This paper explores Kant’s views about the logical form of “I think”-judgments. It is shown that according to Kant, in an important class of cases the prefix “I think” does not contribute to the assertoric, truth-conditional content of judgments of the form “I think that P.” Thus, judgments of this type are often merely judgments that P. The prefix “I think” does mention the subject and his thought, but it does not make the complex judgment a judgment about the subject (...) and his or her thought. Kant argues that there is a distinctive kind of self-consciousness that is adequately expressed by means of this non-assertoric “I think.” The paper explains that understanding Kant’s ideas on the logic of “I think”-judgments is fruitful both for discussions in contemporary analytic philosophy and for an adequate understanding of Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)

This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception.

Synthetic biology is often described as a project that applies rational design methods to the organic world. Although humans have influenced organic lineages in many ways, it is nonetheless reasonable to place synthetic biology towards one end of a continuum between purely ‘blind’ processes of organic modification at one extreme, and wholly rational, design-led processes at the other. An example from evolutionary electronics illustrates some of the constraints imposed by the rational design methodology itself. These constraints reinforce the limitations of (...) the synthetic biology ideal, limitations that are often freely acknowledged by synthetic biology’s own practitioners. The synthetic biology methodology reflects a series of constraints imposed on finite human designers who wish, as far as is practicable, to communicate with each other and to intervene in nature in reasonably targeted and well-understood ways. This is better understood as indicative of an underlying awareness of human limitations, rather than as expressive of an objectionable impulse to mastery over nature. (shrink)

A range of extremely plausible moral principles turn out to generate “deontic cycling”: sets of actions wherein I have stronger reason to do B than A, C than B, and A than C. Indeed, just about anything recognizable as commonsense morality generates deontic cycling. This matters for two reasons. First, it creates a problem for the widely held view that agent-centered rankings can square consequentialism with commonsense morality. Second, it forces a choice between some deeply plausible views about rationality—wherein someone (...) cannot have stronger reason to do A than B, B than C, and C than A—and commonsense morality. (shrink)

Paper presented at Cognition, Evolution and Rationality: Cognitive Science for the 21st Century. Oporto, September 2002. To appear in a volume based on that conference edited by Antonio Jose Teiga Zilhao.

Do accounts of scientific theory formation and revision have implications for theories of everyday cognition? We maintain that failing to distinguish between importantly different types of theories of scientific inference has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the relationship between science and everyday cognition. In this article, we focus on one influential manifestation of this phenomenon which is found in Fodor's well-known critique of theories of cognitive architecture. We argue that in developing his critique, Fodor confounds a variety of distinct claims (...) about the holistic nature of scientific inference. Having done so, we outline more promising relations that hold between theories of scientific inference and ordinary cognition. (shrink)

Philosophers have nothing to lose, and much to gain, by paying close attention to developments in the natural sciences. This insight amounts to a case for a tempered, eclectic naturalism. But the case for naturalism is often overstated. We should not overestimate the heuristic benefits of close attention to scientists’ claims, nor should we give up on traditional “armchair” philosophical methods. We should not draw solely on the natural sciences (at the expense of the humanities) when seeking to enrich and (...) discipline our philosophical theorising. Finally, philosophers should not shy away from criticising some scientists’ claims, at the same time as they learn from others. (shrink)

This paper explores the debate between perfectionists and anti-perfectionists in the context of children. It suggests that the most influential and compelling arguments in favour of anti-perfectionism are adult-centric. It does this by considering four leading reasons given in favour of anti-perfectionism and shows that none apply in the case of children. In so doing, the paper defends a perfectionist account of upbringing from the attacks made against perfectionism more generally. Furthermore, because the refutation of the various anti-perfectionist arguments are (...) made exclusively dealing with children, the paper suggests that the perfectionist view of upbringing is compatible with anti-perfectionist restrictions on dealing with adults. This dual view combining perfectionism for children and anti-perfectionism for adults is referred to as restricted perfectionism. (shrink)

Despite a prevalence of articles exploring links between sport and art in the 1970s and 1980s, philosophers in the new millennium pay relatively little explicit attention to issues related to aesthetics generally. After providing a synopsis of earlier debates over the questions ‘is sport art?’ and ‘are aesthetics implicit to sport?’, a pragmatically informed conception of aesthetic experience will be developed. Aesthetic experience, it will be argued, vitally informs sport ethics, game logic, and participant meaning. Finally, I will argue that (...) embodying pragmatic conceptions of art as its ideal metaphor re-opens space to best realize the deep potential of sport as a meaningful human practice. (shrink)

