This article argues against Jon Elster’s contention that there is a fundamental incompatibility between, on the one hand, autonomy and rationality, and, on the other hand, adaptation to the conditions of one’s existence in the sense that one’s desires or preferences are adjusted to what it is possible to achieve. It is claimed that Elster’s conclusions are premised on a defective conception of human faculties and powers, including a defective conception of human experience and rationality. Moreover, the claim is made (...) that these defects are also characteristic of “rational choice theory” more generally. (shrink)

This introduction describes the background and reasons why the Mercator-Hondius atlas analysed in this issue became part of the library collection of the Donner Institute.

The development of geology during the first half of the nineteenth century is now considered to be more complicated than was once thought. The positivistic picture of two conflicting schools, one of them allegedly modern and progressive, the other supposedly conservative and scriptural, is too simplistic and misleading. First, the influence of the Bible has been exaggerated. It is true that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Flood had been given an important role as a geological agent, but in (...) the early nineteenth century there were hardly any professional geologists who defended this view. At least, it is not correct to associate either neptunism, catastrophism, or diluvialism with the Mosaic tradition. Secondly, the use of such terms as ‘catastrophism’ and ‘diluvialism’ has been unfortunate in so far as they have led to biblical associations; these terms must be given a more precise meaning. Thirdly, in the evaluation of the geology of the period, not enough weight has been given to the historical context. From our knowledge of modern geology alone it is not possible to judge what was loose speculation or empirical science at that time. Lyell's contributions to geology, as well as those of his opponents, should be considered and examined in more detail. (shrink)

The two ``relevance'' criteria set out by Anderson and Belnap are discussed. It is argued that the motivation backing the variable sharing property is far weaker than it is commonly made out to be, and that the use-criterion does not distinguish between relevant logics such as E and R and ``irrelevant'' logics such as S4, intuitionistic and classical logic. In short, then, the paper argues that Anderson and Belnap's two criteria of relevance are both motivationally unsound, and do not accomplish (...) what they are commonly taken to accomplish. (shrink)

We argue that the transmission of "normal science" is not enough to secure high-quality research, especially in the underdeveloped parts of the world. We survey some of the problems raised by the role of science in development. A simple model for "research-practice complexes" is presented. It is suggested that research-practice complexes ought to fulfil the three basic criteria of efficiency, perceptiveness, and sensitivity. The role of joint paradigm discussions in research-practice complexes is particularly emphasized.

Purpose: To survey the attitudes of the general public in Sweden to biobank research and to discuss the findings in the light of some well-known ethical principles.Methods: A questionnaire was used to survey the opinions of the general public in Sweden, and an ethical analysis (using the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice) was performed to discuss the possible conditions of such research.Findings: Between 3 and 9% answered that they did not want their samples to be collected and stored (...) in a biobank. Many respondents required information about the purpose of the research and wanted to be able to consent or refuse. About one third of the respondents said they would have answered differently if financial gain was involved and those who commented indicated a more negative attitude. The principle of autonomy maintains that the right to self-determination should be respected, and the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence that the probable harms and benefits resulting from a particular project by using samples from a biobank should be balanced. The general public disagree about how these principles are to be balanced. Interpretation: In the light of the findings different interpretations of the situation as well as possible alternatives are discussed in this paper. (shrink)

Cheyne and Girard characterize felt presence during sleep paralysis attacks as a pre-hallucinatory expression of a threat-activated vigilance system. While their results may be consistent with this interpretation, they are nonetheless correlational and do not address a parsimonious alternative explanation. This alternative stipulates that FP is a purely spatial, hallucinatory form of a common cognitive phenomenon—social imagery—that is often, but not necessarily, linked with threat and fear and that may induce distress among susceptible individuals. The occurrence of both fearful and (...) non-fearful FPs in a multiplicity of situations other than sleep paralysis attacks supports the notion that FPs are hallucinatory variants of social imagery and that they are not necessarily bound to threat-activated vigilance. Evidence linking FPs with anxiety disorders supports the notion that the distress they evoke may be mediated by a more general affective distress personality factor. To illustrate the predominantly spatial character of FP hallucinations, similarities between FP and phantom limbs are summarized and the possibility that these two phenomena are parallel expressions of a mirror neuron system is considered. (shrink)

