In The Biosemiotic Fundamentals of Aesthetics: Beauty is the Perfect Semiotic Fitting Kull makes a foray into the concept of Beauty. His target article is a welcome contribution not only for providing a biosemiotic notion of beauty but also as a trigger for further enquiry into the matter. Additionally, Kull delivers a new concept: Semiotic Fitting, shining new light on the Umwelt theory. My commentary embraces the challenge Kull presents. Offering an alternate view on beauty, as a matter, and product, (...) of cognition, I suggest reflecting on the philosophy of Alexander von Baumgarten, who coined the term “aesthetics”, offers rich insight that could extend and enrich the definition of beauty Kull presents. (shrink)

This monograph develops an argument for the following view: In leading an autonomous life, persons make choices and adopt attitudes of a distinctive kind. To justify these choices and attitudes, they need to draw on knowledge about their biographies. More specifically, their biographies are a source of a distinctive type of practical reasons. These reasons are typically such that their adequate articulation will have a narrative structure. Along the way, the book develops what has been called "the best analysis of (...) the concept of narrativity currently on offer" (Journal of Literary Theory 2011). This monograph has received the Wolfgang Stegmüller award of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP) in 2009. (shrink)

What, if anything, is wrong with typological thinking? The question is important, for some evolutionary developmental biologists appear to espouse a form of typology. I isolate four allegations that have been brought against it. They include the claim that typological thinking is mystical; the claim that typological thinking is at odds with the fact of evolution; the claim that typological thinking is committed to an objectionable metaphysical view, which Elliott Sober calls the ‘natural state model’; and finally the view (endorsed (...) by Ron Amundson and Günter Wagner) that typological thinking—and specifically evolutionary developmental biology’s typological thinking—is committed to a peculiar form of causation that does not fit neatly into the causal models endorsed by population genetics. I argue that, properly understood, the typological thinking of evolutionary developmental biology does not run into any of these problems. *Received April 2008; revised August 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, CB2 3RH Cambridge, United Kingdom; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Što je distinktivno filozofski problem opažanja? Ovdje se tvrdi da je to konflikt između prirode opažajnog iskustva kakva nam se intuitivno čini, te stanovitih mogućnosti koje su implicitne upravo u ideji iskustva: mogućnosti iluzije i halucinacije. Opažajno iskustvo čini nam se kao odnos prema svojim objektima, vrsta »otvorenosti prema svijetu« koja uključuje izravnu svijest postojećih objekata i njihovih svojstava. Ali ako netko može imati iskustvo iste vrste a da objekt nije tamo – halucinaciju objekta – onda izgleda da opažajno iskustvo (...) ne može esencijalno biti takav odnos. Ovo je fundamentalni filozofski problem opažanja; različite filozofijske teorije opažanja 20. i 21. stoljeća mogu se sagledati kao odgovori na to.What is the distinctively philosophical problem of perception? Here it is argued that it is the conflictbetween the nature of perceptual experience as it intuitively seems to us, and certain possibilitieswhich are implicit in the very idea of experience: possibilities of illusion and hallucination. Perceptualexperience seems to us to be a relation to its objects, a kind of “openness to the world” whichinvolves direct awareness of existing objects and their properties. But if one can have an experienceof the same kind without the object being there – a hallucination of an object – then it seems thatperceptual experience cannot essentially be such a relation. This is the fundamentally philosophicalproblem of perception; the various philosophical theories of perception in the 20th and 21st centuriescan be seen as responses to it. (shrink)

Michael and has argued that species have intrinsic essences. This paper rebuts Devitt’s arguments, but in so doing it shores up the anti-essentialist consensus in two ways that have more general interest. First, species membership can be explanatory even when species have no essences; that is, Tamsin’s membership of the tiger species can explain her stripyness, without this committing us to any further claim about essential properties of tigers. Second, even the views of species that appear most congenial to essentialism—namely (...) phenetic and genotypic cluster accounts—do not entail strong forms of intrinsic essentialism. (shrink)

In response to Hand’s paper, I undertake three tasks. Firstly, I believe that his characterisation of the theory and practice of Community of Inquiry facilitation does not take account of approaches to indoctrination and the idea of philosophical self-effacement that can lessen his worries. Secondly, I will argue that Hand makes some sharp cuts—particularly between justified, controversial and unjustified moral standards—that do not stand up to scrutiny, and that he unnecessarily narrows the scope of moral inquiry. Finally, I will explore (...) the practicalities of these considerations. How should we approach the idea of directive teaching in training facilitators? What should moral inquiry cover? In doing so, I see much of value in Hand’s approach, but also recommend some modifications. (shrink)

