This paper investigates force shift, a phenomenon in which the canonical discourse conventions, or force, associated with a clause type can be overridden to yield polar questions with the help of additional force-indicating devices. Previous studies attribute force shift to the presence of a complex question force component operating on semantic content. Based on utterance particles and particle clusters in Cantonese, we analyze force shift as resulting from compositional operations on force-bearing expressions. We propose that a simplex force, such (...) as assertion or question, denotes unanchored sentence acts, while a force-shifting particle like Cantonese _ho2_ is an anchoring function anchoring a sentence act to the speaker while querying whether or not the addressee can perform the sentence act. The proposed semantics makes predictions about _ho2_’s interactions with addressee-changing operations and imperatives, as well as about a larger family of force shift phenomena. (shrink)

Human rights discourse has been likened to a global lingua franca, and in more ways than one, the analogy seems apt. Human rights discourse is a language that is used by all yet belongs uniquely to no particular place. It crosses not only the borders between nation-states, but also the divide between national law and international law: it appears in national constitutions and international treaties alike. But is it possible to conceive of human rights as a global language or lingua (...) franca not just in a figurative or metaphorical sense, but in a literal or linguistic sense as a legal dialect defined by distinctive patterns of word choice and usage? Does there exist a global language of human rights that transcends not only national borders, but also the divide between domestic and international law? Empirical analysis suggests that the answer is yes, but this global language comes in at least two variants or dialects. New techniques for performing automated content analysis enable us to analyze the bulk of all national constitutions over the last two centuries, together with the world’s leading regional and international human rights instruments, for patterns of linguistic similarity and to evaluate how much language, if any, they share in common. Specifically, we employ a technique known as topic modeling that disassembles texts into recurring verbal patterns. The results highlight the existence of two species or dialects of rights talk—the universalist dialect and the positive-rights dialect—both of which are global in reach and rising in popularity. The universalist dialect is generic in content and draws heavily on the type of language found in international and regional human rights instruments. It appears in particularly large doses in the constitutions of transitional states, developing states, and states that have been heavily exposed to the influence of the international community. The positive-rights dialect, by contrast, is characterized by its substantive emphasis on positive rights of a social or economic variety, and by its prevalence in lengthier constitutions and constitutions from outside the common law world, especially those of the Spanish-speaking world. Both dialects of rights talk are truly transnational, in the sense that they appear simultaneously in national, regional, and international legal instruments and transcend the distinction between domestic and international law. Their existence attests to the blurring of the boundary between constitutional law and international law. (shrink)

"This work springs from a conviction of the unity of nature, expressed here in a single principle. In its earliest form this conviction was merely the sense of a hidden unity of form in nature, which the intellect had not yet identified. At that stage it had little value, except in creating the need to find a rational justification for the a-rational feeling. Soon I realised that the discovery of a universal form of process was hindered by the intellectual separation (...) of the processes of subjective experience from those of the external world. It was necessary to bring into closer relation the scientific conception of the forms of external nature and the subjective sense of the forms of experience. This in turn led to the recognition that the methods of exact science had paid inadequate attention to the irreversible or one-way character of process, which is unmistakable in the subjective realm, but is also evident in many inorganic and organic processes, such as those do which form is developed. I expressed this view in a sketch of the outlook of the sciences, entitled Archimedes, or the Future of Physics (1927). The next step was the observation that one principle only could account for the development of regular spatial forms: the principle that asymmetry decreases in isolable processes. This concept of one-way process appeared to me to be the most general conception of spatial process conceivable at the present time, so that all other types of process should be capable of being represented as special cases. I called it the Unitary Principle and determined to use it as the basis of a comprehensive scientific method."--The preface. (shrink)

In view of the vital role played by the testimony or witness in detecting and combating corruption crimes, the Saudi Arabia issued a new law for the protection of whistleblowers, witnesses, experts and victims, by Royal Decree No. (M/148) dated 8/8/1445 AH, and since there is a potential threat to those who dare to reporting or witnessing the commission of these crimes, the low dealt with the types and forms of protection provided to them, and this research tries to answer (...) a key question, which is: What types of protections does the Saudi low guarantee to witnesses in corruption cases? This is done by using the descriptive, analytical research methodology, by characterizing and extrapolating the types of protection, and analyzing the texts of the low to identify the types and forms of protection contained therein. The study reached several results, the most important of which are: the interest of the Saudi regulator in protecting witnesses in this type of cases to provide the necessary guarantees for the protection of human rights, as it enacted a set of security, judicial, functional and social guarantees to protect the witness, and organized a number of new measures, including concealing the witness's identity and personal data, not attending him during the trial, and sufficiency, for example, with recordings without the possibility of discussing him. (shrink)

