Forgiveness interventions benefit victims’ mental health, reduce levels of anger, and promote forgiveness. However, forgiveness interventions are rarely used to improve the offender’s anger and mental health, especially in specific situations such as juvenile correctional facilities. The offender is often also a victim, and reducing the offender’s excessive anger may prevent or decrease the likelihood of future interpersonal violence. This study examined the effects of forgiveness interventions on anger, forgiveness, empathy, and harmony of juvenile delinquents with (...) high levels of trait anger. Eighteen adolescents with trait anger in a juvenile correctional facility volunteered to participate in group counseling. A pretest–posttest method of quasi-experimental design was used, with 8 participants in the intervention group and 10 in the control group; the intervention group received forgiveness group counseling, and the control group did not. The results revealed that the intervention group had significantly higher scores for forgiveness, empathy, and harmony than the control group, although no significant differences in the scores of state and trait anger were found. The forgiveness intervention had significantly improved the levels of forgiveness toward specific perpetrators of childhood victimization for the juvenile delinquents with high levels of trait anger, raising their levels of empathy and harmony; there was no significant increase in trait anger. The findings indicated that forgiveness intervention provides an effective way to improve the positive mental strength of adolescents with high levels of trait anger. (shrink)

This study explored attention and interpretation biases in processing facial expressions as correlates of theoretically distinct self-reported anger experience, expression, and control. Non-selected undergraduate students completed cognitive tasks measuring attention bias, interpretation bias, and Spielberger’s State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory. Attention bias toward angry faces was associated with higher trait anger and anger expression and with lower anger control-in and anger control-out. The propensity to quickly interpret ambiguous faces as angry was associated with (...) greater anger expression and its subcomponent of anger expression-out and with lower anger control-out. Interactions between attention and interpretation biases did not contribute to the prediction of any anger component suggesting that attention and interpretation biases may function as distinct mechanisms. Theoretical and possible clinical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Although anger as a negative emotion is associated with unpleasantness, recent research on anger highlights its motivational effect. The present study tested whether individuals experience both, an unpleasant and an activating affect, after real-life provocations. Results revealed that an anger situation evoked not only typical subjective and cardiovascular anger reactions but also a sense of strength, which is a positive affect. A comparison of participants with low versus high anger disposition according to the STAXI-2 at (...) baseline, treatment, and recovery showed that participants with high trait anger consistently scored higher in subjective ratings of feeling strong than their counterparts did. Moreover, we found a larger and longer lasting effect of feeling strong than feeling angry after an anger treatment. Thus, differences in anger disposition influence the positive correlation between trait anger and positive affect. (shrink)

Several personality dispositions with common features capturing sensitivities to negative social cues have recently been introduced into psychological research. To date, however, little is known about their interrelations, their conjoint effects on behavior, or their interplay with other risk factors. We asked N = 349 adults from Germany to rate their justice, rejection, moral disgust, and provocation sensitivity, hostile attribution bias, trait anger, and forms and functions of aggression. The sensitivity measures were mostly positively correlated; particularly those with (...) an egoistic focus, such as victim justice, rejection, and provocation sensitivity, hostile attributions and trait anger as well as those with an altruistic focus, such as observer justice, perpetrator justice, and moral disgust sensitivity. The sensitivity measures had independent and differential effects on forms and functions of aggression when considered simultaneously and when controlling for hostile attributions and anger. They could not be integrated into a single factor of interpersonal sensitivity or reduced to other well-known risk factors for aggression. The sensitivity measures, therefore, require consideration in predicting and preventing aggression. (shrink)

The present study was designed to verify hypothesized predictor effects for five anger-related variables, i.e. trait anger, anger expression-out, anger expression-in, anger control-out, and anger-control-in. A sample of 138 students completed measures for FFM personality traits, self-esteem, shyness, and anger. The study confirmed the effects of neuroticism and agreeableness as being the chief personality predictors of anger; however, for the domain of anger expression-in, an unexpected role of extraversion was revealed. (...) Furthermore, introducing self-esteem and shyness changed some effects of FFM traits. Entering self-esteem as an additional predictor improved the predictability of anger control-in. Additionally, a mediation effect of shyness was revealed for the relation between extraversion and anger expression-in. (shrink)

To investigate the role of anger and anxiety traits on psychological attitudes about consumer behaviour, we asked to participants their perceptions and preferences about housing loans. Results show that: mortgage risk perception is negatively associated with trait anger and positively with trait anxiety, whereas the opposite happens for housing loan predictability; trait anger is positively associated with preference for adjustable-rate mortgage, whereas trait anxiety predicts a preference for no form of housing loan. These (...) findings fit with a growing body of evidence suggesting that personality traits influence perceptions and preferences about financial risk-taking. (shrink)

In this study, we assessed the influence of trait anger on decisions in risky situations evaluating how it might interact with some contextual factors. One hundred and fifty-eight participants completed the Trait Anger scale of STAXI-2 and an inventory consisting of a battery of hypothetical everyday decision-making scenarios, representative of three specific domains: financial, social and health. Participants were also asked to evaluate familiarity and salience for each scenario. This study provides evidence for a relationship between (...) individual differences in the tendency to feel anger and risky decisions in different domains and for mediation effects of familiarity and salience perception. The evaluation of the mechanisms with which dispositional anger is linked to risky decision-making could further contribute to an understanding of the role of personality traits in decision-making processes. (shrink)

IntroductionAn individual’s level of mindfulness can predict his/her level of general health, anxiety, and anger. If we have a valuable tool for measuring mindfulness, we can predict such factors more concisely. Therefore, the aim of this study was to compare a narrowband and a broadband mindfulness scale in predicting the level of general health, anxiety, and anger in a general population.Materials and MethodsThis was a cross-sectional study on an Iranian general population from September 22, 2020 to April 14, (...) 2021. The convenience sampling method was used. Data were collated via electronic and paper forms of the Relaxation/Meditation/Mindfulness Tracker t-Persian version, the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory- Short-Form-Persian version, the General Health Questionnaire, the trait anxiety section of the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory, and the trait anger section of the State–Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2.ResultsThe FMI-P predicted 0.05% of GHQ variance while the first and third levels of RMMt-P predicted 0.145%. The FMI-P predicted 0.19% of anxiety variance, while the first and third levels of RMMt-P predicted 0.195%. The FMI-P predicted 0.0% of anger variance, while the first, second, and third levels of RMMt-P predicted 0.08%. RMMt-P Level 1 was a better predictor of general health, anger, and anxiety.ConclusionThe current study found that the RMMt-P was a better predictor of general health and anger than the FMI-P. These findings suggest that the type of questionnaire used in the study of mindfulness is important, but more research is needed to determine the extent of these relationships. (shrink)

