mathematical understanding. (shrink)

The relationship between philosophy and science in contemporary times is closer than ever. From the methodology perspective, scientific and philosophical research has a clear sequential relationship. It is highlighted in the following aspects: 1. the methodology of scientific research, including theoretical assumptions and data modeling, parallels with apparent similarities in conceptual analysis and logical deduction in philosophy;2. consistency of analytical argumentation methods in scientific research and philosophical research;3. naturalism is currently a research approach that both scientific and philosophical research adopt. (...) There has been a significant dispute over the relationship between philosophy and science among contemporary philosophers. This dispute focuses on the impact of scientific development on philosophy research. Nowadays, no one would deny the existence of this impact, but there is no consensus on the impact's nature, scope, and role. Wittgenstein's conception of certainty can provide valuable insights to understand the relationship between philosophy and science. In addition, we conclude the pragmatic turn in cognitive science because we misinterpret the cognitive scientists' emphasis on action as a practical claim and interpret the cognitive scientists' views with pragmatism. The theoretical analysis and research suggestions philosophers provide are becoming essential focuses in contemporary artificial intelligence research, including the interpretability of computer technology, the ethical norms of artificial intelligence technology, and the possible conception of human beings in the future. The interdisciplinary study of science and philosophy will achieve more significant development. In sum, understanding the nature of philosophy can be given a new explanation from a future perspective. The future outlook here refers to the starting point from possible world scenarios that can be conceived and traced back to all the facts happening in the present world, thereby giving an appropriate explanation to the real world. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a unifying approach to the analysis of understanding coherencies and understanding subject matters by highlighting the contextualist nature of understanding. Inspired by the relevant alternatives contextualism about knowledge, I will argue that understanding inherently has context-sensitive features and that a theory of understanding that highlights those features can incorporate our intuitions towards understanding as well as consolidate the different accounts of how to analyse understanding. In developing a contextualist (...) account of understanding, I will argue that an account of the features commonly taken to be central to understanding greatly benefits from a contextualist framework. Central to my analysis will be the claim that a person has to fulfill the function of a competent problem solver in order to qualify for the ascription of understanding. In addition to the theoretical elucidation of my contextualist approach to understanding, a demanding hypothetical scenario will be developed to function as a test case. (shrink)

Life is definitively purposive and creative. Organisms use genes in controlling their destiny. This book presents a paradigm shift in understanding living systems. The genome is not a code, blueprint or set of instructions. It is a tool orchestrated by the system. This book shows that gene-centrism misrepresents what genes are and how they are used by living systems. It demonstrates how organisms make choices, influencing their behaviour, their development and evolution, and act as agents of natural selection. It (...) presents a novel approach to fundamental philosophical and cultural issues, such as free-will. Reading this book will make you see life in a new light, as a marvellous phenomenon, and in some sense a triumph of evolution. We are not in our genes, our genes are in us. (shrink)

In the natural and social sciences, it is common to use toy models—extremely simple and highly idealized representations—to understand complex phenomena. Some of the simple surrogate models used to understand opaque machine learning (ML) models, such as rule lists and sparse decision trees, bear some resemblance to scientific toy models. They allow non-experts to understand how an opaque ML model works globally via a much simpler model that highlights the most relevant features of the input space and their effect on (...) the output. The obvious difference is that the common target of a toy and a full-scale model in the sciences is some phenomenon in the world, while the target of a surrogate model is another model. This essential difference makes toy surrogate models (TSMs) a new object of study for theories of understanding, one that is not easily accommodated under current analyses. This paper provides an account of what it means to understand an opaque ML model globally with the aid of such simple models. (shrink)