This volume presents a Type Theory of Law (TTL), claiming that this is a unique theory of law that stems from the philosophical understanding of Jung's psychological types applied to the phenomenon of law. Furthermore, the TTL claims to be a universal, general and descriptive account of law. To prove that, the book first presents the fundamentals of Jungian psychological types, as they had been invented by Jung and consequently developed further by his followers. The next part of the (...) book describes how the typological structure of an individual determines their understanding of law. It then addresses the way in which inclusive legal theory can be understood based on this typology. Finally, the book describes the TTL in general and descriptive terms and puts it into context. All in all, the book shows how the integral or inclusive approach to understanding the nature of law is not only in tune with our time, but also relevant for presenting a more persuasive picture of law than the older exclusivist or dualist approaches of strict natural law and rigid legal positivism did. (shrink)

It is likely that internal factors play an important role in restricting the possible avenues of evolutionary change from any starting point. Internal selective processes operating on premutational disturbances, on mutations, and on developmental phases may usefully be separated from the adaptive selection of phenotypes. The precise structural and morphological consequences of internal factors should soon become an isolable problem owing to a) the observational correlation of definite changes in hereditary specificity with particular developmental consequences; and b) the progressive theoretical (...) identification of the coordinative conditions in organisms. Increasing clarity regarding the coordinative conditions should throw light on the “mutational selection rules” and on the differentiative mutations which led to the most important steps in the past history of evolution.Die Wege der Evolution können sowohl durch innere Auslese der Genotypen wÄhrend der Entwicklung als auch durch die Äussere Darwinische Auslese der Phenotypen bestimmt werden. Seit 1949 haben sich zumindest fünf Forscher mit dieser Möglichkeit befasst. Es ist zur Zeit möglich, zwischen den beiden Arten von Zuchtwahl theoretisch und experimentell zu unterscheiden.Les chemins de l'évolution peuvent Être déterminés non seulement par la sélection extérieure Darwinienne des phénotypes mais aussi par la sélection intérieure des genotypes pendant le développement. Depuis 1949 aux moins cinq investigateurs en ont considéré la possibilité. Il est possible à présent de faire la distinction entre les deux types de sélection dans la théorie comme dans l'expérience. (shrink)

This paper describes the automated classification of legal norms in German statutes with regard to their semantic type. We propose a semantic type taxonomy for norms in the German civil law domain consisting of nine different types focusing on functional aspects, such as Duties, Prohibitions, Permissions, etc. We performed four iterations in classifying legal norms with a rule-based approach using a manually labeled dataset, i.e., tenancy law, of the German Civil Code ). During this experiment the \ score (...) continuously improved from 0.52 to 0.78. In contrast, a machine learning based approach for the classification was implemented. A performance of \ was reached. Traditionally, machine learning classifiers lack of transparency with regard to their decisions. We extended our approach using so-called local linear approximations, which is a novel technique to analyze and inspect a trained classifier’s behavior. We can show that there are significant similarities of manually crafted knowledge, i.e., rules and pattern definitions, and the trained decision structures of machine learning approaches. (shrink)

Law as a leap of faith -- Legal positivism : 5 1/2 myths -- Some types of law -- Can there be a written constitution? -- How law claims, what law claims -- Nearly natural law -- The legality of law -- The supposed formality of the rule of law -- Hart on legality, justice, and morality -- The virtue of justice and the character of law -- Law in general.

