This paper argues against the moral Turing test as a framework for evaluating the moral performance of autonomous systems. Though the term has been carefully introduced, considered, and cautioned about in previous discussions :251–261, 2000; Allen and Wallach 2009), it has lingered on as a touchstone for developing computational approaches to moral reasoning :98–109, 2015). While these efforts have not led to the detailed development of an MTT, they nonetheless retain the idea to discuss what kinds of action and reasoning (...) should be demanded of autonomous systems. We explore the flawed basis of an MTT in imitation, even one based on scenarios of morally accountable actions. MTT-based evaluations are vulnerable to deception, inadequate reasoning, and inferior moral performance vis a vis a system’s capabilities. We propose verification—which demands the design of transparent, accountable processes of reasoning that reliably prefigure the performance of autonomous systems—serves as a superior framework for both designer and system alike. As autonomous social robots in particular take on an increasing range of critical roles within society, we conclude that verification offers an essential, albeit challenging, moral measure of their design and performance. (shrink)

Husserl beruft sich immer wieder programmatisch auf Platon als den Gründervater der europäischen Philosophie, arbeitet jedoch die Bezüge der Phänomenologie zum Platonismus nie auf - obwohl er die "historische Rückbesinnung" auf die Urstiftung seines Denkens als wesentlichen Bestandteil der "Selbstbesinnung auf ein Selbstverständnis dessen hin, worauf man eigentlich hinaus will, als der man ist, als historisches Wesen" charakterisiert. Die vorliegende Arbeit will diese Reflexion leisten. Ihr Gegenstand ist mithin die Transformation Platonischer Gedanken in Husserls Phänomenologie. Dabei werden sechs Problemgebiete thematisiert: (...) A) Philosophie als Wissenschaft, B) Philosophie als Ethik, C) Philosophie als Polemik, D) Philosophie und das Ende der Lebenswelt, E) Philosophie und das Eigenrecht des Eidetischen, F) Philosophie und das Absolute. Den Abschnitten folgen jeweils kritische Erwägungen zu den Spannungen, die vor dem Platonischen Hintergrund innerhalb der Phänomenologie sichtbar werden. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass die Phänomenologie tatsächlich als eine eigenwillige Endstiftung des Platonismus betrachtet werden kann, wodurch sich eine neue Perspektive auf ihre programmatische und systematische Grundkonfiguration ergibt. (shrink)

As a way to address both ominous and ordinary threats of artificial intelligence, researchers have started proposing ways to stop an AI system before it has a chance to escape outside control and cause harm. A so-called “big red button” would enable human operators to interrupt or divert a system while preventing the system from learning that such an intervention is a threat. Though an emergency button for AI seems to make intuitive sense, that approach ultimately concentrates on the point (...) when a system has already “gone rogue” and seeks to obstruct interference. A better approach would be to make ongoing self-evaluation and testing an integral part of a system’s operation, diagnose how the system is in error and to prevent chaos and risk before they start. In this paper, we describe the demands that recent big red button proposals have not addressed, and we offer a preliminary model of an approach that could better meet them. We argue for an ethical core that consists of a scenario-generation mechanism and a simulation environment that are used to test a system’s decisions in simulated worlds, rather than the real world. This EC would be kept opaque to the system itself: through careful design of memory and the character of the scenario, the system’s algorithms would be prevented from learning about its operation and its function, and ultimately its presence. By monitoring and checking for deviant behavior, we conclude, a continual testing approach will be far more effective, responsive, and vigilant toward a system’s learning and action in the world than an emergency button which one might not get to push in time. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 47, Issue 4, Page 412-424, Fall 2019.

The Reformed theological tradition has maintained that faith consists in trust, with that trust involving belief of certain doctrinal propositions. This paper has two aims. First, it contributes towards rehabilitating this conception of faith. I start, accordingly, by setting out the Reformers’ basic case: faith consists in trust because faith is a response to the promises of God, by which the Christian receives God’s forgiveness and is united with God. This argument is independent of any commitment to nondoxasticism or doxasticism (...) about faith. Second, it argues for a methodological commitment which the Reformers’ conception of faith-as-trust complies with, which I think is independently compelling, and which has significant implications for contemporary debates on faith: the kind of faith that matters is that which enables the individual to stand justified, or righteous, before God. Philosophical accounts of faith are unavoidably entangled with theological disputes about justification. (shrink)

by Victor Farías, translated from Spanish and German into French by Myriam Benarroch and Jean-Baptiste Grasset, preface by Christian Jambet. Editions Verdier, 332 pp., Fr125 (paper).