Three negative affective dispositions—anger, anxiety, and depression—are hypothesized to increase physical disease risk and have been the subject of epidemiological studies. However, the overlap among the major negative affective dispositions, and the superordinate construct of trait negative affectivity are only beginning to be tested. Presented here is a narrative review of recent prospective studies that simultaneously tested anger, anxiety, depression, and trait NA as risk factors for cardiac outcomes. Anxiety and depression emerged as independent risk factors (...) for premature heart disease in population studies of persons nominally healthy at baseline, and for recurrence/mortality among patients with existing heart disease. General trait NA also was a cardiac risk factor in population samples. (shrink)

In the time of the COVID-19 pandemic, people are often faced with uncertain risky choice. Risky choice will be affected by different descriptions of the event’s gain or loss framework, this phenomenon is known as the framing effect. With the continuous expansion and in-depth study of frame effects in the field of risky choice, researchers have found that the are quite different in different situations. People have different interpretations of the same event at different psychological distances, and will also be (...) affected by their own emotions. Therefore, the current study examines the common influence of task frame, spatial distance, and trait emotion on risky choice through two studies. Study 1 used a 2 × 2 inter-subject design, and the dependent variable is the choice of the rescue plan for the classic “Asian disease” problem. The results revealed that trait anger did not predict individuals’ risky choice preferences, and high trait anxiety led individuals to be more risk-averse. The framing effect exists in risky choice, and individuals prefer risk seeking in the loss frame. Study 2 used a 2 × 2 × 2 three-factor inter-subject design in which the dependent variable is the choice of rescue plan. The results indicate that the framing effect also exists in risky choice, and individuals prefer risk seeking in a loss frame. High trait anxiety lead individuals to be more risk-averse, while trait anger has no significant predictive effect on risk preference. Distant spatial distance lead individuals to increase their preference for risk-seeking under the gain frame, which leads to the disappearance of the framing effect. In conclusion, trait anxiety and spatial distance have a certain degree of influence on risky choice under the framework of gain and loss. (shrink)

This study investigates the relative importance of trait anger and trait anxiety in financial decision-making. Given the disparate economic, cultural and social environments within an emerging market, this study focuses on South Africa to provide unique insights. The use of a student experimental cohort and hypothetical scenarios allows for the assessment of prima facie evidence of the merits of future research using more experienced participants and more realistic scenarios. Gender and race are incorporated as explanatory variables given (...) the history of South Africa and the disparate opportunities amongst individuals of different races. Both variables are also notable indicators of financial behaviour and decision-making. A questionnaire was completed by 288 university students which measured Trait anxiety and Trait anger using the Anxiety Inventory and Anger Expression Inventory-2. Using multinomial logistic regressions, the results showed that White participants and those individuals with higher levels of anger are more inclined to invest in equity. Alternatively, Women and individuals with higher levels of anxiety were found to be more risk averse. These findings are relevant to financial advisers as most of the predictive outcomes relate to risk which is vital in making investment decisions. While prior research has shown the relevance of personality traits on investment performance, the added dimension of gender and race adds practicality to the findings. It also highlights the necessity of including demographic variables when assessing personality traits. (shrink)

In this study, the relationship between adolescents' perception of God, forgiveness inclination and anger was examined. For this purpose, it was determined whether the perception of God, forgiveness inclination, the trait anger and anger expression styles of the adolescents studying in different educational institutions differ according to demographic variables and the relationship between the adolescents' perception of God, forgiveness inclination and anger was determined. The sample of the study consists of 596 10th grade students studying (...) in different types of high schools in the city center of Ankara. The Demographic Information Form, The Forgiveness Inclination Scale, The God Perception Scale, The Trait Anger and Anger Expression Style Scale were used as data collection tools. The obtained data were analyzed with the unrelated samples t test when the scale scores of the two-category variables were normally distributed and with the Mann-Whitney U test when there was no normal distribution. For variables with more than two categories, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used in cases where the scale scores were normally distributed, and the Kruskal-Wallis H test was used in cases where the normal distribution could not be determined. As a result of the research, statistically significant differences were found in the scores of the sub-dimensions of the scales applied according to the demographic variables. In addition between the Forgiveness Inclination Scale distancing sub- dimension and trait anger, anger-out dimensions; It was determined that there was a positive, moderately statistically significant relationship between the forgiveness inclination scale revenge sub- dimension and trait anger, anger-in, anger-out dimensions. The findings were discussed in the light of the literature. (shrink)

I argue that the evolutionary history of anger has substantive implications for normative ethics. In the process, I develop an evolutionary account of anger and its influence on action. First, I consider a prominent argument by Peter Singer and Joshua Greene. They conclude that evolutionary explanations of human cooperation debunk – or undercut the evidential value of – the moral intuitions supporting duty ethics (as opposed to utilitarian or consequentialist ethics). With this argument they aim to defend consequentialist (...) theories. However, their argument also threatens to debunk intuitions that support consequentialist theories. I give a novel argument that overcomes this difficulty. Specifically, I offer an evolutionary story about anger that can explain retributive, duty-oriented intuitions concerning punishment. This explanation debunks these intuitions (and not others) by showing that they were selected for their biological consequences rather than their accuracy (concerning duties to punish). I develop this explanation by raising and resolving three additional problems. First, prominent evolutionary explanations of retributive motives fail because they appeal to models that apply only to organisms with strategic insight. To mitigate this problem, I explain the existence of a retributive-like motive in rodents by appealing to an economic model of resource competition, which applies to organisms without strategic insight. Second, I show that human anger was shaped by resource competition of this kind. To do so, I develop evidential criteria to determine when psychological systems in different species share common evolutionary origins. I deploy these criteria to argue that human anger and the retributive motive in rodents derive from the same ancestral trait. Finally, the continuity of anger across human and nonhuman animals stands in tension with the idea that anger causes purposive behavior like retribution or retaliation. I argue that differences between the angry behaviors of human and nonhuman animals are differences in degree and not in kind. In the end, this evolutionary story both explains and undermines retributive intuitions, but not in the straightforward way that Singer and Greene suppose. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that purely quantitative understandings of Aristotle's concept of "the mean" are oversimplified, and I make this argument by analyzing the particular emotion of anger. Anger, I contend, helps to complicate the purely quantitative understanding of the mean, insofar as, I argue, the amount of anger experienced is not the morally salient feature in determining whether or not the anger is virtuous. Rather, anger is one example of an emotion or (...) class='Hi'>trait for which other, non-quantitative parameters of the mean are more salient, giving us a more nuanced understanding of what the mean is. Anger is virtuous not when it is in the right measurable degree, but rather when it is directed at the proper target. In this way, the virtue-making property of anger is distinctly qualitative. Examining anger provides insight into the concept of the mean and its role in Aristotle's ethics, and also helps to shed light on contemporary debates about political anger. (shrink)

In four experiments, we asked subjects for judgements about scenarios that pit utilitarian outcomes against deontological moral rules, for example, saving more lives vs. a rule against active killing. We measured trait emotions of anger, disgust, sympathy and empathy, asked about the same emotions after each scenario. We found that utilitarian responding to the scenarios, and higher scores on a utilitarianism scale, were correlated negatively with disgust, positively with anger, positively with specific sympathy and state sympathy, and (...) less so with general sympathy or empathy. In a fifth experiment, we asked about anger and sympathy for specific outcomes, and we found that these are consistently predictive of utilitarian responding. (shrink)

