Quasi things come and go and we cannot wonder where they've been (starting from the wind) -- Quasi-things assault and resist us: feelings as atmospheres -- Quasi things are felt (though not localized): the isles of the felt-body -- Quasi-things are proofs of existence: pain as the genesis of the subject -- Quasi-things affect us (also indirectly): vicarious shame -- Quasi-things communicate with us: from the gaze to the portrait (and back) -- Quasi-things are the more effective the vaguer they (...) are: twilightness. (shrink)

Through an atmospherological approach, primarily inspired by the Aisthetik and the New Phenomenology, the paper investigates the relationship between atmosphere and lived space, defines what kind of perception the atmospheric one is and examines the space we experience in the lifeworld and to which plane geometry turns out to be completely blind. Sketching briefly the history of lived space, we assume that atmospheres function as affordances that permeate the lived space, i.e. as ecological invites or meanings that are ontologically rooted (...) in things and quasi-things. (shrink)

Is there really an atmospheric turn? The concept of “atmosphere” as a qualitative-emotional prius of sensory experience seems today to have encouraged the convergence of many interdisciplinary studies focused on the qualitative aspects of our “surroundings”. Based on the neo-phenomenological theory of atmospheric perception as a first pathivc impression and a felt-bodily communication, this paper explores and synthesises the relationship between atmospheres and expressive qualities. It thus clarifies the key features of a general “pathic” aesthetics. It considers perceivers as beings (...) who are touched by atmospheric feelings in emotional and tactile ways. These are widespread and vary in their modulation of lived space. They are also ontologically rooted in things and quasi-things of the lifeworld. By realising how they (especially in an unintentional way) expose themselves to what happens, perceivers turn out not to be “subjects of something” but rather “subjects to something”: that is, human beings who are only “sovereign” when they are free, at least in their daily experience, from the dogma of rational and methodological autonomy imposed by Western Modernity. (shrink)

The paper examines the notion of habits from the perspective of a pathic aesthetics based on the neo-phenomenological theory of Leib (felt body) and its ubiquitous communication. By questioning whether experience should be considered as a confirmation or a failure of expectation, it shows the inextricable intertwining of the unexpected and routine in our involuntary life experience and delves into a well known phenomenological crux: is the lived or felt body what is subject to self-affection and proprioception or rather the (...) “absent” body, which is always transcended in its being-for-other (transitivity)? The assumption then that felt-bodily habits are formed through a motor scheme depending on its being a perfect pre-reflective resonance (especially thanks to its more or less stable “felt-bodily islands”) of outside atmospheric feelings and affordances that also becomes a true “style”, is finally examined by showing the points of both contact and discrepancy between a New Phenomenology (Hermann Schmitz) focused above all on the rediscovery (in a critical function) of the archaic dimension of the Leib and a melioristic Somaesthetics (Richard Shusterman) pragmatically interested in a more creative individual self-stylisation. (shrink)

Through an approach primarily inspired by the Aisthetik (Gernot Böhme) and the Neue Phänomenologie (Hermann Schmitz) I define the atmospheric perception as the first pathic impression and investigate the relationship between this kind of perception (possibly initially immersive, then reflective) and the expressive qualities of our lifeworld. Pathic aesthetics therefore ceases to be just a theory of works of art. It considers the perceiver as a being first of all emotionally and felt-bodily touched by atmospheric feelings widespread in her (lived) (...) space but these atmospheric feelings are also affordances, ontologically rooted in things and quasi-things of her lifeworld. By exploring how she unintentionally exposes herself to what happens in this lifeworld, man turns out to be not a “subject of something” but rather a “subject to something”: a human being who is “sovereign” to the extent she is free from the claim of rational autonomy imposed by the western Modernity. (shrink)

The paper addresses the issue of dwelling as a powerful way of cultivating atmospheric feelings without the risk of suffering their disturbing aggressiveness, and deals with inclusiveness or immersivity that true dwelling arouses. To avoid the widespread trend to consider every space a dwelling place, it proposes that only a really “lived” place, in so far it radiates a specific and particularly intense-authoritative atmosphere (in kinetic, synesthetic, felt-bodily sense) affecting the perceivers and finding in their body its precise sounding board, (...) makes dwelling in the proper sense possible. Just as there are different types of atmosphere (prototypical, derivative, spurious), there are therefore different types of dwelling and inclusiveness. However, contrary to the today’s projectivistconstructionist explanation and globalized orientation, for a “pathic aesthetics” only a lifewordly qualitative-emotional experience based on an atmosphere of intimacy-familiarity really turns a house into a home. (shrink)

