Jesus of Nazareth, like Socrates, left nothing behind written by himself. Yet, the records of his teaching indicate a rich interest in dialogic pedagogy, reflected in his use of the parable, primarily an oral genre, as a dialogic provocation. Working at the interface of pedagogy, theology and philosophy, this article explores the parable of the Good Samaritan from the perspective of dialogic pedagogy. It employs an analytical approach termed diacognition, developed from the notions of dialogue, position and cognition, to analyse (...) the moves within the parable and the teaching situation in which it is located. The article explores how Jesus engages the dialogue of and around the parable to position and reposition his interlocutor, provoking a re-cognition of what it means to love one’s neighbour. It concludes by reflecting on the implications of this analysis for the relation of meaning to knowing and doing. (shrink)

This essay compares Aquinas' understanding of the precepts of justice with the various accounts of moral rules developed in the debate over proportionalism among contemporary moral theologians. It is argued that both sides in this debate oversimplify Aquinas' account of moral rules so drastically as to misread him. Moreover, it is argued that because Aquinas' account reflects a sense of the communal context for moral discernment, it is superior to both traditionalism and proportionalism.

In the English translation of Giorgio Agamben's Homo Sacer, the concepts of the "norm" and "normal" are ambiguously replaced by "rule" and "regular." Important distinctions, inherited directly from Carl Schmitt are thereby obscured. Kurt Hildebrandt, whose work on the norm is more explicitly biopolitical, provides further contextualization for Schmitt's legal theory; likewise, Georges Canguilhem has analyzed the biological metaphors latent within the concept of the juridical norm. In conclusion I argue that it also makes sense to read Agamben's work in (...) the context of the normative discourse. (shrink)

According to what one might call ‘indirect” forms of utilitarian thinking, the proper end of all human action is the greatest happiness of the greatest number of individuals, but due to the fallibility of moral agents this end cannot, and must not, be directly pursued. Instead, according to at least one version of the indirect theory, moral agents have a duty to act in conformity with a set of general rules which, in their turn, have been designed to promote (...) the greatest happiness of humankind. But acts which conform to such general rules can under exceptional circumstances occasion more suffering than happiness. This is clearly problematical to indirect utilitarians. If they follow the rules regardless of the evil consequences, it can be argued that they have abandoned the basic principles of utilitarianism. If, on the other hand, they refuse to follow the rules which normally promote the general good, their view can be seen to collapse into the direct form of the creed. (shrink)

Therapy for metaphysics -- Concepts, rules, and the spirit of recognition -- Meaning and meanings -- Reference and presence -- Truth and correspondence -- Emancipating theology.

The attention to the deductive method began with Imam Al-Ash’ari and the establishment of the rules of theorizing from the first moment of the emergence of the Ash’ari school of thought at the hands of the founder of the school of thought, Abu Al-Hasan Al-Ash’ari, and the scholars who followed after him who wrote theological works. This reflects the great care of the Ash’arism in rooting and theorizing the methods of theory, and setting the methodological rules of (...) reasoning, so he dealt with The research examines the most important comprehensive theological rules through which the Ash’ari reasoned in the doctrinal issues on which Ash’ari theological thought was founded, taking into account the extent of stability or change that occurred in some of these rules along the path of the Ash’ari doctrine. The aim of this study was to answer an important methodological question in formulating the verbal thinking curriculum: It is: What is the impact of comprehensive verbal rules in achieving intellectual consistency and methodological consistency in the theory of verbal reasoning according to the Ash’arism between theory and application? The answer to the nature of this research required delving into the journey of exploring the idea of comprehensive verbal grammar in the theological heritage. It was appropriate for this task to adopt the historical approach in collecting the material and searching for comprehensive grammar in its context from the verbal works approved in the Ash’arite school. It was necessary to study the origins of the theory of verbal grammar. Comprehensive and anticipating the methodological features governing inference, adopting the analytical approach; The approach adopted in this study was a combined approach of the two approaches: historical and analytical, in order to reach the impact of comprehensive verbal rules in both theoretical and applied studies. (shrink)

