In the paper I try to present what I termed epistheology in its relation to basic concepts of theory of knowledge: the knowledge itself, its unity and systemic character, criteria of truth and selfevidence, and the questions of justification (of knowledge and criteria of knowledge both) and ethical ideal of knowledge as the contemplation of God's design. Epistheology is thus an epistemic discourse based on and warranted by theological concepts. I analyze Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz and the like to demonstrate the (...) way this discourse operates. In the second part of the paper I sketch the British approach: empirical, secular, and most importantly based on the concept of verisimilitude. Humean philosophy is in this way not only seen as antagonistic to its continental predecessors, but also victorious as a foundation of new and fertile paradigm of secular science. (shrink)

Artykuł traktuje o relacjach ateizmu i sekularyzmu. Podstawowym problemem rozważanym w tekście jest pytanie o to, czy trzeba być ateistą, żeby być sekularystą. Pojęcia sekularyzmu i ateizmu przedstawiamy na tle historycznym, a następnie analizujemy w taki sposób, by uzyskać możliwie pełną odpowiedź na nasze pytanie. Analizie poddane zostały teoretyczne możliwości kształtowania relacji religii i państwa, a także konsekwencje, jakie wypływają z poszczególnych form kształtowania tych relacji. Sądzimy, że o ile rozumieć ateizm jako niewiarę w Boga/bogów, a sekularyzm jako nieużywanie teologicznych (...) uzasadnień w decyzjach politycznych, o tyle nie trzeba być ateistą, by być sekularystą, z drugiej zaś strony warto być sekularystą będąc człowiekiem religijnym, bo to sekularyzm jako zasada polityczna gwarantuje prawo do wyznawania i praktykowania religii. (shrink)

The goals and tasks of neuroethics formulated by Farahany and Ramos (2020) link epistemological and methodological issues with ethical and social values. The authors refer simultaneously to the social significance and scientific reliability of the BRAIN Initiative. They openly argue that neuroethics should not only examine neuroscientific research in terms of “a rigorous, reproducible, and representative neuroscience research process” as well as “explore the unique nature of the study of the human brain through accurate and representative models of its function (...) and dysfunction”, but also its responsibilities or social consequences. In our commentary, we would like to concentrate on problem selection, which is shortly noticed by Farahany and Ramos, and by BRAIN Initiative’s Neuroethics Report itself. The document raises an important issue related to problem selection, which is strengthening or perpetuating existing prejudices and biases by choosing a research subject: “scientists are prompted to consider how the questions they choose to study in the laboratory might amplify existing biases.” This leads to several further problems: what constitutes bias?; how biases may be embedded in the selection of research programs?; is it possible to conduct completely unbiased research?; who should be a gatekeeper in the case of research that may amplify biases? We try to notice possible answers to these questions in the context of the research on differences (e.g., cognitive, medical, behavioral) between human populations. (shrink)

The frustration in Polish society arising from excessive costs of conducting court proceedings and lengthy delays for dispute resolution has resulted in a genuine limitation in access to judicial justice for citizens. This paper argues that the answer to the dilemma between ensuring both justice and efficiency lies in language being a tool for the active participation of the parties in building mutual trust and shaping solutions in conflictual circumstances. How should the postulate of effective communication leading to dispute resolution (...) in modern justice be achieved? The authors present the advantages of oral communication in proceedings on the way to finding agreement, pointing out the content and quality of language that make dispute resolution possible. (shrink)

Perez-Rodriguez and de la Fuente (2017) assume that although human races do not exist in a biological sense (“geneticists and evolutionary biologists generally agree that the division of humans into races/subspecies has no defensible scientific basis,” they exist only as “sociocultural constructions” and because of that maintain an illusory reality, for example, through “racialized” practices in medicine. Agreeing with the main postulates formulated in the article, we believe that the authors treat this problem in a superficial manner and have failed (...) to capture the current state of the field of knowledge in science and the humanities. In our commentary, we want to highlight two main omissions, and to notice three important implications for “a postracial medicine.”. (shrink)

O problema do ceticismo é colocado na seguinte questão: é possível obtero conhecimento como um todo? Há argumentos fortes que dizem quenão. Por exemplo, embora o K não possa descansar sobre dados brutos,todos os argumentos devem começar e terminar em algum lugar. Contudo,se nós não podemos justificar, conseqüentemente, não podemos aumentaro K genuíno. Assim, o problema é que, se podemos começar com argumentosdo ceticismo filosófico, que dizem que o K é impossível , então esses argumentos forçam a conexão de conhecimento (...) comjustificação para tentar refutar o ceticismo. Assim, o problema do ceticismoestá intimamente ligado com o problema da justificação. Podemos analisarse há um problema do ceticismo e se ele pode ser entendido comocolocamos inicialmente. Enfim, por que o problema do ceticismo é nossoproblema? Por que temos o ônus da prova? Não podemos inverter o ônusda prova para o cético?The issue of skepticism is put in the following question: is it possible togain knowledge as a whole? There are some strong arguments that sayno. For instance, although K can not rest over gross data, all argumentsmust start and finish somewhere. However, we cannot justify andconsequently enlarge the genuine K. The problem here is: if we can startwith arguments from the philosophical skepticism, the ones that say K is impossible , then such arguments impose that weconnect knowledge to justification on an attempt to refute skepticism. Theissue of skepticism is closely connected to the issue of justification. It ispossible to see whether or not there is a problem with skepticism or if itcan be understood according to our initial proposal. Finally, we ask: whyis the issue of skepticism our problem? Why do we have the burden ofproof? Can we send the burden of proof back to the skeptic? (shrink)