The Kantian account of political authority holds that the state is a necessary and sufficient condition of our freedom. We cannot be free outside the state, Kantians argue, because any attempt to have the ‘acquired rights’ necessary for our freedom implicates us in objectionable relations of dependence on private judgment. Only in the state can this problem be overcome. But it is not clear how mere institutions could make the necessary difference, and contemporary Kantians have not offered compelling explanations. I (...) present a detailed analysis of the problems Kantians identify with the state of nature and the objections they face in claiming that the state overcomes them. I then sketch a response on behalf of Kantians. The key idea is that only under state institutions can a person can make claims of acquired right without presupposing that she is by nature exceptional in her capacity to bind others. (shrink)

Two problems continue to haunt Heideggerian scholarship and to pose needless obstacles to those who seek to enter his thought. One is the almost ritualistic repetition of the master’s terminology—especially at its most manneristic—on the part of his disciples. Another is the tendency, which is found in Heidegger as well as in his disciples, to hypostasize “being” into an autonomous “other” that seems to function on its own apart from entities and from man. Both of these problems gather around Heidegger’s (...) key word Ereignis and therefore around his interpretation of the history of philosophy, and they obscure a clear insight into what he was trying to say. (shrink)

Thomas C. Vinci argues that Kant's Deductions demonstrate Kant's idealist doctrines and have the structure of an inference to the best explanation for correlated domains. With the Deduction of the Categories the correlated domains are intellectual conditions and non-geometrical laws of the empirical world. With the Deduction of the Concepts of Space, the correlated domains are the geometry of pure objects of intuition and the geometry of empirical objects.

Habit and habitualisation play an important role in Husserl's phenomenology, yet one aspect of habituality has been somewhat overlooked, namely the dimension of authenticity/inauthenticity. While authenticity in Heidegger has received a lot of attention, inauthenticity in Husserl is less well researched, although, as I will show, it is of equal importance to his overall theorising. The central aim of this paper is to explore the authenticity/inauthenticity-distinction in the various domains of habitualisation and to establish its fundamental importance for Husserl. In (...) the first, introductory part of this paper I offer a few remarks on how to understand and categorise Husserl's transcendental take on habits; I also introduce the important distinction between authentic and inauthentic habits and authenticity and inauthenticity in general. In the second part I present the problem of mechanisation as a form of inauthentic habitualisation as it appears in Husserl's phenomenologies of ethics and, more importantly, science. The third part concludes the paper with a reflection on how phenomenology is programmatically aimed against any form of inauthenticity, and on how it might or might not achieve this goal. (shrink)

