In his 1963 response to an open letter from eight white religious leaders chastising his involvement in Birmingham, Martin Luther King, Jr. explained that civil rights activists’ blatant breaking of some laws while obeying others was the result of two types of laws: just laws and unjust laws. Civil rights activists believed they had a legal responsibility to obey just laws and a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. Today, new civil rights struggles continue to challenge unjust laws that shred (...) the fabric of democracy that America espouses. Drawing upon both the Civil Rights Movement and the contemporary Movement for Black Lives, this article argues that unjust laws and practices must be broken and challenged before a just society is established. It identifies four ethical strategies for social activism: collective work and responsibility, strategic timing and economic disconnection, political mobilization, and faithful perseverance. (shrink)

Much of the time, human beings seem to rely on habits. Habits are learned behaviours directly elicited by context cues, and insensitive to short-term changes in goals: therefore they are sometimes irrational. But even where habitual responses are rational, it can seem as if they are nevertheless not done for reasons. For, on a common understanding of habitual behaviour, agents’ intentions do not play any role in the coming about of such responses. This paper discusses under what conditions we can (...) say that habitual responses are, after all, done for reasons. We show how the idea that habitual behaviour cannot be understood as ‘acting for reasons’ stems from a widely but often implicitly held theoretical framework: the causal theory of action. We then propose an alternative, Anscombean understanding of intentional action, which can account for habitual responses being done for reasons. (shrink)

In A Treatise of Human Nature 1.4.2, entitled ‘Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses’, Hume discussed the causes of belief in the existence of external objects. Philosophers, correcting the false...

What does it mean to live and build up the Kingdom of God? In this book, professor and priest Alberto de Mingo Kaminouchi introduces the contemporary reader to Christian ethics by examining the New Testament through the three key concepts of Aristotle’s ethics: happiness, virtue, and love. In turn, the three affirmations orient this reflection through the Gospel. First, when the triune God appears on the horizon, it becomes easier to understand that existence has a purpose: namely, participating with (...) the entire human family in this project of happiness called the Kingdom of God. Second, happiness is not something outside of us; it consists in the practice of the virtues that bring about a personal transformation. Third, the project of the Kingdom leads us to live in love with others. De Mingo Kaminouchi shows the reader a real model of this in the community we call the church, the “field hospital” for all those in need of hope. This book is accessibly written for readers not already well-versed in Christian ethics. (shrink)

What attitude does someone manifesting implicit bias really have? According to the default representationalist picture, implicit bias involves having conflicting attitudes (explicit versus implicit) with respect to the topic at hand. In opposition to this orthodoxy, dispositionalists argue that attitudes should be understood as higher-level dispositional features of the person as a whole. Following this metaphysical view, the discordance characteristic of implicit bias shows that someone’s attitude regarding the topic at hand is not-fully-manifested or ‘in-between’. However, so far few representationalists (...) have been convinced by dispositionalist arguments, largely because dispositionalism cannot provide explanations in terms of underlying processes. We argue that if dispositionalism wants to be a genuine contender, it should make clear what it has to offer in terms of understanding of implicit bias. As a concrete proposal, we combine dispositionalist metaphysics with the idea that our normative practices of attitude ascription partly determine what it means to have an attitude. We show that such regulative dispositionalism can account for two prominent normative features of implicit bias. We conclude by suggesting that in order to engage in a meaningful debate with representationalism, dispositionalists might have to put the question ‘what counts as a good explanation?’ back on the table. (shrink)

A well‐known typological observation is the dominance of subject‐initial word orders, SOV and SVO, across the world's languages. Recent findings from gestural language creation paradigms offer possible explanations for the prevalence of SOV. When asked to gesture transitive events with an animate agent and inanimate patient, gesturers tend to produce SOV order, regardless of their native language biases. Interestingly, when the patient is animate, gesturers shift away from SOV to use of other orders, like SVO and OSV. Two competing hypotheses (...) have been proposed for this switch: the noisy channel account (Gibson et al., 2013) and the role conflict account (Hall, Mayberry, & Ferreira, 2013). We set out to distinguish between these two hypotheses, disentangling event reversibility and patient animacy, by looking at gestural sequences for events with two inanimate participants (inanimate‐inanimate, reversible). We replicated the previous findings of a preference for SOV order when describing animate‐inanimate, irreversible events as well as a decrease in the use of SOV when presented with animate‐animate, reversible events. Accompanying the drop in SOV, in a novel condition we observed an increase in the use of SVO and OSV orders when describing events involving two animate entities. In sum, we find that the observed avoidance of SOV order in gestural language creation paradigms when the event includes an animate agent and patient is driven by the animacy of the participants rather than the reversibility of the event. We suggest that findings from gestural creation paradigms are not automatically linkable to spoken language typology. (shrink)

