In 2016, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen officially apologised to the island’s indigenous peoples. This national apology not only plays a persuasive role in informing the general public about the historical wrongdoings inflicted on the Taiwanese aborigines, but also constitutes a therapeutic and restorative role in the process of reconciliation with the indigenous victims. This article provides a critical discourse analysis of President Tsai’s apology. In particular, it examines the power and ideology embedded in both the speech and the related ceremony, (...) and is supplemented with extracts from interviews with a cross-section of key stakeholders, such as a former Constitutional/supreme Court Justice, indigenous/tribal leaders and members/staff/advisers from the Presidential Office Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee. The analysis reveals that, despite President Tsai’s apology and reconciliation policies, instead of facilitating reconciliation, the apology appears to exacerbate the long-standing latent tension between indigenous and non-indigenous groups. While the apology opens a window for reconciliation, a higher level of commitment is required to promote structural and systemic changes, such as land restitution, before the apology can be deemed adequate. (shrink)

The Western model of modernization has become the new dogmatism, and we should oppose it from the actual situation of China to go our own way in the practice of the Chinese path to modernization. The dogmatism is also called bookism. It means that theory is divorced from practice. Oppose Bookism is a book that criticizes dogmatism by Marxist method, which was written by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse Tung, 1893-1976). This article explores the position of this book in Mao (...) Zedong Thought from the perspective of the sinicization of Marxist philosophy. As far as I’m concerned, influenced by the academic tradition of Neo-Confucianism in Hunan, he emphasizes the dialectical unity between theory and praxis. Through his investigation of the social situation in China, he realizes that correct understanding comes from actual investigation. Therefore, this work, Oppose Bookism, discusses the relationship between theory and practice from the perspective of combining the universal principles of Marxism with the Chinese revolution and traditional Chinese culture, and summarizes the revolutionary experience. Later, On Practice and On Contradiction have elaborated in depth the relationship between theory and practice. Therefore, practically speaking, it marks the beginning of China’s own revolutionary path, and theoretically speaking, it is the beginning of the sinicization of Marxist philosophy. This provides methodological guidance for the Chinese path to modernization in the new era. (shrink)

科学とテクノロジーによる合理性の制度化のなかの現代の〈非人間化〉を、ハーバーマスの問題提起に触発され、カントの社会哲学によって反省する野心作。.

It was a common practice of the Chinese official historiographers to employ pseudo-historical, semi-fictional source materials alongside the factual, ascertainable data in their narratives for prescribed political or didactic purposes despite their commitment to the time-honored principles of truth and objectivity in the Confucian-oriented traditional historiography. The intrusion of these non-historical elements in the imperial historical records illustrates, therefore, the adaptability of the source materials representing the popular tradition of the masses for the uses of the great tradition, and the (...) propensity of the reciprocal exchanges between the expressions of the Confucian literati and the less cultured populace in historical compositions. Drawing on a textual analysis of the T'ai-tsu shih-lu, the reign chronicle of the Ming founder Chu Yüan-chang, who rose from a humble peasant to the imperial throne in 1368, this essay examines the historical circumstances and historiographical devices by which the factual records were commingled with the non-historical materials in the accounts of the dynasty founding. It shows how the historiographers synthesized the pseudo-historical expressions in the popular tradition with the deliberately fabricated falsehoods of their own doing to conjure up an inflated portrait of the Ming founder, transforming him from an illiterate, beggar mendicant monk and rebel leader into the topoi of a righteous hero, dynasty founder and exemplar ruler in traditional official historiography. It also shows that apart from the historiographers' penchant for conformity to the established conventions, the exaggerated portrait of the Ming founder in the T'ai-tsu shih-lu was a product of a historiographical revision undertaken on order of the third emperor Yung-lo, fourth son of T'ai-tsu, aiming at legitimizing his usurpation of the throne from his nephew the imperial successor Chien-wen in a palace rebellion of 1402. Lastly, it shows how the early Ming revision of the records of the rise of T'ai-tsu inspired a cycle of bizarre legends about the early years of the dynasty founding in later official and private writings, and how a case study of such historiographical process may add to our understanding of the continuous interactions between the expressions of the élite and mass heritages in the making of the Chinese intellectual and cultural traditions. (shrink)

"Chinese philosophy before our Christian era is emphasized in this nontechnical summary of Chinese thought. Professor Creel also deals with Confucianism, the ideas of Mo-tsu and Mencius, Taoism, Legalism, and their variations and adaptations. As an introduction for the general reader, this book stands among the best."—_China: A Resource and Curriculum Guide_ "There exists nowhere else such a well-written presentation of the main trends in Chinese thought in so brief a space. The text is not cluttered with Chinese names and (...) the pages are not weighed down with footnotes—but the references are there for those who want them, with suggestions for further readings. This is a book which can be understood by those who have never read anything else about China."—_The New York Times Book Review _. (shrink)