There is reason to think that a familiar and frequently used epistemic closure principle is false. Given this, the relevant instance of that principle should be removed from a familiar skeptical argument, and replaced with an instance of a more plausible epistemic closure principle. Once this has been done, however, we see that even if the resulting skeptical argument is unsound, we need deny neither closure nor the claim that we know the things we ordinarily take ourselves to know. Nothing (...) that the skeptic can do, at least with an argument that makes use of an epistemic closure principle, can ever force us to relinquish closure or the utterly vast stretches of knowledge that we ordinarily take ourselves to have. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In “Temporal Passage and the ‘No Alternate Possibilities Argument’”, Jonathan Tallant takes up one objection based on the observation that if time passes at the rate of one second per second there is no other possible rate at which it could pass. The argument rests on the premise that if time passes at some rate then it could have passed at some other rate. Since no alternative rate seems to be coherent, one concludes that time cannot pass at all. (...) The obvious weak point of the NAP is the premise itself. (shrink)

Alex Mesoudi’s book shows cultural evolution to be a mature field, which has already illuminated many instances of cultural change. Mesoudi’s presentation of the discipline nonetheless invites three objections. First, the culture concept it makes use of is not clearly defined; second, Mesoudi’s historical argument which looks back to the modern synthesis in order to predict an analogous synthesis in the social sciences is flawed; third, Mesoudi’s understanding of the positions held by leading figures within social science is shaky.

On December 9, 1999, VA Linux issued shares to the public and left over $900 million on the table for investors. In the prospectus, the investment banker Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) stated it would receive a 7% gross spread as its compensation for underwriting the shares. Yet the SEC alleges some investors paid enormous commissions to CSFB in the form of a kick-back immediately after obtaining the IPO shares. Hence, CSFB had an economic interest in the IPO and there (...) was not a full distribution of shares. This apparent violation of NASD Rule 2110 raises questions as to the credibility of the financial markets. (shrink)

My dissertation explores the nature of artifacts – things like chairs, tables, and pinball machines – and addresses the question of whether there is anything essential to being an artifact and a member of a particular artifact kind. My dissertation offers new arguments against both the anti-essentialist and current essentialist proposals. Roughly put, the view is that artifacts are successful products of an intention to make something with certain features constitutive of an artifact kind. The constitutive features are often functional (...) features, but may include structural, material, aesthetic, and other features. I further explore the ways in which artifacts are mind-dependent and I argue that this dependence is disjunctive. Not only do they depend on the intentions of their makers, but they also can depend on social groups or public norms and thus artifacts have an importantly social dimension and I argue that this disjunctive account applies not to artifact kinds but to individual artifacts depending on their context of creation. (shrink)

People generally develop some degree of competence in general informal reasoning and argument skills, but how do they go beyond this to attain higher expertise? Ericsson has proposed that high-level expertise in a variety of domains is cultivated through a specific type of practice, referred to as ‘deliberate practice’. Applying this framework yields the empirical hypothesis that high-level expertise in informal reasoning is the outcome of extensive deliberate practice. This paper reports results from two studies evaluating the hypothesis. University student (...) participants completed 12 weeks of deliberate practice in informal reasoning. Quantity of practice was recorded by computer, and additionally assessed via self report. The hypothesis was supported: students in both studies showed a large improvement, and practice as measured by computer, was related to amount of improvement in informal reasoning. These findings support adopting a deliberate practice approach when attempting to teach or learn expertise in informal reasoning. (shrink)

Reading James O'apos;Connor's Accumulation Crisis is very confusing. At certain junctures, it reads like the “sequel” to The Fiscal Crisis of the State, elaborating the expanding of his 1973 critique of modem macroeconomic management as a spoils system of special interests. At odier turns, it comes across as a “prequel” to the earlier work, oudining a tortuous logic for the underproduction and accumulation crises that set off the “fiscal crises” he described over a decade earlier. Although not all that new, (...) the plot of the sequel is occasionally interesting. The prequel side of the narrative, however, is very questionable and as old as the hills because, once again, the ancient apparatus of theories of surplus value is trundled out and fired up to “explain” the roots of the current crisis. (shrink)

