The article notes that the sources of legitimacy were different in ancient and medieval times than today. It is emphasized that the concept of legitimacy in China emerged from a complex interplay of philosophical ideas, cultural beliefs, and historical precedents. The Mandate of Heaven, Confucianism, and legalism each provided different sources through which rulers sought to legitimize their authority. In ancient Greece, the concept of legitimacy arose from a combination of civic participation, philosophical thoughts, mythological narratives, and the pursuit of (...) virtue. In ancient India, however, the concept of legitimacy was deeply rooted in the rich tapestry of spiritual, social and philosophical ideals. Dharma served as a spiritual compass that guided rulers to maintain cosmic order and ethical principles. The article also notes that the sources of legitimacy in ancient Rome were multifaceted, based on a combination of mythology, legal foundations, religious symbolism, and the ability to ensure stability and prosperity. In medieval Europe, the concept of legitimacy was shaped by the complex dynamics of feudal relations, religious beliefs, and evolving political structures. In medieval Islam, the concept of legitimacy was deeply rooted in the caliphate, the implementation of the Sharia and the pledge of allegiance. The interaction of political and religious factors determined the sources of legitimacy, emphasizing the importance of rulers to rule according to Islamic principles. The scientific result of the article, the novelty and importance of the work is that it shows how the concept of legitimacy changes over time and space and the impact of these changes on the management structure of societies. The author emphasizes that the sources of legitimacy in ancient and medieval times, unlike in the modern era, originated more from religious, philosophical and cultural contexts. The novelty of the work is the comparative presentation of specific models of legitimacy in ancient China, Greece, India and Rome, as well as in medieval Europe and the Islamic world. The main hypothesis is that the sources of legitimacy were formed according to the social, economic and ideological realities of the time and had a direct impact on the management mechanisms. The importance of the work is that it provides an opportunity to better understand the dynamics of legitimacy in the modern era and build effective governance structures by learning from its historical models. This approach creates a new perspective for both philosophical and political-legal studies. (shrink)

This study explores John Dewey’s critique of classical liberalism, particularly its conception of the individual, and examines his effort to reconstruct liberalism in response to the social, political, and economic challenges of the early 20th century. During this period, the Western world, which had been industrializing for the last two hundred years, encountered unprecedented social, political, and economic problems. Rapid industrialization, urban migration, and the emergence of class struggles exposed the limitations of classical liberalism. Liberalism faced serious criticism both from (...) within and from outside. While some thinkers proposed alternative models to liberalism, others sought to reinterpret liberalism in line with modern conditions, aiming to preserve its core values of individuality and freedom while addressing its flaws. Dewey, who was in the second group, aimed to reconstruct liberalism, which he saw as one of humanity’s greatest achievements despite all its shortcomings, in accordance with the requirements of the age. Dewey’s reconstruction attempt unfolds in two steps: The first step includes a critical analysis of classical liberalism and the identification of the elements that render it ineffective. The second step is the construction of a new liberalism that leaves the shortcomings of classical liberalism behind but maintains its emphasis on individuality and freedom. This study touches upon Dewey’s proposed new liberalism but mainly focuses on his critique of classical liberalism. Firstly, Dewey reveals that classical liberalism creates an artificial opposition between the individual and society, as well as between freedom and political authority, showing that these artificial dualisms undermine liberalism’s capacity to address contemporary social issues. These false oppositions are a faulty conclusion reached by reasoning based on false premises. Therefore, it is necessary to go deeper to identify the false premises that cause this faulty conclusion. For Dewey, the most fundamental problem of classical liberalism is an abstract understanding of the individual, disconnected from social context and relations. This understanding of the individual is a philosophical ideal inherited from 18th-century liberal thought and lacks historical, psychological, and sociological foundations. John Locke and the tradition that followed him developed an understanding of individuality that has no empirical equivalent in order to protect the individual against social pressures and political coercion; however, the individualism of classical liberalism has led to new forms of oppression over time. This article aims to reveal the steps John Dewey followed in criticizing classical liberalism and the logical relationship between these steps. (shrink)

Although Les Philosophes was an ordinary comedy, and Palissot was far from the caliber of Molière or Voltaire, it successfully consolidated conservative criticisms of the philosophes within a satirical framework, enjoying a successful three-month run in 1760. The reason behind its success was that it was at the center of a debate between the Enlightenment philosophers and the Counter-Enlightenment figures. In addition to being an example of 18th-century French comédie, the play serves as a valuable source for understanding the key (...) points of conservative discourse of the time. While Palissot seemed to focus on attacking individual philosophes’ personalities, he paired these attacks with conceptual critiques, and directed the most of his criticism primarily at Diderot and Rousseau. The play remains significant for two reasons: First, it captures almost all of the concerns and arguments of the conservative reaction to the Enlightenment. Second, it sheds light on Enlightenment thinkers' personal and intellectual struggles. This paper examines Palissot’s Les Philosophes not as a mere literary dispute but as a rich text that reveals the Counter-Enlightenment discourse that emerged in the second half of the 18th century. (shrink)