The logic of the weak law of excluded middleKC p is obtained by adding the formula A A as an axiom scheme to Heyting's intuitionistic logicH p . A cut-free sequent calculus for this logic is given. As the consequences of the cut-elimination theorem, we get the decidability of the propositional part of this calculus, its separability, equality of the negationless fragments ofKC p andH p , interpolation theorems and so on. From the proof-theoretical point of view, the formulation presented (...) in this paper makes clearer the relations betweenKC p ,H p , and the classical logic. In the end, an interpretation of classical propositional logic in the propositional part ofKC p is given. (shrink)

Law as Art presents a radical new legal theory, the Law as Art Hypothesis, which conceives law, not as a system of rules, but as a distinctive kind of art work. Law is differentiated as art by the Law as Compound Artistic Type Hypothesis, which uses the heuristic metaphor of the Operatic Music Drama, the most elementally complex compound art form, to develop an idea of legal art as a distinctive empowered text, supported by the arts of drama, painting, (...) sculpture, dress-design, architecture, rhetoric and communication to form an elementally developed yet integrated unitary art work. Part I develops a new realist epistemology to support a contemporary action-type ontology of art, differentiated as art by virtue of its artistic value. Part II opens with a critical review of the arts in legal theory, before detailing the Law as Art and Law as Compound Artistic Type Hypothesis and locating them within contemporary scholarship. Legal philosophical implications are considered and there is an acronym key and glossary, bibliography and index. (shrink)

P. Busch has formulated a particular measurement process in order to show that predictable position measurements are impossible in general. Here we apply his formulation to studying the characteristics of various quantum measurements under the limitations which are imposed by the universal conservation laws and prove some theorems related to Busch's theorem. A simple approximate model measuring momentum is analyzed to investigate the roles of energy and momentum conservation. The results reveal the importance of the role of Galilei's principle (...) of relativity. (shrink)

Law is an essential tool for public health practice, and the use of a systematic legal framework can assist with preventing chronic diseases and addressing the growing epidemic of obesity.The action options available to government at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels and its partners can help make the population healthier by preventing obesity and decreasing the growing burden of associated chronic diseases such as cardiovascular disease and Type 2 diabetes. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention uses (...) the four-part systematic legal framework commonly referred to as “public health legal preparedness” to demonstrate the essential role law can play for any public health issue. This paper uses the “laws and legal authorities” component of the framework and should be considered in combination with the competencies, coordination, and information-best practices components of the framework. (shrink)

Motorcycle helmet laws are perceived to infringe upon individual rights even though they reduce mortality and health care costs. We describe proposed helmet legislation that protects individual rights and provides incentives for helmet use through a differential motorcycle registration fee that requires higher fees for those who wish to ride without a helmet.

Modeling law search and retrieval as prediction problems has recently emerged as a predominant approach in law intelligence. Focusing on the law article retrieval task, we present a deep learning framework named LamBERTa, which is designed for civil-law codes, and specifically trained on the Italian civil code. To our knowledge, this is the first study proposing an advanced approach to law article prediction for the Italian legal system based on a BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers) learning framework, which has (...) recently attracted increased attention among deep learning approaches, showing outstanding effectiveness in several natural language processing and learning tasks. We define LamBERTa models by fine-tuning an Italian pre-trained BERT on the Italian civil code or its portions, for law article retrieval as a classification task. One key aspect of our LamBERTa framework is that we conceived it to address an extreme classification scenario, which is characterized by a high number of classes, the few-shot learning problem, and the lack of test query benchmarks for Italian legal prediction tasks. To solve such issues, we define different methods for the unsupervised labeling of the law articles, which can in principle be applied to any law article code system. We provide insights into the explainability and interpretability of our LamBERTa models, and we present an extensive experimental analysis over query sets of different type, for single-label as well as multi-label evaluation tasks. Empirical evidence has shown the effectiveness of LamBERTa, and also its superiority against widely used deep-learning text classifiers and a few-shot learner conceived for an attribute-aware prediction task. (shrink)

Modern contract law is characterized by a certain kind of unity and multiplicity. On the one hand, it establishes fundamental principles that apply to all contracts in general. But at the same time, it specifies further principles and rules for particular kinds of contracts or transaction-types that mark out their distinctive features, incidents and effects. Clearly, a viable theory of contract law should be able to provide a suitable account of both aspects. The central critical contention of The Choice Theory (...) of Contracts is that all prior approaches, in particular rights-based theories, have failed to do so. Indeed, Dagan and Heller argue that only a theory that explains the settled rules of contract law as teleologically oriented toward facilitating individuals’ pursuit of their different substantive goods, and thus as primarily power-conferring in this particularly robust sense, can provide the needed account. Such a theory, they believe, would be not only interpretatively accurate with respect to the actual law but also fully acceptable as a liberal view of contract. This Article challenges the core contentions of choice theory, suggesting why it may be unable to meet its own goal of explaining how contract law coherently specifies and integrates the general and specific dimensions of enforceable agreements. The Article looks into basic contract doctrines in order to specify a general conception of the contractual relation that can meet this desideratum and it sketches how, beginning with that conception, contract law unfolds a rich multiplicity of transaction-types. The resulting view is liberal but rights-based rather than teleological, and it proposes an alternative understanding of how the rules of contract law are power-conferring as well as duty-imposing. (shrink)