Actual anger response styles during anger encounters may well diverge from self-reported habitual anger response styles, such as anger - in, anger - out, or anger control. Also, the relationship of actual anger response styles to broad personality traits is not well known. We obtained anger self - reports, physiological reactivity (diastolic blood pressure, skin temperature at the forehead, and EMG extensor digitorum), and ratings of facial anger expression, and defined actual (...) anger response style dimensions of “intensity”, “suppression”, “repression”, and “denial” as particular patterns of discrepancies among these responses. A total of 80 female subjects were randomly assigned to a treatment (Tr) and a control (Co) group. Anger was induced through real - life provocations. Compared to Co, Tr subjects showed larger physiological responses and reported more anger. Habitual anger response styles did not predict actual styles, whereas extraversion and neuroticism did. Control subjects scoring low on extraversion or high on neuroticism reacted with high denial, that is, with stronger physiological and behavioural than experiential anger, whereas the opposite pattern of low denial was found for treatment subjects low on extraversion or high on neuroticism. These results suggest that both the particular situation and broad but not narrow personality traits exert an influence on actual anger response styles. (shrink)

The notion that emotional expressions regulate social life by providing information is gaining popularity. Prior research on the effects of emotional expressions on observers’ inferential processes has focused mostly on inferences regarding the personality traits of the expresser, such as dominance and affiliation. We extend this line of research by exploring the possibility that emotional expressions shape observers’ construal of social situations. Across three vignette studies, an interaction partner's expressions of anger, compared to expressions of happiness or disappointment, led (...) observers to construe hypothetical situations as less cooperative, both in dyads and groups. These effects occurred even when factual information regarding the cooperativeness or competitiveness of the situation was provided, attesting to the power of emotional expressions in shaping the construal of social situations. Results are discussed in relation to appraisal theory, reverse appraisals, emotions as social information theory, and the emergence of cooperation in groups and cultures. (shrink)

This study aims to explore the mediating effect of anger and turnover intention on the relationship between workplace ostracism and counterproductive work behaviors. A two-stage follow-up survey of 426 employees born after 1990 was conducted using the Workplace Ostracism Scale, Counterproductive Work Behaviors Scale, Trait Anger subscale of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory, and Turnover Intention Scale. Workplace ostracism was found to be significantly positively correlated with anger, turnover intention, and counterproductive work behaviors. Furthermore, (...) anger and turnover intention both separately and serially mediated the relationship between workplace ostracism and counterproductive work behaviors. This study confirms the chain mediating effect of anger and turnover intention on the relationship between workplace ostracism and counterproductive work behaviors. (shrink)

This is a study of the relationship between EAS temperament traits, age and gender, and religious fundamentalism in an adult Polish sample. Participants were sampled from among people who tended towards secularisation. A total of 902 participants, including 551 women and 351 men, aged 18 to 58 were studied. Participants were students in a variety of university faculties and adults with higher education representing a variety of professions. They all lived in the Warsaw area. Temperament was assessed with Buss and (...) Plomin’s EAS Temperament Survey. Religious fundamentalism was assessed using Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s Religious Fundamentalism Scale. The level of religious fundamentalism was found to be associated with the temperament traits of sociability and anger. All three variables decrease in intensity with age. Women have higher levels of religious fundamentalism than men. (shrink)

Machiavellianism is a double-edged sword in leadership. While Machiavellian leaders can be successful, they also can be amoral, influencing their followers to exhibit unethical, counterproductive, and corrupt behaviors. The extant research surrounding Machiavellian leadership has focused narrowly on how followers tacitly endorse such leader behaviors rather than standing up to the leader through whistleblowing. Drawing upon affective events theory (AET), this research examines the relationship between a leader’s Machiavellian traits, followers’ moral anger and empathic concern, and the likelihood of (...) whistleblowing. We conducted three complementary studies that examine our model. First, in a time-lagged, leader–follower field study, we examined the indirect relationship between Machiavellian leadership and whistleblowing through follower moral anger. Then, we adopted the causal chain design and conducted two independent recall experiments using the critical incident technique to establish the moderating role of follower empathetic concern on the causal relationship between Machiavellian leadership and moral anger, and the causal relationship between moral anger and whistleblowing. This research contributes to the literature by highlighting the emotional dynamics that explain a constructive follower response to leader Machiavellianism. (shrink)

Background: Facial proportionality and symmetry are positively associated with perceived levels of facial attractiveness. -/- Objective: The aims of this study were to confirm and extend the association of proportionality with perceived levels of attractiveness and character traits and determine differences in attractiveness and character ratings between "anomalous" and "typical" faces using a large dataset. -/- Methods: Ratings of 597 unique individuals from the Chicago Face Database were used. A formula was developed as a proxy of relative horizontal proportionality, where (...) a proportionality score of "0" indicated perfect proportionality and more negative scores indicated less proportionality. Faces were categorized as "anomalous" or "typical" by 2 independent reviewers based on physical features. -/- Results: Across the ratings for all faces, Spearman correlations revealed greater proportionality was associated with attractiveness ( ρ = 0.292, P < 0.001) and trustworthiness ( ρ = 0.193, P < 0.001), while lesser proportionality was associated with impressions of anger (ρ = 0.132, P = 0.001), dominance (ρ = 0.259, P < 0.001), and threateningness ( ρ = 0.234, P < 0.001). Mann-Whitney U tests revealed the typical cohort had significantly higher levels of proportionality (-13.98 versus -15.14, P = 0.030) and ratings of attractiveness (3.39 versus 2.99, P < 0.001) and trustworthiness (3.48 versus 3.35, P < 0.001). -/- Conclusions: This study demonstrated that facial proportionality is not only significantly associated with higher ratings of attractiveness, but also associated with judgements of trustworthiness. Proportionality plays a role in evoking negative attributions of personality characteristics to people with facial anomalies. (shrink)

Machiavellianism is a double-edged sword in leadership. While Machiavellian leaders can be successful, they also can be amoral, influencing their followers to exhibit unethical, counterproductive, and corrupt behaviors. The extant research surrounding Machiavellian leadership has focused narrowly on how followers tacitly endorse such leader behaviors rather than standing up to the leader through whistleblowing. Drawing upon affective events theory (AET), this research examines the relationship between a leader’s Machiavellian traits, followers’ moral anger and empathic concern, and the likelihood of (...) whistleblowing. We conducted three complementary studies that examine our model. First, in a time-lagged, leader–follower field study, we examined the indirect relationship between Machiavellian leadership and whistleblowing through follower moral anger. Then, we adopted the causal chain design and conducted two independent recall experiments using the critical incident technique to establish the moderating role of follower empathetic concern on the causal relationship between Machiavellian leadership and moral anger, and the causal relationship between moral anger and whistleblowing. This research contributes to the literature by highlighting the emotional dynamics that explain a constructive follower response to leader Machiavellianism. (shrink)