The relationship between philosophy and science in contemporary times is closer than ever. From the methodology perspective, scientific and philosophical research has a clear sequential relationship. It is highlighted in the following aspects: 1. the methodology of scientific research, including theoretical assumptions and data modeling, parallels with apparent similarities in conceptual analysis and logical deduction in philosophy;2. consistency of analytical argumentation methods in scientific research and philosophical research;3. naturalism is currently a research approach that both scientific and philosophical research adopt. (...) There has been a significant dispute over the relationship between philosophy and science among contemporary philosophers. This dispute focuses on the impact of scientific development on philosophy research. Nowadays, no one would deny the existence of this impact, but there is no consensus on the impact's nature, scope, and role. Wittgenstein's conception of certainty can provide valuable insights to understand the relationship between philosophy and science. In addition, we conclude the pragmatic turn in cognitive science because we misinterpret the cognitive scientists' emphasis on action as a practical claim and interpret the cognitive scientists' views with pragmatism. The theoretical analysis and research suggestions philosophers provide are becoming essential focuses in contemporary artificial intelligence research, including the interpretability of computer technology, the ethical norms of artificial intelligence technology, and the possible conception of human beings in the future. The interdisciplinary study of science and philosophy will achieve more significant development. In sum, understanding the nature of philosophy can be given a new explanation from a future perspective. The future outlook here refers to the starting point from possible world scenarios that can be conceived and traced back to all the facts happening in the present world, thereby giving an appropriate explanation to the real world. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta a Weber y Habermas como los umbrales o polos de una modernidad que tiene al progreso como horizonte teórico-práctico. El diagnóstico weberiano sobre la modernidad y su proceso de desencantamiento del mundo y la injustificada reducción de la actividad racional a una actividad utilitario-estratégica desprovista de su carácter veritativo y de su orientación valórica, Habermas la utiliza para justificar su propuesta teórico-crítica respecto a la modernidad y la "paradoja de la racionalización", distinguiendo "sistema" y "mundo vital". Aquí (...) "desencantamiento del mundo" y "consenso del proyecto de lamodernidad", se encuentranThis article presents Weber and Habermas like the thresholds or poles of a modernity that has to the progress as theoretical- practical horizon. The diagnosis weberiano on the modernity and his process of disenchantment of the world and the unjustified reduction of the rational activity to a utilitarian-strategic activity devoid of his character of truth, Habermas uses to justify his theoretical-critical offerwith regard to themodernity and the "paradox of the rationalization", distinguishing "system" and "vital world". Here "disenchantment of the world" and "consensus of the project of the modernity", they are. (shrink)

Good decision-making requires reliable information. In medicine, relevant information comes from clinical trials and other forms of scientific research. In business, one source is in corporate annual financial statements. As for-profit, publicly traded companies whose business is discovering, manufacturing, and marketing drugs, pharmaceutical companies sit at the nexus of these two fields. Determining the safety and efficacy of a pharmaceutical product and determining the profitability of a complex enterprise are similarly difficult tasks: each is fraught with deeply ambiguous information that (...) requires sophisticated judgment to interpret reasonably. (shrink)

Much work in history, anthropology, sociology, and political science has a narrative form — the events described are emplotted into stories. A number of recent critics of narrative have argued that the story form is a poor vehicle for social scientific explanation, as it often misleads us about the causal structure of the social world. Defenders of narrative typically claim that such criticisms miss the point of narrative. Even if narrative is not the best means for providing us with causal (...) information, it can provide us with information about something else of importance such as the events' “meanings” or others' experiences. I reject such defenses of narrative, but I then offer a novel defense in their place. On the view I defend, narratives increase our understanding of the social world not by giving us some kind of special information about the social world but rather by cuing certain kinds of responses to it. I tie this conception of the epistemic function of narrative to the political role that narrative can play in correcting failures of interpersonal recognition and promoting structural change. (shrink)

In the recent literatures in which moral understanding has played a starring role, it is assumed that moral understanding is a species of explanatory understanding. That is, it is assumed that instances of moral understanding are of the form ‘S understands why p,’ where p is some explicitly moral proposition, paradigmatically about an action being morally right or wrong. This paper highlights some shortcomings of this explanatory picture of moral understanding and articulates a different, complementary (...) account on which the object of moral understanding is the relation of normative support between a proposition and an action. (shrink)

Watson’s monograph, The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them, clearly, succinctly and deftly introduces the notion of the right to know or epistemic rights to the epistemology literature. She does this partly by connecting the conclusions and theoretical motives of the moral and legal rights literature to the epistemology literature. In part, motivated by this book’s great value, I present two objections to some of the book’s central claims. The first objection is that there is tension (...) between (i) the book’s claim that information distribution is a basic epistemic duty that epistemic rights generate and (ii) the book’s claim that epistemic rights are complied with if subjects receive epistemic goods such as understanding and knowledge that respect their final value. The second objection is that the dyadic nature of Watson’s account of epistemic rights violation does not comport with plausible cases in which non-dominant groups’ epistemic rights have been violated and as a consequence the book’s claim that epistemic rights provide those who wield them an especially forceful rhetorical tool requires further motivation. (shrink)

