In setting out their normative account of the truth-belief relationship, Nishi Shah and David Velleman make two claims about a feature of doxastic deliberation they call transparency. Firstly, transparency is a feature only of doxastic deliberation. Secondly, teleological theories of the truth-belief relationship cannot account for both transparency and the non-evidential factors present in instances of motivated belief. Therefore, they argue, we should abandon teleological accounts in favour of a normative one, which is able to make sense (...) of both descriptive features of belief. I argue that if their first claim about transparency is correct, then their second is a non sequitur: if transparency is a feature only of doxastic deliberation, then it is described and explained in terms of action rather than of belief. Since theories of belief do not have to account for features of action, teleological accounts cannot be undermined by their inability to explain transparency. (shrink)

Transparency has become a global concept of responsible government. This book argues that the transnational discourse of transparency promotes potentially contradictory policy ideas that can lead to unintended consequences. It critically examines whether or not increased transparency really leads to increased democratic accountability.

In this chapter, I defend a transparency account of substantial self-knowledge against the self-interpretation account. First, I question how such self-interpretation should proceed without taking up at least some of the perspectives of the attitudes at issue. I argue that the inability to assess our attitudes from a detached perspective is not just a matter of epistemic access but relates to the nature of substantial attitudes themselves. Because they are connected to a person’s conception of themselves but also their (...) conception of their values, substantial attitudes are synchronically and diachronically indeterminate. This means that they need to be translated to a particular context and person. Second, I argue that such a process of translation involves the person’s sense-making agency. Different from interpretation— and, as will be addressed, different from reflective endorsement and self-regulation—substantial attitudes can only be self-attributed if the agent determines what they mean for her, here and now. My contribution highlights aspects of substantial self- knowledge that, on the one hand, connect substantial self-knowledge to non-ideal approaches in epistemology, linking it to an emancipatory practice of self-inquiry. On the other hand, the chapter shifts our way of thinking about transparent self-knowledge, how it should not be dismissed too quickly with respect to substantial self-knowledge, and how important the agential, non-reductive, and first-personal perspective is in relation to our mental life. (shrink)

Transparency and openness are broadly endorsed in energy and environmental modelling and analysis, but too little attention is given to the transparency of value-laden assumptions. Current practices for transparency focus on making model source code and data available, documenting key equations and parameter values, and ensuring replicability of results. We argue that, even when followed, these guidelines are insufficient for achieving deep transparency, in the sense that results often remain driven by implicit value-laden assumptions that are (...) opaque to other modellers and researchers, and that may not be understood by wider audiences to be controversial. This paper identifies additional best practices for achieving transparency by highlighting issues where disagreement over value judgements will persist for the foreseeable future. Recommendations for deepening transparency are developed by learning from successes and ongoing challenges represented in three case studies. We provide recommendations to accelerate the adoption of additional best practices for deepening transparency of energy and environmental modelling in policy-relevant domains, increasing stakeholder participation with non-modellers, and encouraging interdisciplinary dialogue. (shrink)

Many philosophers endorse the Transparency Thesis, the claim that by introspection one cannot become aware of one's experience. Recently, some authors have suggested that the Transparency Thesis is challenged by introspective states reached under mindfulness. We label this the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis. The present paper develops the hypothesis in important new ways. First, we motivate the hypothesis by drawing on recent clinical psychology and cognitive science of mindfulness. Secondly, we develop the hypothesis by describing the implied shift in (...) experiential perspective, the scope of introspectable qualities, and the level of skill. Thirdly, we defend the hypothesis against various philosophical arguments. We conclude that the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis is empirically and theoretically well motivated and supported. (shrink)

Transparency is an increasingly prominent area of research that offers valuable insights for organizational studies. However, conceptualizations of transparency are rarely subject to critical scrutiny and thus their relevance remains unclear. In most accounts, transparency is associated with the sharing of information and the perceived quality of the information shared. This narrow focus on information and quality, however, overlooks the dynamics of organizational transparency. To provide a more structured conceptualization of organizational transparency, this article unpacks (...) the assumptions that shape the extant literature, with a focus on three dimensions: conceptualizations, conditions, and consequences. The contribution of the study is twofold: On a conceptual level, we provide a framework that articulates two paradigmatic positions underpinning discussions of transparency, verifiability approaches and performativity approaches; on an analytical level, we suggest a novel future research agenda for studying organizational transparency that pays attention to its dynamics, paradoxes, and performative characteristics. (shrink)