Lautemann et al. (1995) gave a descriptive characterisation of the class of context-free languages, showing that a language is context-free iff it is definable as the set of words satisfying some sentence of a particular logic (fragment) over words. The present notes discuss how to specialise this result to the class of linear languages. Somewhat surprisingly, what would seem the most straightforward specialisation actually fails, due to the fact that linear grammars fail to admit a Greibach normal form. We identify (...) an alternative specialisation, based on an alternative characterisation of context-free languages, also noted by Lautemann et al. (1995). (shrink)

En el mundo actual, en el que se está reduciendo la abundancia y la inalterabilidad de la diversidad cultural, nuestras barreras culturales se pueden salvar —aunque no adulterar— si todo el mundo en todas partes se acoge a los derechos humanos. En el presente artículo intento defender la idea de que, para conseguirlo, tenemos que elaborar una pluralidad de aprobaciones de los derechos humanos universalmente aplicables que sea diversa pero bien cimentada culturalmente; en resumidas cuentas, deberíamos adoptar una justificación plural (...) de los derechos humanos. (shrink)

Langacker's usage-based model provides cognitive linguists with a useful tool for the study of allomorphy. In the present article the model is applied to a central problem in Russian conjugation, viz., the formation of the past passive participle. The analysis demonstrates the restrictiveness of the model, which precludes reference to arbitrary indices and underlying representations. Thus, the analyst is forced to look for surface-true generalizations including phonological, semantic, and symbolic structures and relationships holding between them. This reseach strategy proves fruitful (...) for the Russian past passive participle. The choice of suffixes is shown to be predictable from the shape of the past-tense stem, facilitating the formation of simple generalizations about the distribution of the relevant suffixes. (shrink)

In this article we apply one of the key concepts in cognitive linguistics, the radial category, to inflectional morphology. We advance the Paradigm Structure Hypothesis, arguing that inflectional paradigms are radial categories with internal structure primarily motivated by semantic relationships of markedness and prototypicality. It is possible to construct an expected structure for a verbal paradigm, facilitating an empirical test for our hypothesis. Data tracking an on-going morphological change in Russian documents the distribution of conservative vs. innovative forms across the (...) cells of the verbal paradigm. A logistic regression model that takes into account the sources of variation (the frequencies of individual verbs and paradigm slots, and individual verb preferences) shows that the language change is implemented differently across the paradigm forms, confirming the expected structure. In addition to markedness and prototypicality, we investigate the impact of frequency and show that there is a good, albeit not perfect match between the expected hierarchy and frequency. We conclude that the diachronic change analyzed in this article gives evidence for the structure of paradigms modeled on the radial category. (shrink)

Dream-enacting behaviors are behavioral expressions of forceful dream images often occurring during sleep-to-wakefulness transitions. We propose that DEBs reflect brain activity underlying social cognition, in particular, motor-affective resonance generated by the mirror neuron system. We developed a Mirror Behavior Questionnaire to assess some dimensions of mirror behaviors and investigated relationships between MBQ scores and DEBs in a large of university undergraduate cohort. MBQ scores were normally distributed and described by a four-factor structure . DEB scores correlated positively with MBQ total (...) and factor scores even with social desirability, somnambulism and somniloquy controlled. Emotion-specific DEB items correlated with corresponding emotion-specific MBQ items, especially crying and smiling. Results provide preliminary evidence for cross-state relationships between propensities for dream-enacting and mirror behaviors—especially behaviors involving motor-affective resonance—and our suggestion that motor-affective resonance mediates dream-enactment imagery during sleep and emotional empathy during waking. (shrink)