While different worries about population size are present in public debates, political philosophers often take population size as given. This paper is an attempt to formulate a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian approach to population size: does it make sense to speak of ‘too few’ or ‘too many’ people from the point of view of justice? It argues that, drawing on key features of liberal egalitarian theory, several clear constraints on demographic developments – to the extent that they are under our control (...) – can be formulated. Based on these claims, we can clarify both the grounds and content of our obligations to future generations. (shrink)

I explore the moral implications of four possible futures: a broken future where our affluent way of life is no longer available; a virtual future where human beings spend their entire lives in Nozick's experience machine; a digital future where humans have been replaced by unconscious digital beings; and a theological future where the existence of God has been proved. These futures affect our current ethical thinking in surprising ways. They raise the importance of intergenerational ethics, alter the balance between (...) competing moral theories, and push morality in a more objective direction. (shrink)

In this paper, I evaluate the adequacy of various multiverse hypotheses relative to classical theism in explaining the fine tuning of the universe to life and the fine tuning of our life to the universe. I conclude that, despite its rational attractiveness in explaining the fine tuning of the universe to us in a more conclusive and arguably simpler manner than the God hypothesis, due to its failure to explain the continuing fine tuning of us to the universe, we should (...) discard even the explanatorily strongest multiverse hypothesis, what I call the ’maximal multiverse’ hypothesis, and instead believe in the God hypothesis. (shrink)

Realism criticizes the idea, central to what may be called ‘the priority view’, that philosophy has the task of imposing from the outside general norms of morality or standards of reasonableness on politics understood as the domain of power. According to realism, political philosophy must reveal the specific standards internal to the political practice of handling power appropriately and as it develops in actual circumstances. Framed in those terms, the debate evokes the idea that political power itself is lacking normativity (...) until such time as norms are devised that govern its use. In contrast, this essay identifies a normative dimension internal to power. Power depends on recognition and support in the form of belief. This dependence explains how an interest in power introduces a responsiveness to normative considerations into the domain of politics. (shrink)

An examination of the philosophical issues surrounding prudential value: what it is for something to be good for a person; and well-being: what it is for someone's life to go well. It critically analyzes competing approaches, and proposes a new subjective account that addresses key weaknesses of existing theories.

In the Treatise, Book I, Part iv, Section 2, Hume seeks to explain what causes us to believe that objects continue to exist even when they are not perceived. He argues that we won't be able to prov...

The mind-body problem is the problem of explaining how our mental states, events and processes—like beliefs, actions and thinking—are related to the physical states, events and processes in our bodies. A question of the form, ‘how is A related to B?’ does not by itself pose a philosophical problem. To pose such a problem, there has to be something about A and B which makes the relation between them seem problematic. Many features of mind and body have been cited as (...) responsible for our sense of the problem. Here I will concentrate on two: the fact that mind and body seem to interact causally, and the distinctive features of consciousness. A long tradition in philosophy has held, with René Descartes, that the mind must be a non-bodily entity: a soul or mental substance. This thesis is called ‘substance dualism’ (or ‘Cartesian dualism’) because it says that there are two kinds of substance in the world, mental and physical or material. One reason for believing this is the belief that the soul, unlike the body, is immortal. Another reason for believing it is that we have free will, and this seems to require that the mind is a non-physical thing, since all physical things are subject to the laws of nature. To say that the mind (or soul) is a mental substance is not to say that the mind is made up of some non-physical kind of stuff or material. The use of the term ‘substance’ is rather the traditional philosophical use: a substance is an entity which has properties and persists through change in its properties. A tiger, for instance, is a substance, whereas a hurricane is not. To say that there are mental substances— individual minds or souls—is to say that there are objects which are non-material or non-physical, and these objects can exist independently of physical objects, like a person’s body. These objects, if they exist, are not made of non-physical ‘stuff’: they are not made of ‘stuff’ at all.. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy – and (...) its relationship to continental philosophy – if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength – since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity – and its weakness – since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”. (shrink)