A possible way out to Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief could start from the rejection of the notion of epistemic transparency. Epistemic transparency seems, indeed, irremediably incompatible with an externalist conception of mental content. However, Brandom’s inferentialism could be considered a version of externalism that allows, at least in some cases, to save the principle of transparency. Appealing to a normative account of the content of our beliefs, from the inferentialist’s standpoint, it is possible to state that a (...) content is transparent when name-components of that content are a priori associated with some application conditions and, at the same time, reflection alone provides an a priori access to those application conditions, with no need of any empirical investigation. Nevertheless, such requirements are only met in trivial cases. The aim of this paper is to argue that some application conditions of that sort, albeit trivial, can be ontologically ampliative. As a result, the related contents can be regarded as transparent in a substantial and rich way. (shrink)

In Switzerland, the importance of transparency in animal experimentation is emphasized by the Swiss Federal Council, recognizing the public’s great interest in this matter. Federal reporting on animal experimentation indicates a total of 585,991 animals used in experiments in Switzerland in 2022. By Swiss law, the report enables the public to learn about many aspects such as the species and degree of suffering experienced by the animals, but some information of interest to the public is missing, such as the (...) fate of the animals at the end of the experiment (e.g., euthanized, rehomed in a private home, reused in another experiment). When it comes to animals bred in facilities but not used in experiments, further information of interest is not required to be made public according to Swiss law, for example, the number and fate of “surplus” animals (i.e., animals bred but not used in experiments for a variety of reasons such as not carrying the phenotypical properties needed). Considering that the Swiss government has a duty to provide a full accounting of animal experimentation conducted on the public’s behalf, further relevant information should be disclosed. While efforts toward transparency, such as the STAAR Agreement, have been made in the scientific community, these mostly reflect the legal requirements already in force. If Switzerland is to move toward more transparency in public information on animal experimentation, an update of the legal requirements is needed. In this article, we give recommendations for Swiss law to move toward more transparency in public information on seven aspects: (1) the fate of the animals at the end of the experiment; (2) the sources of funding for animal experimentation; (3) the harm-benefit analysis performed by researchers and ethics committees to justify an experiment using animals; (4) the number of breeding/surplus animals; (5) the fate of breeding/surplus animals; (6) the harms experienced by animals in facilities; and (7) the funding of animal facilities. (shrink)

In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency (...) to the public over expert domains. I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to non-experts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption — but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual’s capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust — if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public — then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise. (shrink)

La contribution part du constat qu’il existe actuellement peu d’exigences de transparence en ce qui concerne les algorithmes de justice prédictive qui seraient mis à la disposition des juges judiciaires et administratifs pour adopter des décisions de justice, en dépit des propositions formulées en ce sens. Elle recherche pourquoi de telles exigences devraient être imposées et comment elles pourraient être concrétisées. Elle expose dans un premier temps les raisons pour lesquelles de telles exigences seraient souhaitables, en rappelant les nombreux risques (...) inhérents aux algorithmes ( a fortiori dans l’optique de les mettre à disposition des juges dans un but de justice prédictive) et en démontrant que ces risques pourraient être contrebalancés par l’application d’exigences de transparence. Elle esquisse dans un second temps une proposition de concrétisation de ces exigences, en commençant par approfondir leurs fondements juridiques potentiels. Elle s’inspire des exigences de transparence administrative applicables aux administrations qui fondent des décisions individuelles sur des algorithmes pour proposer une modélisation d’exigences de transparence applicables aux magistrats pour ce qui concerne le degré d’utilisation d’algorithmes dans l’adoption de décisions de justice, dans le respect des prérogatives des magistrats et des garanties dont ils bénéficient. (shrink)