A small minority of biologists, psychologists and philosophers have recently tried to show, in various ways, that evolutionary psychology is of relevance to politics and to policy makers. Two widely accepted arguments still suffice (with only a little tweaking) to dismiss such attempts to forge a link between evolution and policy. The first denies the link between adaptation and fixity, the second denies that ‘adaptive thinking’ is of strong heuristic benefit. Finally, the silence of many evolutionary explanations with respect to (...) developmental mechanisms should also make us suspicious of the relevance of evolutionary psychology to matters of policy. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that classical theists should think of God as having created morality. In form, my position largely resembles that defended by Richard Swinburne. However, it differs from his position in content in that it evacuates the category of necessary moral truth of all substance and, having effected this tactical withdrawal, Swinburne's battle lines need to be redrawn. In the first section, I introduce the Euthyphro dilemma. In the second, I argue that if necessary moral truths are (...) seen as analytically/logically so, then, pace Swinburne, they cannot be regarded as substantive principles. Thus, seeing necessary moral truths as analytically/logically necessary and independent of God does not threaten God's power or sovereignty and leaves open the possibility that all value is contingent upon His will. In the third section, I turn to consider how the claim that all value is contingent upon God's will might best be understood, arguing that classical theists will want to commit themselves to a relatively strong form of objectivism about moral value (even though this is not needed in order to solve the Euthyphro dilemma). I then give and defend an account of God's creation of contingent moral truths which coheres with what I argue is the most plausible form of this commitment. In the following section, I argue that this account avoids the charge that God is arbitrary in His choice of values and, finally, I argue that it avoids the charge that God may not be said to be good without vacuity. Thus, I conclude that the Euthyphro dilemma does not threaten classical theism. (shrink)

Buchanan and Powell’s book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the evolution of morality. I suggest that they exaggerate the degree to which their view of the evolution of moral progress is committed to a form of moral realism. I also suggest that Darwin’s own approach to the evolution of the moral sense shares more with their view than they may realise. Finally I point to some tensions in their invocation of the concept of the Environment of Evolutionary (...) Adaptedness (EEA). (shrink)

The principal aim of this article is to examine the relations between positioning and belonging in terms of the potential for critique of existing social conditions. The underlying purpose is to inform social scientific engagement with social life in order to illuminate the potential for social transformation via reflexivity. These discussions will be informed by the division of reflexivity into two dimensions: endogenous and referential. It is argued that this enables the social scientist to highlight the pre-reflexive world and render (...) it problematic and demonstrates how the objectivity of the social world is both a presupposition and ongoing achievement of everyday interactions. To that extent, the possibility for social conditions to be otherwise is then open to scrutiny. (shrink)

Paper presented at Cognition, Evolution and Rationality: Cognitive Science for the 21st Century. Oporto, September 2002. To appear in a volume based on that conference edited by Antonio Jose Teiga Zilhao.

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 21-23.

In the first part of this paper I consider whether an academic bioethicist is likely to change the arguments she is prepared to voice if she is in receipt of payment from a corporation. I argue that she is not, so long as a number of conditions are met regarding the size of payment, the values of the academic bioethics community, the degree to which she participates in that community, and the transparency of corporate involvements. In the second half I (...) consider a different concern that one might have with corporate payments that relate to the dubious nature of the functions bioethicists might play within those corporations. I argue that three roles—those of marketer, expert and lobbyist—are best avoided, but that a fourth—the dialectical role—does provide a legitimate niche within which a bioethicist may offer consultation. (shrink)

Popper's logic of scientific discovery and Kuhn's paradigm switches in science have been considered competing schools of thought in the philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge. In the present paper the author establishes a unified three-dimensional framework that synthesizes the quintessential ideas of these schools. Theories are tested for confirmation or falsification in the first dimension; their scope conditions are defined and redefined in the second dimension; and they replace their predecessors to become a dominant theory or possibly (...) even a new paradigm in the third dimension. The development of fertility theory is examined in the three-dimensional framework. This framework helps us understand important aspects of theory construction, and thereby shed light on how to build viable sociological theory. Also discussed are major problems in formulating sociological theory. The overcoming of these problems is a necessary condition for a theory to be examined in the three-dimensional framework, and thereby to become a candidate of a new theoretical paradigm. (shrink)

" All major religious traditions are equal in respect of making common reference to a single transcendent sacred reality. All major traditions are likewise equal in respect of offering some means or other to human salvation. All traditions are to be seen as containing revisable, limited, accounts of the nature of the sacred: none is certain enough in its particular dogmatic formulations to provide the norm for interpreting the others." P. Byrne, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism, p. 12. In this paper, (...) I argue that of the three claims that constitute the form of Religious Pluralism outlined by Peter Byrne in his Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism, the first is something proponents of the theory can't think of themselves as having the resources to defend; the second is something that is in danger of being rendered trivial by the definition of religions offered; however, if one makes it non-trivial, it becomes implausible ; and, even if the first half of the third is right, the second half is wrong. (shrink)