1 Segmentando In psicologia da tempo si parla dell’“effetto atmosfera” eventualmente creato da certi sillogismi, segnatamente da quelli che “sentiamo” come maggiormente persuasivi del tutto indipendentemente dalla loro validità logica. Da due premesse particolari e affermative (alcuni A sono B, alcuni B sono C), ad esempio, molti sono indotti, appunto in virtù di questo effetto “atmosferico”, a trarre un’affermazione altrettanto particolare e affermativa ancorché erronea (alcuni A sono C), la...

In this paper we describe the Curry-Howard-De Bruijn isomorphism between Higher Order Many Sorted Intuitionistic Predicate Logic PREDω and the type system λPREDω, which can be considered a subsystem of the Calculus of Constructions. The type system is presented using the concept of a Pure Type System, which is a very elegant framework for describing type systems. We show in great detail how formulae and proof trees of the logic relate to types and terms of the type system, respectively. Finally, (...) we discuss some consequences of the isomorphism with respect to the relation between the systems discussed in this paper. (shrink)

Treatise on the basic tenets of Viśiṣṭādvaita school in Hindu philosophy as propounded by Ramanuja, 1017-1137, founder of sect.

This book provides a presentation of the concept of “atmosphere” in the realm of aesthetics. An “atmosphere” is meant to be an emotional space. Such idea of “atmosphere” has been more and more subsumed by human and social sciences in the last twenty years, thereby becoming a technical notion. In many fields of the Humanities, affective life has been reassessed as a proper tool to understand the human being, and is now considered crucial. In this context, the link between atmospheres (...) and aesthetics becomes decisive. Nowadays, aesthetics is no longer only a theory of art, but has recovered its original vocation: to be a general theory of perception conceived of as an ordinary experience of pre-logical character. In its four parts, this volume discusses whether atmospheres could take the prominent and paradigmatic position previously held by art in order to make sense of such sensible experience of the world. (shrink)

This paper outlines the process of verbal communication of emotion as this occurs through the phases of the referential process, including arousal of an emotion schema; detailed and specific descriptions of images and episodes that are exemplars of emotion schemas; and reflection and reorganization, which may include emotion labels and other types of categorical terms. The concepts of emotion schemas and the referential process are defined in the theoretical framework of multiple code theory which includes subsymbolic sensory, visceral and motoric (...) processes, symbolic images and words. Emotion schemas are defined as clusters of representations of events incorporating similar bodily, sensory and motoric processes activated in relation to different people in different contexts. Through the referential process subsymbolic components of a schema that have been activated in a speaker or writer and that may be connected only partially to words may be evoked in a listener or reader. The concept of the emotion schemas is examined in relation to current work in emotion theory and neuroscience. The unique effects of detailed descriptions of episodes in conveying complex aspects of emotional experience are discussed, as recognized by writers, and as demonstrated in empirical research. Computerized measures of the phases of the referential process are presented, focusing particularly on the central measure, the Weighted Referential Activity Dictionary which identifies points of narrative and imagery. The operation of the function words that dominate the WRAD are examined in relation to the structure of narrative expression underlying the verbal representation of emotion schemas. (shrink)

Moving from a phenomenological theory of the lived body, the text outlines its constitutive role in human experience but especially in aesthetic perception. Against every reductionist and introjectionist objectification of the lived experience, every explanatory hypothesis of associationist and projectivist type, a pathic aesthetics ‒ that emphasizes the affective involvement that the perceiver feels unable to critically react to or mitigate the intrusiveness of ‒ is an adequate investigation of the felt body as sounding board of outside atmospheres and Stimmungen. (...) By means of its specific dynamics and lived “isles”, in fact the felt body feels what happens in the surrounding area without drawing on the five senses and the perceptual body schema. Felt-bodily isles turn out exactly to be both a tool for sensing the affective radiation provoked by atmospheres and quasi-things, and “places” that, communicating with each other and with our consciousness, are themselves quasi-things. (shrink)