The 18th century witnessed the transformation of aesthetics into an independent philosophical discipline. In this period, two main traditions emerged, based on which we can categorize aesthetic theorists. The first of these is classical or rationalist aesthetics, and the other is empiricist or subjective aesthetics. Because classical/rational aesthetic theories were largely based on Cartesian metaphysics, they also inherited the difficulties faced by Cartesian metaphysics. For Descartes, senseperception is not a reliable mode of cognition and truth only comes out of the (...) ideas of pure understanding. Where Descartes' philosophy came to a dead end was that it could not convincingly explain how the concepts in our minds represent reality that is independent of us. This problem also manifested itself in the rationalist aesthetics. Similarly, the empiricist theory inherited the weaknesses of the empiricist epistemology. The main problem of empiricism was to overcome subjectivism and reach universal principles that make sense of the world surrounding us. To overcome the relativism of the empiricist epistemology, empiricist theoreticians claimed that there is an intuition, a common feeling shared by all human beings. However, this common feeling could not be proven empirically. Diderot created a new aesthetic theory that aimed to reconcile rationalist and empiricist aesthetics by redefining the term perception. This article discusses Diderot's innovative effort to create a new aesthetics free from the limits of rationalism and empiricism. (shrink)

18. yüzyıl, estetik kuramları açısından felsefe tarihinde daha önce görülmemiş ölçüde verimli bir dönemdir. Bu dönemde oluşturulan estetik kuramları, 18. yüzyılda epistemoloji, yöntem, ontoloji ve insan doğası üzerine yapılan tartışmaları doğrudan yansıtır. İlk estetik kuramlarını incelediğimizde, kuramların kendilerinden beslendiği iki ana hatla karşılaşırız. Bunlardan ilki kartezyen felsefenin estetikteki karşılığı olan nesne merkezli estetik, diğeri ise Lockeçu empirizmin estetikteki karşılığı olan özne merkezli estetiktir. Jean-Baptiste Du Bos, 18. yüzyılın hemen başlarında “Şiir ve Resim Üzerine Eleştirel Düşünceler” adlı çalışmasında nesne merkezli felsefenin (...) eleştirisini yaparak özne merkezli estetiği kurmuştur. Du Bos estetik soruşturmanın odağına özneyi yerleştirmiş, sanatı ve estetik deneyimi öznenin bilişsel yetilerinden, duygularından ve psikolojisinden hareketle tanımlamıştır. Eleştirel Düşünceler yalnızca bir estetik kuramı değil, aynı zamanda bir sanat tarihi, sanat sosyolojisi ve sanat psikolojisi çalışmasıdır. Çalışma farklı sanat türlerinin tarihsel gelişimlerini inceler ve bu türlerin yüzyıllar içinde nasıl evrildiğine bakar. Bunun yanında, coğrafi koşulların ve kültürel normların sanat kuramlarına etkisini inceler. Daha önce görülmemiş ölçüde bir kapsama sahip olan Eleştirel Düşünceler, estetiğin bağımsız bir disiplin olarak kurulmasında belki de en önemli rolü oynamış, 18. yüzyılda estetik alanında yazan tüm düşünürleri etkilemiştir. Bu makale, Eleştirel Düşünceler’de geliştirilen estetik kuramının ana hatlarını inceleyerek Jean-Baptiste Du Bos’nun modern estetiğe yaptığı katkıyı ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. (shrink)

The concept of political elite has been the subject of discussion by many researchers in different periods of history. Various theories and concepts have been put forward about this phenomenon. Today, we cannot imagine any society without a political elite. In both democratic and non-democratic states, power is concentrated in the hands of an organized minority-the political elite. The article basically tries to clarify questions that interest many scientists, such as the essence and content of the political elite, as well (...) as the role of elite groups forming the political elite in the management of the community and decision-making. The political elite theories and concepts of thinkers such as G. Mosca, V. Pareto, R. Michels were investigated, and an extensive comparative analysis was conducted between these concepts. In-depth study of different approaches plays an exceptional role in understanding the basic nature of the political elite. (shrink)