The historical continuity of spinal catastrophism, traced across multiform encounters between philosophy, psychology, biology, and geology. Drawing on cryptic intimations in the work of J. G. Ballard, Georges Bataille, William Burroughs, Andre Leroi-Gourhan, Elaine Morgan, and Friedrich Nietzsche, in the late twentieth century Daniel Barker formulated the axioms of spinal catastrophism: If human morphology, upright posture, and the possibility of language are the ramified accidents of natural history, then psychic ailments are ultimately afflictions of the spine, which itself is a (...) scale model of biogenetic trauma, a portable map of the catastrophic events that shaped that atrocity exhibition of evolutionary traumata, the sick orthograde talking mammal. Tracing its provenance through the biological notions of phylogeny and "organic memory" that fueled early psychoanalysis, back into idealism, nature philosophy, and romanticism, and across multiform encounters between philosophy, psychology, biology, and geology, Thomas Moynihan reveals the historical continuity of spinal catastrophism. From psychoanalysis and myth to geology and neuroanatomy, from bioanalysis to chronopathy, from spinal colonies of proto-minds to the retroparasitism of the CNS, from "railway spine" to Elizabeth Taylor's lost gill-slits, this extravagantly comprehensive philosophical adventure uses the spinal cord as a guiding thread to rediscover forgotten pathways in modern thought. Moynihan demonstrates that, far from being an fanciful notion rendered obsolete by advances in biology, spinal catastrophism dramatizes fundamental philosophical problematics of time, identity, continuity, and the transcendental that remain central to any attempt to reconcile human experience with natural history. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Logic of God Incarnate. By THOMAS V. MORRIS. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. Pp. 220. $19.95. Thomas V. Morris, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, has written a technical yet provocative study on the Incarnation. As a faithful Christian he believes in and desires to defend the traditional Christian doctrine of the Incarnation proclaimed in the New Testament and defined (...) by the early councils of the Church, especially Chalcedon, that is, that Jesus is the One eternal Son existing in two natures. He also holds that, while the truth of the Incarnation is revealed, it must nonetheless stand the test of logic and reason. The Incarnation cannot be illogicaJ or meaningless. " If the church has been guided by God in such matters as the formulation of its creeds, conciliar decrees, and catechisms,.... we would not expect glaring logical flaws in its central doctrinal affirmations" (p. 46). The stated purpose of Morris's study is to defend the traditional doctrine against those who would hold it to be logically incoherent and meaningless. "In the course of thinking about the Incarnation for some years now, I have come to see that a few simple metaphysical distinctions and a solid dose of logical care will suffice to explicate and defend the doctrine against all extant criticisms of a philosophical nature" (p. 9). Morris meticulously analyzes and critiques a number of arguments that oppose the possibility of coherence of the Incarnation by attempting to demonstrate that such arguments are.either false and illogical themselves, or that they do not apply to a true understanding of the Incarnation. Moreover, Morris proposes a novel understanding of the Incarnation which he believes is both logical and intelligible, and which conforms to the Christian tradition. This goal of upholding the intelligibility of the Incarnate leads Morris to a three-fold task. He first of all must refute his chief adversaries, those who would deny the sensibleness of saying God became man in Jesus. Such critics deny the validity of the Incarnation on the ground..'! that it is meaning·less, and the'l'efore impossible to juxtapose the incommensurable. attributes of divinity and humanity, e.g., perfection/imperfection, immutability/corruptibility. They hold that Jesus could not have had both these sets of properties at once (cf. p. 20). Morris refuses to capitulate to such arguments. He nevertheless insists that any solution to the issue which would undermine human logic or which would fail to uphold the Christian's belief is no solution at all (cf. p. 32). 367 368 BOOK REVIEWS Secondly, Morris's task leads him to refute any attempts at a " OneNature " solution, which would "squash" together the human and divine natures in Jesus to form a single nature. Such proposals jeopardize either the integrity of Jesus's divinity (Arianism) or his humanity (Docetism, Monophysitism), inevitably composing a mythical tertium quid (cf. pp. 33-38). Morris presents a clear case against such corruptions of the Incarnation. Thirdly, Morris's task brings him to analyze contemporary kenotic Christology. He thoroughly discusses this approach, for the reason that it is directly involved in the issue at hand, namely, the incompatibility between divine and human properties in Christ. Secondarily, however, Morris's interest in kenoticism reflects his own hope that some variation of the approach might posibly arrive at a Christological solution (cf. p. 92). While he ultimately rejects kenoticism, Morris flirts with the various alternatives, and, as we shall see, his own perception of the Incarnation remains tinged with a kenotic flavor. How then is it possible to predicate of one and the same individual divine and human attributes intelligibly and coherentlyT To use contemporary computer jargon, the question might be phrased: is it possible that God and man can he "incarnation-friendly¥" Morris believes so. Morris first of all sets out to define the terms-divine nature and human nature. He believes part of the incompatibility problem lies in attributing to Jesus's humanity unnecessarily hostile aspects. He distinguishes between being "merely human" and being "fully human"· To be " merely human " is to possess not only those properties that narrowly define one's nature or kind, such as rationality, but... (shrink)