In the current debate on the relation between how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and understanding, two seemingly irreconcilable positions have emerged, which either deny or assert HPEs’ contribution to understanding. We argue, in contrast, that there is substantial room for reconciliation between these positions. First, we show that a shared assumption is unfounded: HPEs can be interpreted as being correct explanations. Second, we argue that what we call the standard account is actually compatible with the claim that HPEs may improve (...) understanding. Our analysis not only indicates that there is room for reconciliation, but also specifies the potential remaining disagreements. (shrink)

Understanding Mental Causation proposes a new, non-relational theory of mental causation. Andrea White believes that contemporary philosophy of mind labours under a misapprehension of what mental causation is supposed to be. This volume explains where the leading theories go astray, and how the new theory proposed solves critical problems for philosophers of mind and action. Ordinary experience suggests that what we do with our bodies causally depends, somehow, on what is going on in our minds. However, the problem of (...) how to understand the causal relationship between mind and body remains. Contemporary philosophy of mind is shaped by the question: how is it possible for the mental to causally interact with the physical? Mental causation is often presented as a cause-effect relation between mental and physical entities. This understanding of mental causation is widely endorsed because it seems like a straightforward explanation of what is going on when people act intentionally. Desires and beliefs are seen as causes of the actions they explain, entailing the existence of causal relations between mental items and physical events. White calls this the 'causalist' view of intentional action. This view is not universally accepted. The 'non-causalist' view denies that intentional action entails the existence of causal relations between mental items and physical events. However, non-causalists reach this conclusion by arguing that explanations of intentional actions which cite beliefs or desires are not usually causal explanations at all. White presents a theory of intentional action that falls between the 'causalist' and 'non-causalist' views. She rejects the idea that as-a-cause is how we should understand the place of mentality in intentional action. Concepts like belief, desire and intention do not refer to items which can stand in causal relations to actions or physical events. However, like causalists, she holds that explanations of intentional actions which cite the agent's thoughts do give causal information. This intermediary view demands a new theory about the causation that is on display when human beings act intentionally, one that does not reduce mental causation to a relation between mental items and physical events. Orthodox theories of causation, inspired by David Hume, assume that causation is always a relation between events. Therefore, the causation demonstrated in intentional action must be a relation, because all causation is, and will count as mental causation if and only if at least one of the terms of that relation is a mental entity. White challenges this orthodoxy by presenting her own non-relational theory of causation. Denying causation is always a relation, she holds instead that causation is a general type of process in which substances engage and that exercising a causal power is to engage in a process. White shows how this novel theory can be used to provide a better understanding of intentional action and the mental causation associated with it. She suggests that to act intentionally is to engage in a process and, as such, to exercise a power - but a power of a special sort. The power to act intentionally is a power to structure one's own activities so that they demonstrate a pattern - a pattern which is only revealed by attributing mental states to the agent. So, when an agent acts intentionally, they engage in the process of mental causation because the agent is manifesting a special power to organise their activities into a pattern that can be made sense of by appeal to mental concepts. Broadening our understanding of causation, and more specifically incorporating the concepts 'power' and 'process', opens up new ways of understanding intentional action and mental causation. In Understanding Mental Causation, White presents a compelling new account in this key area of philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Can understanding be transmitted by testimony, in the same sense that propositional knowledge can be transmitted by testimony? Some contemporary philosophers – call them testimonial understanding pessimists – say No, and others – call them testimonial understanding optimists – say Yes. In this chapter I will articulate testimonial understanding pessimism (§1) and consider some arguments for it (§2).