This study developed a Buddhist Generosity Scale to assess Buddhist generosity, acts of compassion to give something of value to humans and animals, among Thai Buddhists. Conceptually the Scale consists of two factors: scope—giving to humans and animals, and criticality—the gifts’ importance to the recipients. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses supported the two-factor structure. Convergent validity tests showed its relationships with optimism, hope, and altruism but none with forgiveness; discriminant validity tests found positive relationship with psychological entitlement but none with (...) trait anger and greed. Results of the predictive validity test showed that Buddhist generosity mediated the relationship between loving kindness and happiness. The scale is valid for use to assess Buddhist generosity in countries where Theravada Buddhism is practiced. The relationships between good thought and good deed and good result support the Buddhist law of human behaviors. (shrink)

The objective of this study was to develop and determine the psychometric properties of an instrument designed to detect traits and behavior that are associated with predatory violent behavior, which is defined as a determined, planned, controlled, and proactive aggression. The sample was comprised of 546 students, mostly in their last year of high school or in their first year of college. The initial instrument had 78 items, ultimately resulting in 15 with good internal consistency (α =.825). Factor analysis showed (...) four factors: anger-in, appeal for weapons, suicidal ideation, and the tendency to take justice into one’s own hands. Said factors showed significant correlations of convergent validity. Data shown here allows inferring that the instrument is a novel and concise tool that evaluates and detects the potential of predatory violent behavior. (shrink)

The study was designed to examine whether trait emotional intelligence would moderate the impact of negative emotions at work on job burnout. A total of 188 female nurses participated in this study and completed measures of trait affectivity, emotional intelligence, anger and sadness at work [over five consecutive days, nurses rated the extent to which they experienced anger-related emotions (i.e., irritation, embitterment and anger) and sadness-related emotions (i.e., depression, disappointment and sadness)], and burnout. The results (...) revealed significant and positive relationships between both types of negative emotions and burnout above and beyond demographics and the nurses’ trait affectivity. Importantly, the study demonstrated that trait emotional intelligence buffers the effects of negative emotions on burnout. Specifically, anger- and sadness-related emotions predicted greater burnout among nurses with low trait emotional intelligence but not among nurses with high trait emotional intelligence. These results suggest that emotional intelligence training could be implemented to prevent the adverse effect of negative emotions felt at work on job burnout. (shrink)

Together with language, music is perhaps the most distinctive behavioral trait of the human species. Different hypotheses have been proposed to explain why only humans perform music and how this ability might have evolved in our species. In this paper, we advance a new model of music evolution that builds on the self-domestication view of human evolution, according to which the human phenotype is, at least in part, the outcome of a process similar to domestication in other mammals, triggered (...) by the reduction in reactive aggression responses to environmental changes. We specifically argue that self-domestication can account for some of the cognitive changes, and particularly for the behaviors conducive to the complexification of music through a cultural mechanism. We hypothesize four stages in the evolution of music under self-domestication forces: (1) collective protomusic; (2) private, timbre-oriented music; (3) small-group, pitch-oriented music; and (4) collective, tonally organized music. This line of development encompasses the worldwide diversity of music types and genres and parallels what has been hypothesized for languages. Overall, music diversity might have emerged in a gradual fashion under the effects of the enhanced cultural niche construction as shaped by the progressive decrease in reactive (i.e., impulsive, triggered by fear or anger) aggression and the increase in proactive (i.e., premeditated, goal-directed) aggression. (shrink)

Psychopathy is typically seen as a trait that is undesirable in any context, including the workplace. But several authors have suggested that people high in psychopathy might possess resources that preserve their ability to perform well in stressful contexts. We consider the possibility that primary psychopathy is adaptive—for the employee, if not for the organization—under conditions of abusive supervision. In particular, we draw from the multimotive model of interpersonal threat and the theory of purposeful work behavior to argue that (...) high primary psychopathy individuals possess characteristics that enable them to experience higher levels of well-being and lower levels of anger than their peers under abusive supervisors. Based on a scenario study and a time-lagged field study, we found support for a model in which abusive supervision moderates the relationships between primary psychopathy and positive work-related outcomes, such that these relationships are positive under conditions of abusive supervision and either diminished or negative under conditions of low abusive supervision. Abusive supervision also affected the relationship between primary psychopathy and anger in the field study such that high primary psychopathy individuals were less angry under more abusive supervisors. Thus, there appears to be some credence to the notion of a “psychopathic advantage” in that primary psychopaths do have access to greater psychological resources than their peers under abusive supervision. However, these findings also suggest that abusive supervisors may empower employees with characteristics that hold strong potential to damage the organization and its stakeholders. (shrink)

The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” (...) of shame- turns out to be the following: is there a common trait shared by all shame evaluations that will allow us to differentiate these evaluations from those that feature in other negative self-reflexive emotions like anger at oneself or self disappointment? Some progress is perhaps accomplished if we say that, in shame, a given trait or behavior is evaluated as degrading or as revealing one’s lack of worth. Still, even if we agree with this last claim, truth is that these answers are less illuminating than we might wish. A theory of shame should surely further elucidate the aspect of one’s identity relevant for shame, namely, the self of shame. In this connexion, philosophers have referred to “self-esteem,” “self-respect” or the “social self,” significantly disagreeing thus on which aspect of one’s identity is at stake in shame. After critically discussing the different solutions to the problem, we offer our own. Shame, we claim, consists in an awareness of a distinctive inability to discharge a commitment that goes with holding self-relevant values. This conception solves the unity problem while illuminating other aspects of this emotion. (shrink)

David Shoemaker presents a new pluralistic theory of responsibility, based on the idea of quality of will. His approach is motivated by our ambivalence to real-life cases of marginal agency, such as those caused by clinical depression, dementia, scrupulosity, psychopathy, autism, intellectual disability, and poor formative circumstances. Our ambivalent responses suggest that such agents are responsible in some ways but not others. Shoemaker develops a theory to account for our ambivalence, via close examination of several categories of pancultural emotional responsibility (...) responses and their appropriateness conditions. The result is three distinct types of responsibility, each with its own set of required capacities: attributability, answerability, and accountability. Attributability is about the having and expressing of various traits of character, and it is the target of a range of aretaic sentiments and emotional practices organized around disdain and admiration. Answerability is about one’s capacity to govern one’s actions and attitudes by one’s evaluative judgments about the worth of various practical reasons, and it is the target of a range of sentiments and emotional practices organized around regret and pride. Accountability is about one’s ability to regard others, both evaluatively and emotionally, and it is the target of a range of sentiments and emotional practices organized around anger and gratitude. In Part One of the book, this tripartite theory is developed and defended. In Part Two of the book, the tripartite theory’s predictions about specific marginal cases are tested, once certain empirical details about the nature of those agents have been filled in and discussed. (shrink)