ABSTRACT Using a five-point Likert scale survey and a follow-up open-ended questionnaire, this study examined Chinese participants’ perceptions of their ethical responsibilities as educational researchers as well as their ethical awareness as human subjects. The participants were 418 faculty and graduate students from two specific Chinese schools, where the first two educational research ethics committees were recently established in Chinese higher education. Results indicate that participants demonstrate basic understanding of their ethical responsibilities as educational researchers and develop their general sense (...) of ethical awareness as human subjects. Further, there are significant gender, faculty versus graduate student status, and research experience effects on their perceptions of general ethical issues in educational research. Important implications for research ethics education in China are discussed. (shrink)

L’affaire Faye: Johannes Fritsche’s bizarre Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1999) mistranslates every key term in Sein und Zeit §74 and distorts the entire book. Gaëtan Pégny’s justification of Emmanuel Faye’s mistranslations of Heidegger is beyond irresponsible. François Rastier’s “Open Letter to Philosophy Today” lends uncritical support to Faye’s dubious “scholarship.”.

Research Articles Thomas G. West, Social Philosophy and Policy, FirstView Article.

Most people believe that the rights of others sometimes require us to act in ways that have even substantially sub-optimal outcomes, as viewed from an axiological perspective that ranks outcomes objectively. Bringing about the optimal outcome, contrary to such a requirement, is an ‘optimific wronging’. It is less clear, however, that we are required to prevent optimific wrongings. Perhaps the value of the outcome, combined with the relative weakness of prohibitions on allowing harm as compared to those against doing harm, (...) justifies non-intervention. In this article, I consider arguments to that effect, focusing on a recent paper in this journal by Andreas Mogensen. I argue that while we do not, in general, do wrong by failing to prevent optimific wrongings, we are nevertheless not permitted, in key cases, to refrain from intervening on the grounds that not intervening will secure the optimal outcome. (shrink)

Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially important forms of trustworthiness solely in terms of the instrumentally rational seeking of one’s interests, in response to external sanctions or rewards. A richer psychology is required. So, second, possession of moral character is a plausible explanation of some socially important instances when people are trustworthy. I defend this conclusion against the influential account of trust as ‘encapsulated interest’, given by Russell Hardin, on which most (...) trustworthiness is explained by the interest of continuing relationship. (shrink)

Thomas Alured Faunce, College of Law, Fellows Road, Acton, Canberra ACT 0200, Australian National University, Fax: 61 2 61253971, Email: Thomas.Faunce{at}anu.edu.au ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//-->This paper sets out to analyse three different academic proposals for addressing the needs of the poor in relation to new, rather than ‘essential’ medicines. It focuses particularly on research and development prize funds, a health impact fund system and a multilateral treaty on health technology cost-effectiveness evaluation and (...) competitive tender. It compares the extent to which each responds to the ‘market fundamentalist’ philosophy and begins to analyse their respective strengths and weaknesses. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

A half century ago electronic fetal monitoring was rushed into clinical use with the promise that the secrets of fetal heart rate decelerations had been discovered and that the newly discovered knowledge would prevent cerebral palsy with just in time cesarean sections preventing babies from experiencing asphyxia, which was thought to be the primary cause of cerebral palsy. In the years since electronic fetal monitoring’s debut, it has been discovered that asphyxia is a rare cause of cerebral palsy. At the (...) same time electronic fetal monitoring use increased to 85% of all labors, the C-section rate increased to 33% without an attributable decrease in the rate of cerebral palsy. What went wrong with electronic fetal monitoring? The answer lies in a new analysis of the physiologic theories concerning fetal heart rate decelerations, demonstrating that the earlier electronic fetal monitoring theories were wrong. This revelation is only the latest evidence that electronic fetal monitoring use today... (shrink)