> Wealthy nations must do much more, much faster. The United Nations General Assembly in September 2021 will bring countries together at a critical time for marshalling collective action to tackle the global environmental crisis. They will meet again at the biodiversity summit in Kunming, China, and the climate conference 26) in Glasgow, UK. Ahead of these pivotal meetings, we—the editors of health journals worldwide—call for urgent action to keep average global temperature increases below 1.5°C, halt the destruction of nature (...) and protect health. Health is already being harmed by global temperature increases and the destruction of the natural world, a state of affairs health professionals have been bringing attention to for decades.1 The science is unequivocal; a global increase of 1.5°C above the preindustrial average and the continued loss of biodiversity risk catastrophic harm to health that will be impossible to reverse.2 3 Despite the world’s necessary preoccupation with COVID-19, we cannot wait for the pandemic to pass to rapidly reduce emissions. Reflecting the severity of the moment, this editorial appears in health journals across the world. We are united in recognising that only fundamental and equitable changes to societies will reverse our current trajectory. The risks to health of increases above 1.5°C are now well established.2 Indeed, no temperature rise is ‘safe’. In the past 20 years, heat-related mortality among people aged over 65 has increased by more than 50%.4 Higher temperatures have brought increased dehydration and renal function loss, dermatological malignancies, tropical infections, adverse mental health outcomes, pregnancy complications, allergies, and cardiovascular and pulmonary morbidity and mortality.5 6 Harms disproportionately affect the most vulnerable, including children, older populations, ethnic minorities, poorer communities and those with underlying health problems.2 4 Global heating is also contributing to the decline in …. (shrink)

In his 2009 PSA Recent Ph.D. Award winning contribution to the bi-annual PSA Conference at Pittsburgh in 2008, C. Wu ̈thrich mounted an argument against struc- turalism about space-time in the context of the General Theory of Relativity, to the effect that structuralists cannot discern space-time points. An “abysmal embarrass- ment” for the structuralist, Wu ̈thrich judged. Wu ̈thrich’s characterisation of space-time structuralism is however incorrect. We demonstrate how, on the basis of a correct char- acterisation of space-time structuralism, it (...) is possible to discern space-time points in the GTR-structures under consideration. Thus Wu ̈thrich’s argument crumbles. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have had little to say about ‘middle-range theory’ although much of what is done in science and of what drives its successes falls under that label. These lectures aim to spark an interest in the topic and to lay groundwork for further research on it. ‘Middle’ in ‘middle range’ is with respect to the level both of abstraction and generality. Much middle-range theory is about things that come under the label ‘mechanism’. The lectures explore three different kinds (...) of mechanism: struc tural mechanisms or underlying systems that afford causal pathways; causal-chain mechanisms that are represented in what in policy contexts are called ‘theories of change’ and for which I give an extended account following the causal process theory of Wesley Salmon; and middle-range-law mechanisms like those discussed by Jon Elster, which I claim are —and rightly are— rampant throughout the social sciences. The theory of the democratic peace, that democracies do not go to war with democracies, serves as a running example. The discussions build up to the start of, first, an argument that reliability in social (and natural) science depends not so much on evidence as it does on the support of a virtuous tangle of practices (without which there couldn’t even be evidence), and second, a defence of a community-practice centred instrumentalist understanding of many of the central basic principles that we use (often successfully) in social (and in natural) science for explanation, prediction and evaluation. (shrink)

The philosophical discussion about logical constants has only recently moved into the substructural era. While philosophers have spent a lot of time discussing the meaning of logical constants in the context of classical versus intuitionistic logic, very little has been said about the introduction of substruc-tural connectives. Linear logic, affine logic and other substructural logics offer a more fine-grained perspective on basic connectives such as conjunction and disjunction, a perspective which I believe will also shed light on debates in (...) the philosophy of logic. In what follows I will look at one particularly interesting instance of this: The development of the position known as logical inferentialism in view of substructural connectives. I claim that sensitivity to structural properties is an interesting challenge to logical inferentialism, and that it ultimately requires revision of core notions in the inferentialist litera-ture. Specifically, I want to argue that current definitions of proof theoretic harmony give rise to problematic nonconservativeness as a result of their insensitivity to substructurality. These nonconservativeness results are undesirable because they make it impossible to consistently add logical constants that are of independent philosophical interest. (shrink)

Predictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle (FEP)—a nor- mative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., repre- sentational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpre- tations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies (or fails to qualify) as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle (FEP) instrumentally to dis- tinguish (...) four main notions of representation, which focus on organizational, struc- tural, content-related and functional aspects, respectively. The various ways that these different aspects matter in arriving at representational or non-representational interpretations of the Free Energy Principle are discussed. We also discuss how the Free Energy Principle may be seen as a unified view where terms that tradition- ally belong to different ontologies—e.g., notions of model and expectation versus notions of autopoiesis and synchronization—can be harmonized. However, rather than attempting to settle the representationalist versus non-representationalist debate and reveal something about what representations are simpliciter, this paper demon- strates how the Free Energy Principle may be used to reveal something about those partaking in the debate; namely, what our hidden assumptions about what represen- tations are—assumptions that act as sometimes antithetical starting points in this persistent philosophical debate. (shrink)