A successor relation between theories T und T₁ express that T₁, the successor of T, has justifiably superseded T. In physics, for instance, Newton's theory of gravitation has superseded Kepler's laws and, in turn, Einstein's theory has become the successor of Newton's. By now there is no agreement on how a general concept of successor relation would have to be construed. In the present paper attention is drawn to two types of such relations, one deductive the other confirmatory. It (...) seems that what most people are looking for is the deductive type of relation. However, a deductive successor relation has to be justified by showing that if it holds then another, confirmatory relation holds, saying roughly that the actual empirical success of the deducing theory is at least as good as the corresponding success of the deduced theory. Under certain restrictions such a justification is given in the paper. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a semiotic analysis of environmental law and youth protests. More precisely, drawing on speech act theory this article regards both as types of communication and teases out the inherent voice and message, specifically with regard to the interests of future generations. The argument unfolds in three steps. First, the article looks into speaker and speech of environmental law and argues that it speaks, as legislation does, in the first-person plural voice of a ‘we’. Second, the (...) article examines a speech of Greta Thunberg through the lens of Stanley Cavell’s theory of passionate utterances. This interpretation will unlock the political stakes of Thunberg’s speech as she claims standing with those responsible for enacting environmental law. Finally, the consequences of this reading will be analysed by relating message and voice of environmental law. As youth protests question ordinary forms of political representation, new ways of safeguarding the interests of future generations are called upon. (shrink)

International Law in Context is a pedagogy-forward textbook. It reflects the recent paradigm shift in legal education, which focuses more on what students actually learn rather than the material to which they are exposed. The text aims to prepare the next generation of U.S. lawyers to engage with our interconnected world and to critically evaluate the U.S.'s role within the international legal order. The work is divided into three parts that accomplish these goals. Part One lays a foundation. It covers (...) the various actors within the system, the theories that help explain their behavior, and the principles and sources of law they create. Part Two turns to the fora that define and support the international order, the historical and political contexts that impacted their design, and their efficacy. Part Three is a capstone section that asks students to weave together everything they have learned in Parts One and Two. Students will engage in normative development regarding climate change, including the existing international treaty regime and U.S. implementation options, and the law of war in the modern age. The cornerstone of this book is its organization. The text groups material into conceptual frameworks that promote understanding and retention. For example, rather than consider the various dispute resolution fora in isolation, Part Two asks students to consider them in the context of what types of disputes arise and what legal rules can be employed to resolve them in various international and domestic fora. The institutions also are presented in chronology. In this way, students are encouraged to chart the developmental progression and to make connections and comparisons between various institutions. The use of conceptual frameworks continues within each part. For example, Chapter Six covers the sovereign State as a conflict resolution forum. Under this umbrella, the author discusses (a) State Jurisdiction; (b) The Reception of International Law into the Domestic Sphere; (c) The Qualification as a State Forum or State Litigant (i.e., Recognition of States & Governments); and (d) Protections Afforded Within the Forum: Sovereign, Diplomatic, and Consular Immunity. A typical coursebook might locate this material in four different chapters. The conceptual framework approach, however, allows students to see the big picture and the relationship between concepts. In addition to the frameworks, there are several other innovative pedagogical devices that support student learning. There are Foundation Questions that initially direct readers through the material and cumulatively help students confirm whether they have grasped key takeaways from each section. There also are Assessment Sets in each section, which provide students with immediate opportunities to apply material and gauge their understanding, and "Why Is This Important (a/k/a WITI Moment)" prompts designed to delve deeper into the underpinnings and consequences of various rules. Finally, there are directed reading notes before some more complex readings and margin annotations to keep readers oriented. (shrink)