In this paper we study the method of refutation rules in the modal logic K4. We introduce refutation rules with certain normal forms that provide a new syntactic decision procedure for this logic. As corollaries we obtain such results for the following important extensions: S4, the provability logic G, and Grzegorczyk''s logic. We also show that tree-type models can be constructed from syntactic refutations of this kind.

This is an attempt to defend Field's nominalistic program from the criticism raised by K. Wójtowicz in his article. The author argues for the following theses: (a) that Wójtowicz uses the notion of „mathematical theory” broader than Field does it; (b) that he misinterprets the conception of the „abstract counterparts” of nominalistic statements; (c) and that his general evaluation of Field's program is based on too high methodological standards which he applies to the possible nominalistic versions of empirical theories. The (...) second part of this paper contains an attempt to generalize the results of Field's analysis. The following fact is proved: every open sentence expressible in the language of an empirical theory and being empirically contentful is implicitly definable by the set of certain qualitative predicates. In the case of first-order language this result can be strengthened via Beth's definability theorem, to the theorem stating that every open sentence fulfilling conditions formulated above is definable explicitly with the help of certain nominalistic formula. The philosophical significance of this result is that each mathematized empirical theory for which representation theorem is true, can be translated into purely qualitative version. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to argue for the view that Władysław Tatarkiewicz’s Historia filozofii [History of Philosophy] (1931) cannot be regarded as a work derived from the philosophical tradition of the Lvov‑Warsaw School. Tatarkiewicz was inspired to take up the history of philosophy thanks to his studies in Marburg (1909). When he came into contact with Twardowski and his students, Tatarkiewicz noticed that the history of philosophy was regarded by them as a discipline belonging to the field of (...) history, and was sometimes completely disregarded. The fact that the postulate of order and clarity of language brought Tatarkiewicz closer to Twardowski seems to have been due to Tatarkiewicz’s personal inclinations rather than to Twardowski’s influence on him. (shrink)

In this paper we examine Prior's reconstruction of Master Argument [4] in some modal-tense logic. This logic consists of a purely tense part and Diodorean definitions of modal alethic operators. Next we study this tense logic in the pure tense language. It is the logic $K_t 4$ plus a new axiom $:p \wedge Gp \supset PGp'$. This formula was used by Prior in his original analysis of Master Argument. is usually added as an extra axiom to an axiomatization of the (...) logic of linear time. In that case the set of moments is a total order and must be left-discrete without the least moment. However, the logic of Master Argument does not require linear time. We show what properties of the set of moments are exactly forced by in the reconstruction of Prior. We make also some philosophical remarks on the analyzed reconstruction. (shrink)

W artykule przedstawiam tzw. chwyt z zasadnej stwierdzalności (WAM) wymierzony w znaną argumentację E. Gettiera, która miała wykazać nieadekwatność tradycyjnej definicji wiedzy. Keith DeRose sformułował trzy warunki poprawności WAM – pokazuję, że zaproponowany w pracy WAM je spełnia. Jeśli zaproponowany sposób wyjaśnienia Gettierowskich przykładów jest poprawny, to konkluzywność argumentacji Gettiera staje się wątpliwa. Jeśli jednak nie jest i przykładów Gettiera nie można wyjaśnić poprzez odwołanie się do generowania fałszywych implikatur konwersacyjnych przez prawdziwe asercje określonych zdań, to warunki poprawności nałożone przez (...) DeRose’a na WAM okazują się niewystarczające. W pracy proponuję więc uzupełnić listę tychże o następujący warunek: jeżeli w określonym kontekście k asercja danego zdania Z ma być nieakceptowalna jedynie ze względu na generowanie w tych okolicznościach fałszywych implikatur i1, ..., in, to asercja tego zdania w każdym innym kontekście k*, która generować będzie w k* dokładnie te same fałszywe implikatury i1, ..., in, ma być również nieakceptowalna (i to w równym stopniu). (shrink)