Transparency has gained much attention in both public health and medical contexts. Alberto Giubilini, Rachel Gur-Arie and Euzebiusz Jamrozik make a valuable contribution to addressing the ethical question on the value and role of transparency by claiming that transparency is a necessary condition for the moral trustworthiness of experts. This comment is conceived as a follow-up on this issue. Usually, ethical discussions on transparency concern its consequentialist aspects such as the influence of disclosure on stakeholders’ trust. (...) However, as the author will claim, there is something morally significant and non-consequentialist at stake. The aim of the comment is to highlight two important aspects concerning transparency. Firstly, its role in public health ethics, and, secondly, the moral basis for this role. Regarding the former, the author will claim that transparency influences moral legitimacy of coercive public health policies. Regarding the latter, the author will claim that by being transparent, policymakers respect stakeholders as moral agents capable of reason. (shrink)

Transparent windows on food packaging can effectively highlight the actual food inside. The present study examined whether food packaging with transparent windows (relative to packaging with food- and non-food graphic windows in the same position and of the same size) has more advantages in capturing consumer attention and determining consumers’ willingness to purchase. In this study, college students were asked to evaluate prepackaged foods presented on a computer screen, and their eye movements were recorded. The results showed salience effects for (...) both packaging with transparent and food-graphic windows, which were also regulated by food category. Both transparent and graphic packaging gained more viewing time than the non-food graphic baseline condition for all the three selected products (i.e., nuts, preserved fruits and instant cereals). However, no significant difference was found between transparent and graphic window conditions. For preserved fruits, time to first fixations was shorter in transparent packaging than other conditions. For nuts, the willingness to purchase was higher in both transparent and graphic conditions than the baseline condition, while the packaging attractiveness played a key role in mediating consumers’ willingness to purchase. The implications for stakeholders and future research directions are discussed. (shrink)

A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.

Transparency generates a paradox. For the way that we make things transparent is by simplification which at the same time masks all the information and thus contributes to opacity. The paper looks at how this paradox is played out in the contexts of the interplay between legal rules and particularity and between political representation and complete democracy. This raises questions of the Rule of Law and the functions and meanings of democratic legitimacy and though these are different questions, they (...) are closely related and overlapping. Finally, it looks at how the issues come into focus in questions of governance of an entity like the EU which should not be seen either on the model of a union of states or a nation state itself. (shrink)

I draw on work in social epistemology, feminist philosophy, trans philosophy, queer theory, and ethics to rethink what hermeneutical injustices are, who suffers them, and what can be done to prevent them. I identify several problems with Miranda Fricker’s original account of what hermeneutical injustices are and how they arise, and argue for a number of revisions and clarifications in order to solve these problems. One upshot of these revisions is that more people suffer hermeneutical injustices than Fricker’s account acknowledges. (...) I then outline a novel, more materialist sort of strategy for preventing hermeneutical injustices, and argue that the provision of gender-affirming healthcare is one context in which such a strategy ought to be pursued. Finally, I criticize the hermeneutical injustice literature for what I call its implicit commitment to transparency politics. By this I mean its implicit commitment to the view that when it comes to the hermeneutical dimension of people’s lives, the satisfaction of their interests in things about themselves being intelligible is all that matters. I argue that this view is mistaken, not least because it ignores the existence of two other important sorts of distinctly hermeneutical interest. (shrink)

A tradition of work in cognitive science indicates that much of our mental lives is not available to introspection . Though the researchers often present these results as surprising, little has been done to explore the degree to which people presume introspective access to their mental events. In this paper, we distinguish two dimensions of introspective access: the power of access, i.e. whether people believe they can unfailingly or only typically introspect mental events; and the domain of access, i.e. what (...) types of mental events people believe they are able to introspect. We report five experiments carried out to discover where lay beliefs about introspection fall on these dimensions. In our experiments, people did not presume universal introspective access, but they did overestimate the amount of access they actually have, particularly in the case of decisions. (shrink)

This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.

This study examines specifically, the mission statement and ideology as discursive practices of the Mavrodi Mondial Moneybox (MMM) Ponzi scheme. As the demand for transparency in governance, public and private practices increase, there is also a rising proliferation of counter forms of transparency in financial sectors. While studies have focused on the practices of transparency in the reports of public and private institutions, very little attention has been paid to the perils of transparency in mission statements (...) of online scam practices such as Ponzi schemes that parade as transparent financial schemes. Using a critical discourse analytic approach, this study investigates Ponzi schemes in Nigeria and their ideology of a ‘transparent economic system’. These schemes claim to operate a mutual benefit fund for the poor and discourage individuals from investing in banks. The critical discourse analysis draws attention to masked discourses of MMM and examines how the transparent discourse of the MMM generally constitutes deceptive discourse. The findings of the study reveal that factual and political arguments and propagandas are strategies of negative other representation that attempt to discredit the government and other legitimate financial institutions and at the same time attempt to control the mind of the participants by presenting the schemes as reliable thereby defrauding their victims. (shrink)