Traditionally, self-control is conceptualized in terms of internal processes such as willpower or motivational mechanisms. These processes supposedly explain how agents manage to exercise self-control or, in other words, how they act on the basis of their best judgment in the face of conflicting motivation. Against the mainstream view that self-control is a mechanism or set of mechanisms realized in the brain, several authors have recently argued for the inclusion of situated factors in our understanding of self-control. In this paper, (...) we review such recent attempts from the perspective of situated accounts of cognition and argue that even though these accounts integrate situational features, they ultimately still rely on an orthodox, neurocentric view of self-control. Instead, we will argue that in order to develop a really situated account it is necessary to radically rethink what self-control is. Building on recent work on extended skill, we will develop an outline of a really situated account of self-control. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle’s account of perception has not become widely known. Moreover, most of the responses to his account have been critical. Ryle’s method was to analyze our everyday use of perception verbs such as ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’, in order to argue that perception is a skill that we learn by doing. His critics concluded that by focusing on the use of perception verbs, Ryle dodged all central problems of perception. The current article aims to rebut this conclusion, by showing how (...) Ryle’s work on perception builds on his logical-geographical method. That method leads Ryle to the conclusion that perceptual skill is a form of knowing how. Perception recipes, defined as shared criteria for correct use of perception verbs, display the normative structure of this knowledge. Although this analysis raises questions of its own, it shows that Ryle was in fact engaging seriously with core philosophical questions about the nature of perception. (shrink)

The comorbidity of personality disorders and mental disorders is commonly understood through three types of theoretical models: either a) personality disorders precede mental disorders, b) mental disorders precede personality disorders, c) mental disorders and personality disorders share common etiological grounds. Although these hypotheses differ with respect to their idea of causal direction, they all imply a latent variable perspective, in which it is assumed that either personality and mental disorders are latent variables that have certain causal relations [models a) and (...) b)]; or that, as in model c), the common etiology is in fact a latent variable that causes symptomatology of both personality and mental disorders. We aim to provide another perspective on the comorbidity between personality and mental disorders, namely a network perspective. To this end, we investigated Major Depression and Borderline Personality Disorder and hypothesized that symptoms of BPD and MD could interact with one another rather than being caused by a latent variable. To illustrate this theoretical network conceptualization of the comorbidity of BPD and MD we analyzed a cross-sectional clinical dataset of 376 patients who were asked to complete the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Disorders and the Beck Depression Inventory II. The results identify direct associations between symptoms of MD and BPD. If we take the links in this empirical network to be ‘substantive', this suggests a radical shift of our current conceptualization of the comorbidity of mental disorders and personality disorders. (shrink)

In the Name of the One who has no Name,He who appears before you, how ever you call Him!How does Islamic theology and Koran exegesis, some of whose representatives set out to find the most modern developments, such as the atomic bomb, in the Koran, deal with the latest interpretations of quantum physics, of Heisenberg's uncertainty relation, and with the question of whether the sub-atomic world is made up of waves or particles? How does a theologian react to the notion (...) that parts of the atom influence each other and that the observer himself plays a role in the shaping of future events? Are these discoveries compatible with the traditional idea of a God who knows all; are they compatible with the various terms for fate: qadar, qada, or qismat? (shrink)

In the present article it is proposed to think about the possibility of an ethics in times of precariousness; on the one hand, through the figure of the Other that appears as a Face in E. Lévinas’ ethics of responsibility, as it is received by Butler in Precarious Life. And, on the other hand, through a proposal to re-read, which we believe it is necessary, the passage known as the “Parable of the Good Samaritan”, key-text in our pre-understanding-hermeneutical background about (...) the link between ethics and openness to the Other. That re-reading would help us to think about the possibility of an ethics that articulates care as assistance to the Other and delegation to an “Other” of the Other, that is usually forgotten. (shrink)

El chismorreo puede parecer un comportamiento anecdótico en el contexto de una microsociología de la vida cotidiana. Sin embargo, cuando los medios de comunicación lo convierten en un tema masivo y rentable, cabe pensar que el conocimiento que ofrecen de la vida privada o íntima de los otros tiene relevancia ética y política en la imagen peculiar y ejemplarizante de la humanidad y de la propia comunidad, así como en las opciones axiológicas, con inevitables repercusiones en el prestigio de la (...) democracia. Para indagar este tema, se parte del estudio sobre la actualidad o inactualidad del pensamiento de Plutarco sobre el fisgoneo. Gossip might appear to be an anecdotal type of behavior in the context of the micro-sociology of everyday life. However, since the media have turned it into a profitable mass topic, it might be reasonable to think that the knowledge it provides about the private life of others is ethically and politically relevant for the peculiar and exemplary image of humanity and of the community itself, as well as for axiological options, thus inevitably affecting the prestige of democracy. In order to explore this issue, the article starts out by examining the currency or lack thereof of Plutarch's thoughts on gossip. (shrink)