Przedmiotem pracy są uwagi Jerzego Pelca dotyczące pojęcia kłamstwa i kłamania opublikowane w O pojęciu kłamstwa – z punktu widzenia semiotyki (1990). Przedstawioną w niej definicję kłamania porównuję z warunkami nakładanymi na to pojęcie przez innych autorów. Pokazuję, że zdaniem Pelca, warunek ekstensji przekonań nie jest koniecznym warunkiem na kłamstwo. Dodatkowo, zauważam, iż pewne uwagi Pelca skłaniają do wniosku, że można kłamać implikując coś, co uważa się za fałsz, nie zaś wyraźnie to stwierdzając. Argumentuję, że przyjmowany w analizowanej pracy warunek (...) chęci oszukania adresata jest wątpliwym warunkiem koniecznym kłamania. Ostatecznie, uwzględniając spostrzeżenia Pelca, proponuję następująca definicję: (DEF. Kłamania*) Osoba A kłamie w określonym kontekście K osobie B, że p, zawsze i tylko wtedy, gdy: (1) A posługuje się w K pewnym znakiem Z, zaś zgodnie z pewną przyjętą lub utartą konwencją posłużenie się Z przez A wobec B w K może być zasadnie uznane za twierdzenie przez A wobec B, że p, i (2) A nie uznaje w K, że p, oraz (3) nie powiadamia uprzednio o tym B, albo też (2*) A uznaje w K, że p, ale (3*) zakłada, że pomimo (1) B uzna, że A nie sądzi, że p. (shrink)

For a free filter F on $$\omega $$, let $$N_F=\omega \cup \{p_F\}$$, where $$p_F\not \in \omega $$, be equipped with the following topology: every element of $$\omega $$ is isolated whereas all open neighborhoods of $$p_F$$ are of the form $$A\cup \{p_F\}$$ for $$A\in F$$. The aim of this paper is to study spaces of the form $$N_F$$ in the context of the Nikodym property of Boolean algebras. By $$\mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ we denote the class of all those ideals $$\mathcal {I}$$ on (...) $$\omega $$ such that for the dual filter $$\mathcal {I}^*$$ the space $$N_{\mathcal {I}^*}$$ carries a sequence $$\langle \mu _n:n\in \omega \rangle $$ of finitely supported signed measures such that $$\Vert \mu _n\Vert \rightarrow \infty $$ and $$\mu _n(A)\rightarrow 0$$ for every clopen subset $$A\subseteq N_{\mathcal {I}^*}$$. We prove that $$\mathcal {I}\in \mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ if and only if there exists a density submeasure $$\varphi $$ on $$\omega $$ such that $$\varphi (\omega )=\infty $$ and $$\mathcal {I}$$ is contained in the exhaustive ideal $$\text{ Exh }(\varphi )$$. Consequently, we get that if $$\mathcal {I}\subseteq \text{ Exh }(\varphi )$$ for some density submeasure $$\varphi $$ on $$\omega $$ such that $$\varphi (\omega )=\infty $$ and $$N_{\mathcal {I}^*}$$ is homeomorphic to a subspace of the Stone space $$St(\mathcal {A})$$ of a given Boolean algebra $$\mathcal {A}$$, then $$\mathcal {A}$$ does not have the Nikodym property. We observe that each $$\mathcal {I}\in \mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ is Katětov below the asymptotic density zero ideal $$\mathcal {Z}$$, and prove that the class $$\mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ has a subset of size $$\mathfrak {d}$$ which is dominating with respect to the Katětov order $$\le _K$$, but $$\mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ has no $$\le _K$$ -maximal element. We show that, when $$\mathcal {I}$$ is a density ideal, $$\mathcal {I}\not \in \mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ holds if and only if $$\mathcal {I}$$ is totally bounded if and only if the Boolean algebra $$\mathcal {P}(\omega )/\mathcal {I}$$ contains a countable splitting family. Our results shed some new light on differences between the Nikodym property and the Grothendieck property of Boolean algebras. (shrink)

Artykuł ukazuje problematykę rozwoju majątku Floriana Zebrzydowskiego h. Radwan (zm. 1566), jednego z najbardziej zaufanych dworzan, wojskowych i urzędników Zygmunta Augusta. Stosując metodę indukcyjną, zwrócono uwagę na niemal nieznane dotychczas w historiografii wejście przez Zebrzydowskiego w posiadanie majątku we wsi Radocza k. Wadowic w księstwie zatorskim. Jako współwłaściciel tej wsi Zebrzydowski procesował się w latach 1549–1550 z Jakubem Frydrychowskim. Z kolei dokumentem z 1551 roku król nadał Zebrzydowskiemu przywilej budowania tamy/ fosy na rz. Skawie w celu doprowadzania wody do majątku (...) w Radoczy, co było niezbędne m.in. do zbudowania stawów rybnych (edycja wraz z tłumaczeniem w Aneksie). Osiem lat później Florian Zebrzydowski przeprowadził transakcję majątkową dotyczącą Radoczy z Felicją Frydrychowską i jej mężem Stanisławem Milanowskim. Nie udało się jednak ustalić, kiedy dostojnik pozbył się majątku w tej wsi, jednak źródła z okresu ostatnich lat jego życia i kolejnych dziesięcioleci wymieniające właścicieli Radoczy nie wspominają już o Zebrzydowskich. Przy okazji ustaleń dotyczących Radoczy ukazano także przykładowe inne transakcje majątkowe, w których brał udział Zebrzydowski. Studium miało za zadanie zasygnalizować konieczność podjęcia szerszych badań nad rozwojem majątku Floriana Zebrzydowskiego w powiązaniu ze sprawami majątkowymi jego rodziny, szkicując tym samym nowe perspektywy badawcze. (shrink)