Transparency is the order of the day. It is a term, a slogan, that dominates public discourse about corruption and freedom of information. Considered crucial to democracy, it touches our political and economic lives as well as our private lives. Anyone can obtain information about anything. Everything—and everyone—has become transparent: unveiled or exposed by the apparatuses that exert a kind of collective control over the post-capitalist world. Yet, transparency has a dark side that, ironically, has everything to do (...) with a lack of mystery, shadow, and nuance. Behind the apparent accessibility of knowledge lies the disappearance of privacy, homogenization, and the collapse of trust. The anxiety to accumulate ever more information does not necessarily produce more knowledge or faith. Technology creates the illusion of total containment and the constant monitoring of information, but what we lack is adequate interpretation of the information. In this manifesto, Byung-Chul Han denounces transparency as a false ideal, the strongest and most pernicious of our contemporary mythologies. (shrink)

Proponents of the extended mind have suggested that phenomenal transparency may be important to the way we evaluate putative cases of cognitive extension. In particular, it has been suggested that in order for a bio-external resource to count as part of the machinery of the mind, it must qualify as a form of transparent equipment or transparent technology. The present paper challenges this claim. It also challenges the idea that phenomenological properties can be used to settle disputes regarding the (...) constitutional status of bio-external resources in episodes of extended cognizing. Rather than regard phenomenal transparency as a criterion for cognitive extension, we suggest that transparency is a feature of situations that support the ascription of certain cognitive/mental dispositional properties to both ourselves and others. By directing attention to the forces and factors that motivate disposition ascriptions, we arrive at a clearer picture of the role of transparency in arguments for extended cognition and the extended mind. As it turns out, transparency is neither necessary nor sufficient for cognitive extension, but this does not mean that it is entirely irrelevant to our understanding of the circumstances in which episodes of extended cognizing are apt to arise. (shrink)

. Transparency and the European Union. Cultural Values: Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 387-392.

The transparency approach to introspection has received much attention over the last few decades. It is inspired by some wellknown remarks from Gareth Evans (1982). Although this approach can seem quite plausible as applied to belief (and perhaps perception), philosophers tend to be sceptical that it can succeed for other mental kinds. This paper focuses on desire. It lays out in detail a transparency theory of desire introspection and addresses various concerns and objections to such a theory. The (...) paper takes as its launching point Alex Byrne's (2018) influential work on transparency. (shrink)

An important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of self-knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a (...) version of the KK principle with an “externalist” or “reliabilist” conception of knowledge commonly thought to make that principle particularly problematic. (shrink)

Phenomenal transparency was once widely believed to be necessary for cognitive extension. Recently, this claim has come under attack, with a new consensus coalescing around the idea that transparency is neither necessary for internal nor extended cognitive processes. We take these recent critiques as an opportunity to refine the concept of transparency relevant for cognitive extension. In particular, we highlight that transparency concerns an agent’s employment of a resource – and that such employment is compatible with (...) an agent consciously apprehending (or attending to) a resource. This means it is possible for an object to be transparent and opaque to an agent, even at a single moment in time. Once we understand transparency in this way, the detractors’ claims lose their bite, and existing arguments for transparency’s necessity for cognitive extension return to apply with full force. (shrink)

Without exaggeration, it could be said that we are entering a golden age of neuroscience. Informed by recent developments in neuroimaging that allow us to peer into the working brain at both a structural and functional level, neuroscientists are beginning to untangle mechanisms of recovery after brain injury and grapple with age-old questions about brain and mind and their correlates neural mechanisms and consciousness. Neuroimaging, coupled with new diagnostic categories and assessment scales are helping us develop a new diagnostic nosology (...) about disorders of consciousness which will likely improve prognostication and suggest therapeutic advances. Historically such diagnostic refinement has yield therapeutic advances in medicine and there is no reason to doubt that this will be the case for disorders of consciousness, perhaps bringing relief to a marginalized population now on the periphery of the therapeutic agenda. In spite of this promise, the translation of research findings into the clinical context will be difficult. As we move from descriptive categories about disorders of consciousness, like the vegetative or minimally conscious states, to ones further specified by integrating behavioral and neuroimaging findings, humility not hubris should be the virtue that guides the ethical conduct of research and practice. (shrink)