:Recent behavioral economics studies have shown that third parties compensate players in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games. However, there are almost no studies about what drives third parties to compensate victims in such games. It can be argued that compensation is a form of helping; and helping behavior, in a variety of forms, has been widely researched, especially with regard to motivators. Previous work on helping behavior has focused on empathic concern as a primary driver. In sharp contrast, anger (...) is often seen as an antisocial motivator resulting in aggression. However, other research has shown that moral outrage, anger evoked by the violation of a moral rule or a social norm, can lead to the punishment of a perpetrator, often described as altruistic or pro-social punishment. Some of the motivations for pro-social punishment, namely a concern for justice or the restoration of community values, can also be realized through victim compensation. We therefore propose the hypothesis that moral outrage leads to compensating behavior above and beyond what is predicted by empathic concern, but only when a social norm has been violated. We test this hypothesis in two studies, both of which use modified trust games in which the investor experiences a loss due either to a social norm violation or some other cause. Study 1 shows that trait moral outrage predicts third-party compensatory behavior above and beyond empathic concern, but only when a social norm is violated. To better understand the causal mechanism, Study 2 directly manipulated moral outrage, showing again that moral outrage leads to compensation, but only when a social norm is violated. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.I’M SO ANGRY I COULD HELP YOU: MORAL OUTRAGE AS A DRIVER OF VICTIM COMPENSATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Erik W. Thulin and Cristina Bicchieri DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000145Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. I’M SO ANGRY I COULD HELP YOU: MORAL OUTRAGE AS A DRIVER OF VICTIM COMPENSATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Erik W. Thulin and Cristina Bicchieri DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000145Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. I’M SO ANGRY I COULD HELP YOU: MORAL OUTRAGE AS A DRIVER OF VICTIM COMPENSATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Erik W. Thulin and Cristina Bicchieri DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000145Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Sufism has been neglected in the religious discourse and educational practices of modernist Muslims in the Islamic world, including Indonesia, where Kiai Moechtar Boechari (1899-1926) had emerged as an early activist in the Muhammadiyah Surakarta and Sufism. This research aims to examine Kiai Boechari’s religious thought, emphasizing the idea of Sufism as a practice of moral education (_akhlaq_). The data of research comprised mainly documentation and library archives. The findings reveal that Kiai Boechari’s religious thinking was driven by persistence in (...) reformulating Islam to be relevant and able to answer the challenges of the modern era based on purification and dynamization. Boechari emphasized on the problem of purifying faith (_aqidah_), the dynamics of worldly _muamalah_ problems, comparative religions, women’s emancipation, and moral Sufism. Kiai Boechari’s Sufism thought emphasized the purification of _aq__i__dah_, guided by the Quran and Sunnah, respect for the Shari’a, and the practice of individual social moral education, which are characteristics of the typology of Sufism (_transcendental mysticism_), moral Sufism, and orthodox/prophetic Sufism. This was known as neo-Sufism formulated by Kiai Boechari to practice moral education. It requires persistence to carry out the process of purifying oneself from despicable and immoral traits (_takhalli_), such as anger, envy, arrogance, pride, riya, and the urge to lust; which eventually starts the process of internalizing good qualities (_tahalli_), culminating in _mahabbah_, the disappearance of the human hijab (_tajalli_), giving a peak of spiritual experience. This study implicates that, in the prophetic orientation of Sufism, spiritual experience is not an end in itself, for the sake of the experience itself, but to give meaning to actions in history. (shrink)

Jealousy often wreaks havoc among those who love each other. There are many different forms of jealousy. These can be brought to light by scrutiny of grammar, which discloses the scope and limits of the concept of jealousy and hence too of the emotion it subsumes. In Bronzino's painting, Jealousy has a livid complexion (a mixture of yellow and black bile). Robert Herrick's poem in Anthony Frederick Sandys's painting, however, associates jealousy with yellow. In this, he too was following the (...) doctrine of the humours, which explained jealousy by reference to an excess of the choleric humour of yellow bile that causes anger, irritability, boldness, envy, jealousy, and courage. The chapter elaborates the manifold differences between two emotions, envy and jealousy, and the corresponding character traits and motives. The comparison involves numerous for the most parts, and normallys. (shrink)

This study examined the relationship between the perceived fairness of the assessment process and the intention of participants to appeal the process, while taking into consideration the influence of two personality traits. Specifically, two of the Big Five traits, neuroticism and agreeableness, were included in the model, based on their special importance in predicting “anger-like” reactions similar to that triggered by unfairness. This study builds on the theoretical integration of the two dominant frameworks of organizational justice, and on two (...) separate empirical studies that use different methodologies : a personnel selection simulation and a study of an academic examination process. The pattern of results was similar in both studies. Neuroticism was not detected as a moderator based on the significance of the interaction term, but conditional effect analysis identified the specific area of scores where neuroticism was found to have a buffer effect on intention to appeal. Agreeableness weakens the relationship between perceived fairness and intention to appeal. However, contrary to our expectation, high agreeableness does not decrease but rather increases the probability of appealing the assessment process when it is perceived as unfair, thus providing evidence for the Pollyanna myth, i.e., that highly agreeable individuals are more likely to react to and appeal unfairness. (shrink)

Atypical emotion interpretation has been widely reported in individuals with borderline personality disorder ; however, empirical studies reported mixed results so far. We suggest that discrepancies in observations of emotion interpretation by iBPD can be explained by biases related to their fear of rejection and abandonment, i.e., the three moral emotions of anger, disgust, and contempt. In this study, we hypothesized that iBPD would show a higher tendency to correctly interpret these three displays of social rejection and attribute more (...) negative valence. A total of 28 inpatient iBPDs and 28 healthy controls were asked to judge static and dynamic facial expressions in terms of emotions, valence, and self-reported arousal evoked by the observed faces. Our results partially confirmed our expectations. The iBPD correctly interpreted the three unambiguous moral emotions. Contempt, a complex emotion with a difficulty in recognizing facial expressions, was recognized better by iBPD than by healthy controls. All negative emotions were judged more negatively by iBPD than by controls, but no difference was observed in the neutral or positive emotion. Alexithymia and anxiety trait and state levels were controlled in all analyses. (shrink)

In Greek mythology, Lamia, daughter of the king of Libya, bore several children to Zeus, but his jealous wife, Hera, killed all but one of them. Transformed by grief and anger, Lamia became a monster with the manners and physical traits of an animal. The word lamia can also be found in the form of an appellative. In the book of Isaiah in the Vulgate, the lamia is among the animals, beasts and monsters which will despoil Jerusalem when God's (...) judgement befalls the city. Ancient zoological works use the word to indicate what is probably a species of shark, while medieval encyclopedias add several other meanings: lamia denotes, among other things, a hybrid creature which looks like a woman with horse legs; and a four-legged animal which damages plants in gardens at night and is likely to attack people it encounters. The origins of most ancient, early-Christian and medieval conceptions of the lamia have been traced more or less satisfactorily; the only tradition which remains unexplained is that of the fierce quadruped which threatens property and people's lives. The purpose of the present Note is to explore the origins of this ferocious creature, to determine what animal or animals may have inspired it, and to map the ways in which it entered medieval culture under the new name of lamia. The answers to these questions are to be found in the medieval reception of Aristotle's zoological observations, through the Arabic and Latin translations of his Historia animalium. (shrink)