The subject “rule”, which is one of the most fundamental issues of the Islamic legal theory (usūl al-fiqh), has been in the center of methodological debates. There is one important term in this regard, which should be studied very carefully: Khiṭāb(speech) of the God. It is because that, especially since the first period of Islam, it has been taken with some significant terms in the field of Kalāmsuch as Husn (pretty; good), Qubh (ugly; evil), and the quality of God’s talk. (...) Yet, adopting this term in the description of the “rule” shows that Fiqh is based on divine inspiration, and it also emphasizes that even though there are some differences in details, wisdom of human being is not ignored when adjudicating. Moreover, it suggests that the validity or methodological accuracy of the “rule” which is adjudicated with ruling case is related to the connection through the term speech or divine inspiration. In this regard, Kalāmdimension of the term and its affect to legal theoretical discussions are very important in terms of historical process of the definition of the “rule” in Islamic law. In this study, I tried to examine whether or not the term “khiṭābof the God” which is used in the definition of the “rule” formed a limitation for consideration of legal evidence in Islamic law and if there is any limitation for the legal evidence regarding being only in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah due to this definition.SummaryThe “hukm (rule, arbritation, judgment, God’s will)”-as the backbone notion in usūl al-fiqhis one of the significant key notions discussed in the legal theory. Specifically, the term “khitabullah” mentioned in the definition of hukmis noteworthy to investigate. Since the early formation period of Islamic law, the term khitabullahhas been embraced along with the theological subjects: “husnand qubuh(the good and evil) and kalām(the attribute of speech to Allah)”. The term “khitabullah” in the definition of hukmemphasizes that indeed the source of fiqhis the revelation (wahy) and also emphasizes that the function of reason (‘aql) is not ignored in the process of adjudication- even if there are some nuances in details.Additionally, it presents that the validity or methodological accuracy of the “rule” which is adjudicated with ruling a case is connected to the term speech (khitāb), or in other words to revelation (wahy).On the whole, in the legal theory, the rule of Sharī‘ah is defined as God’s khitab(the communication of God), which means the demand of God relating to the acts of those who are subject of law or the effect of the khitābon the acts of those persons. Although, in the early formative period various explanations were made about what the rule is, it can be understood that the present definition of hukmbegan to evolve towards the end of the 5thcentury (A. H.). It is clear that al-Ghazālī had an impact on the formation of this definition. It is because al-Ghazālī defined the rule of Sharī‘ahas “the communication from God relating to an act of the person who is the subject of law”. After al-Ghazālī, al-Rādī and al-Baydāwī added to al-Ghazālī’s definition the words “iqtidā and takhyīr” and Ibn Hājib added “wad‘an”. Whereas in the Mutakallimun(theologians) tradition, Ibn Hacib's definition was preferred, Fuqaha(jurists) tradition chose two definitions-resembling each other: “Those coming to exist with the khitāb” and “the effect of God’s khitāb”.Along with al-Ghazālī’s definition, the concept of khitābcarved out a niche for itself in it and became the main element of the definition. It is understood that some discussions in the field of theology, such as husn-qubhand God’s attribute of speech have been effective on the interpretation of the concept of khitāb. The Ash‘arilegal theorists argue that the good and evil are not attributes of the self / the acts, whereas the Maturidi legal theorists argue that the exploration and determination of these attributes is rational and thus, the verdict reached via this rationale is lawful. The Maturidi legal theorists initiated the concept of being subject of law with the concept Sharī‘ah and in the line with this opinion; they defined hukmon the basis of khitāb. On the other hand, the Mutazilites’ claiming the attribute of good and evil are inherent feature of the act, did not define hukmon the basis of the khitābaccording to their theological understanding. The word of khitābassessed with God’s eternal speech (al-kalām al-azalī) has been approached from various aspects: for instance, whether the presence of the addressee is mandatory. The early Asharites scholars (mutaqaddimun), in particular Imam Asharī, did not entitle the eternal speech as khitāb. They consider that the presence of the interlocutor is necessary in the conversion of Kalāminto khitāb. The mutaakhirunAsharites (successors of the early Asharites scholars) did not consider the presence of the interlocutor necessary, thus they viewed the eternal speech as khitāb. The former identification of the hukmwith khitābby the early Ashari legal theorists caused to the problem of whether hukmis adventitious or not. Therefore, this approach was criticised by the Mutazilites. On the other hand, the Maturidi and Mutezilite legal theorists accept that hukmis adventitious; hence they do not consider as a problem naming the eternal speech of God as khitāb.When the historical course is examined, it can be said that one of the important aspects of the development of hukm’s definition is the use of khitāb. Khitābin some cases is used without possessive construction, in other cases it is used with possessive construction with God, or in possessive construction with shar’ or Shāri’. The most important one within these possessive constructions is the notion “khitaballah”. Therefore, it is necessary for khitaballahto be approached from the angle of the legal theory. In comparison to other terms, this notion narrowed the scope of the rule down. In the meanwhile, it raised the question: how the rule deduced via legal evidences can be incorporated in khitāb? As a consequence of this question, some legal theorists, such as Tūfī, proposed another definition by adducing this question.Although it is commonly accepted that the rules deduced via other evidences are within the context of the khitāb, there are also different descriptions about the concept of khitaballah. The rule is not limited to khitaballahin the conception of traditional interpretation accepting the khitābas eternal speech or literal speech (al-kalām al-lafzī). Because either all evidences are within the context of the khitāb,which is the eternal speech or other evidences are within the context of the khitāb,which is the literal speech. Thus, each result coming to exist with the other evidences is part of the Islamic law. But not all of these rules are considered equal to each other. Because each rule which is deduced from indisputable origin (qatii al-thubut) and is deduced from completely explicit sources (qatii al-dalala) are accepted as the word of God or the Prophet. On the other hand, other rules deduced via jurisprudence- in other words by jurist’s own value of judgment is viewed as the virtual rule (al-hukm al-zāhir). Such rules do not express absolute certainty. It is unacceptable for these rules to be described as the word of God or the Prophet. In this way, it is clearly understood that the concept of khitaballahmentioned in the description do not introduce restriction to the evidences ofSharī‘ah.We do not see a contradiction when the indefinite rules of Islamic law included in the context of khitāb. Because ijtihāddoes not aim to produce a new rule, on the contrary it functions in order to find out the already existing rules. The legitimacy of the rule obtained through ijtihādemerges from the way that this rule is deduced from the khitāb,which directly or indirectly represents the divine will. In addition, according to us, this legitimacy is not merely limited to versification and conception of the khitāb, but it also includes the function of the reason in (reasonable of the) khitāb. As a matter of fact, trying to solve unlimited cases with limited texts is difficult- in fact this is impossible. The majority of the legal theorists also share this opinion. Then, there is no obstacle in accepting that each rule obtained by authentic source and methodology can be considered part of Islamic law by implicating the rule in the context of khitāb(which represents the divine will) - although it may contain error and presumption. (shrink)

This essay introduces the political thought of Hans G. Ulrich as it is presented in his seminal work Wie Geschöpfe leben. What sets Ulrich's thought apart from most other authors in the field is that his interest is not in an account of community or citizenship, but in the status politicus — the political form of existence that is bestowed on human beings as God's creatures who are called to be `ruled by the spirit' instead of succumbing to any form (...) of rule by which human beings exert dominion over human beings. Drawing from Biblical sources and a fresh reading of Luther's doctrine of the two regimes in the spirit of the Confessing Church, Ulrich arrives at a highly emancipative account of political existence that does not derive its rationale from the necessity for co-existence or common action, but from the liberation from `ungodly ties' that prevent people from free discourse and cooperation. (shrink)

Far from merely reinvigorating relativism, postmodernism has detected and expressed in our time a powerful nihilating process of which truth and reality itself are the final casualties; and with these morality and religion. Beginning from the theological reaches of philosophy, this book argues that gods played a crucial part in modern philosophy, even when it was most critical of them; that the dominant nihilism of Derrida is really an excessive and misleading outcome of a contemporary philosophy which could otherwise (...) resonate with all that is best in our evolutionary image of the universe; that moralists who turn to art in order to overcome the fact-value version of this deadly dualism do not thereby rule out religion; and that a Christian theology which recognises the evolutionary/historical conditions of faith and revelation is once again producing a theology that builds upon the best of contemporary philosophy and science. (shrink)