The use of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in health care opens up new opportunities for the measurement of the human. Their application aims not only at gathering more and better data points but also at doing it less invasive. With this change in health care towards its extension to almost all areas of life and its increasing invisibility and opacity, new questions of transparency arise. While the complex human-machine interactions involved in deploying and using AI tend to become (...) non-transparent, the use of these technologies makes the patient seemingly transparent. Papers on the ethical implementation of AI plead for transparency but neglect the factor of the “transparent patient” as intertwined with AI. Transparency in this regard appears to be Janus-faced: The precondition for receiving help - e.g., treatment advice regarding the own health - is to become transparent for the digitized health care system. That is, for instance, to donate data and become visible to the AI and its operators. The paper reflects on this entanglement of transparent patients and (non-) transparent technology. It argues that transparency regarding both AI and humans is not an ethical principle per se but an infraethical concept. Further, it is no sufficient basis for avoiding harm and human dignity violations. Rather, transparency must be enriched by intelligibility following Judith Butler’s use of the term. Intelligibility is understood as an epistemological presupposition for recognition and the ensuing humane treatment. Finally, the paper highlights ways to testify intelligibility in dealing with AI in health care ex ante, ex post, and continuously. (shrink)

The paper argues that Gareth Evans’ argument for transparent self-knowledge is based on a conflation of doxastic transparency with ascriptive transparency. Doxastic transparency means that belief about one’s own doxastic state, e.g., the belief that one thinks that it will rain, can be warranted by ordinary empirical observation, e.g., of the weather. In contrast, ascriptive transparency says that self-ascriptions of belief, e.g., “I believe it will rain”, can be warranted by such observation. We first show that (...) the thesis of doxastic transparency is ill-motivated and then offer a non-epistemic interpretation of ascriptive transparency by reference to the theory of explicit expressive acts: “I think it will rain” requires attendance to the weather because the utterance expresses a belief about the weather, not about ourselves. This will allow us to avoid what is often called “the puzzle of transparent self-knowledge” while remaining faithful to Evans’ linguistic observations. (shrink)

Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session.

This book offers a comprehensive, authoritative, and accessible introduction to journalistic transparency. Pulling from historical and theoretical perspectives, Transparency in Journalism explains the concept of transparency and its place in journalistic practice, offering a critical assessment of what transparency can and cannot offer to journalism. The author also reviews the key theoretical claims underlying transparency and how they have been researched in different parts of the world, ultimately proposing a communication model that can be used (...) to study the concept of transparency across journalism research. Other topics discussed include the use of algorithmic forms of transparency, the limitations of the transparency myth, and suggestions for future avenues for research. Transparency and Journalism is an important resource for students and scholars in the field of journalism and media studies, as well as for journalists and researchers interested in delving into an ever-relevant topic for the field. (shrink)

In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour (...) of disjunctivism; and (iv) to argue that there is a related reason to prefer experiential intentionalism over Martin’s version of disjunctivism. (shrink)

The transparency of perceptual experience has been invoked in support of many views about perception. I argue that it supports a form of enactivism—the view that capacities for perceptual experience and for intentional agency are essentially interdependent. I clarify the perceptual phenomenon at issue, and argue that enactivists should expect to find a parallel instance of transparency in our agentive experience, and that the two forms of transparency are constitutively interdependent. I then argue that i) we do (...) indeed find such parallels: the way in which an action is directed towards its goal through our bodily movements parallels the way in which an experience is directed towards its object through our perceptual sensation, and ii) reflecting on sensorimotor skills shows why the two instances of transparency are constitutively interdependent. Section 4 gives reasons for generalizing beyond the cases considered so far by applying the enactive view to Kohler's landmark studies of perceptual adaptation. The final section clarifies the form of enactivism to which the previous sections point. The view that emerges is one whereby our perceptual and practical skills are interrelated aspects of a single capacity to have one's mind intentionally directed upon the world. The transparency of experience, on this view, is achieved in virtue of our capacities as agents as much as it is given in virtue of our capacities as perceivers. (shrink)