ENG: In this brief commentary on Sara Palermo’s article, I highlight several methodological criticisms of the data analysis and hypotheses proposed by the author. I then focus on the relevance of nocebo/placebo studies for the contemporary debate on the mind/body problem. In particular, I show how these phenomena raise questions for dualistic and neurocentric approaches that are still prevalent in philosophy. Finally, I stress the role of expectations in nocebo/placebo models, with reference to a promising theoretical framework: the predictive brain. (...) -/- ITA: In questo breve commento all’articolo di Sara Palermo mi propongo di rilevare alcune criticità relative al metodo di indagine e alla solidità dell’ipotesi suggerita dall’autrice. In seguito mi concentrerò sulla rilevanza dello studio del nocebo/placebo nell’ambito del dibattito sul rapporto mente/corpo e su come questi fenomeni mettano in discussione approcci dualisti e neurocentrici ancora pervasivi soprattutto in campo filosofico. In conclusione, mi soffermerò sul ruolo delle aspettative nella costruzione del modello del nocebo/placebo, riprendendo un contesto particolarmente promettente per l’inquadramento teorico del fenomeno: il cervello predittivo. Parole chiave: Placebo; Nocebo; Meta-analisi; Cervello bayesiano; Elaborazione predittiva. (shrink)

My hypothesis is that landscape is identified by the atmospheric feeling it radiates in a now constant and now more ephemeral way and by the felt-bodily resonance it generates in those who simply perceive it, and a fortiori in those who are also deeply affectively grasped by it. In partial contrast to a reductionist approach prevalent today, the intention is to demonstrate that the (feeling of) landscape, in its constitutive extraneousness to the objective-quantitative dimension, can never be fully explained in (...) pragmatist and socio-constructivist terms. In fact, it holds and even enhances its critical role if its fundamental affordance remains that of allowing a ‘contemplative’ (in the broadest sense) perspective, i.e. a involuntary, distanced, supervenient as well as ‘framed’ by boundaries perception. Precisely in questioning its boundaries, how it extends exactly as far as you feel its inherent atmosphere, the paper sketches in conclusion a liminology of the landscape on an atmospherological basis. (shrink)

Sleep and dreaming are important daily phenomena that are receiving growing attention from both the scientific and the philosophical communities. The increasingly popular predictive brain framework within cognitive science aims to give a full account of all aspects of cognition. The aim of this paper is to critically assess the theoretical advantages of Predictive Processing (PP, as proposed by Clark 2013, Clark 2016; and Hohwy 2013) in defining sleep and dreaming. After a brief introduction, we overview the state of the (...) art at the intersection between dream research and PP (with particular reference to Hobson and Friston 2012; Hobson et al. 2014). In the following sections we focus on two theoretically promising aspects of the research program. First, we consider the explanations of phenomenal consciousness during sleep (i.e. dreaming) and how it arises from the neural work of the brain. PP provides a good picture of the peculiarity of dreaming but it can’t fully address the problem of how consciousness comes to be in the first place. We propose that Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi et al. 2016) is a good candidate for this role and we will show its advantages and points of contact with PP. After introducing IIT, we deal with the evolutionary function of sleeping and dreaming. We illustrate that PP fits with contemporary researches on the important adaptive function of sleep and we discuss why IIT can account for sleep mentation (i.e. dreaming) in evolutionary terms (Albantakis et al. 2014). In the final section, we discuss two future avenues for dream research that can fruitfully adopt the perspective offered by PP: (a) the role of bodily predictions in the constitution of the sleeping brain activity and the dreaming experience, and (b) the precise role of the difference stages of sleep (REM (Rapid eye movement), NREM (Non-rapid eye movement) in the constitution and refinement of the predictive machinery. (shrink)

The new phenomenological and aesthetic paradigm of atmospheres, conceived as feelings spread out in the external space and not as private moods, is tested here from different points of view and different disciplines in the context of a full valorization of the so-called "affective turn" in Humanities.