It is not uncommon for Darwinists and memeticists to speculate not only that god–memes (cultural units for belief in a god) evolved as maladaptive traits but also that these memes do not correspond to anything real. However, a counter–Darwinian argument exists that some god–memes evolved as adaptive traits and did so with a metaphysical correspondence to reality. Memeticists cannot disallow these positive claims, because the rules they would use to disallow them would also disallow their negative claims. One must (...) either accept that positive Darwinian theological claims can fall within the bounds of science (and therefore be judged on their explanatory merits alone) or must disallow both sets of arguments, including any claims that god–memes fail to correspond to reality. Given that many Darwinists do not appear to accept a modest version of science that avoids negative metaphysical claims, precedence exists in memetic and Darwinian discourse for making positive metaphysical claims as well. (shrink)

Ethics is a study which deals fundamentally with the rules of conduct from moral point of view. The main characteristic of ethics is to judge the value of moral act or moral conduct. Therefore, ethics means a code of conduct. The history of the development of morality grew through a long process of evolution of certain morality like ‘taboos’, habits and customs in the primitive society. There are two broad divisions of ethics i. e., secular ethics and theological (...) ethics. The history of the development of secular ethics flourished through four periods i. e., the Greek ethics, the Medieval ethics, the Modern ethics and the Contemporary ethics. Each period has its own prominent characteristics. Moreover, the history of theological ethics grew with the rise of different religions like Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Morality has been developed during the period of more than two thousand years. Within this long span of time, many doctrines, ideas and values are included in it. Hence, morality takes different shapes in different periods and ethical views also develop accordingly. In this article, an attempt has been made to show a gradual development of morality- secular and theological. Again, the similarities and the dissimilarities between secular and theological ethics are the additional concerns of this paper. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#73-74; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2023 P 59-94. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND THE INTERPRE.TATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE FREDERICK SONTAG Pomona OoUego Olaremont, Oalifornia " It is impossible to remain loyal to Marxism, to the Revolution, without treating insurrection as an art." Lenin, paraphrasing Karl Marx WHENEVER Liberation Theology ·and its contributions to theologicail discussion al'e ·concerned, no aspect has been more controversirul than its association with violence. There is no question that Marxism/Leninism depends on the use of (...) violence. But all liberation theories must take violence into consideration. On the one hand, the ties that hold humans in bondage may be so strong that only violent means ca.n be effective to release us. On the other hand, it is well known that violenre often breeds its own do·wnfall and results in ten·or more often than peace. Since the beginning of time, probably every prrogram seeking to release human beings to their furhl. potential has had to consider the use of violence to achieve its ends, even while awal'e of its potential dangers. Yet this issue takes on a new urgency in our time because of two s[gnificant changes in our situation: (I) Most communist proposals which have resulted in world~wide change have militantly asserted the necessity to use force if we are to be set free; (2) In recent times Liberati.on Theofogy has been espoused by some Christian theologians even while the adoption of pacifism or the abhorrence of violence by most Christian groups is well known. The question of religion's intrusion into the politicaiJ. reailm is problem 271 FREDERICK SONTAG enough, but add to this the question of the use of violence and the discussion becomes very heated indeed. Although many traditions have well-developed positions regarding violence and non-violence, Christianity will be our frame of reference in discussing these issues, since Liberation Theology has, in fact, developed in a Christian context. First of all we havie to ask whether the use of violence to ruchieve politicaJ ends is a;lways ruled out or whether some circumstances might justify it as an ruooeptable tool for Christian use. Where Christianity is concerned, it is always instructive to begin by looking at the life and work of Jesus. Trruditionally, Jesus is seen as rejecting the use of violence and as having suffered vioilence himself. Can anything so change this image as to make violence acceptable on Christian grounds? In ·considering this, we first have to note that Jesus himself lived under po1itiool oppression. We must oons~der the Jewish expectations for the ' Messiah ' and how this role came to be projecbed onto Jesus; their hope for release from Roman oppressors was what plruced mroh high political expectations on Jesus. Christians recognized Jesus as a' Messiah', even though he obvious1ly did not fulfill the role of a political liberato·r. Afiter his death and for centuries fater, Jewish political fortunes went from bad to worse. The people's expectations of gaining release by the hand of Jesus did not result in a change in their political fortunes. Christians diid enter into politics and governments in!Later years, and some welcome changes can be attributed to Christian influence. But still, none of these improvements can be directly attributed to Jesus' efforts in his own fileis a prime :requfoement for success. We 'are aware of the Marxist/Leninist insistency on toeing the line on dogma, for conformity to doctrine. But can the Christian,aiccept the uniformity of interpretation which effective acbion seems to require? If the Christian liberation theofogian argues that aU Christians cannot be required to aiocept some one program of wction, he or she is limited by the division that plurality brings. On the other LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL VIOL]j]NCE '277 hand, the Christian revotutionary activist should not be told that his program is " unchristian " as judged by some singular, authoritative standard. Of course, the chief complication in saying this lies with a hieI"archical church which includes authorities to formulate doctrine. The Christian who wants to act differently from what the srbructure of such a chureh allows will either: (1) have to find a way to act independently and still stay within that community; or (2) convince... (shrink)

Evangelical Protestant spirituality, under the influence of the Enlightenment, has assumed a somewhat modernist flavor. As a result, traditional forms of religious symbol and piety were demoted in favor of religious affections, true spirituality was now discerned by means of “heart knowledge,” and the assurance of salvation assumed a place of prominence in the emerging market of spiritual autobiography. This essay explores several ways that a non-monastic, non-modern Protestant tradition, which lives according to a community rule, can contribute to the (...) spiritual formation conversation. I begin by introducing the reader to the Amish narrative and discuss how two theological themes shape their approach to spirituality–-the cross of Christ and the relationship between faith and works, justification and sanctification. Next, I question a common view of Jesus’ ministry as being diametrically opposed to that of the Pharisees and suggest that the Sermon on the Mount deserves to be central to the enterprise of spiritual formation. I conclude this essay by revealing how the Amish put spiritual theology into practice, via a locally constructed Ordnung and while seated around the supper table. (shrink)