A series of recent papers raises worries about the manipulative potential of algorithmic transparency (to wit, making visible the factors that influence an algorithm’s output). But while the concern is apt and relevant, it is based on a fraught understanding of manipulation. Therefore, this paper draws attention to the ‘indifference view’ of manipulation, which explains better than the ‘vulnerability view’ why algorithmic transparency has manipulative potential. The paper also raises pertinent research questions for future studies of manipulation in (...) the context of algorithmic transparency. (shrink)

Sometimes, states face emergencies: situations where many individuals face an imminent threat of serious harm. Some believe that in such cases certain sorts of actions which are normally morally prohibited might be permissible. In this paper, I discuss this view as it applies in both the contexts of war and of public health policy. I suggest that the deontologist can best understand emergencies by analogy with the distinction between act- and rule consequentialism. In real world cases, we must often make (...) decisions in ‘epistemically murky’ situations, such that the application of deontological principles to particular cases is unclear. I suggest that we develop conventions to deal with such cases in a manner which we think is most likely to approximate the demands of abstract deontological principles across time. I claim that we can best understand ‘supreme emergencies’ as situations which ‘epistemic murkiness’ is resolved. In such cases, there may be a conflict between what would be valid application of abstract deontological principles and the conventions which normally guide us in epistemically murky situations. (shrink)

Arthur Danto was an original thinker, and like all creative readers of the history of philosophy he invariably heard in those who caught his attention echoes, faint or raucous, of his own thoughts. Danto rejects the transparency theory as inadequate to how we talk about art and to artistic practice. For Danto, an artwork is not a mere representation, with a particular kind of content. Echoing a familiar theme from traditional aesthetic theory, Danto reminds us that “it is crucial (...) to distinguish the form of a representation from the content of the representation”. Sartre and Danto agree that artistic style and expression differ essentially from mundane character and meaning. By his own admission, Sartre's favored argumentative technique was to invest heavily in sharp categorical distinctions where common sense and philosophical refinement are inclined to see complexity and ambiguity. (shrink)

According to the thesis of transparency, subjects can attend only to the representational content of perceptual experience, never to the intrinsic properties of experience that carry this representational content, i.e., to “mental paint.” So far, arguments for and against transparency were conducted from the armchair, relying mainly on introspective observations. In this paper, we argue in favor of transparency, relying on the cognitive neuroscience of attention. We present a trilemma to those who hold that attention can be (...) directed to mental paint. Such attention is either first-order sensory, higher-order cognitive, or higher-order sensory attention. We argue that the notion of first-order sensory attention to mental paint is incompatible with the neuroscience of sensory attention; that higher-order cognitive attention to mental paint is irrelevant to transparency; and that the notion of higher-order sensory attention to mental paint has an apparently incoherent prediction. Via elimination, these considerations support the thesis of transparency. (shrink)

Over the past few decades, as philosophers of mind have begun to rethink the sharp divide that was traditionally drawn between the phenomenal character of an experience (what it’s like to have that experience) and its intentional content (what it represents), representationalist theories of consciousness have become increasingly popular. On this view, phenomenal character is reduced to intentional content. This article explores a key motivation for this theory, namely, considerations of experiential transparency. Experience is said to be transparent in (...) that we ‘look right through it’ to the objects of that experience, and this is supposed to support the representationalist claim that there are no intrinsic aspects of our experience. (shrink)

In recent work Philip Goff has defended the thesis of subjecthood transparency: someone possessing the concept ‘subjecthood’ is thereby in a position to know, a priori, what it is for an entity to be a subject of experiences. Kevin Morris has criticized a specific argument that Goff provides for subjecthood transparency. I will argue that Morris’s criticism of Goff’s argument does not succeed. I will then present an alternative criticism of Goff’s argument, one that also applies to the (...) thesis of subjecthood transparency itself. (shrink)