El presente artículo muestra en qué medida una atenta lectura de la sección de Ideas II dedicada a la actitud personalista podría con-tribuir eficazmente a deshacer algunas de las críticas dirigidas por el primer Heidegger a Husserl –críticas que calan en el lector inadvertido de Heidegger, desanimando de la lectura de Husserl. Concretamente, en Ideas II se ofrecen pistas para abordar la reflexión desde un cierto distanciamiento crítico, en tanto que desde la actitud personalista no podría entronizarse una reflexión como (...) aquella en que se ejercita el fenomenólogo; y, por otra parte, desmiente que fuese válido el reproche que dirige Heidegger a Husserl en el sentido de que la “lupa fenomenológica” supondría un énfasis analítico y teórico que desvirtuaría una descripción fiel de la proximidad no reflexiva en que vivimos en nuestro mundo circundante cotidiano. Finalmente, se apela al pluralismo de las perspectivas de cara a abordar la complejidad de nuestro circunmundo cotidiano, tomando como referencia el perspectivismo orteguiano.This article shows how much a careful reading of the Ideas II section dedicated to the personalistic attitude could effectively contribute to undo certain criticism directed by the first Heidegger to Husserl–criticism that permeate an inadvertent reader of Heidegger discouraging of Husserl´s reading. Concretely, Ideas II offers clues to approach reflection from a certain critical detachment, insofar as a reflection like one in which phenomenologist exercises could not be enthroned from the personalistic attitude; and, on the other hand, it denies the validity of the reproach directed by Heidegger to Husserl in the sense that the "phenomenological magnifying glass" would suppose an analytical and theoretical emphasis that would distort a faithful description of the non-reflective proximity in which we live in our everyday surrounding world. Finally, we appeal to the pluralism of perspectives in order to address the complexity of our everyday surrounding world, taking as reference the Orteguian perspectivism. (shrink)

From a certain point of view, mass tourism is undeniably part —and an expression— of contemporary acceleration. However, what we defend is that desire for difference —which originally nestles in the dream of traveling, before the appearance of the subject as tourist— responds to a desire for slowdown. In the time of pause and exception of the tourist experience, this desire acts as a generator of a symbolism —or an imagery— that seeks to preserve, protect, restore and promote difference, reality, (...) localness, past, tradition, folklore, nature, the other… beyond the —already insufficient— debate on authenticity. In this way, the importance of rescuing tourism from mere marketing could be shown, as well as to start to think about it from its relevance to humanities and its ethical commitment. (shrink)

Es difícil pensar tanto la vida moral como la vida comunitaria fuera dela tensión entre los Otros y el sí-mismo. Por una parte, de cara a la cohesión dela sociedad y a que la persona singular encuentre su dimensión comunitaria, sehace necesaria una suerte de vida transparente, sin secretos, a fuer de honesta.Sin embargo, por otra parte, cuando el entorno social es moralmente cuestionable,se hace imprescindible una paideía privada que permita la orientación moral delsujeto personal, por más que ello le (...) reporte soledad e incomprensión por parte desus conciudadanos, debiendo, entonces, construir un espacio de privacidad. (shrink)

It would be hard to imagine medical care without diagnosis, so pivotal is it to how Western medicine is practiced. Diagnosis is one of medicine’s principle tools, bringing with it as it does an explanation for what ails the sick person, an idea of what the treatment options might be, a prognosis, and much more. It assigns responsibility for illness, within medicine and outside. It will determine which specialty or sub-specialty can take care of which disorders. It also explains causation, (...) pointing the finger variably at the patient for what she ought to have done, or to the gene for what one can do little about. Diagnosis structures and explains relationships as it provides the impetus for the sick.. (shrink)

After the introduction of the fifth Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, familiar voices were raised in protest. The voices stem from ideas of which, among others, and in different ways, Michel Foucault and Thomas Szasz were influential proponents: The movement was referred to as 'antipsychiatry.' This movement reacted, among other things, to the system of categorization of mental disorders. Diagnoses, in a system of classification, were thought to be vague, arbitrary, labelling, stigmatizing, and scientifically and clinically poorly validated. (...) In contemporary debates on DSM-5, similar critiques can be heard, expressed by a movement now referred to as 'critical psychiatry'... (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2022.