Introduction. The article analyzes one of the qualitative states of culture, called the cultural gap, which is a phenomenon of ambivalent properties, on the one hand, generating most of the destruc- tive conflicts in the history of mankind, and on the other hand, in constructive overcoming of contra- dictions, prompting creative transformations. The purpose of the study is to give a definition of a cultural gap with the allocation of significant distinctive features found when analyzing any empirically fixed manifestations of (...) it, for subse- quent understanding at the ultimate general level of reflection. Methods. Philosophical-anthropological, systemic, axiological, historical-philosophical and dialectical approaches are used as the methodological basis of the research, making it possible to consider the phenomenon of cultural gap in various aspects. Scientific novelty of the research. An analysis of the main directions of scientific discourse in the subject area under consideration makes it possible for us to conclude that the phenomenon of a cul- tural gap is studied within the framework of social and humanitarian knowledge, but mainly in relation to the analysis of conflict situations and turning points in history. The phrase “cultural gap” itself is beginning to be introduced into scientific circula- tion, however, often outside the established con- ceptual apparatus, in a narrow context and without meaningful disclosure, which makes it scientifically necessary to address the emerging subject field of studying the phenomenon and determining the meaning of the corresponding term. Results. As a result of the study, the author identifies significant signs of the phenomenon of a cultural gap, consisting in the loss of the integrity of certain areas of culture due to the heterogene- ous development of its parts, a critically significant interruption at the level of structure and content of the universals of culture in the deep value and semantic relationships provided by it, supporting mutual understanding and conflict-free coexistence of people. As no less significant signs, one can also designate the polarization and absolutization of cultural contradictions that result in antagonistic relations between representatives of sociocultural communities, separated by the interruption of these relationships Conclusions. The definition of a cultural gap, formed on the basis of existing options for inter- preting and comprehending this phenomenon, its essential and contextual features, is due to the ontological and semantic ambiguity of some of its aspects, due to which it goes beyond a strict defini- tion and is partly projective in nature, containing significant research potential. The realization of this potential through the functional capabilities of philosophical anthropology and philosophy of culture will make it possible to determine the main approaches to identifying, preventing and overcom- ing cultural gaps, including the formation of new worldview meanings and values that can ensure harmonious coexistence between people of differ- ent cultures in modern conditions. (shrink)

This article tries to explain the foundational entrapment of the logic of modernism, which imprisons interpreters in only one truth. It elucidates a clash between foundationalism and hermeneutics, and offers an alternative to overcome it. This study concludes that foundational textualism (bayani), intuisionism (`irfani), and empericism (burhani) in the history of Islamic thought, claim their own truth. Contemporary chal- lenges presented by post-modernism have shocked social and cultural conventions, systems of belief, statism and foundationalism of thinking, cultures and outlooks, which (...) have been sacralized by Moslem society for long time. In order to look for a way out from this crisis of Islamic thinking, which eventually affects its social praxis, multicultural interpretation should become an alternative for Moslems in promoting Islam as a uni- versal grace for the whole creation. Keywords: Fondasionalisme (foundationalism), hermeneutika (hermeneu- tics), pemikiran Islam (Islamic thought), multikulturalisme (multicul- turalism), interpretasi (interpretation). (shrink)

Very often, phenomenology has been presented as opposed to structuralism. We aim to contest that opposition. We will argue that Husserl has influenced on structuralism in the early 20th century, and that phenomenolgy shows itself as a neither a global (trivial) nor a methodic struc-turalism. Indeed,..

A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology requires that specific cognitive capacities be (a) heritable and (b) ‘quasi-independent’ from other heritable traits. They must be heritable because there can be no selection for traits that are not. They must be quasi-independent from other heritable traits, since adaptive variations in a specific cognitive capacity could have no distinctive consequences for fitness if effecting those variations required widespread changes in other unrelated traits and capacities as well. These requirements would be satisfied by innate cognitive (...) modules, as the dominant paradigm in evolutionary cognitive psychology assumes. However, those requirements would also be satisfied by heritable learning biases, perhaps in the form of architec- tural or chronotopic constraints, that operated to increase the canalization of specific cognitive capacities in the ancestral environment (Cummins and Cummins 1999). As an organism develops, cognitive capacities that are highly canalized as the result of heritable learning biases might result in an organism that is behaviourally quite similar to an organism whose innate modules come on line as the result of various environ- mental triggers. Taking this possibility seriously is increasingly important as the case against innate cognitive modules becomes increasingly strong. (shrink)