BackgroundOpen peer review practices are increasing in medicine and life sciences, but in social sciences and humanities they are still rare. We aimed to map out how editors of respected SSH journals perceive open peer review, how they balance policy, ethics, and pragmatism in the review processes they oversee, and how they view their own power in the process.MethodsWe conducted 12 pre-registered semi-structured interviews with editors of respected SSH journals. Interviews consisted of 21 questions and lasted an average of 67 (...) min. Interviews were transcribed, descriptively coded, and organized into code families.ResultsSSH editors saw anonymized peer review benefits to outweigh those of open peer review. They considered anonymized peer review the “gold standard” that authors and editors are expected to follow to respect institutional policies; moreover, anonymized review was also perceived as ethically superior due to the protection it provides, and more pragmatic due to eased seeking of reviewers. Finally, editors acknowledged their power in the publication process and reported strategies for keeping their work as unbiased as possible.ConclusionsEditors of SSH journals preferred the benefits of anonymized peer review over open peer and acknowledged the power they hold in the publication process during which authors are almost completely disclosed to editorial bodies. We recommend journals to communicate the transparency elements of their manuscript review processes by listing all bodies who contributed to the decision on every review stage. (shrink)

Dans son choix grec, la philosophie a pensé la vie, mais non pas vivre ; et le religieux, qui prenait en charge la question du vivre, est aujourd'hui en retrait. De là que vivre soit laissé en friche, abandonné au prêche ou bien au truisme ; et que prospèrent le Développement Personnel et le marché du Bonheur vendant vivre comme du ± tout positif?.00Or vivre est paradoxal, s'étendant du vital au vivant. Il est à la fois la condition de toutes (...) les conditions : être en vie ; et l'aspiration de toutes nos aspirations : vivre enfin! Nous sommes en vie, mais nous n'accédons pas pour autant à vivre. Car la vie d'elle-même rabat la vie. De là que nous puissions être nostalgiques de la vie au sein même de la vie - ou que ± la vraie vie est absente?.00Or, c'est à travers cette inanité même de ± la vie? que nous pourrons voir transparaître à l'envers l'inouï de vivre débordant le déjà vécu et l'ouvrant à de l'± in-vécu?, quitte à s'y heurter à de l'invivable ; et, puisque vivre n'est, au fond, qu'ouvrir des possibles, nous pourrons alors rouvrir des possibles dans nos vies, au lieu de les laisser s'étioler.00Car répéter qu'il faut ± cueillir le jour?, ± profiter de la vie?, n'a pas prise sur la vie. Traçons donc plutôt, pour nous y repérer, une carte de ces possibles intensifs entre lesquels décider vivre.00Vivre y reparaît alors dans sa ressource, dans son essor, dans son ± matin?, dégagé de ce qui l'enlisait, au fil des jours, et l'emmurait.00Telle est la ± transparence du matin?, en amont de tous les enseignements de la morale.0F. J. (shrink)

Extended cognition brings with it a particular phenomenology. It has been argued that when an artifact is integrated into an agent’s cognitive system, it becomes transparent in use to the cognizing subject. In this paper, I challenge some of the assumptions underlying how the transparency of artifacts is described in extended cognition theory. To this end, I offer two arguments. First, I make room for some forms of conscious thought and attention within extended cognitive routines, and I question the (...) close association drawn between attention and effort. Second, I vindicate the importance of paying careful attention to individual differences and the diverse ways in which bodies and technologies can be experienced. I end by offering some hints toward an alternative, and more accurate, account of the phenomenology of extended cognition. (shrink)

L’idéal de transparence semble s’imposer à tous les esprits comme une évidence. Toute opacité est suspecte de cacher des pratiques douteuses (népotisme, corruption, détournement, abus) en faisant obstacle à une indispensable soif de vérité. Prenant à contre-pied cette aspiration commune à tout rendre transparent, on s’efforce ici de souligner certains des coûts, des écueils et des victimes collatérales de l’impératif de transparence agité aujourd’hui de façon irréfléchie dans nos discours publics.