Bioethic reflects — like many other disciplines — the cultural fragmentation and the complexity of what has come to be known as the postmodern condition. The case of bioethics is particularly acute because of its epistemological indeterminacy and the moral pluralism characterizing post liberal societies. A provisional solution to this situation is the retrieval of a neo-Kantian version of ethical formalism in which concern for a consensus on rules replaces universal dialogue on moral content. The article analyzes the possible (...) consequences of this solution with reference to theological ethics. In particular, the reduction of ethical rationality to a function of political regulation on the one hand, and the implicit legitimization of ethical relativism on the other, push any theological contribution to bioethics to the margins. The central methodological issue for the articulation of theological discourse in bioethics is how to avoid the pitfall of privatism while creating the conditions for ethical dialogue across different traditions. (shrink)

The publication of this volume completes the set of English translations of the commentaries on the Franciscan Rule, beginning with the 1242 exposition of the four Parisian masters and followed by Hugh of Digne, David of Augsburg, John of Wales and Angelo Clareno. It brings together the glosses by two friars with contrasting experiences of the order, Peter of John Olivi and John Pecham. Both were members of le grand couvent des Cordeliers at Paris in the later 1260s and the (...) 1270s: the one served as lector in his own province at Narbonne and Montpellier and then at Santa Croce in Florence and the other was the regent master of theology at the Universities of Paris and Oxford. Olivi was one of the friars consulted in... (shrink)

Though Milton at no point in Areopagitica attacks monarchical government directly, his position in this treatise is implicitly republican. The vocabulary of Areopagitica is full of echoes of republican discourse, with terms like ?tyranny,? ?slavery,? ?yoke,? ?servile,? ?thraldom,? as well as ?true liberty.? In a number of eloquent metaphorical passages, the search for truth is presented both as a sacred duty and as a communal task, performed by free individuals working independently in a common cause. The extended metaphor of ?the (...) virgin Truth,? hewed into ?a thousand peeces? to be patiently reassembled ?in every joynt and member,? like many passages in Areopagitica, is simultaneously classical and Christian in its allusions and its imagery. In the celebrated ?fugitive and cloistered virtue? passage, anticipating the action of Paradise Lost, the reading of books is presented as one of many instances of the exercise of moral choice, ?triall???by what is contrary.? Conflating Biblical and classical allusions, Milton here redefines ?the rules of antient libertie? in terms of the freedom of the will, extended to Adam and Eve and their descendants by their creator, in accordance with Milton's Arminian theology. (shrink)

In recent years attention has been redirected to the significance of the ethical rule that “good should be done and evil avoided.” It may be called the synderesis rule or principle, since in its most influential presentation it was associated by Thomas Aquinas with the intellectual habit called synderesis. In 1965 Germain Grisez published an article on this subject which attracted much interest in America and England. He argued that the principle as found in Aquinas’s treatise on laws in the (...) Summa of Theology has been misinterpreted in the common Scholastic tradition. In particular Grisez maintained that the common interpretation is wrong in restricting the good and evil, as used in this formula, to the moral order. Further, he suggested that the SR does not have the obligatory force of an imperative. (shrink)

Eric Nelson has confidently revealed to us God’s justice. God is not an oppressive tyrant but a king subject to the laws of justice. The celestial realm is monarchical, not republican or ruled by a...

This article interrogates the interface between the older Pentecostal movement and politics in Zimbabwe. The country continues to face political violence and a breakdown in rule of law. The Zimbabwean populace is asking whether the Zimbabwean Pentecostal movement is ready and able to exercise its prophetic role in promoting real peace and democracy. Many Zimbabweans are asking this question, because the track record shows that whilst most mainline churches have been consistent in becoming the voice of the voiceless, some Zimbabwean (...) Pentecostal churches seem to have been sitting on the fence for too long by adopting a middle of the road stance, thereby avoiding a head-on confrontation with the corrupt Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front government. In this article, I argue that for many decades the Zimbabwean Pentecostal movement has taken what one might refer to ironically as a ‘smart approach to politics’–in which the image of the ZANU–PF government is sanitised by espousing what I call a ‘spiritualised political theology.’ I use this critique, whilst remaining cognisant of the fact that the primary motivation of the movement on which I focus in this article, was evangelism, not politics. Thus, for the purpose of this research, the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa of Apostle Ezekiel Guti was sampled to investigate its prophetic voice in a polarised political environment. This article examines the history of Apostle Guti’s political subterfuge based on the reflections of his pastoral letters referred to as the ‘Ten-days prayer letters’ issued since 1975 up to the time of writing this article. It is important at this early stage to outline that these letters were not political statements or meant to address politics only but theological letters addressing different social ills including politics. Thus, reading this letter one shall see that Apostle’s political subterfuge demonstrated a continuous oscillation of a theological position on how the church should relate to politics. Furthermore, I undertake a brief examination of other few millennial Zimbabwean Pentecostal churches to see if this political subterfuge transcended elsewhere thereby propagating a spiritualised political theology.Contribution: What is key to note is the fact that the Zimbabwean Pentecostal movement remained insignificant with regard to democratization agenda even after the removal of President Mugabe. The above claim is evidenced by the Zimbabwean Pentecostal church founders’ continuous political subterfuge authenticated by a propagation of a spiritualized political theology. (shrink)