Is there a justified presumption that a speaker is testifying sincerely? Anti-reductionism about testimony claims that there is, absent reasons to the contrary. Yet why believe this, given the actuality and prevalence of lies and deception? I examine one argument that may be appropriated to meet this challenge, David Lewis's claim that truthfulness is a convention. I argue that it fails, and that the supposition that there is a presumption of sincerity remains unsupported. The failure of Lewis's argument is instructive, (...) however, for it shows us a better way of approaching language use than the standard anti-reductionist treatment. As speech is an intentional action, so a presumption of the sincerity or otherwise of others' testimony must be explicable in the terms we normally use to explain action. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs Justin Martyr’s justification for giving evaluative priority to practical rather than theoretical activity when determining whether a human life qualifies as godlike. I argue Justin does so because he believes reason—expressed in both practical and theoretical contexts—is the location of value in human life, but that necessary limits on theoretical success mean we should look primarily to someone’s practical activities when determining the overall value of that person’s life. To show this, I first reconstruct key elements of (...) Justin’s action theory, demonstrating the centrality of reason to his understanding of practical action. Then, I show that Justin believes reason’s expression in practical contexts is valuable in two ways, first, human reason stands in a value-conferring relationship to the divine, and second, practical action is directly imitative of God's creative activity. I then argue that Justin believes God’s essence is unknowable, which provides several possible reasons to grant evaluative priority to practical rather than theoretical activity. Throughout, my analysis of Justin aims to show the intrinsic interest of Justin’s philosophical reflections while also offering a new perspective on how to interpret accounts of godlikeness in contemporaneous philosophical sources. (shrink)

Thomas Weber's book comprises a series of biographical reflections about people who influenced Gandhi, and those who were, in turn, influenced by him. Whilst previous literature tended to focus on Gandhi's political legacy, Weber's book explores the spiritual, social and philosophical resonances of these relationships, and it is with these aspects of the Mahatma's life in mind, that the author selects his central protagonists. These include friends such as Henry Polak and Hermann Kallenbach, who are not as well known (...) as those usually cited, but who left a deep impression nevertheless, and motivated some of Gandhi's major life changes. Conversely, the work of luminaries such as E. F. Schumacher and Gene Sharp reveal the Mahatma's influence in arenas which are not traditionally associated with his thinking. Weber's book offers intriguing insights into the life and thought of one of the most significant figures of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Object-hood is central to Husserl’s work, yet he employs several different notions of object-hood without clarifying the differences; his work thus offers rich and nuanced reflections on object-hood, but in a theoretically underdeveloped, at times even paradoxical, form. This paper aims to develop Husserl’s theory of objects systematically. In order to achieve this I distinguish five object-concepts operative in Husserl’s phenomenology and prove that they are not co-extensional. I also argue that they form a layer in terms of transcendental constitution, (...) one implying the other. I conclude the paper by exploring Husserl’s paradoxical claim that the absolute is not an object. From these considerations, two meta-phenomenological lessons emerge: object-hood is not total ; yet we cannot escape objectification while engaged in phenomenological reflection. (shrink)

These are two of the questions that inform the extraordinary open letter that Martin Heidegger published in 1955 in a Festschrift celebrating Ernst Jünger's sixtieth birthday.2 Heidegger's letter was in response to an essay that Jünger had contributed six years earlier, in 1949, to a Festschrift on Heidegger's own sixtieth birthday. So there was a certain reciprocity in the exchange: a favor returned, a public gesture of respect mirroring an earlier one.

The rich have two defining capabilities: independence from and command over others. These make being wealthy very pleasant indeed, but they are also toxic to democracy. First, I analyse the mechanisms by which the presence of very wealthy individuals undermines the two pillars of liberal democracy, equality of citizenship and legitimate social choice. Second, I make a radical proposal. If we value the preservation of democracy we must limit the amount of wealth any individual can have and still be a (...) citizen of our polity. (shrink)

Aristotle describes human happiness as a life of virtuous activity in Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics but as a life of contemplative activity and a life of ethically virtuous activity in Book Ten. In which kind of life does Aristotle ultimately believe that happiness consists? The answer lies in the role of philosophical wisdom within ethically virtuous activity. I argue that philosophical wisdom has a dual role: its exercise is the end of ethically virtuous activity and the virtue by (...) which that end is rationally apprehended. Just as ethically virtuous activity depends on the exercise of philosophical wisdom in this dual way, so human happiness can be understood as a single life of virtuous activity whose end is the exercise of philosophical wisdom in contemplative activity. The exercise of philosophical wisdom will include ethically virtuous activity as an end that includes what is desired for its sake. (shrink)