This paper discusses a role playing ethics case suitable for business students in which participants must balance shareholder and stakeholder concerns. Students take on the role of operations manager and are challenged to consider the effects of their choices on the local society as they balance the demands of stockholders, employees, and family when the concerns of the groups come into conflict. The exercise helps students understand the need to consider the ethicalcomponents of business decisions and the difficulties of handling (...) values in conflict. Students learn more about their own values through playing the role of manager. Suggested discussion questions are provided. This note also reviews some of the extant literature on the goals of stakeholder versus shareholder wealth and the role of ethics, and it discusses areas of common ground between the stakeholder/shareholder theories. (shrink)

Television news directors were questioned about their interpretations and implementation of new Radio?Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) guidelines covering potential conflicts of interest such as moonlighting and acceptance of freebies. Nearly half responded that accepting gifts of value is prohibited, but that moonlighting is more acceptable, under certain conditions. Freebies appear most acceptable when they make possible coverage of otherwise inaccessible areas.

There has been increasing use of argument-based approaches in the development of safety-critical systems. Within this approach, a safety case plays a key role in the system development life cycle. The key components in a safety case are safety arguments, which are designated to demonstrate that the system is acceptably safe. Inappropriate reasoning in safety arguments could undermine a system's safety claims which in turn contribute to safety-related failures of the system. The review of safety arguments is therefore a crucial (...) step in the development of safety-critical systems. Reviews are conducted using dialogues where elements of the argument and their relations are proposed and scrutinised. This paper investigates an approach of conducting argument review using dialectical models. After studying five established dialectical models with varying strengths and drawbacks, a new dialectical model specially designed to support persuasion and information-seeking dialogues has been proposed to suit the requir... (shrink)

Tim Blanning & Hagen Schulze: IntroductionJames Sheehan: Art and its Publics, c. 1800Silke Leopold: The Idea of National Opera around 1800John Deathridge: The Invention of German Music, c. 1800Peter Alter: Playing with the Nation: Napoleon and the Culture of NationalismSiegfried Weichlein: Cosmopolitanism, Patriotism, NationalismPeter Mandler: Art in a Cool Climate: The Cultural Policy of the British State in European Context, c. 1780- c. 1850Otto Dann: The Invention of National LanguagesHans-Erich Bödeker: The Debates about Universal History and National History around 1800: (...) A Problem-oriented Historical AttemptVincent Morley: Views of the Past in Irish Vernacular Literature, 1650-1850. (shrink)

In 1873, within two years of the publication of The Descent of Man, Friedrich Max Mueller wrote: There is one difficulty which Mr Darwin has not sufficiently appreciated … There is between the whole animal kingdom on the one side, and man, even in his lowest state, on the other, a barrier which no animal has ever crossed, and that barrier is – Language … If anything has a right to the name of specific difference, it is language, as we (...) find it in man, and in man only … If we removed the name of specific difference from our philosophic dictionaries, I should still hold that nothing deserves the name of man except what is able to speak … a speaking elephant or an elephantine speaker could never be called an elephant.' and ‘If a pig were ever to say to me, “I am a pig” it would ipso facto cease to be a pig’. (shrink)

Abstract The questions of whether the news media are biased, and if so, in what direction, typically generate more heat than light. Here, we review some of the most recent and meritorious empirical studies on media bias. This evidence suggests that several prominent national news outlets have a distinct slant to the left or right, and that exposure to these sources influences both public opinion and voting behavior.

acknowledgements This is not a memoir, it is a description of the world seen by one pair of eyes. This is not intentionally a science book, although it draws on generations of scientific research. Because it is a book about the nature ...

Quince: Bless thee, Bottom, bless thee! Thou art translated.Yet it can happen suddenly, unexpectedly, and most frequently in the half-light-of-glimpses, that we catch sight of another visible order which intersects with ours and has nothing to do with it.This article is a reflection on the process of transformation: whether that be a change of the physical kind undergone by Bottom through the acquisition of a donkey’s head or the inner alteration wrought by a moment of heightened perception of the type (...) recorded by John Berger. I have structured it around four questions: What is transformation? What needs transformation? Who needs to be transformed? How does drama/theatre contribute to transformation? I also... (shrink)

Descartes famously argued that animals were mere machines, without thought or consciousness. Few would now share this view. But if other animals have conscious lives, what are they like, how do they differ from ours, and how would we ever know anything about them? This lecture will address this question by looking at the kinds of thoughts we might share with animals, and looking at philosophical and empirical arguments for how our thoughts might differ from theirs.