This book presents the case for Compassionate Reasoning as a moral and psychosocial skill for the positive transformation of individuals and societies. It has been developed from a reservoir of moral philosophical, cultural, and religious wisdom traditions over the centuries. These have been derived from a careful combination of classical schools of ethical thought that are artfully combined with compassion neuroscience, contemporary approaches to conflict resolution, public health methodologies, and positive psychological approaches to social change. There is an urgent need (...) for human civilization to invest in the broad-based cultivation of compassionate thoughts, feelings, and especially habits. This skill is then combined with moral reasoning to move the self and others toward less anger and fear, more joy and care in the pursuit of reasonable policies that build peaceful families, communities, and societies. There are many people across the planet who work every day for the sake of others but who are ensconced in exhausting work with dangerous and difficult situations of conflict. These people are often heroic bridge-builders and creators of peaceful societies, and they have a common set of cultivated moral character traits and psychosocial skills. They tend to be kinder, more reasonable, more self-controlled, and more goal-oriented to peace. They are united by a particular set of moral values and the emotional skills to put those values into practice. The aim of this book is to articulate the best combination of those values and skills that lead to personal and communal sustainability, not burnout and self-destruction. The book pivots on the observable difference in the mind-and proven in neuroscience imaging experiments-between destructive empathic distress, on the one hand, and, on the other, joyful, constructive, compassionate care. Facing existential threats to life on the planet, humans can and must make such skills universally sustainable and ingrained. (shrink)

Penthésilée, reine des Amazones, est représentée sous les traits d’une guerrière armée de pied en cap sur une tapisserie appartenant à la collection du château d’Angers. Cette tapisserie mille-fleurs qui date du début du XVIe siècle rappelle le succès rencontré par le thème des Neuf Preuses à la fin du Moyen Age. Ces figures de guerrières qui appartiennent toutes à l’Antiquité ou à la mythologie classique connaissent une mode qui répond à celle de leur pendant masculin, les Neuf Preux. Preux (...) et Preuses évoquent avec une certaine nostalgie un monde chevaleresque dont la réalité militaire du temps vient bouleverser tous les repères. (shrink)

Individuals vary in perceptual accuracy when categorising facial expressions, yet it is unclear how these individual differences in non-clinical population are related to cognitive processing stages at facial information acquisition and interpretation. We tested 104 healthy adults in a facial expression categorisation task, and correlated their categorisation accuracy with face-viewing gaze allocation and personal traits assessed with Autism Quotient, anxiety inventory and Self-Monitoring Scale. The gaze allocation had limited but emotion-specific impact on categorising expressions. Specifically, longer gaze at the eyes (...) and nose regions were coupled with more accurate categorisation of disgust and sad expressions, respectively. Regarding trait measurements, higher autistic score was coupled with better recognition of sad but worse recognition of anger expressions, and contributed to categorisation bias towards sad expressions; whereas higher anxiety level was associated with greater categorisation accuracy across all expressions and with increased tendency of gazing at the nose region. It seems that both anxiety and autistic-like traits were associated with individual variation in expression categorisation, but this association is not necessarily mediated by variation in gaze allocation at expression-specific local facial regions. The results suggest that both facial information acquisition and interpretation capabilities contribute to individual differences in expression categorisation within non-clinical populations. (shrink)