This article analyzes the use of the mobile phone in Portuguese classrooms in order to examine new practices of disclosure and transparency. A literature review provides a global context of the nature of the mobile phone, and contextualizes an overview of the current usage trends in Portugal. The high uptake rates of mobile phone usage in Portugal means that this country can be considered an interesting case study for the usage of mobile phones in educational settings. Evidence of a (...) young mobile culture gathered in recent research studies conducted at the national level and on a qualitative case study of high-school teachers, provides a basis for a practical discussion of the impact of the mobile phone on the Portuguese education system. Building on the views from different actors- students, teachers, parents, and school administrators- the paper closes with the proposition of the mobile phone as a valid educational tool that requires new skills and strategies for a successful integration. (shrink)

Transparency is now a fundamental principle for data processing under the General Data Protection Regulation. We explore what this requirement entails for artificial intelligence and automated decision-making systems. We address the topic of transparency in artificial intelligence by integrating legal, social, and ethical aspects. We first investigate the ratio legis of the transparency requirement in the General Data Protection Regulation and its ethical underpinnings, showing its focus on the provision of information and explanation. We then discuss the (...) pitfalls with respect to this requirement by focusing on the significance of contextual and performative factors in the implementation of transparency. We show that human–computer interaction and human-robot interaction literature do not provide clear results with respect to the benefits of transparency for users of artificial intelligence technologies due to the impact of a wide range of contextual factors, including performative aspects. We conclude by integrating the information- and explanation-based approach to transparency with the critical contextual approach, proposing that transparency as required by the General Data Protection Regulation in itself may be insufficient to achieve the positive goals associated with transparency. Instead, we propose to understand transparency relationally, where information provision is conceptualized as communication between technology providers and users, and where assessments of trustworthiness based on contextual factors mediate the value of transparency communications. This relational concept of transparency points to future research directions for the study of transparency in artificial intelligence systems and should be taken into account in policymaking. (shrink)

Transparency is a salutary value in our constitutional architecture. It has also been described as a necessary element in promoting accountability in the regulatory aspects of essential medicines. Despite its several incarnations, the Medicines and Related Substances Act (Medicines Act) retains a provision headed 'Preservation of secrecy' (section 34). This contributionseeks to evaluate section 34 in the context of transparency and ascertain whether it is in conflict with other legislation pertaining to the promotion of access to information and, (...) in particular, whether it is consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. (shrink)

Transparency of textbook activities, i.e., the degree of easiness for teachers to process and comprehend them, needs to be researched in terms of both materials design and materials use. This article reports on a study that investigates the impact of teachers’ professional experience and transparency of textbook activities on teachers’ actual perception of the transparency of materials. The study adopted a mixed-methods design and collected quantitative data via a five-point scale survey from 115 secondary school teachers as (...) well as interview data from 15 informants. Data analysis reveals that both teachers’ professional experience and transparency of textbook activities affect the degree of easiness teachers perceived as they understand and interpret the activities for pedagogical purposes. However, discrepancy exists between transparency in materials design and transparency in teachers’ perception. Lack of pedagogical knowledge about the relationship between teaching objectives, steps, and assessment and strong existing cognitive schemata developed from the stereotype of processing a familar set of teaching materials might hamper teachers’ perception of transparency. (shrink)

This edited collection examines the multi-faceted phenomenon of transparency, especially in its relation to social movements, from a range of multi-disciplinary viewpoints. Over the past few decades, transparency has become an omnipresent catch phrase in public and scientific debates. The volume tracks developments of ideas and practices of transparency from the eighteenth century to the current day, as well as their semantic, cultural and social preconditions. It connects analyses of the ideological implications of transparency concepts and (...) transparency claims with their impact on the public sphere in general and on social movements in particular. In doing so, the book contributes to a better understanding of social conflicts and power relations in modern societies. The chapters are organized into four parts, covering the concept and ideology of transparency, historical and recent developments of the public sphere and media, the role of the state as an agent of surveillance, and conflicts over transparency and participation connected to social movements. (shrink)

In the first section of the paper, I set out a tripartite scheme for classifying philosophical accounts of metaphor. In the second and longest section, I explore a major difficulty for certain of these accounts, namely the need to explain what I describe as the 'transparency' of metaphor. In the third section, I describe two accounts which can overcome the difficulty. The first is loosely based on Davidson's treatment of metaphor, and, finding this to be inadequate for reasons having (...) nothing to do with transparency, it will be used solely to show the way. The second is my own, and, without attempting to defend it at length, I will content myself with suggesting how it can cope with the difficulty discussed in this paper in a way which mimics the Davidsonian proposal. Finally, in the fourth section, I shall briefly mention several considerations independent of transparency for adopting my account. (shrink)

For decades, healthcare has relied on data-driven algorithms to guide clinical practice. Recent advances in machine learning have opened up new possibilities in the field, enabling detailed analyse...