This book analyzes a rich and diverse body of philosophical and theological literature concerning the import of narrative for the understanding of morality. Nelson begins by examining the theses that to understand oneself, a tradition, and history as a whole, they must be understood in the context of a narrative. Recent philosophical writings on the relation of narrative to the moral concepts of social groups and individuals—including Alasdair MacIntyre's proposal for the rehabilitation of an ethic of virtue shaped by (...) narrative—are explored. Issues discussed include the freedom of moral agents in relation to their narratives, the relation between narrative and universal moral rules, and the problem of relativism. Next, Nelson classifies theological uses of narrative as belonging to either a liberal-universalistic or postliberal-particularistic tradition and considers the implications of construing scripture as narrative for the problematic relation between scripture and ethics. The work of Stanley Hauerwas, the foremost narrativist in Christian ethics, is analyzed at length. Nelson argues that while narrative is a necessary focus, it does not exhaust the methodological agenda. Narrative is not, as its advocates sometimes suggest, a universal solvent for every theological problem and disagreement. An adequate Christian ethics must not lose sight of the universal, narrative-independent features of morality. Since the realm of the moral is an interweaving of narrative-dependent and narrative-independent features, Christian ethics stands to profit from both narrativist and rationalist insights. The role of narrative is demonstrably a major topic of conversation across several fields in religious studies today. Particularly designed for scholars in ethics, theology, and the philosophy of religion, the book is a reliable guide to an expanding literature and a judicious introduction to these interdisciplinary discussions. (shrink)

Decolonisation discourse has gained significant momentum in South Africa with the rise of the various #MustFall movements that strive to rid South Africa of its colonial vestiges. But does South Africa need another national metanarrative that envisions an ideal South Africa and champions utopian social ideals? Following the logic of Johan Degenaar and Dirkie Smit, this contribution argues that we should refrain from developing social meta-narratives that seek to frame a single South African identity and social ethos. However, we do (...) need a grammar for peaceful coexistence that goes beyond legal and procedural considerations to establish basic parameters for a constructive social discourse that promotes peaceful coexistence. Such a grammar cannot be imposed unilaterally on social groupings but should be framed by a public discussion aimed at reaching a consensus among social imaginaries on the rules of discourse. Drawing on Reformed thinkers such as John Calvin and John Althusius, the essay continues to discuss the contribution that the Reformed tradition can make to such a grammar. The last part of the essay proceeds to apply the proposed grammar as a benchmark to evaluate the validity of decolonisation discourse. (shrink)

This article traces Augustine’s presentation of an exegetical rule for oneness based on scriptural patterns in three different anti-Homoian contexts throughout his life. First, his letter to Pascentius outlines how descriptions of oneness in Scripture that include an added phrase detailing “one what” indicate substantial difference. Pericopes without the additional “one what,” though, reveal that the beings are of the same substance. Then, Augustine’s De trinitate builds upon this initial distinction by outlining how Trinitarian unity becomes the soteriological aim for (...) the believers’ oneness with one another. Just as the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are of one substance and of one mind and volition, so too humanity, who is already of one substance, must become of one mind and volition through the same faith. Finally, Augustine’s encounter with Maximinus toward the end of his life elaborates further by explicating the significance of a verb’s singularity or plurality in a biblical verse for substantial oneness. He incorporates an argument that has already appeared in his thought into his approach to oneness in Scripture. This article, therefore, contributes to a greater understanding of Augustine’s exegetical arguments against Homoian theology and the trajectory of his pro-Nicene explanations over his life. (shrink)

Hegel’s definition of the state as a common public authority in The German Constitution marks his first thorough attempt to understand the authority of the modern state in terms of the rule of law. Such an understanding of the state constitutes an important advance in Hegel’s political philosophy since, in his early political-theological writings, the legal relation was in essence excluded from the political sphere. Positing a fundamental opposition between legality and authentic ethical life, Hegel interpreted societies in which (...) legal forms become particularly pronounced as societies founded on degenerate political institutions and caught up in an inexorable process of decline. Until Hegel grasped the positive ethical significance of legal authority, something accomplished in The German Constitution, his theory of the state remained largely determined by a Greek-inspired, virtue-based paradigm of political life. Only with the overcoming of this paradigm could he move to a comprehensive analysis of both modern institutional structures and the political theories that attempt to understand and justify them. Hegel’s evolving theory of modern legal form thus provides an important index and measure of his complex stance toward modern political society and of his critical assessment of the self-interpretations of modernity offered by the natural right tradition and the Enlightenment. (shrink)

Wattles offers a comprehensive survey of the history of the golden rule, "Do unto others as you want others to do unto you". He traces the rule's history in contexts as diverse as the writings of Confucius and the Greek philosophers, the Bible, modern theology and philosophy, and the American "self-help" context. He concludes by offering his own synthesis of these varied understandings.

For a century or more political theology has been in decline. Recent years, however, have seen increasing interest not only in how church and state should be related, but in the relation between divine authority and political authority, and in what religion has to say about the limits of state authority and the grounds of political obedience. In this book, Nicholas Wolterstorff addresses this whole complex of issues. He takes account of traditional answers to these questions, but on every point (...) stakes out new positions. Wolterstorff offers a fresh theological defense of liberal democracy, argues that the traditional doctrine of 'two rules' should be rejected and offers a fresh exegesis of Romans 13, the canonical biblical passage for the tradition of Christian political theology. This book provides useful discussion for scholars and students of political theology, law and religion, philosophy of religion and social ethics. (shrink)