Natural law ethics holds that practical rationality consists in engaging in non-defective ways with a range of fundamental goods. These basic goods are characteristically presented as reflecting the natural properties of humans, but the details of this picture vary widely. This article argues that natural law ethics can usefully be understood as a type of dispositional theory of value, which identifies the basic goods with those objectives that humans are characteristically disposed to pursue and value for their own sake. (...) Natural law theories of practical rationality can then be understood as attempts to capture the principles that would govern engagement with the basic goods under ideal conditions. The article begins by offering an account of normative inclinations as human dispositions both to act in certain ways and to believe that the actions are worthwhile or required. It then explores the implications of this account for natural law ethics, discussing the role of the basic goods in practical rationality, whether the goods may change over time and the connection between the goods and human nature. (shrink)

Though political philosophers often presuppose that coercive enforcement is fundamental to law, many legal philosophers have doubted this. This article explores doubts of two types. Some legal philosophers argue that given an adequate account of coercion and coerciveness, the enforcement of law in actual legal systems will generally not count as coercive. Others accept that actual legal systems enforce many laws coercively, but they deny that law has a necessary connection with coercion. There can be individual laws that (...) lack coercive sanctions, and it is at least conceptually possible for there to be a legal system that lacks coercive enforcement altogether. This article then examines why most political philosophers and some legal philosophers have been reluctant to treat the conceptual possibility of non-coercive law as significant. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a type-hierarchy approach to provide an intersubjective framework for the evaluation of evolutionary analogies. This approach develops David Hull’s and others’ attempts to provide full generalisation for selection processes, in order to show that sociocultural development and, particularly, scientific change can be considered as an instance of Darwinian selection. I argue that the recent work by Eileen Cornell Way on type hierarchies can offer the kind of generalisation needed to solve the main problems (...) that still affect Hull’s theory and to show that the evolutionary analogy is, after all, only a particular way of grouping phenomena together. If Hull’s main objective is a unified theory of selection, which supports the idea that science selection and natural selection obey the same laws, I also argue that the type hierarchy approach to models shows that this objective is unsustainable as it stands, and is in need of further development. I will firstly introduce the general outline of the type hierarchy approach to models. Then, after a brief recapitulation of Hull’s main points and difficulties, I will try and construct a hierarchy for a general abstraction of selection processes. Finally I will introduce the main criticisms that Hull’s work has faced from philosophers and scientists, and show how they compare with my proposal. (shrink)

Catholics and Evangelical Protestants often find themselves on the same side on a variety of issues in bioethics. However, some Evangelicals have expressed reluctance to embrace the natural law reasoning used by Catholics in academic and policy debates. In this article, I argue that the primary concerns raised by Evangelicals about natural law reasoning are, ironically, concerns expressed by and intrinsic to the natural law tradition itself. To show this, I address two types of Protestant critics: the Frustrated Fellow Traveler (...) and the Solo Scripturist. (shrink)

What are laws? -- What is justice? -- Law and justice -- Types of justice -- Justice and human rights -- Deciding what is just -- Unjust laws in the past -- Injustice aroud the world -- Justice today -- Class discussions.

Zoning laws determine what types of land uses and densities can occur on each property lot in a municipality, and therefore also govern the range of potential environmental and health impacts resulting from the land use. Zoning regulations are the most ubiquitous of the land use laws in the United States, as well as in many other countries. As such, they have far-reaching effects on the location of noxious uses, and any concomitant environmental or human health impacts.Zoning has (...) enormous implications, in general, for shaping our environment, and because changes to zoning are made through a political process, it has possibilities for abuse. One zoning expert stated:I suppose what really disturbs me is that because zoning is the most universal of the legal tools for shaping the character of the municipality, any unwise use of the process has a far greater impact upon our national character than does the abuse of a less widely employed device. (shrink)