This paper presents an original interpretation of John Duns Scotus’s theory of hylomorphism. I argue that Scotus thinks, contrary to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, that at least some of the extended parts of a substance—paradigmatically the organs of an animal—are themselves substances. Moreover, Scotus thinks that the form of corporeity is nothing more than the substantial forms of these organic parts. I offer an account of how Scotus thinks that the various extended parts of an animal are substantially unified. (...) First, a plurality of substances can become parts of a complex substance if they are essentially ordered to one another in the order of final causality. Second, a plurality of substances do become parts of a complex substance if they are together informed by a soul. The paper closes with some reflections on some of the ramifications of the substancehood of organic parts on the function of soul. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE CASE FOR SPIRIT CHRISTOLOGY: SOME REFLECTIONS THOMAS WEINANDY, O.F.M., CAP. Greyfriars Hall, University of Oxford IN THE JUNE, 1992, issue of Theological Studies Roger Haight, S.J., of the Weston School of Theology, authored an essay entitled "The Case for Spirit Christology." 1 In the December, 1992, issue of the same journal John Wright, S.J., of the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley, wrote a critical response entitled: (...) "Roger Haight's Spirit Christology." 2 While I fully endorse Wright's reservations, here I wish to offer some of my own criticisms as well as expand upon some of his.3 In order for a Spirit Christology to be viable Haight believes that it must fulfill six criteria: 1) It must adequately explain why Christians believe that their salvation is found in Jesus; 2) It must be faithful to the Bible; 3) It must uphold the teaching of the Councils, especially Nicaea and Chalcedon; 4) It must be intelligible and coherent; 5) It must respond to contemporary concerns, specifically the relationship of Jesus to the founders of other 1 Roger Haight, S.J., "The Case for Spirit Christology," Theological Studies 53(1992): 257-287. Hereafter referred to in the text by page numbers. 2 John Wright, S.J., "Roger Haight's Spirit Christology," Theological Studies 53(1992) : 729-735. 3 While this article will focus exclusively on Haight's Spirit Christology, much of what will be said here, by way of criticism, can be applied equally to other expressions of Spirit Christology, since the various forms are quite similar. Haight himself relies heavily upon and substantially agrees with G. W. H. Lampe, " The Holy Spirit and the Person of Christ," in Christ, Faith and History, ed. S. W. Sykes and J. P. Clayton (Cambridge: University Press, 1972) 111-130; and God as Spirit (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977). For other recent examples of Spirit Christology see Haight's footnote 1, p. 257. 173 174 THOMAS WEINANDY, O.F.M., CAP. religions; 6) It must be able to stimulate and empower Christian life (see 260-262). As in Wright's response, I wish to examine I-Iaight's Spirit Christology in light of these criteria. I will begin with an extensive examination of Haight's second criterion-faithfulness to scripture-for it is most central to his whole enterprise. Then, more succinctly, I will address his other criteria. Biblical Revelation and Religious Language The central, and therefore fatal, flaw within Haight's Spirit Christology is that his understanding of '.' God as Spirit," upon which the whole of his Christology is founded, is itself non-biblical. To discern Haight's understanding of " God as Spirit," we must first examine his notion of religious language and the philosophy sustaining it. For Haight, "the medium through which religious experience takes place may be called a symbol, making all religious knowledge symbolic knowledge. A symbol is that through which something else is made present and known; a symbol mediates a perception and knowledge of something other" (263). While the symbol makes the presence of God known, yet, precisely because it is a symbol, God is beyond or transcends what is symbolized. The symbol " both makes God present and points away from itself to a God who is other than itself" (263). Thus the symbolized " is" and " is not" the symbol (263). Haight argues then that the biblical symbol, " the Spirit of God " refers to God and is " materially and numerically identical with God. God as Spirit is God" (266). However, God as Spirit " indicates God at work, as active, and as power, energy, or force that accomplishes something" (266-267). God as Spirit refers not to God as he is immanent in himself, but to God as he is "outside of himself," within the order of time and history. Haight recognizes that the Old Testament also uses " Word" and " Wisdom" as symbols along with " Spirit," but " all of these symbols are basically the same insofar as they point to the same generalized experience of God outside of God's self and im- THE CASE FOR SPIRIT CHRISTOLOGY 175 manent in the world in presence and active power" (267). While Haight acknowledges that these symbolic... (shrink)