In this article, I will explore an idea of authority as depicted by a religious picture (note the indefinite article). It is a picture, not the picture. It is the picture of God as the supreme decision maker without him being a deliberator. I shall call it the decisionist picture of God. His authority is based on his absolute will unhindered by any laws and rules and in particular by any laws of morality. One may call the decisionist picture (...) of God a fascist picture of God. This is perhaps abusive but not inaccurate. 'That there must be', in the language of the 18th century Blackstone, 'a supreme, irresistible, absolute, and uncontrolled authority, in which the … right of sovereignty resides', is the idea and ideal that I am interested in. Pompously put, it is the genealogy of authority that I am interested in. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.1 (2000) 97-114 [Access article in PDF] Blackloism and Tradition: From Theological Certainty to Historiographical Doubt Beverley C. Southgate * Introduction "Pyrrho himself never advanced any Principle of Scepticism beyond this," complained John Tillotson at the height of the seventeenth-century "rule of faith" debates; 1 and John Sergeant, as Catholic champion and the object of his charge, must have noted the irony. (...) For Tillotson was not unreasonable in concluding that his adversary's theological arguments had the effect of increasing the very uncertainty which they were designed to combat. Sergeant's attempts to overcome scepticism in theology were actually destined to exacerbate the problem of scepticism in relation to historiography.John Sergeant (1623-1707) was an English secular priest and, more specifically, a member of that notorious faction of Catholics known as "Blackloists," followers of Thomas White (1593-1676), alias Blacklo. 2 White produced some forty works on theology, natural philosophy, and political theory; he was known as an eminent philosopher in his own day and has more recently been restored to wider interest following the publication of Hobbes's lengthy critique of his cosmological treatise De Mundo. Sergeant has remained best known for his advocacy of the Catholic position in the "rule of faith" debates, but he was also a prolific writer on philosophy and, as a late Aristotelian, took issue with such "modernists" as Descartes and Locke. 3 Sergeant was widely recognized as White's [End Page 97] intellectual disciple, and it will be convenient here to consider their thought together. 4 Both devoted much of their time and energy (in Sergeant's words) to "beating down scepticism" or, as White had earlier called it, the "contagion of Pyrrhonism"; and both would have been horrified to think that they had actually contributed to any extension of skeptical philosophy. 5Blackloist concerns with the refutation of skeptically induced uncertainty had obvious implications for their contributions to the "rule of faith" debates and to their attempted establishment of one single and certain ground of religious belief. During the latter half of the seventeenth century Protestants and Catholics expended a considerable amount of intellectual and emotional energy in advocating their respective routes to that level of religious certainty which would assure salvation. While the former expressed confidence in the reliability of the scriptures' literary record, the latter counter-claimed that they alone enjoyed a faith that was reliably grounded in an unbroken tradition deriving from Christ himself.Thomas White highlights these issues in his additions to the "corrected and enlarged" 1654 edition of William Rushworth's Dialogues, in which he laments the fragmenting effects of the Reformation. White argues that because they no longer enjoy "one rule among them all" Protestants resort to their various individual principles; and although all appeal ultimately to the authority of the Bible, they each have only their own "private conceit" by which to resolve any ambiguities in the scriptural record. The extraction of religious tenets then becomes effectively a matter of mere guesswork; the whole Bible might as well be replaced by the Koran. Something far more authoritative, White insists, is needed to overcome theological uncertainty--"this dangerous Cockatrice, Incertitude"; 6 and it is precisely such firmly based and wholly reliable authority that he and Sergeant strove to provide. [End Page 98]In this context, however, theology became intimately interrelated with historiography. Some of the difficulties attendant on the Protestant recourse to the Bible were no doubt specific to the Bible itself, but others related more generally to the validity of any historical record, and it is some of the wider historiographical implications of theological debate that I shall examine in this paper. By arguing against the skeptics and pragmatic Protestants while simultaneously insisting on their own variety of absolute theological certainty based on reliable historical tradition, the Blackloists actually contributed to the development of that form of historiographical uncertainty which culminated in what, by the end of the century, came to be known as "Historical Pyrrhonism." 7 The Scriptures: Linguistic and Literary Problems "For since the... (shrink)

In this article a case is made for considering the liturgy as theological norm par excellence. The case is built up by relying on an emphatic current of thought within the field of liturgical studies, namely the ‘liturgical theology’ as it was developed by Alexander Schmemann, Aidan Kavanagh, and David W. Fagerberg. After presenting the concept of ‘liturgical theology’ and the context out of which it emerged, its major characteristics are discussed. Particular attention is devoted to the radicalness of (...) their position. It can be called radical because the reversal of the relation between doctrine and liturgy is by no means evident for the vast majority of modern believers and theologians. However, ‘liturgical theology’ claims that it is not doctrine which determines liturgy but liturgy which determines doctrine. According to liturgical theologians, the liturgy is not simply the ritual expression of the content of faith, but itself theology, even theologia prima . Correspondingly, liturgical theologians point to the original wording of the famous adage lex orandi lex credendi , which is the following: ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi . Whereas the usual formulation suggests equality and mutual dependence, the original context lays bare a clear priority of the rule of prayer over the rule of faith. In the final part of the article I explore some avenues to the evaluation of ‘liturgical theology’. I argue that there is need for a more profound philosophical underpinning and historical adequacy. But nevertheless the idea that the liturgy constitutes a theological norm stands firmly and should be considered far more broadly and seriously among contemporary systematic theologians. (shrink)

Moral philosophers have frequently criticized theological ethics for its dependence upon divine authority and its consequent lack of autonomy. To test their perception of religious ethics and mentality, this paper examines the ways in which Paul justifies his ethical advice in I Corinthians 7. Analysis of his reasoning reveals that Paul invokes his own authority as well as the Lord's rulings and the commands of God. These are, however, related in ways which encourage freedom of interpretation and application. In (...) this text at least, theological ethics cannot be reduced to simple obedience to religious authority. (shrink)

This essay reevaluates the Weimar writings of Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss, specifically, their intellectual efforts to replace the political authority of Kantian liberalism with, respectively, a ‘political theology’ and ‘Biblical atheism’ derived from the thought of early-modern state theorists like Hobbes and Spinoza. Schmitt and Strauss each insisted that post-Kantian Enlightenment rationality was unraveling into a way of thinking that violently rejected ‘form’ of any kind, fixated myopically on material things and lacked any conception of the external constraints that (...) invariably condition the possibilities of philosophy, morality and politics. They considered Kantian reason and liberal politics to pose serious threats to ‘genuine’ expressions of rationality and as dangerous obfuscations of the necessity of political order—of the brute fact that human beings stand in need of ‘being ruled,’ as such. (shrink)