Compiled in the twelfth century A.D. by Chu Hsi, leading exponent of Neo-Confucianism, with the assistance of Lü Tsu-Ch'ien, Chin-ssu Lu serves as a summary of, and introduction to, the vast literature of Neo-Confucian philosophy. Adding a more rational theoretical foundation and new methods of moral cultivation and study to traditional thought and practice, Neo-Confucianism has exercised great influence upon thought and social life in East Asia in the past six hundred years. As the classical statement of this philosophy, this (...) anthology brings together passages from Chou Tun-i, Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I, and Chang Tsai on the Way, Learning, and Self-improvement, as well as assessments of the character of Sages and Worthies; also included is a chapter on the doctrines of Buddhism and Taoism, pointing out ways in which they deviated from the Confucian Way. It is a very stimulating work; indeed almost every sentence has spark and substance. Although it has been widely studied by East Asian scholars, so far in the West there has been only the translation into German by Father Olaf Graf, now virtually unobtainable. With his mastery of Chinese philosophical literature, his industriousness in research and his augmentation of the text by generous quotations from the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean commentaries, the translator has achieved extraordinary success in making the English version even more comprehensible than the original Chinese.--T. S. C. (shrink)

Crutchfield and Redinger (2024) maintain that “being conscious is a basic liberty,” and infer from this that without informed consent, deep sedation, by intruding upon one’s consciousness, is an in...

I take the debate between the particularists and the principlists to be centered on the issue of whether there are true moral principles. One argument the principlists often appeal to in support of their claim that there are true moral principles is the argument from supervenience. Roughly, the argument is made up of the following three statements: (P1) If the thesis of moral supervenience holds, then there are true moral principles. (P2) The thesis of moral supervenience holds. (C) There are (...) true moral principles, and hence particularism is false. In this paper, I argue that the above argument is not sound by attacking (P1). I hold that no general supervenient/resultance base has a robust enough configuration of contextual features as to ground the existence of true moral principles. If I am right about this, I think it would be indicative of a reason to be less confident about the truth of principlism and more confident about the truth of particularism. (shrink)

There are in fact two questions to be discussed. Is the importance of a philosophical thesis relative to language? Is the validity of a philosophical thesis relative to language? The answer to both questions is "yes." It can be shown that two well-known philosophical theses--the logical distinction between numerals and adjectives drawn by Frege, and the distinction between tasks and achievements drawn by Ryle--are true but trivial when stated in Chinese. This is the program for the first part of this (...) paper. In the second part, I will try to show that Mrs. Daitz's statement "a sentence states, but its parts cannot state" and Strawson's grammatical criterion for the subject-predicate distinction are both invalidated by Chinese grammar. (shrink)

Moral particularism, on some interpretations, is committed to a shapeless thesis: the moral is shapeless with respect to the natural. (Call this version of moral particularism ‘shapeless moral particularism’). In more detail, the shapeless thesis is that the actions a moral concept or predicate can be correctly applied to have no natural commonality (or shape) amongst them. Jackson et al. (Ethical particularism and patterns, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) argue, however, that the shapeless thesis violates the platitude ‘predication supervenes on (...) nature’—predicates or concepts apply because of how things are, and therefore ought to be rejected. I defend shapeless moral particularism by arguing that Jackson et al’s contention is less compelling than it firstly appears. My defense is limited in the sense that it does not prove shapeless moral particularism to be right and it leaves open the possibility that shapeless moral particularism might attract criticisms different from the ones advanced by Jackson et al. But at the very least, I hope to say enough to undermine Jackson et al’s powerful attack against it. The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 1 glosses the view of moral particularism and why it is taken to be essentially committed to the shapeless thesis. Section 2 examines a Wittgensteinian argument for the shapeless thesis. I shall argue that the Canberrans’ counter-arguments against it on grounds of disjunctive commonality and conceptual competence do not succeed. Section 3 explicates Canberrans’ predication supervenience argument against the shapeless thesis. Section 4 offers my criticisms of the Canberrans’ predication supervenience argument. In view of the above discussions, in Sect. 5, I conclude that there is no compelling argument (from the Canberrans) to believe that the shapeless thesis fails (as I have argued in Sect. 4). In fact, there is some good reason for us to believe it (as I have argued in Sect. 2). If so, I contend that moral particularism, when construed as essentially committed to the shapeless thesis, still remains as a live option. (shrink)

In this paper, I will examine the debate between the principlists and the particularists with special focus on the question of whether there is any true and coherent set of moral principles that codifies the moral landscape metaphysically speaking. My stance on this issue is an extreme sort of particularism which gives a ‘no’ answer to the above question. Yet it is significantly different from the positions of other extremists like John McDowell, Jonathan Dancy and Margaret Little. In section 2, (...) I will explain how my position is distinguished from theirs and why it is worth exploring. In section 3, I elucidate the meaning of ‘codify’. In section 4, I examine four types of principlism that claim to codify morality and argue that none of them succeeds. In section 5, I distinguish between four models of virtue and explore what implications the failure of principlism has for normative ethics and applied ethics. (shrink)