There are differences in the approach to law and ethics in Western philosophy compared to law and ethics in Islamic philosophy. Western philosophy itself is divided into several schools, including natural law philosophy, legal realism or positivistic philosophy, historical philosophy of law, sociological philosophy of law, and utilitarianism. These schools have different views on the position of law and ethics. In the discourse of Islamic philosophy, Law and Ethics or Morality are seen as interrelated principles. While Western philosophy is divided (...) into several schools and dichotomizes between Law and Ethics, in Islamic philosophy they are integrated into the view that law and ethics are a unity and represent the spirit of Islamic teachings. This research aims to explain the role of law and ethics in Western philosophical schools. This research will explain how Western philosophical thought relates to law and ethics, and how the integration of law and ethics occurs in the context of Islamic philosophy. This research is a type of literature review or bibliographic study. The method applied in this research is descriptive analysis using a comparative approach. In the issue of Law and ethics, Western philosophical schools are divided into two views: those that unite law and those that separate law and ethics. The view that unites law and ethics includes natural law philosophy and historical philosophy of law. The view that separates law and ethics includes legal realism, positivism, social jurisprudence, and utilitarianism. Meanwhile, in the context of Islamic philosophy, the relationship between law and ethics is considered an integrated dimension in human life that cannot be separated. (shrink)

"16 'On Justification and Interpretation', ARSP-Beiheft, 53, pp. 255-68." -- "17 'Authority Reasons in Legal Interpretation and Moral Reasoning', ARSP Supplementa (III), pp. 144-52." -- "18 'Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law Justification', Cornell Law Review, 63, pp. 707-88." -- "19 'Reasonableness and Objectivity', Notre Dame Law Review, 74, pp. 1575-603.

The article discusses theoretical and practical issues one may face when applying various types of employment contracts, refers to specific legal relations governed by Labour Code standards, and raises issues that would help to solve the existing troubles. Last decades as globalization processes were gaining pace, and market economy conditions changed, labour and production organization models were undergoing transformation. The more complex people’s social relationships are, the greater is the need to regulate these relationships, i. e. to adopt legislation that (...) would create pre-conditions for addressing social interest conflicts. Thus a need has arisen for a new legal regulation because new activity models do not fit into traditional relationships governed by labour law. Along standard employment relationship, non-standard relationships occur in the market. In 2003 the Ministry of Social Security and Labour of the Republic of Lithuania issued recommendations for employers on flexible work organisation forms and indicated reasons for the organisation of flexible work forms: the nature of work and employee’s demographic and social characteristics; fulfilment of family duties; health condition; unfavourable work environment; employee’s age; studying and studies. (shrink)

, which uses the intuitionistic propositional calculus, with the only connective →. It is very important, because the well known Curry-Howard correspondence between proofs and programs was originally discovered with it, and because it enjoys the normalization property: every typed term is strongly normalizable. It was extended to second order intuitionistic logic, in 1970, by J.-Y. Girard [4], under the name of system F, still with the normalization property.More recently, in 1990, the Curry-Howard correspondence was extended to classical logic, following (...) Felleisen and Griffin [6] who discovered that the law of Peirce corresponds to control instructions in functional programming languages. It is interesting to notice that, as early as 1972, Clint and Hoare [1] had made an analogous remark for the law of excluded middle and controlled jump instructions in imperative languages.There are now many type systems which are based on classical logic; among the best known are the system LC of J.-Y. Girard [5] and the λμ-calculus of M. Parigot [11]. We shall use below a system closely related to the latter, called the λ c -calculus [8, 9]. Both systems use classical second order logic and have the normalization property.In the sequel, we shall extend the λ c -calculus to the Zermelo-Frænkel set theory. The main problem is due to the axiom of extensionality. To overcome this difficulty, we first give the axioms of ZF in a suitable (equivalent) form, which we call ZF ɛ. (shrink)

Rousseau's Du contrat social develops an important, unjustly neglected type of theory, which I call 'Natural Law Constructivism' ('NLC'), which identifies and justifies strictly objective basic moral principles, with no appeal to moral realism or its alternatives, nor to elective agreement, nor to prudentialist reasoning. The Euthyphro Question marks a dilemma in moral theory which highlights relations between artifice and arbitrariness. These relations highlight the significance of Hume's founding insight into NLC, and how NLC addresses Hobbes's insight that our (...) most fundamental moral problems concern social coordination. Part 2 systematically re-examines the core of Rousseau's theory of justice to show that it assigns no constitutive role to contractual agreement in identifying or justifying basic normative principles. Part 3 highlights his NLC. (shrink)

Of late, historians have been realising that South Asia and Europe have more in common than a particular strand in the historiography on "the rise of the West" would have us believe. In both world regions a plurality of languages, religions, and types of belonging by birth was in premodern times matched by a plurality of legal systems and practices. This volume describes case-by-case the points where law and social diversity intersected.