Addams wrote extensively on the significance and value of immigrant cultures of origin, both for immigrants themselves and for nonimmigrant Americans. Her theory of cul¬tural pluralism is democratic and cosmopolitan. However, in the few essays she wrote on African Americans, she does not extend her theory to encompass African American culture. In this paper I develop Addams's theory of cultural pluralism. I then point out resources in her theory with which she could have extended it to include African American (...) culture, in light of knowledge available to her at the time. I also identify barriers in her theorizing that made it difficult to do so. (shrink)

In this article, multiculturalism and feminism are dis- cussed at the crossroad of their diverse meanings: as po- litical ideologies, as social movements, as philosophical trends and as academic disciplines. In order to provide a solid conceptual analysis, the two terms are examined in relation with several key concepts of contemporary cul- tural discourse, such as postmodernism, pluralism, rela- tivism, globalization and postcolonialism.

What is structuralism? The stock To explain why we should see Quine can translate the natives’ gavagai either as answer is that it is the brainas a structuralist, I would like to revive rabbit or as undetached rabbit’s part, so he child of Ferdinand de his widely discussed thought experican translate his peers’ rabbit either as Saussure, later fostered by Levi-Strauss, ment, featuring a field linguist decipherrabbit or as undetached rabbit’s part. Hence Foucault, Derrida and their allies. But I ing (...) an unknown language spoken by the cultural relativism appears to muthink we have only to confront the ausnatives somewhere in the middle of tate into an “individual relativism”, a terely scientific style of Saussure’s Course nowhere. On hearing the natives exkind of solipsistic skepticism in which de linguistique générale with that of the claiming “Gavagai!” whenever they see a we can be certain neither that we underwritings of the French structuralists to rabbit, the linguist records in his notestand the natives, nor even that we unrecognise an essential discontinuity. The book the tentative translation hypothderstand each other! French philosophers have developed esis gavagai = rabbit. Next, Quine asks us However this is not a conclusion only certain consequences of Saussure’s to imagine another linguist, who, ob- Quine would be willing to draw. He teaching; and, moreover, in a rather nonserving the same behaviour of the same does not say that we cannot understand Saussurean way. natives, proposes the hypothesis gavagai each other (nor even that we cannot un- In my recent book I put forward the = undetached rabbit’s part. Quine then conderstand the natives): that we can is conalternative thesis that the kind of strucsiders ways of deciding which of the tinually testified to by the indubitable turalism advanced by Saussure is in fact two linguists is correct, and concludes, successes of our communication. For present implicitly in the writings of to the astonishment of many readers, Quine, there is no other measure of unpeople not normally associated with the that there is no feasible way to decide; derstanding, save the smoothness and term, namely the (post)analytic phiand hence that both linguists are corfruitfulness of linguistic interaction, the losophers such as Willard Van Orman rect.. (shrink)

If the technological situation is unique, the ways to understand the contemporary moral condition are not. We link it to age-old questions: in fact, the power promised by technol-ogy only establishes a new form of human finitude. In the face of this continuity of the fundamental moral condition, we examine a number of alternative ways of thinking about the basis of responsible innovation, exploring the metaphors of quasi-parental and political responsibilities, as well as the place of virtue in innovation and (...) the role of cul-tural narratives in helping us understand the limits of responsible innovation. (shrink)

The concept of pluriculturalism is a relatively novel one that has yet to be fully explored. It is based on the principles of plurilingualism, which focuses on the individual's capacity to acquire multiple abilities and competencies in terms of cultural and linguistic engagements. From a theoretical perspective, the concept emerged at the advent of the pragmatist turn in language, as well as from socio-linguistic studies. It reflects the breakdown of the one-culture man at the juncture and intersection of identities in (...) the context of the global outbreak. The individual’s concealed modularity and capacity to prioritize an identity within a cluster of affiliations revealed an emerging activity at the base of inter-social reality. As a result, a more finely tuned description of sociocul- tural phenomena enables pluriculturalism to transcend the limitations of multiculturalism, which is perceived as a more static picture. While multiculturalism sought to identify the foundation for a mutual dialogue at societal contacts, pluriculturalism demonstrates the potential for such a dialogue as individual repertoires. A crucial difference can be observed in terms of political management. While multiculturalism is oriented towards the institutional preservation and integration of a guest culture within a host country, pluriculturalism allows for a move towards an emergent planning. The latter is based on constraint-driven strategies that aim to facilitate individual abilities to engage in self-generating phenomena. This approach encourages the formation of living systems or networks. (shrink)