Virtue ethics is now well established as a substantive, independent normative theory. It was not always so. The revival of virtue ethics was initially spurred by influential criticisms of other normative theories, especially those made by Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, John McDowell, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Bernard Williams. 1 Because of this heritage, virtue ethics is often associated with anti-theory movements in ethics and more recently, moral particularism. There are, however, quite a few different approaches to ethics that can reasonably claim (...) to be versions of virtue ethics. The predominant strand of virtue ethics is broadly Aristotelian, although some accounts bear little resemblance to Aristotle's. In its most general form, virtue ethics is compatible with a wide range of meta-ethical and normative commitments. This diversity makes it difficult to compare virtue ethics as such with other normative theories. It can also be a challenge to see just what the various versions of virtue ethics have in common with each other. Three major types of virtue ethics are represented in the books by Rosalind Hursthouse, Michael Slote, and Christine Swanton, recommended in the following section. Each of these book sets forward a considerably self-standing form of virtue ethics. The authors differ on central issues such as the relationship between virtue and flourishing and the link between virtuous agents and right or virtuous actions. Unlike Swanton and Slote, Hursthouse defends a version of ethical naturalism that has affinities with theories recently defended by Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre. 2 Slote's theory is agent-based, meaning that his account derives judgments about the moral status of actions from moral features of agents. Hursthouse and Swanton defend theories according to which the moral status of an action depends on its broader relationship to human flourishing (Hursthouse) or whether it hits the target of a virtue (Swanton). Although these three books presently form the core of contemporary virtue ethics, there are other approaches that might reasonably be described as versions of virtue ethics, such as those presented by Julia Driver, Linda Zagzebski, and Robert Adams. 3 There are also, of course, a large number of articles in which authors defend or criticize tenets that are central to most versions of virtue ethics. Some recent articles on especially important topics are listed in the following section. Current 'hot topics' in virtue ethics include whether its account of right action is adequate and whether virtue ethics is at odds with empirical psychology. Articles on these debates and others are listed in the following section. Author Recommends: Books These three books are foundational works in contemporary virtue ethics, and represent quite different approaches to virtue ethics. For each book, I have also listed an article by the same author in which he or she articulates some similar themes. Those pressed for time or space on a syllabus might start by examining those articles. 1. Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Hursthouse defends a eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics with Aristotelian affinities. *See also Hursthouse, Rosalind. 'Normative Virtue Ethics.' How Should One Live? Ed. Roger Crisp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 19–36. 2. Slote, Michael. Morals from Motives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Slote defends a version of virtue ethics based on evaluations of motives, drawing on historical figures like Martineau, Hutcheson, and Hume. Note that this book represents a fairly significant departure from his first book in virtue ethics, From Morality to Virtue (New York: Oxford, 1992). *See also Slote, Michael. 'Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.' Virtue Ethics . Ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 3. Swanton, Christine. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Swanton defends a pluralistic, non-eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics that draws on influences ranging from Aristotle to Nietzsche to contemporary psychoanalytic theory. *See also Swanton, Christine. 'A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action.' Ethics 112 (2001): 32–52. Articles The following is a selection of articles that address some of the central and controversial topics within virtue ethics. 1. Annas, Julia. 'Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing.' Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78.2 (2004): 61–75. This article addresses the problem of action guidance and the role that an account of right action should play in virtue ethics. 2. Conly, Sarah. 'Flourishing and the Failure of the Ethics of Virtue.' Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIII, Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue . Eds. P. French et al. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. 83–96. This article articulates the central problems faced by versions of virtue ethics that rely on a conception of human flourishing. 3. Das, Ramon. 'Virtue Ethics and Right Action.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 324–39. This article raises objections about insularity and circularity to accounts of right action presented by Hursthouse, Slote, and Swanton. 4. Doris, John M. 'Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics.' Nous 32 (1998): 504–30. This article argues that situationist psychology undermines the concept of a character trait on which virtue ethicists rely. An expanded version of this criticism can be found in Doris, Lack of Character, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 5. Hursthouse, Rosalind. 'Virtue Theory and Abortion.' Philosophy and Public Affairs 20.3 (1991): 223–46. This article argues that virtue ethics is capable of providing action guidance in the difficult problem of abortion. 6. Johnson, Robert N. 'Virtue and Right.' Ethics 113 (2003): 810–34. This article raises several objections against the accounts of right action in virtue ethics, one of which is that they cannot make sense of the rightness of self-improving actions. The criticism is directly primarily at Hursthouse's theory, but Swanton and Slote are discussed as well. 7. Kamtekar, Rachana. 'Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character.' Ethics 114 (2004): 458–91. This article argues that situationist critiques of virtue ethics rely on a mistaken understanding of virtuous character. 8. Kawall, Jason. 'Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers.' Philosophical Studies 109 (2002): 197– 222. This article argues for an ideal observer-style account of right action in virtue ethics. 9. Nussbaum, Martha. 'Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach.' Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIII, Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue . Ed. P. French et al. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. 32–53. This article presents a view of the virtues on which the virtues are excellences in spheres of activity. Although the spheres are common to all humans, the manifestation of excellence in a given sphere is subject to cultural variation. 10. Sreenivasan, Gopal. 'Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution.' Mind 111 (2002): 47–68. This article addresses the situationist critique of character traits by arguing that virtue ethics does not depend on the concept of a character trait as Doris and others understand it. 11. Stangl, Rebecca. 'A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics.' Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 665–78. This article addresses the relationship between virtue ethics and radical moral particularism, arguing that the latter may have undesirable consequences for virtue ethicists unless they accept the unity of the virtues. 12. Stohr, Karen. 'Contemporary Virtue Ethics.' Philosophy Compass 1.1 (January 2006): 22–7. This article provides an overview and analysis of contemporary virtue ethics. It includes discussion of main problems and challenges for the future. 13. Stohr, Karen. 'Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue.' Journal of Ethics 7 (2003): 339–63. This article raises problems for the commonly accepted distinction between virtue and continence, arguing that the mixed emotions normally associated with continence are sometimes characteristic of virtue instead. 14. van Zyl, Liezl. 'Agent-Based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance.' Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009): 50–69. This article defends agent-based virtue ethics against objections that it cannot distinguish agent-appraisal from act-appraisal and that it cannot provide adequate action guidance. Anthologies 1. Crisp, Roger, ed. How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. This is one of the first virtue ethics anthologies published, and so reflects a correspondingly earlier picture of the field. The essays, however, are important and interesting in their own right, and cover a broad array of topics. 2. Crisp, Roger and Michael Slote, eds. Virtue Ethics . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. This anthology was published over a decade ago and does not capture recent developments in the field. It is, however, an admirably thorough collection of the most influential essays from the early days of virtue ethics, both promoting and criticizing it. 3. Darwall, Stephen, ed. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003. This anthology is distinctive in that it includes material from Aristotle, Hutcheson, and Hume, along with some central contemporary sources. 4. Walker, Rebecca L. and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds. Working Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. This recent anthology focuses on applied virtue ethics and has an excellent selection of essays by influential thinkers on topics including the environment, business, medicine, war, and poverty. Online Sources 'Virtue Ethics', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ Entry written by Rosalind Hursthouse and updated in 2007. 'Bibliography on Virtue Ethics', maintained by Jörg Schroth. http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/cvirtue.pdf Extensive list of work published in virtue ethics. Updated regularly, listed in both alphabetical and chronological order, and contains abstracts of papers. 'Janusblog', maintained by Guy Axtell. http://janusblog.squarespace.com/ Blog devoted to current work in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, although with an emphasis on the latter. It contains spirited discussion among the many contributors, as well as a library of papers. Sample Syllabus This syllabus is for a graduate seminar or intense upper-level undergraduate course. Books for purchase for this course might include the Crisp and Slote anthology, the Walker and Ivanhoe anthology, and Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics. Week 1: The Roots of Contemporary Virtue Ethics Anscombe, Elizabeth. 'Modern Moral Philosophy' (Crisp and Slote) Foot, Philippa. 'Virtues and Vices' (Crisp and Slote) MacIntyre, Alasdair. 'The Nature of the Virtues' (Crisp and Slote) Week 2: The Roots of Contemporary Virtue Ethics Stocker, Michael. 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories' (Crisp and Slote) Williams, Bernard. 'Morality, the Peculiar Institution' (Crisp and Slote) McDowell, John. 'Virtue and Reason' (Crisp and Slote) Week 3: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics, Part I Hursthouse, Rosalind. 'Practical Wisdom: A Mundane Account.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106.3 (2006): 283–307. Stangl, Rebecca. 'A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics' Week 4: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics, Part II Stark, Susan. 'Virtue and Emotion.' Nous 33.5 (2001): 440–55. Stohr, Karen. 'Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue' Week 5: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics, Part III Conly, Sarah. 'Flourishing and the Failure of an Ethics of Virtue' Nussbaum, Martha. 'Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach' MacIntyre, Alasdair. Dependent Rational Animals, chapter 10 Week 6: Agent-Based Virtue Ethics Slote, Michael 'Agent-Based Virtue Ethics' (Crisp and Slote) Slote, Michael, Morals from Motives, chapters 1 and 3 Week 7: Pluralistic Virtue Ethics Swanton, Christine. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View , chapters 3, 4, and 11. Week 8: The Situationist Critique of Virtue Ethics Doris, John. 'Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics' Kamtekar, Rachana. 'Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character' Sreenivasan, Gopal. 'Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution' Merritt, Maria. 'Aristotelian Virtue and the Interpersonal Aspect of Ethical Character.' Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009): 23–49. Week 11: Right Action – Problems Johnson, Robert. 'Virtue and Right' Das, Ramon. 'Virtue Ethics and Right Action' Week 12: Right Action – Virtue Ethics Solutions Annas, Julia. 'Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing' van Zyl, Liezl. 'Agent-Based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance' Kawall, Jason. 'Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers' Week 13: Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles Pelligrino, Edmund. 'Professing Medicine, Virtue Based Ethics, and the Retrieval of Professionalism' (Walker and Ivanhoe) Swanton, Christine. 'Virtue Ethics, Role Ethics, and Business Ethics' (Walker and Ivanhoe) Sherman, Nancy. 'Virtue and a Warrier's Anger' (Walker and Ivanhoe) Week 14: Virtue Ethics and the Non-Human World Hursthouse, Rosalind. 'Environmental Virtue Ethics' (Walker and Ivanhoe) Walker, Rebecca. 'The Good Life for Non-Human Animals: What Virtue Requires of Humans' (Walker and Ivanhoe) Focus Questions 1. What is the relationship between virtue and flourishing? Are the virtues necessary for flourishing? Sufficient? 2. Can virtue ethics provide an adequate account of right action? 3. On what concept of a character trait does virtue ethics rely, and does situationist psychology undermine it? 4. Is the project of ethical naturalism a plausible one? To what extent does the success of Aristotelian virtue ethics depend on it? 5. How does virtue ethics affect the way that applied ethics is done? (shrink)