Substantive counterlegal discourse poses a problem for those according to whom the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. I discern two types of necessitarianism about laws: dispositional essentialism and modal necessitarianism. I argue that Toby Handfield’s response to the problem of counterlegals cannot help the modal necessitarian, according to whom all possible worlds are identical with respect to the laws. I thus propose a fictionalist treatment of counterlegals. Fictions are not limited by metaphysical possibility; hence, fictionalism affords (...) the modal necessitarian the means to account for the apparent substance of counterlegals even granting the metaphysical necessity of the laws. (shrink)

Aristotle and Natural Law lays out a new theoretical approach which distinguishes between the notions of 'interpretation,' 'appropriation,' 'negotiation' and 'reconstruction' of the meaning of texts and their component concepts. These categories are then deployed in an examination of the role which the concept of natural law is used by Aristotle in a number of key texts. The book argues that Aristotle appropriated the concept of natural law, first formulated by the defenders of naturalism in the 'nature versus convention debate' (...) in classical Athens. Thereby he contributed to the emergence and historical evolution of the meaning of one of the most important concept in the lexicon of Western political thought. Aristotle and Natural Law argues that Aristotle's ethics is best seen as a certain type of natural law theory which does not allow for the possibility that individuals might appeal to natural law in order to criticize existing laws and institutions. Rather its function is to provide them with a philosophical justification from the standpoint of Aristotle's metaphysics. (shrink)

In his 1963 response to an open letter from eight white religious leaders chastising his involvement in Birmingham, Martin Luther King, Jr. explained that civil rights activists’ blatant breaking of some laws while obeying others was the result of two types of laws: just laws and unjust laws. Civil rights activists believed they had a legal responsibility to obey just laws and a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. Today, new civil rights struggles continue (...) to challenge unjust laws that shred the fabric of democracy that America espouses. Drawing upon both the Civil Rights Movement and the contemporary Movement for Black Lives, this article argues that unjust laws and practices must be broken and challenged before a just society is established. It identifies four ethical strategies for social activism: collective work and responsibility, strategic timing and economic disconnection, political mobilization, and faithful perseverance. (shrink)

A common objection to Humeanism about natural laws is that, given Humeanism, laws cannot help explain their instances, since, given the best Humean account of laws, facts about laws are explained by facts about their instances rather than vice versa. After rejecting a recent influential reply to this objection that appeals to the distinction between scientific and metaphysical explanation, I will argue that the objection fails by failing to distinguish between two types of facts, only one (...) of which Humeans should regard as laws. I will then conclude by rebutting a variant of this objection that appeals to a principle of metaphysical explanation recently put forward by Kit Fine. (shrink)

This is a first attempt at the philosophical articulation and projection of the Igbo concept of law and the role of law in the traditional environment. In the Igbo traditional setting, the rules of law are uncodified. The author, who teaches philosophy of law and logic at the University of Nigeria, defines the law of a given community as the body of rules recognised as binding by its members. On this concept of law, he has based his attempt to elucidate (...) the philosophical underpinning of those rules recognised in Igbo traditional legal system as law. Unless the philosphical foundation is understood, the traditional law, machinery for enforcement, and legislative and judicial processes may appear incomprehensible. The first part gives a descriptive insight into the moral, religious, socio-political and legal background of the Igbo. The second part is devoted to the fundamental questions concerning the concept of law, the various types of laws, the reciprocal influence between law and Igbo religion and the end of laws. Finally, the author examines the nature of right in Igbo traditional thought and locates the philosophical background. (shrink)

This paper examines the tension between the mainstream belief in international law as a source of objectivity distinct from politics and its new stream critics that question the validity of such a distinction. It is argued that, as a type of language, international law is not distinct from politics as a function of objectivity, but rather by the fact that it serves the international community’s thymos. The phenomena of global administrative law and NATO’s use of force in Kosovo are (...) analyzed as examples of how the thymos drives international law. Building on feminist theories of international law, the article sets forth a vision of international law as the primary communicative device for the international community’s thymos. (shrink)

This chapter provides a general overview and introduction to the law and ethics of virtual sexual assault. It offers a definition of the phenomenon and argues that there are six interesting types. It then asks and answers three questions: (i) should we criminalise virtual sexual assault? (ii) can you be held responsible for virtual sexual assault? and (iii) are there issues with 'consent' to virtual sexual activity that might make it difficult to prosecute or punish virtual sexual assault?