This paper shows that the relevant logics E and Π′ are strongly sound and complete with regards to a version of the “simplified” Routley-Meyer semantics. Such a semantics for E has been thought impossible. Although it is impossible if an admissible rule of E – the rule of restricted assertion or equivalently Ackermann’s δ-rule – is solely added as a primitiverule, it is very much possible when E is axiomatized in the way Anderson and Belnap did. The simplified semantics for (...) E and Π′ requires unreduced frames. Contra what has been claimed, however, no additional frame component is required over and above what’s required to model other relevant logics such as T and R. It is also shown how to modify the tonicity requirements of theternary relation so as to allow for the standard truth condition for both fusion – the intensional conjunction◦ – as well as the converse conditional ←. (shrink)

This paper presents a range of new triviality proofs pertaining to naïve truth theory formulated in paraconsistent relevant logics. It is shown that excluded middle together with various permutation principles such as A → (B → C)⊩B → (A → C) trivialize naïve truth theory. The paper also provides some new triviality proofs which utilize the axioms ((A → B)∧ (B → C)) → (A → C) and (A → ¬A) → ¬A, the fusion connective and the Ackermann constant. An (...) overview over various ways to formulate Leibniz’s law in non-classical logics and two new triviality proofs for naïve set theory are also provided. (shrink)

We argue that people may resist temptations not only with the aim of acquiring more self-control, but also because they want to convince others that they are patient and already possess self-control.

Whereas many researchers see a heuristic potential in the covert REM sleep model for explaining NREM sleep mentation and associated phenomena, many others are unconvinced of its value. At present, there is much circumstantial support for the model, but validation is lacking on many points. Supportive findings from several additional studies are summarized with results from two new studies showing (1) NREM mentation is correlated with duration of prior REM sleep, and (2) REM sleep signs (eye movements, phasic EMG) occur (...) frequently in NREM sleep. The covert REM sleep model represents one class of explanatory models that combines the two assumptions of mind-body isomorphism and a 1-gen mentation generator; its future development will depend largely upon a more detailed understanding of sleep state interactions and their contribution to mind-body isomorphisms. (shrink)

That PTSD nightmares are highly realistic threat simulations triggered by trauma is difficult to reconcile with the disturbed, sometimes debilitating sleep and waking functioning of PTSD sufferers. A theory that accounts for fundamental forms of imagery other than threat scenarios could explain the selection of many more adaptive human functions – some still pertinent to survival today. For example, interactive characters, a virtually ubiquitous form of dream imagery, could be simulations of attachment relationships that aid species survival in many different (...) ways. [Revonsuo]. (shrink)

This article discusses fundamental problems in "rational choice theory," as outlined by Jon Elster. Elster's discussion of why institutions may not be said to act shows his fundamental presupposition that only "monolithic," unitary entities are capable of action. This is, for him, a reason why only individual human beings may be said to act. Furthermore, human beings may be said to act only insofar as they "maximize" (their "utility") on the basis of a unitary, complete, consistent "preference structure." All action (...) that is not maximization in this sense is for Elster not really human action, but rather instances of "pure causality." Elster distinguishes between the "real," intentional person, who "maximizes," and "purely causal forces" within the person. This article tries to show that this radical, sharp dichotomy between "intentionality," in this narrow sense, and "pure causality" is inadequate as a basis for understanding human action. This radical dichotomy is central to important arguments made by Elster more generally. (shrink)

This paper argues against Jon Elster's contention that there is a fundamentalincompatibility between, on one hand, autonomy and rationality and, on theother hand, adaptation to conditions of one's existence in the sense that one'sdesires or preferences are adjusted to what it is possible to achieve. While thefirst part of the paper more narrowly concentrated on Elster's discussion ofthese ideas, this second part goes on to a more general discussion of the conceptof rationality. On the basis of this discussion, it is (...) claimed that Elster's conclusionsconcerning autonomy and adaptation are premised on a defective conceptionof human experience and rationality. Moreover, the claim is made that thesedefects are also characteristic of "rational choice theory" more generally. (shrink)