Scientific normativity, one of the contentious issues in the philosophy of science, warrants thorough exploration to situate the epistemic role of the norms governing methodological choices in science. This paper endeavors to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of it by using Lewis' account of convention. The attempt is to develop a social conventional framework for scientific normativity. It is an epistemological framework that recognizes scientific norms governing methodological choices as social conventions. These social conventions are arrived at by appealing (...) to the values, goals, desires, and assumptions that characterize the sociality of the situation in which they emerge. We argue for a pluralistic notion of scientific normativity without being dismissive of the universalists’ central concerns. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Understanding Musical Understanding: The Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology of the Musical ExperienceDavid BakerHarold E. Fiske, Understanding Musical Understanding: The Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology of the Musical Experience. (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008).Building on several earlier publications on music and the mind (1990, 1993, 1996, 2004), Harold Fiske offers Understanding Musical Understanding. This is a well-referenced piece that outlines the thinking (...) of various authors (for example, Crowder, 19931; Huron, 2006;2 Snyder, 20073). Furthermore, as Fiske meticulously constructs his case, it draws in psychologists such as Carl Seashore and philosophers like Aristotle, Hegel, Kant, and Schopenhauer. All this suggests an author of great expertise and wide appeal.Fiske begins to build his argument by discussing musical cognition in terms of ‘time’ (Chapter 2) and ‘shape’ (Chapter 3) returning to these themes in greater detail in Chapter 6. It may seem axiomatic that music is perceived structurally and through time. Yet, as the author mentions, the capacity for someone to designate musical form is no way in which to illustrate systematically the workings of musical understanding. This happens swiftly and unceasingly in the course of a person’s musical encounter. It is commonplace, too, for musicians and listeners to allude to visual imagery and shape when describing music (for example, ‘high [End Page 204] and low pitches,’ ‘a texture that is dense or thin,’ or ‘an angular melody’). Fiske contributes a plausible explanation of musical shape:... the perceived shape of music can only be the outcome of a construction (not reconstruction or ‘copy’) calculated on the part of the neural network mechanisms… The ‘reality’ of a musical-auditory image is likely a result of imposing a three-dimensioned visual perspective on an inherently unstructured (invisible, tasteless, intangible, and otherwise unknowable) transitory experience. This is the only means the brain has for making sense of a sound event. What it seems to do is: identify relevant cues, piece the cues together into patterns that can be retained (in the echoic memory) long enough for brain mechanisms to examine and create the sense that we can ‘look’ at music by invoking principles borrowed from vision, and then creating the impression of an auditory ‘object.’ The ‘object’ seems complete and multidimensioned but is, however, only remotely related to what we hear during the slit-like limitations of the perceptual ‘now.’(p. 56).Nonetheless, the manner in which we communicate musical perception with terms borrowed from vision does not inconclusively evidence the same mechanisms of human thought on receiving visual or, on the other hand, musical stimuli. Use of such language may only represent an opportune mode of expressing phenomena to which we have no dedicated vocabulary. Fiske argues that musical understanding is part of the human organism’s genetically-inherited capacity to construe (rapidly invent) patterns from sonic stimuli thus making sense of temporal experience. This process, he argues, is part of the brain’s facility to determine quickly the source, kind and meaning of stimuli for the organism’s immediate safety and survival; the mental processes involved are regulated by ‘brain time’ as opposed to ‘clock time.’ Brain time is “... a rapid, micro-temporal, flexible-variable scheme...” (p. 8) in contrast to pre- and externally-determined ‘clock time.’Musical memory is addressed in Chapter 4 in tandem with ‘pattern constructs.’ Pattern constructs, Fiske explains, are ‘chunks’ of learned musical experience encoded in ‘brain time’ as multi-dimensional, unidirectional entities (p. 63). There is evidence of the ‘inner replay’ of learned events such as these.4 Incoming musical information is perceived, though, according to the listener’s cognitive context, and perhaps retroactively linked for ‘best fit’ rather than being ‘measured’ against fixed expectations and pre-established contextual information, say, about genre. The degree of ‘best fit’ either confirms or modifies assumed context. An important point Fiske makes, then, is that “... a misfit... between incoming information and the presumed context” evidences learning (p. 84).5 Since a ‘misfit’ triggers modifications to the cognitive context by which a person discerns music, it enriches his or her musical knowledge and understanding. [End Page 205] Consequently, Fiske sets a challenge for music education: “... how [do we] design teaching... (shrink)