This article discusses the relation between Judaism and political theology in the work of Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig. Both Cohen and Rosenzweig give an interpretation of Judaism that prioritizes the messianic ideal while maintaining the priority of philosophy over religion. With respect to political theology, this article argues that Cohen and Rosenzweig criticize the priority assigned to the national state in modern politics in favour of a politics that is both cosmopolitan and republican, in so far as it makes (...) the internal relation between peoplehood and rule of law central, and detaches the rule of law from sovereignty. In this sense, the messianism of Cohen and Rosenzweig is opposed to Christian conceptions of the messianic recovered in recent contemporary political theory. The article concludes with a discussion of Rosenzweig’s hypothesis concerning how the antagonism between these two forms of messianism are to be reconciled in a new understanding of natural right. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Occupy Religion:Theology of the Multitude and Interreligious DialogueJoerg RiegerOne of the big questions for the present is how to bring the different liberation movements together. The different liberation theologies, as is well known, have addressed various forms of oppression along the lines of gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, class, and other factors. What is it that brings us together without erasing our differences? This question has important implications for interreligious (...) dialogue, as we shall see.In our book Occupy Religion Kwok Pui-lan and I use the term “multitude” to reflect on unity and difference.1 This term, made prominent by political scientists and philosophers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri,2 has deep roots in our theological traditions. Several decades ago, Korean Minjung theology noted the prominence of the notion of the multitude (this is how the term minjung can be translated into English) in the Bible. In the Gospels, the so-called ochlos (the Greek term for the masses or the common people) does not describe only the ones who are the recipients of Jesus’ transformative ministry; the ochlos also describes the participants in it and the agents of change. In addition, our Latin American colleagues have highlighted the importance of Greek term laos in the biblical traditions, which is also used to designate the common people rather than the elites.There is a distinct difference between the Greek notions of democracy and laocracy or ochlocracy. Democracy describes the rule of the demos, which is constituted by the elite citizens of a city-state. Lower-class citizens, women, and slaves are not part of this rule. Laocracy and ochlocracy, on the other hand, describe the rule of the common people, including the proverbial “least of these” of which Jesus speaks frequently. These common people include all those who have been and are being marginalized on the basis of their gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and class. In the ministry of Jesus, which is informed by the ministry of Moses, Miriam, Hannah, and the prophets, the common people are organized and become agents. God values their diverse contributions to life. In the world of laocracy and ochlocracy, there are different ways of being productive in the community, and all of them are acknowledged and needed. As Hardt and Negri remind us, the multitude is not the uniform entity of what has often [End Page 167] been called “the people” in various nationalisms or fascisms. Neither is the multitude the undifferentiated mass or the mob.3What brings the various liberation movements together, therefore, is not uniformity or a request to surrender difference. What brings us together is “deep solidarity,” the recognition that we are all in the same boat under the conditions of global capitalism.4 This insight is related to the topic of class, which has consistently been pushed underground in the United States but which has recently reemerged in the context of the Occupy Wall Street movement. The now-familiar notion of the 99 percent versus the 1 percent is a reminder that the majority of people are benefitting less and less from the neoliberal market economy. This includes even members of the middle class, as they have seen their retirement accounts dwindle, their job security take ever-more severe hits, their benefits erode, and their political power fade. Furthermore, the aspects of gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity are closely linked to class, as they all increase the disadvantages of people in the neoliberal market economy, thus boosting the reality of deep solidarity. Deep solidarity ties together members of the 99 percent across the lines of gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity, and it thrives on difference, as they can now work together and make use of their various opportunities and gifts.Deep solidarity differs from conventional ideas of solidarity, which were often based on the idea that those who are privileged place themselves on the side of those without privilege. While it is still possible for members of the 1 percent to place themselves on the side of the 99 percent, the majority of us are now part of the 99 percent, and thus belong to classes that have something to gain from liberation. Class struggle, as... (shrink)

This article seeks to extend and refine Alastair MacIntyre’s moral theory of virtue ethics, by probing behind the Benedictine Rule—so fulsomely invoked at the end of After Virtue—to the ascetical theology of the noted, Eastern, ‘Cappadocian’ theologian of the fourth century: Gregory of Nyssa. I shall argue that Gregory’s vision of ascetical bodily practice complicates MacIntyre’s contemporary appropriation of virtue ethics. It does so by underscoring the diachronic, developmental character of personal ethical maturation—a theme which finds no expression in MacIntyre’s (...) otherwise sophisticated account of ‘narrative’. (shrink)

Taking a cue from Philo we may ask: If the adoption of the "seeing" approach from Greek philosophy was a misfortune for theology, does the repudiation or overcoming of that approach in a contemporary philosophy provide a conceptual means for theology to reform itself, to become more adequate to its task? Can it thus lead to a new alliance between theology and philosophy after, e.g., the medieval one with Aristotelianism has broken down? The question assumes that some use of philosophy, (...) i.e., of the elucidation of the nature of reality by secular thought, and of the nature of thinking about reality in secular thought, is desirable and even necessary for theology. This assumption must be granted, since theology, as the logos about things divine, is by definition the discursive, in some sense scientific, elucidation of the contents of faith and thus, for one thing, comes under the rules and norms of elucidation and discourse as such; and since the contents of faith comprise the dealings of God with the world and with man, the elucidation of the mundane and human side of this polarity must be informed by a knowledge of what world and man are, and philosophy is supposed to provide such knowledge. It would then follow that that philosophy is most adequate to theology which is most adequate to being, i.e., which is most nearly true—by the criteria of philosophy itself, i.e., by the criteria of secular reason. But since for a decision on this the theologians cannot wait for the consensus of philosophers, nor even necessarily trust its authority, they may be guided in their choice by the appeal of affinity, the lessons of past experience with philosophical liaisons, the present needs of their discipline, and by appraising which philosophy is most helpful to the discharge of theology's task, or least dangerous to its own trust, to its own genuineness, least seductive, least alienating—by any or all of these considerations, but as little as possible by fashion. On all these counts the theologian would do well to exercise a great deal of caution and mistrust. Especially in the face of tempting similarity: what theology needs in this relationship is the otherness of philosophy, not its similarity. On this I need not elaborate before a theological audience. However, the experiment of relationship itself is inescapable, and the one choice closed is abstention. Thus, the openness to contemporary thought shown by theology in the present experiment—as it was shown at all times—is to be welcomed. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbooks series is a major new initiative in academic publishing. Each volume offers an authoritative and up-to-date survey of original research in a particular subject area. Specially commissioned essays from leading figures in the discipline give critical examinations of the progress and direction of debates. The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics offers the most authoritative and compelling guide to the discipline. Thirty of the world's most distinguished specialists provide new essays in order to offer a survey of (...) and analysis of the subject. Ethics is first placed firmly within the Christian theological tradition, from which thought and action can never be neatly separated. Four sections then explore the sources of Christian moral knowledge (scripture, divine commands, church tradition, reason and natural law, experience); the structure of the Christian life (vocation, virtue, rules, responsibility, death); the spirit of the Christian life (faith, hope, love); and the spheres of the Christian life (government, family, economy, culture, church). The final section of the Handbook contains essays discussing and evaluating certain scholarly works that have in the past influentially offered (different) visions of how best to structure the field of theological ethics. Unlike any other book now available, the Handbook's unrivalled breadth and depth make it the definitive reference work for all students and academics who want to explore more fully essential topics in Christian ethics. (shrink)

I thank Michael Symons and Dr Paul Rule for comments on this paper; and Channel 10’s Chris Kenny and Grant Heading for access to the uncut tape of Mr Kenny’s interview with Mr Milera.