The purpose of the present article is to propose a research project which will analyse the issue of theoretization of empirical data which takes place in the process of formulating scientific problems. J. Hintikka’s interrogative model of inquiry will serve us as a starting point for our considerations. First, his proposal of viewing the theory-dependence of facts will be characterized. Then, with reference to the results of K. Jodkowski, three interpretations of theory-laden thesis will be given: a radical, a modest (...) and a weak one. This will render it possible to further develop a critique of certain aspects of Hintikka’s conception. Subsequently, the critique will provide a basis for presenting a new way of viewing theory-dependence of empirical data. Some considerations regarding a possible use of the received conceptual scheme for analyzing certain problems of philosophy of science will close the article. A possibility of analyzing such classical problems as falsification and the use of the principle of auto-determinacy in science will also be offered. Lastly, with reference to A. Grobler’s analyses, a possibility of representing a process of rejecting metaphysical presuppositions in science will be considered. (shrink)

We present the (Lascar) Galois group of any countable theory as a quotient of a compact Polish group by an F_σ normal subgroup: in general, as a topological group, and under NIP, also in terms of Borel cardinality. This allows us to obtain similar results for arbitrary strong types defined on a single complete type over ∅. As an easy conclusion of our main theorem, we get the main result of [K. Krupiński, A. Pillay and T. Rzepecki, Topological dynamics and (...) the complexity of strong types, Israel J. Math.228 (2018) 863–932] which says that for any strong type defined on a single complete type over ∅, smoothness is equivalent to type-definability. We also explain how similar results are obtained in the case of bounded quotients of type-definable groups. This gives us a generalization of a former result from the paper mentioned above about bounded quotients of type-definable subgroups of definable groups. (shrink)

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a widespread tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which acts violate the rule. This tendency’s strength varied markedly across (k = 15) field sites, owing to cultural variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared to laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether, and consequently exhibited more pronounced textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for (...) the emergence of textualism: In a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (Ntotal = 5495) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an easily identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers and judges. (shrink)

This article defends the thesis that, in light of the postulates of liberal ethics, it is not possible to put forward universal arguments in support of any form of marriage. The existing forms of marriage should be either deemed unjust or founded on specific arguments recognized within a particular political community and determining the understanding of justice in a particular society. It defends the thesis that the requirement of universality, and consequently of impartiality, is not met, since behind every form (...) of marriage there is a certain “minimum” anthropological approach. Marriage is discussed as a privilege granted to particular groups by the political community. The comments are made with reference to the discussion between Krzysztof Saja and Tomasz Sieczkowski concerning the problem of discrimination against same-sex couples in Polish legislation. (shrink)

My paper is a reaction to polemic of Tomasz Sieczkowski "Discrimination nonetheless. A reply to Krzysztof Saja” [ICF "Diametros" (36) 2013] that he wrote against my paper "Discrimination against same-sex couples" [ICF “Diametros" (34) 2012]. The purpose of the paper is to refute Sieczkowski’s objections that rely on wrong interpretation of the structure of my main argument. I will describe the proper course of the reasoning that I have expressed in the first article and undermine the (...) class='Hi'>Sieczkowski’s proposal to justify gay marriages by referring to values such as dignity, freedom and equality. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions offers an insightful and engaging theory of science that speaks to scholars across many disciplines. Though initially widely misunderstood, it had a profound impact on the way intellectuals and educated laypeople thought about science. K. Brad Wray traces the influences on Kuhn as he wrote Structure, including his ‘Aristotle epiphany’, his interactions, and his studies of the history of chemistry. Wray then considers the impact of Structure on the social sciences, on the history (...) of science, and on the philosophy of science, where the problem of theory change has set the terms of contemporary realism/anti-realism debates. He examines Kuhn’s frustrations with the Strong Programme sociologists’ appropriations of his views, and debunks several popular claims about what influenced Kuhn as he wrote Structure. His book is a rich and comprehensive assessment of one of the most influential works in the modern sciences. (shrink)