Here is one way that philosophers and biologists sometimes speak of Darwin’s explanatory innovation: ‘Eyes, organs of echolocation, camouflage and the like are all wonderful instances of contrivance, of complex adaptation, of good design. Paley and the other natural theologians sought to explain this good design by appeal to an intelligent designer. Darwin, on the other hand, offers us a superior explanation for the appearance of this same property: Darwin shows us that we can explain good design through the action (...) of selection. Indeed, selection is the only process that can explain good design in nature. And that is why evolutionary biologists can continue to use a version of the argument from design called the argument from biological design: when we see an instance of good design in nature, we should infer not the guiding hand of God, but the hand of selection at work.’ -/- . (shrink)

Ecology and Human Emancipation Tim Hayward Humanism vs Prometheanism The entry of ecological considerations into political thought raises new questions about the meaning of human emancipation.* In particular, traditional socialist conceptions of emancipation as a move from a sphere of...

Tim Fisher examines a troubling misconception about philosophy that he noticed his high school students possessed: that when it comes to philosophy, you can never be wrong. He expected incoming philosophy students to hold this belief, but was surprised to learn that even after completing his course, students still held the belief that philosophy had no wrong answers—that all views are equally reasonable. Fisher began to wonder where he went wrong. To rectify this misconception, Fisher details an exercise that he (...) developed for second graders that forces students to justify their beliefs and teaches them to examine why one claim is more or less reasonable than another; the exercise is equally appropriate for high school students. The key to this exercise is to teach students to detach personal opinions from their reasoning. (shrink)

Argues that any state that is constitutionally committed to the recognition of human rights ought to constitutionalise a right to an adequate environment. Rebuts the claim that constitutional provisions relating to the human right to an adequate environment should be made only in the form of a policy statement and not as a fundamental right. Rebuts the further claim that the right to an adequate environment should be placed with those rights of a second order – the ‘social rights’ – (...) rather than among the fundamental rights of a constitution. Problematises the distinction between fundamental and social rights, but also shows why the right to an adequate environment does not resemble a social right. (shrink)

Addresses the doubt about whether, even if legitimately enforceable, a constitutional right to an adequate environment is necessary. The European Union is taken as a context in which that doubt would seem particularly strongly motivated. For the range of existing environmental and human rights provisions which are binding on member states of the EU might already provide the protections that a formally declared right to an adequate environment would aim for. Shows that while those provisions offer significant protections, these nonetheless (...) fall short of what a substantive environmental right with constitutional force would aim to achieve, and so the latter would not be nugatory. (shrink)

Personen erz hlen ihr Leben - eine These dieser Art ist vielerorts popul r. Aber es fehlt bislang an ausgearbeiteten Argumenten f r sie, ebenso wie an einer strengen Definition des Begriffs der Narrativit t. Das vorliegende Buch bietet Abhilfe. Zun chst stellt es einen Beitrag zur Theorie personaler Autonomie dar. Eine Analyse des zentralen Begriffs der Identifikation wird vorgeschlagen; ebenso wird eine anspruchsvolle biographische Bedingung der Autonomie formuliert und begr ndet. Ob wir das tun, was wir wirklich wollen, k (...) nnen wir nur vor dem Hintergrund unseres Wissens ber bestimmte biographische Zusammenh nge entscheiden. Weiter wird eine detaillierte Theorie der Syntax, Semantik und Pragmatik narrativer Sprache entwickelt. Narrativit t basiert nicht nur auf der Form und der Bedeutung von S tzen, sondern hat eine essentielle pragmatische Dimension. Erst vor dem Hintergrund der subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeiten und der empathischen Verm gen von Teilnehmern in Kontexten sind u erungen Geschichten. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird gezeigt, dass die biographischen Zusammenh nge, die relevant f r Autonomie sind, gerade solche sind, von denen wir erz hlen k nnen. Geschichten artikulieren praktische Gr nde, und es zeichnet Personen als autonome Wesen aus, f r diese narrativen Gr nde empf nglich zu sein. Das Buch wurde 2009 mit dem Wolfgang-Stegm ller-Preis der Gesellschaft f r Analytische Philosophie ausgezeichnet. (shrink)

The philosophy of mind and psychiatry seem to be complementary disciplines investigating the same central issues. What is the nature of the mind, of the brain and body, and of their relation? Much of the work of both disciplines is concerned with those central issues.