This study examines the mediating role of rumination, state anger, and blame attribution, and the moderating role of trait forgiveness in the relationship between workplace harassment intensity and revenge among employed students at a medium-sized Midwestern U.S. university and full-time employees from various industries in Shanghai, China. We tested the proposed model using techniques described by Hayes. Results within both samples suggested that workplace harassment intensity is positively associated with both major and minor revenge. Results of multiple mediation (...) tests showed that state anger and blame attribution mediated the relationships between workplace harassment intensity and both types of revenge behavior. Furthermore, trait forgiveness moderated the relationship between blame attribution and major revenge. (shrink)

In the context of animal cognitive research, anthropomorphism is defined as the attribution of uniquely human mental characteristics to animals. Those who worry about anthropomorphism in research, however, are immediately confronted with the question of which properties are uniquely human. One might think that researchers must first hypothesize the existence of a feature in an animal before they can, with warrant, claim that the property is uniquely human. But all too often, this isn't the approach. Rather, there is an a (...) priori argument against attributing some properties to animals. Which features are thought to be uniquely human on a priori grounds? The class can be quite large, including psychological states such as beliefs and desires, personality traits such as confidence or timidity, emotions such as happiness or anger, social organizational properties such as culture or friendship, moral behavior such as punishment or rape. For convenience, I will refer to the members of the class as "psychological properties". One critic includes feeling, purpose, intentionality, consciousness, and even cognition in his list of psychological properties that are incorrectly attributed to animals (Kennedy 1992). Among the critics, there is quite a bit of disagreement about what counts as an anthropomorphic attribution, and this alone should raise questions about the charge. We can identify two different questions about the practice of attributing psychological properties to animals within a scientific context. First we can ask whether it is scientifically respectable to examine questions about the mental, psychological, cultural, etc. states of animals. Those who bemoan anthropomorphism think that we ought not even ask such questions. I will look at the worries about asking the question, and argue that there is no special problem with it. The second question arises with an affirmative answer to the first. Given that it is scientifically respectable to examine whether an animal has a psychological property, there must be some scientifically respectable method for doing the examination.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Comments on Margaret Watkins, The Philosophical Progress of Hume’s “Essays”Jacqueline Taylor (bio)After David Hume’s death, Adam Smith wrote a letter to Hume’s publisher, William Strahan, to recount some of the final words and the attitude of “our late excellent friend, Mr. Hume.”1 Despite declining health and increasing weakness, Hume faced his approaching demise “with great cheerfulness” (EMPL xlvi). He had recently been reading Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead, and (...) although feeling he had every reason “to die contented,” Smith describes the “jocular excuses” Hume might make to Charon to delay his death (EMPL xlv). He first requests more time so that he can see how the public responds to the latest corrections he had been making to his works, but Charon replied that this would only lead Hume to want more time to make further corrections. Hume tries another tack: “Have a little patience, good Charon, I have been endeavouring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfall of some of the prevailing systems of superstition,” to which Charon replies, “You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years... Get into the boat this instant, you lazy loitering rogue” (EMPL xlvi). This imaginary dialogue makes evident Hume’s self-awareness as an author who cared greatly about both the correctness of his written works and the influence of these works on the public.In her book, Margaret Watkins argues that Hume’s concern to open the eyes of the public goes well beyond attempts to bring about the downfall of systems of superstition.2 She credits him with the broader aim of writing essays for a literate audience that would stimulate both public and individual improvement in various areas of human activity, including government, work, aesthetic experience, and intimate [End Page 155] relationships. The first three chapters of the book examine the case for Hume’s concern with public improvement. Chapter 1 focuses primarily on the political essays, and examines Hume’s account of governing and his criticism of the irrationality apt to arise with divisive political factionalism. Chapter 2 turns to inequalities of power and the circumstances that allow some to exercise to a greater degree the domineering tendency that is part of human nature. Watkins uses Hume’s essay on the population size of ancient and modern societies to reconstruct his view on the ills—to both masters and slaves—of ancient slaveholding. She complicates this discussion by looking at modern slaveholding in the colonies, and Hume’s puzzling lack of attention to this. In the ancient world, slaveholding resulted from war and conquest, and Watkins examines how ancient warfare also led to greater ferocity and anger in fighting and exacerbated cruelty (a trait Hume had deemed the worst vice in the Treatise [T 3.3.3.8]).3 This is another place where Watkins sees Hume taking stock of modern improvements. In the wide-ranging third chapter, entitled “Working,” Watkins considers economic circumstances as moral causes that can shape character, highlighting the importance for Hume of the commercial virtues, especially industry.4 She also shows that in the four essays on happiness, modeled on Hellenistic sects, each type of philosopher regards industry, or at least occupation, as essential to human happiness. Watkins concludes that the need for industry is thus something we are naturally motivated to seek out, and so an integral part of human nature. Chapter 4, on “Composing,” shows Watkins’s talents as a philosophical essayist in her own right, as she relates art and other forms of beauty to the cultivation of calm passions. We find here an insightful discussion of art, whether composing or consuming, as having particularly therapeutic effects on melancholy and other forms of nervous conditions. Chapters 5 and 6 take up, respectively, love for oneself and love for others. The former looks at the importance Hume places on both self-love and pride. Here Watkins draws primarily on Hume’s more morally theoretical works, both the Treatise and EPM, since they have more to say about self-valuing. Chapter 6 shows how we may fruitfully read... (shrink)

To succeed in self-regulation, people need to believe that it is possible to change behaviour and they also need to use effective means to enable such a change. We propose that this also applies to emotion regulation. In two studies, we found that people were most successful in emotion regulation, the more they believed emotions can be controlled and the more they used an effective emotion regulation strategy – namely, cognitive reappraisal. Cognitive reappraisal moderated the link between beliefs about the (...) controllability of emotion and success in emotion regulation, when reappraisal was measured as a trait or manipulated. Such moderation was found when examining the regulation of disgust elicited by emotion-inducing films, and the regulation of anger elicited by real political events. We discuss the implications of our findings for research and practice in emotion regulation. (shrink)