Humeanism about laws has been famously accused of the explanatory circularity by David Armstrong and Tim Maudlin, since the Humean laws hold in virtue of their instances and, at the same time, scientifically explain those very instances. Barry Loewer argued that the circularity challenge rests on an equivocation: in his view, once the metaphysical explanation is properly distinguished from the scientific explanation, the circularity vanishes. However, Marc Lange restored the circularity by appealing to his transitivity principle, which connects (...) the two types of explanation. Lange’s transitivity principle has been widely discussed and criticised in the literature. In view of counterexamples, Lange refi ned both the principle, by taking into account the contrastive nature of explanation, and the requirement of prohibition on self-explanation. Recently, Michael Hicks has developed a new strategy for defending Humeanism about laws from the refined circularity challenge, critically appealing to the contrastive nature of both explanations and meta-explanations. We will argue that his strategy fails. (shrink)

This paper reviews the history of AI & Law research from the perspective of argument schemes. It starts with the observation that logic, although very well applicable to legal reasoning when there is uncertainty, vagueness and disagreement, is too abstract to give a fully satisfactory classification of legal argument types. It therefore needs to be supplemented with an argument-scheme approach, which classifies arguments not according to their logical form but according to their content, in particular, according to the roles that (...) the various elements of an argument can play. This approach is then applied to legal reasoning, to identify some of the main legal argument schemes. It is also argued that much AI & Law research in fact employs the argument-scheme approach, although it usually is not presented as such. Finally, it is argued that the argument-scheme approach and the way it has been employed in AI & Law respects some of the main lessons to be learnt from Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument. (shrink)

This book provides theoretical tools for evaluating the soundness of arguments in the context of legal argumentation. It deals with a number of general argument types and their particular use in legal argumentation. It provides detailed analyses of argument from authority, argument ad hominem, argument from ignorance, slippery slope argument and other general argument types. Each of these argument types can be used to construct arguments that are sound as well as arguments that are unsound. To evaluate an argument correctly (...) one must be able to distinguish the sound instances of a certain argument type from its unsound instances. This book promotes the development of theoretical tools for this task. (shrink)

Hempel and Giere contend that the existence of provisos poses grave difficulties for any regularity account of physical law. However, Hempel and Giere rely upon a mistaken conception of the way in which statements acquire their content. By correcting this mistake, I remove the problem Hempel and Giere identify but reveal a different problem that provisos pose for a regularity account — indeed, for any account of physical law according to which the state of affairs described by a law-statement presupposes (...) a Humean regularity. These considerations suggest a normative analysis of law-statements. On this view, law-statements are not distinguished from accidental generalizations by the kind of Humean regularities they describe because a law-statement need not describe any Humean regularity. Rather, a law-statement says that in certain contexts, one ought to regard the assertion of a given type of claim, if made with justification, as a proper way to justify a claim of a certain other kind. (shrink)

The perennial question posed by the philosophically-inclined lawyer is 'What is law?' or perhaps 'What is the nature of law?' This book poses an associated, but no less fundamental, question about law which has received much less attention in the legal literature. It is: 'Who is law for?' Whenever people go to law, they are judged for their suitability as legal persons. They are given or refused rights and duties on the basis of ideas about who matters. These ideas are (...) basic to legal-decision making; they form the intellectual and moral underpinning of legal thought. They help to determine whether law is essentially for rational human beings or whether it also speaks to and for human infants, adults with impaired reasoning, the comotose, foetuses and even animals. Are these the right kind of beings to enter legal relationships and so become legal persons. Are they, for example, sufficiently rational, or sacred or simply human? Is law meant for them? This book reveals and evaluates the type of thinking that goes into these fundamental legal and metaphysical determinations about who should be capable of bearing legal rights and duties. It identifies and analyses four influential ways of thinking about law's person, each with its own metaphysical suppositions. One approach derives from rationalist philosophy, a second from religion, a third from evolutionary biology while the fourth is strictly legalistic and so endeavours to eschew metaphysics altogether. The book offers a clear, coherent and critical account of these complex moral and intellectual processes entailed in the making of legal persons. (shrink)