Introduction. The emerging paradigm of socio- cultural development of the Russian Federation’s local communities is conditioned by the trans- formation of production and economic practices based on the concept of a multi-layered economy and multifunctionality emerging under the pressure of globalization on the development of localities. The desire to preserve and maintain socio-cultural traditions, customs, and values is an axiological guideline for developing local communities. The growing social vulnerability of communities creates certain conditions for losing identity, ability for self-identification, and (...) leads to the destruction of socio-cultural identity. The purpose of the study. The article analyzes the problem of socio-cultural evolution when modern- izing production and economic activity generating factors causing the transformation of culture and sociality of local communities, thus determining the processes of integration and disintegration of socioculture. Methods. Sociocultural analysis provides an op- portunity to reveal the main directions of sociocul- tural development of local communities, to explain the essence of interaction, mutual influence and unification of local communities into an interactive socio-cultural space with compatible formations and components. Scientific novelty of the research. The author dis- plays the models of culture and sociality transfor- mation reflecting the processes of modification of the local communities’ lifestyle that determine the transition from the paradigm of sustainable tradi- tional socio-cultural development to the paradigm of innovative transformations. Results. The problem of sociocultural integration and disintegration is associated with globalization processes that generate contradictions of globality and locality. The processes of integration/disin- tegration of the local communities’ sociocultural development are conditioned by the culture and sociality evolution of the constructing model of socio-cultural behavior. The pressure of globaliza- tion plunges the socio-cultural space into a state of diffusion, instability. Historically established traditions, norms, values are transformed into intermediate forms that help to adapt to new living conditions, neutralize the negative consequences of modernization. Territorial sociocultural formations are being formed, within the framework of which attempts are being made to preserve the tradition- al socio-cultural environment. Conclusions. The dynamics of sociocultural pro- cesses determines the emergence of multidirec- tional poles of sociocultural life: from the desire to preserve the traditional socio-cultural environment, to the full acceptance of the meaningful qualities of liberal socio-culture, which destroys the sociocul- tural identity of local communities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE TRUTH OF MORAL AND OTHER JUDGMENTS STEPHEN THERON Na,tional University of Lesotho Lesotho, Africa, SIMPSON'S RECENT review of Morals as Founded on Natural Law 1 so misrepresents its main point, one so vital to civilization's continuance, that I feel obliged to try to restate that point. It was of course disconcerting that he misunderstood the main point of the hook (whetlrer he agrees with (...) it or not), thoogh it may,weN. be, as he says, that the book oouM have been mOire readably written. He summarizes the book's aim as being" to establish morality on an external authoritative law "-a summary which does indeed seem close, even :identicaJ., to what is said in the book's first paragraph. However, there is ra potential equivocation in the w;ay he uses " externail.'' One should ask, external to what? What.the book speaks of in this opening paragraph is of justifying morality on ra principle " external to states of mind." I use "external" in the sense of that principle's being "independent of them," 'i.e., of meuba1l srtates. So :llar, this is a very open statement. Brut how do I go on to amplify it? Not the way Simpson does. He takes me as equating this principle with " the authoritative law of God," in the sense of "a divine legislative aiuthority " which, he reports me as arguing, " is just somehow an inemdicwblegiven." This " somehow " not only refoses to consider the meta1 Stephen Theron, Mora,ls M Founded on Na,tural Lww, European University Studies (New York: Peter Lang, 1987; 2nd ed. 1988). Reviewed by Peter Simpson in The ThomiBt 53 (1989): 341-342. ~93 294 STEPHEN THERON physical reasoning at the heart of the book's position but even seems to suggest that such reasoning was not evien offered. In fact it is precisely at this point that Simpson goes right off the raiJs as far as representing my view is concerned. H~ claims that this foundation upon divine authority would make morals "dependent on ·divine 1a.w, not, as his title dedares, on natural law." However, my use of " naturrul law " is rthe Thomistic use, which is sufficiently wen known in the debate so as not to be misleading. In the view of St. Thomas (and a whole established school of thought), natural law is indeed, in Simpson's words, "deriviative and secondary," or, in St. Thomas's words, "a reflected divine light.'' 2 Brut in the famous Artiicle 2 of Question 94 of the Prima secundae of the Summa theologica, so exh81ustively discussed in.the rooent literaturie, natural law is declared to be derived from the eternal law and not from divine law in the "external " or positivist •sense clearly intended by Simpson. (A different distinction is used in the Contra gentiles, but throughout my book the above text was referred to, often explicitly). "Divine law," the fourth type of law (eternal law and natural law being the first two types), does indeed refer, in this text, to some kind of positiv;e legisfation on the part of God in the 01d and New Testaments. (But evien here St. Thomas is oarefoil to point out that the law of the New Testament is only analogous to positive law, since it is not written on stone but poured into men's hearts by the Holy Spirit.) If I had been referring to this divine law (in such phrases as " reaISOn is divine and.therefore law ") and not thait eternal law which is one with the divine being, Simpson might have been able to brooket me with those nominalist theologians for whom.2" quasi lumen r.ationis naturalis... nihil aliud sit quam impressio luminis divini in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura." St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica I-II, 91. 2. THE TRUTH OF MORAL JUDGMENTS 295 God might hav:e decreed an opposite morality if he so chose. (Though this, too, would be contrary to St. Thomas's view of such positive divine law, ev;en for the Old Testament; indeed for him even 011dinary "human" positivie law loses the sense... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MARITAIN ON RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW THOMAS A. FAY St. John's University Jamaica, New York T:HE WAY RIGHTS a11e viewed in our time creates urmoil in our society. But this one-sided view of rights ad ]ts origin in the philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseaiu, in which the" Rights of Man" were divinized and hence made unlimited. In contrast, Maritain based his notion of rights on the natu:rail law, and (...) this phifosophic base can ground a more balanced view of rights, one which can protoot both against those who would assert arbitmry rights without any restraints whatever and against an authoritarian State which would subordinate an individual rights to its requirements. I. Maritain's Notion of the Natural Law For Marita:in, the ultimate groundiing of human rights is in the natural law.1 But just what does he mean by the term "natural law? " It is by no means obvious. Certa:inly from antiquity man has had some gmsp of a narturaJ faw, rthat is, of a law which transcends merely positive law, the law fashioned by men. In!J1an and the State, Maritain cites the case of Antigone, the heroine in Sophocles' pJ.ay of the same name. She breaks a positive faw in giving buriaJl to her brother 'and justifies her act by making an appeal to a law higher than any merely human law. And so she says " Nor did I deem Your ordinance of so much binding force, As that a mortal man could overbear The unchangeable unwritten code of heaven; 1 Les droits de l'homme et la, loi naturclle (New York: Editions de la Maison Frnncaise, Hl42), p. 84. 439 440 THOMAS A. FAY This is not of today and yesterday, But lives forever, having origin Whence no man knows...2 The Stoic philosophers spol{'e of a natural law; so did tnpian in the ancient Roman period, and St. Augus:tine in the early Middle Ages. The se-y;enteenth and eighteenth century saw the classical Law of Nature philosophers, such as Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Benedict Spinoza, and John Locke. And of course, by no means least on our list, there was Thomas Aquinas. Mal11'tain takes Thomas's to be the most perfect statement of natural law. But even here there are certain ambiguities and problems. For example, with 11egard to the "primary " and " seconda,ry" precepts of natural law, the statements of St. Thomas in early work The Commentary On The Sentences are at variance with the vocabulary and the teaiching of the Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94. Maritain attempts to clarify these obscurities by introducing what he rtakes to he the key to Thomas's 1 doctrine of natUl"al law-the notion of knowledge through inclination.3 As Maritain sees it, there are two aspects of natural law, one ontological and the other gnoseologicaL4 The ontological.aspect of natural law means that man has a being-structure which is the locus of inrtelligible necessities, that he possesses ends which necessarily correspond to his essential constitution and which are common to all men. This means that there is, by virtue of human nature itself, an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and accol'lding to which the human will should act if lit is to attain the necessary and essential ends of being human. This order or disposition is what he means by nrutural law. From this it follows that 001y being in nature, be it a tree or a dog or whatevier, has its own na.tural law, which is the normality of its funotioning, the proper way in which, by reason 2 Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 85. s Ibid., p. 91. 4!bill., pp. 85-94. MARITAIN ON RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW 441 of its specific structure and specific ends, it " should " achieve the fullness of its being, The " shou1d " here is not a moral imperative but rather an ontological one, just as we say that a "good" eye" shou1d" be :able to perceive certain objects with clarity at a certain disrtance. But as soon as we enter the realm of free... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. By IRIS MURDOCH. Harmondsworth: Allen Lane; New York: Viking, 1992. $35.00. Dame Iris Murdoch is familiar to most people as a witty and en· gaging novelist whose twenty-four hooks of fiction can he read on a variety of levels. They are wonderful stories, hut the philosophically acute reader will also enjoy Murdoch's judgments, polemics, and inhouse jokes about philosophers and philosophical (...) views. Comparatively few people are aware of Murdoch's previous scholarly studies: Sartre, Romantic Rationalist, The Sovereignty of the Good, The Fire and the Sun; and Acastos. Even so, those familiar with these hooks will recognize the profound impact she has had on debates within moral philosophy. She has been at the forefront of the move· ment that has rehabilitated the central importance of such notions as goodness, the Good, virtue, and the moral life as a journey. So it is not surprising that Murdoch has returned to the genre of philosophical argument to advance her views on the relationship between metaphysics and morals. But it is surprising that her argument exhibits neither the clarity of thought characteristic of the analytic philosophy in which she was trained nor the dramatic narrative of her novels. Indeed the hook reads like a collage of lecture notes, complete with extensive quotations from other people's thoughts with minimal com· mentary. Further, the chapter titles (e.g., " Fact and Value," " Schopenhauer," " Consciousness and Thought-I," " Derrida and Struc· turalism," " Consciousness and Thought-II," "Notes on Will and Duty," " Axioms, Duties, Eros," " Void ") shed little light on the overall structure or argument of the hook. One cannot help hut have the impression that Murdoch spent less time crafting the argument of this hook than she does in crafting the story line and characters of her novels. This is not to say, of course, that there is not much to he learned from Murdoch's perspective. She is remarkably erudite, and her discussion of various themes, figures, and issues often yields fascinating insights. But the whole is considerably less than the sum of its often interesting parts. I have already suggested that this is partly because of the structure and style in which the hook is written. But the hook 687 688 BOOK REVIEWS is also disappointing, and perhaps more determinatively, because of the overall perspective she seeks to deploy and defend. Readers of Murdoch's work have heretofore often wondered about the relationship between her avowed Platonism and her interest in Christianity. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals has the virtue of clarifying that relationship, hut the result is unpersuasive. At the heart of Murdoch's Platonism is her recasting of the allegory of the cave from The Republic. The moral life is an arduous struggle to ascend from the cave (represented, as in her earlier works, by " the fat, relentless ego ") by a dispossession of the self so that we can apprehend a little less imperfectly the perfect form of the Good. As Murdoch puts it, Plato assumes the internal relation of value, truth, cogmtion. Virtue (as compassion, humility, courage) involves a desire for and achievement of truth instead of falsehood, reality instead of appearance. Goodness involves truth.seeking knowledge and ipso facto a discipline of desire. ' Getting things right ', as in meticulous grammar or mathematics, is truth-seeking as virtue. Learning anything properly demands (virtuous ) attention. Here the idea of truth plays a crucial role (as it does also in Kant) and reality emerges as the object of truthful vision, and virtuous action as the product of such vision. This is a picture of the omnipresence of morality and evaluation in human life (p. 39). Such a depiction ought to resonate quite deeply with Christians, something not lost on Murdoch when she writes a few pages earlier: "There are innumerable points at which we have to detach ourselves, to change our orientation, to redirect our desire and refresh and purify our energy, to keep on looking in the right direction: to attend upon the grace that comes through faith " (p. 25). But Murdoch's "grace" and her "truth-seeking as virtue," among other themes, involve something quite different from what Christians... (shrink)