Sixty-five undergraduates participating in a wide range of psychological research experiments were interviewed in depth about their research experiences and their views on the process of informed consent. Overall, 32% of research experiences were characterized positively and 41 % were characterized negatively. One major theme of the negative experiences was that experiments were perceived as too invasive, suggesting incomplete explication of negative aspects of research during the informed consent process. Informed consent experiences were viewed positively 80% of the time. However, (...) most of the participants had a limited view of the purpose of informed consent: Less than 20% viewed the process as a decision point. Results suggest a number of common pitfalls to standard informed consent practices that have not generally been recognized. Results are discussed in terms of both ethical and methodological implications. Suggestions for improving the informed consent process are also provided. (shrink)

Studies on the nature of quotation have become a topic of growing interest among linguists and philosophers of language. What is the function and logical status of quotations? How can an analysis of quotation help to develop a general theory of the semantics-pragmatics interface? This volume is a collection of original papers by leading researchers in the field on such issues and related linguistic and philosophical aspects of quotations.

Proponents of individual-based modeling in ecology claim that their models explain the emergence of population-level behavior. This article argues that individual-based models have not, as yet, provided such explanations. Instead, individual-based models can and do demonstrate and explain the emergence of population-level behaviors from individual behaviors and interactions.

In the current debate on the relation between how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and understanding, two seemingly irreconcilable positions have emerged, which either deny or assert HPEs’ contribution to understanding. We argue, in contrast, that there is substantial room for reconciliation between these positions. First, we show that a shared assumption is unfounded: HPEs can be interpreted as being correct explanations. Second, we argue that what we call the standard account is actually compatible with the claim that HPEs may improve (...) understanding. Our analysis not only indicates that there is room for reconciliation, but also specifies the potential remaining disagreements. (shrink)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, there were many vaccine trials which had significant purposes which participants needed to understand to validly consent. For example, participants needed to understand that the purpose of dose-escalation vaccine trials was to give incremental doses of vaccine until participants became ill. Likewise, participants needed to understand that if they received placebos, they could no later take a genuine vaccine to preserve the integrity of the trials. Yet, these intuitive judgements about what participants need to understand to (...) validly consent are rejected by recent accounts of consent. According to these accounts, as long as participants were given a good opportunity to learn these purposes, they do not need to actually understand them to consent. In this paper, I reject this consensus, and I argue that participants who failed to understand these aims associated with vaccine trials failed to provide legitimate consent. I defend this claim by developing and defending a new understanding condition for valid consent. According to this understanding condition, a participant must understand when a consent transaction has features which violate the norms which govern the medical practice with which they are acquainted. I argue that this condition is independently plausible and best explains why participants needed to understand these aims associated with vaccine trials to validly consent. (shrink)

This article presents an existential framework for understanding loss and grief. Since not all experiences of loss lead to grief, I begin by exploring what constitutes grievable losses. The dominant approach in grief research has been to understand grief in terms of bereavement. In light of emerging discourses on living and non-death losses, this approach no longer seems tenable, and the contemporary debate requires an account of grievability that extends beyond bereavement. In response to this challenge, I propose a (...) two-part existential framework. The first part introduces mourning as a ground attunement, suggesting that our finitude is the basis for generalized experiences of loss. The second part posits that specific grievable losses reflect a loss of identity. To explain this, I introduce the concept of existential identity and four associated axes susceptible to loss. Lastly, I demonstrate how this framework can be used to analyze loss as complex existential experiences. (shrink)

Why Delusions Matter is a reflection on the importance of the study of delusions for better understanding and reshaping our mutual interactions. The study of delusions has transformed the philosophy of mind and psychology in the last thirty years, helping redefine the relationship between rationality and intentionality. It has still a lot to offer to emerging areas at the intersection of ethics and epistemology. These are areas where the focus of the investigation of beliefs is moving from a painstaking (...) assessment of the individual’s cognitive achievements and failures to a broader examination of the environmental and social pressures on the adoption, revisions, and maintenance of beliefs at individual and collective levels. In the book, there is an exploration of the notion of delusionality across clinical and non-clinical contexts which shows how delusions are meaningful beliefs that matter to the speaker's identity but are received by the interpreter as implausible and unshakeable. Delusions are not pathological by default, but they can bring epistemic and psychological costs as well as temporary benefits. Although a speaker's delusions can make collaboration difficult, this should not discourage interpreters from attempts at genuine engagement. Delusions are not a sign of a breakdown in the speaker's capacity for agency and thus understanding them can help interpreters appreciate the speaker's perspective. (shrink)

Drawing together the ideas, practices, and techniques associated with the subject, this book puts them in historical context and demonstrates their relevance to ...