Perfect being theology is the attempt to decide questions about the nature of God by employing the Anselmian formula that God is the greatest possible being. One form of perfect being theology—recently defended by Brian Leftow in God and Necessity—holds that we can decide between incompatible claims that God is F and that God is not F by asking which claim would confer more greatness on God, and then using the formula that God is the greatest possible being to rule (...) out the one which confers less greatness on God. This paper argues that this form of argument, while intuitively quite plausible, does not work. (shrink)

The article investigates how the problem of reference is treated in the theology of two pupils of Gilbert of Poitiers by means of suppo* terms. Supposition is for Gilbert an action performed by a speaker, not a property of terms, and he considers language as a system for communication between human beings: key notions are the ‘sense in the author’s mind’ and the ‘interpreter’s understanding’. In contrast, the two Porretans tend to objectify language as a formal system of terms. Suppositio (...) becomes in the Summa Zwettlensis the name itself as subject term in a proposition, and is divided into many kinds; formal rules are described which govern the influence of the predicate on the subject term’s denotation. In Everard of Ypres’ Dialogus Ratii et Everardi, supponere is a function of the name, and ‘human is a species of individuals’ is, as in some logical treatises and differently from Gilbert, a case of rhetorical transfer. (shrink)

In this essay, I evaluate the extent to which some currents in classical Christian mysticism might count as properly ‘Christian’ against the rules of faith and theological methodology of thinkers like Tertullian, Irenaeus, and Justin Martyr. I begin by expounding this methodology as it relates to non-Christian philosophical traditions, and from there explore the rules these thinkers offer, suggesting that the beating heart of these rules is not a string of propositions to affirm so much as (...) it is a commitment to a certain rendition of biblical narrative grammar. After exploring this grammar, I turn to a brief discussion of the foundations of Christian mysticism and the thought of Evagrius Ponticus. The aim here is to illustrate the theoretical foundations of much Christian mysticism, as well as to provide a test case to evaluate how far some prominent elements of this discourse might, or might not, cohere with the biblical narrative grammar elucidated above. I argue that there is ample room to question the legitimacy of Evagrius’s claim to properly Christian theorizing, and suggest this has serious implications for future Christian work in the philosophy of mysticism. (shrink)

From past to present, two significant system changes have occurred in the written Arabic language. The first of these is the differentiation of similar letters through dotting. From the early periods of Islam, dotting was widely used to distinguish similar letters, and over time, these dots became integra-ted with the letters they accompanied, forming the modern Arabic alphabet. The second change is the representation of vowel sounds, which correspond to vowels in other languages, using various symbols in written language. These (...) symbols have been used only in specific books and situations from their inception to the present day. All these efforts in these two areas were made to reduce pronunciation differences in words and sentences in Arabic script, and consequently, to minimize potential ambiguities in any word or sentence. Orthography (imlā’) is a science that was introduced with this aim. Unlike the efforts in dotting and vowel notation, the foundation of ort-hographic rules includes the addition, deletion, and substitution of certain letters to differentiate between words with similar spellings but different meanings, as well as rules regarding the conjunction and separation of cer-tain words. When these rules are examined, it is seen that some of them provide certain conveniences in determining sentence elements. In this con-text, the purpose of this study is to demonstrate the function of orthographic rules in determining sentence elements in written Arabic through examples, and to emphasize the linguistic importance of these rules. (shrink)

The German philosopher Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665) was the first academic teacher who attempted to put the philosophy of René Descartes (1596–1650) at the basis of all disciplines of the traditional curriculum of studies, that is, to establish a Cartesian Scholasticism. To this aim, he developed a first philosophy, i.e. a metaphysics including rational-theological arguments, which was based on Descartes’s Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641). By it, Clauberg attempted to provide philosophy with a foundation, namely with a demonstration of the (...) reliability of clear and distinct knowledge. Moreover, he elaborated a comprehensive logical theory showing how Descartes’s rules of the method could be completed by a Scholastic-inspired theory of definition, division and syllogism. Nevertheless, Clauberg maintained in the corpus of philosophical disciplines a metaphysics dealing with the meanings of ‘being’. Accordingly, he developed a twofold metaphysics: on the one hand, a discipline concerned with the principles of thought and rational theology, being this a philosophia prima in the order of sciences. On the other hand, a metaphysics dealing with the most abstract notions of being, viz. an ontosophia, to be studied at the end of the philosophical curriculum. Building on the account of Clauberg’s work provided by Massimiliano Savini, in this paper I explore the relations between Clauberg’s philosophia prima and ontosophia: after clarifying the overall plan of his philosophy, and presenting some examples of metaphysical arguments belonging to the philosophia prima, I argue that Clauberg’s ontosophia, despite being conceived as the most abstract of the philosophical sciences, plays a foundational role with regards to metaphysics as philosophia prima by unveiling its conceptual assumptions. (shrink)

Theorizing resistance -- Hellenistic rule in Judea : setting the stage for resistance -- Interaction and identity in Seleucid Judea : 188-173 BCE 78 -- Recreating the empire : the sixth Syrian war, Jason's revolt, and the reconquest of Jerusalem -- Seleucid state terror -- The edict of Antiochus : persecution and the unmaking of the Judean world -- Daniel -- Enochic authority -- The apocalypse of weeks : witness and transformation -- The book of dreams : see and cry (...) out. (shrink)