The paper outlines the theoretical and methodological complexity of the historical-philosophi- cal study of Georges Bataille’s literary and philosophical heritage, In: particular «Inner Expe- rience», one of his key works, which is about to be released in Ukrainian. To this end, I analyze the biographical and historical-philosophical contexts of writing «Inner Experience». I observe the main events of the thinker’s life, which led to the writing of this work and testify to Bataille’s opposition to the most common artistic movements of (...) the time (surrealism), philosophical theo- ries (existentialism), religious teachings, and, in fact, anti-systemic nature of his work. In addi- tion, the paper tends to identify sources of influence on the formation of philosophical views of Bataille in the period of «Inner Experience» writing. In particular, I analyze the theoretical and political relations of Bataille, especially with his critics (Belgian surrealists group, G. Marcel, J.-P. Sartre), but also allies (M. Blanchot, P. Klossowski, M. Leiris, H. Masson and others). Further, I study the genesis of the concept of «internal experience» formation, its inherent multi- faceted, multi-layered,and metaphorical nature, rooting in the tradition of Christian mysticism and reflecting the state after the loss of faith at the same time. Particularly, I study the image of the labyrinth as one of the most expressive synonyms of internal experience term, which empha- sizes the meaning of this fundamental word-concept of Bataille’s philosophy. To provide the in- tellectual context, I list main points of Bataille’s «Inner Experience» critique by representatives of the French intellectual communities of the 1940s, as well as the main Bataille’s arguments against this critique. Eventually, I analyze the main ideas of his «Inner Experience», as well as the ways how Bataille’s philosophy influenced the key representatives of the French poststruc- turalism (J. Derrida, M. Foucault, J. Kristeva, J.-F. Lyotard). (shrink)