Background Moral distress is a far-reaching problem for nurses in different settings as it threatens their health. Aim This study examined which situations lead to moral distress in home-care nursing, how and with which consequences home-care nurses experience moral distress, and how they cope with morally stressful situations and the resulting moral distress. Research design A qualitative interview study with reflexive thematic analysis was used. Participants and research context We conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 home-care nurses in Germany. Ethical considerations (...) The study was approved by the Data Protection Office and Ethics Committee of the German Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Findings Twenty (14 female and 6 male) home-care nurses were interviewed between April and August 2023 at their chosen location. The situations leading to moral distress were inadequate care of the person in need of care, not being able to protect one’s health, extended responsibility for the entire care arrangement, work–privacy conflicts, and conflicts between the understanding of care or professional ethics and the performance and billing system. The nurses experienced moral distress as they worked alone and provided care in the patient’s territory. Short- and long-term strains with destructive cognitions, negative emotions, physical symptoms, and health consequences were reported. They faced challenges in coping with moral distress on institutional and individual levels. Conclusions In cases of tension between the service and billing system and the understanding of these nurses’ care services, moral distress is unavoidable. Alternative forms of organization and billing modalities, such as payment by time and the expansion and refinancing of service, should be implemented. The latter relates to systematic case and ethics meetings. Further, a transfer of medical activities, such as the prescription of wound material to registered nurses, could prevent morally stressful situations and improve patients’ quality of care. (shrink)

Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that language is the medium of all understanding and thus that it is the medium through which we can reach understanding with one another. Yet many today are sceptical of this claim and worry that Gadamerian hermeneutics ignores at its own peril the limits of the particular discourses that people utilize to reach understanding with one another. I argue here that this criticism rests on the assumption that, for Gadamer, it is the semantic features (...) of a language alone that allow it to function as the medium for shared understanding. I argue that focusing solely on semantic agreement as the source of understanding ignores the role that mutual recognition plays in allowing language to serve as a medium for shared understanding. I turn to discussions in several of Gadamer’s later essays to examine how he conceives of the mutual recognition that is essential for communicative understanding. (shrink)

I present a bipartite model of organ stewardship that places it at the intersection of resource stewardship and gift stewardship. Though both forms of stewardship are grounded in relationships of trust, they are importantly distinct, as are the duties they confer. This bipartite model of organ stewardship functions as a beneficial instrument for understanding and resolving conflicts among transplant stakeholders. As proof of concept, I apply the bipartite model of organ stewardship to a controversial case of conditional organ donation, (...) showing that we can better understand the underlying moral conflict if we recognize that it involves a tension between resource and gift stewardship. Then, demonstrating that the model can do more than just explanatory work, I use it to resolve the long‐standing debate over whether organ transplant recipients are organ stewards. Although some transplant recipients are gift stewards, I argue, none are resource stewards, and they therefore do not owe anything to members of the transplant team. (shrink)

Within churches, congregational health and well-being require not only efficient church leadership, but also prudent church management. Good leadership structures influence governance and ministry tasks, and the awareness of accountability is a vital concept within organisations. It shapes the entire managerial progression influencing values, objectives and practices. This article reports on a study to establish the understanding of ministerial accountability in the New Prophetic Pentecostal churches. Findings reveal a unique understanding of leaders’ personal accountability, communal and cultural ministry (...) practices and public accountability towards the broader community. This article speaks to the normative task of the Church and creates a new reflection on ministerial accountability and ethical practices as well as implications for congregational development broadly.Contribution: This article highlights findings on how New Prophetic Pentecostal churches understand the concept of ministerial accountability with limited literature on the topic. Gaining insight into the African cultural heritage and values when examining the neo-Pentecostal perspective will enhance the understanding regarding their beliefs and principles. (shrink)