Bennett has said that 'Voluntarism casts no useful light on those aspects of the Meditations that have received the most attention: the truth rule, divine veracity, the relation between those, the Cartesian Circle'. In this paper, I shall draw together various strands from recent Descartes scholarship to argue that this is entirely false. When Descartes's voluntarism is understood as central to his epistemological project, not only does it allow us to make more sense of what he says on all these (...) issues, but also it allows us to see what he says as, on certain assumptions, unassailable. The only difficulty that then remains is that these assumptions are widely held to be necessarily false. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that if the libertarian free will defence were seen to fail because determinism were seen to be true, then another solution to the problem of evil would present itself. I start by arguing that one cannot, by consideration of agents' choices between morally indifferent options, reach any conclusion as to these agents' moral qualities. If certain forms of consequentialism were false, determinism true, and if there were a God who chose to create this universe, then (...) His choice would have been between such options. Consideration of the general nature of the universe God putatively chose to create would not then license any conclusion as His moral qualities. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider various arguments to the effect that natural evils are necessary for there to be created agents with free will of the sort that the traditional free-will defence for the problem of moral evil suggests we enjoy – arguments based on the idea that evil-doing requires the doer to use natural means in their agency. I conclude that, despite prima facie plausibility, these arguments do not, in fact, work. I provide my own argument for there being (...) no possible world in which creatures enjoying this sort of freedom exist yet suffer no natural evil, and conclude that the way is thus open for extending the free-will defence to the problem of natural evil. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The GRW Theory Local Beables for GRW The Flash Ontology Relativistic Flashy GRW The Role of Local Beables The Logical Situation The Methodological Situation.

Brief article on this hedonist, follower of Socrates, and founder of the Cyrenaic school.

Many of those who come to a belief in the God of classical theism do so solely as a result of having had an experience which they believe it is reasonable for them to interpret as a revelation of His existence directly and graciously given to them by God Himself. I shall argue that – at least in the first instance – such people should probably not think of themselves as knowing that there is a God if they are also (...) traditional libertarians and believe in Robert Nozick's theory of knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that a necessary condition of one’s perceiving God is that an experience of the right phenomenological sort be caused in one ‘directly enough’ by God and - bypassing the issue of what is necessary for an experience to be of the right phenomenological sort - discuss some difficulties in finding reasons for thinking that God has or has not ‘directly enough’ caused any such experience.

In this paper, I consider what difference knowledge of outcomes – both past and future – might make to the rationality of praying for them on a traditional theistic model. More specifically, I address four questions: (1)‘Could it be rational to pray for outcomes one knows will obtain?’; (2)‘Could it be rational to pray for outcomes one knows will not obtain?’; (3)‘Could it be rational to pray for outcomes one knows have obtained?’; (4)‘Could it be rational to pray for outcomes (...) one knows have not obtained?’. I argue that, on certain common theistic assumptions, the answer to all of these questions is yes. (Published Online January 15 2007). (shrink)

This paper takes up the themes in the articles and examines not only the environmental changes that are taking place in relation to universities, but also the dynamics of their organizational implications. It argues that there are parallels between managerially and academic professionalism in that both deny context. Arguing for a context-sensitivity that is not dependant, issues of space and governance become important in order to understand forms of knowledge and the relationship between the contexts of production and the contents (...) of what is produced. Universities have different capacities to play at the game of scales and they are judged according to abstract indicators that provide little or no opportunity for learning. Instead of examining these relations, expertise is assumed to be spatial, whilst universities transform themselves in the slipstream of imagined futures as if they were separate from the present and past. Understanding is lost in the process and so too are the opportunities to adequately examine the differences in types of knowledge's that are produced for sustainable futures in contemporary societies. (shrink)

How space – mental, emotional, visual – is implicated in our constructions of reality and our art is the focus of this set of innovative essays. For the first time art theorists and historians, visual artists, literary critics and philosophers have come together to assay the problem of space both within conventional discipline boundaries and across them. What emerges is a stimulating discussion of the problem of embodied space and situated consciousness that will be of interest to the general reader (...) as well as specialists working in the fields of art history and art practice, literature, philosophy and education. (shrink)

This article addresses the question what—if anything—we can and should expect from the practice of international criminal justice. It argues that neither retributive nor purely consequentialist, deterrence-based justifications give sufficient guidance as to what international criminal courts should aim to achieve. Instead, the legal theory of expressivism provides a more viable guide. Contrary to other expressivist views, this article argues for the importance of the trial, not just the punishment, as a form of expressivist messaging. Specifically, we emphasize the communicative (...) aspect of the judicial process. The final section, acknowledging the limited success of international criminal justice so far in terms of fulfilling its expressivist potential, diagnoses the main obstacles to, and opportunities for, expressivist messaging in the contemporary practice of international criminal justice. (shrink)

Television news directors were questioned about their interpretations and implementation of new Radio?Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) guidelines covering potential conflicts of interest such as moonlighting and acceptance of freebies. Nearly half responded that accepting gifts of value is prohibited, but that moonlighting is more acceptable, under certain conditions. Freebies appear most acceptable when they make possible coverage of otherwise inaccessible areas.