This piece is a response to Marilyn Strathern's article, “Binary License,” in the Common Knowledge symposium on “comparative relativism.” Arguing that, across noncoherent practices, there is room for different natures, the essay suggests that modes of relating (the briefly invoked example given is of divergent counting practices) do not need a shared conceptual apparatus in order to be combined. What is held in the juxtaposition of acts and practices seems to be the sense in which acts are not affected by (...) how they are described. The main example given is of surgery, and the emphasis placed on how splitting open part of patient's body is never a matter of a point of view. But to know exactly what is going on in the operating theater, we might wish to ask how this act speaks to the act of intellectual bifurcation, splitting open what up to then had been a seamless argument. To know exactly what is going on in the operating theater, we might also wish to ask how this act speaks to persons cutting themselves off from one another. (shrink)

This article focuses on both daily forms of weakness of will as discussed in the philosophical debate and psychopathological phenomena as impairments of decision making. We argue that both descriptions of dysfunctional decision making can be organized within a common theoretical framework that divides the decision making process in three different stages: option generation, option selection, and action initiation. We first discuss our theoretical framework, focusing on option generation as an aspect that has been neglected by previous models. In the (...) main body of this article, we review how both philosophy and neuropsychiatry have provided accounts of dysfunction in each decision-making stage, as well as where these accounts can be integrated. Also, the neural underpinnings of dysfunction in the three different stages are discussed. We conclude by discussing advantages and limitations of our integrative approach. (shrink)

This is an article about bodily pleasures, words and some of the relations between them. It is a turn in a conversation between the author (‘me’) and Marilyn Strathern (‘Strathern’). It talks theory, but not in general. Instead, this theory gets situated in traditions; specified; in relation to concerns; and exemplified with stories to do with the term lekker. This article is in English, but lekker is not an English term. It is Dutch. The stories come from long-term field work (...) in various sites and situations close to home for the author, who is also Dutch. They were driven by a concern with fostering bodily pleasures in contexts such as nursing homes and dieting practices where nutrients and calories are granted more importance. The difficulties of translating lekker (tasty? pleasant? delicious? fun? nice?) are used as a set of intellectual resources. In contrast to Strathern, the author insists on the fleshy particularities of the practices where lekker is spoken. Along with Strathern, the author seeks to escape nature/culture divides. Inspired by Strathern, the author follows lekker around merographically – that is, along iterative trails and between sites and situations that are connected, but only partially so. In homage to Strathern, finally, the author plays with the question of who the collective subject of anthropological theory – we – might be, and who belongs to the others that form its object – they. (shrink)

In part 1 of Enquiry 12, Hume presents a skeptical argument against belief in external existence. The argument involves a perceptual relativity argument that seems to conclude straightaway the double existence of objects and perceptions, where objects cause and resemble perceptions. In Treatise 1.4.2, Hume claimed that the belief in double existence arises from imaginative invention, not reasoning about perceptual relativity. I dissolve this tension by distinguishing the effects of natural instinct and showing that some ofthese effects supplement the Enquiry’s (...) perceptual relativity argument. The Enquiry’s skeptical argument thus reveals the fundamental involvement of natural instinct in any belief in external existence. (shrink)

Donald C. Ainslie's Hume's True Scepticism is a wonderful book—clearly written and forcefully argued—and was deservedly honored with Journal of the History of Philosophy's Book Prize for 2016. The focus of the book is part four of the first Book of Hume's Treatise, "Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy." Ainslie develops an interpretation that takes seriously Hume's psychological claims, using them to solve puzzles in Hume scholarship, including the extent of Hume's scepticism, the nature of his sceptical crisis, (...) and the basis for his second thoughts on personal identity.I would encourage Ainslie to go further in tracing Hume's psychological explanations. In what follows, I will... (shrink)

In Treatise 1.4.2, David Hume seeks to explain how we come to believe in the external existence of bodies. He offers a complicated psychological account, where the imagination operates on the raw data of the senses to produce the ‘vulgar’ belief in the continued existence of the very things we sense. On behalf of philosophers, he presents a perceptual relativity argument that purports to show that the vulgar belief is false. I argue that scholars have failed to appreciate Hume's peculiar (...) formulation of the perceptual relativity argument and its relation to his psychological account of the vulgar belief. On my interpretation, in order to account for all the premises that Hume explicitly offers, the argument is best interpreted as beginning with a reductio that opposes the effects of the senses and the imagination in the vulgar belief. Thus Hume can be interpreted as identifying an ‘antinomy’ in the habits of the vulgar mind that produce belief in bodies. (shrink)