Filosofisch leer- en leesboek over (medische) ethiek.

In order to defend moderate retributivism Anthony Duff and Christopher Bennett have invoked the idea of the enduring of punishment (including imprisonment) as a form of apologetic penance that is needed to reach atonement. They successfully argue that the concept of penance makes plausible the positive retributivist conviction that the guilty deserve to suffer. Two crucial steps in their argument however still harbor problems. (1) punishments are usually imposed against the will of the offender, which is at odds with the (...) character of penance, even if one stresses the ritual character of apology. Stubbornly unapologetic offenders who are forced to apologize cannot be said to have made an apology and be ‘reconciled’ even though they performed the ritual. (2) The claim that we need to limit offenders’ rights and liberties in order to express withdrawal of our recognition and respect (or as a sign that communal bonds are fractured) may have implications that are unacceptable for liberals. We could also limit offenders’ rights and liberties by forcing them into moralizing, educative or other rehabilitative programs. Suggestions will be given on how Duff and/or Bennett can adapt their approaches to avoid these problems. (shrink)

Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like ‘having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children’. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical reasoning (...) in general. Christine Korsgaard relates the rational binding force of practical reasons to the various identities or self-conceptions under which we value ourselves. The problem is that it is not clear why such self-conceptions would necessitate us rationally, given the fact that most of our identities are simply given. Perhaps, Harry Frankfurt is right in arguing that we are not only necessitated by reason, but also, and predominantly by what we love. I argue, however, that “the necessities of love” (in Frankfurt’s phrase) are not to be separated from, but should be seen as belonging to the necessities of reason. Our loves, concerns and related identities provide for a specific and important structure to practical reflection. They function on the background of reasoning, having a specific default role: they would lose their character as concerns, if there was a need for them to be cited on the foreground of deliberation or if there was a need to justify them. This does not mean that our deep concerns cannot be scrutinised. They can only be scrutinised in an indirect way, however, which explains their role in grounding the normativity of agent-relative reasons. It appears that this account can provide for a viable interpretation of Korsgaard’s argument about the foundational role of practical identities. (shrink)

Osteons are cylindrical structures of bone created by matrix resorbing osteoclasts, followed by osteoblasts that deposit new bone. Osteons align with the principal loading direction and it is thought that the osteoclasts are directed by osteocytes, the mechanosensitive cells that reside inside the bone matrix. These osteocytes are presumably controlled by interstitial fluid flow, induced by the physiological loading of bones. Here I consider the stimulation of osteocytes while the osteon is closed by osteoblasts. In a conceptual finite element model, (...) bone is considered a poro‐elastic material and subjected to locomotion‐induced loading conditions. It appears that the magnitude of flow is constant along the closing cone, while shear strain rate in the bone matrix diminishes linearly with the deposition of bone. This suggests that shear strain rate, rather than fluid flow, is the physical cue that controls osteocytes and bone deposition in newly formed osteons. (shrink)

This articles concerns the compatibility of orthonomy (making the right choices) and autonomy (making one’s own choices). On the one hand we have the experience that we do not just want to govern ourselves, but that we want to do so rightly. the other hand, it seems that the very fact that our choices are responsive to reasons is insufficient to explain why making these choices adds up to leading a life of one’s own. Iit is argued that we can (...) develop a viable view on the co-realisation of autonomy and orthonomy by using the concept of a concern which is closely linked to the concept op caring. (shrink)

Pre-commitment directives or Ulysses contracts are often defended as instruments that may strengthen the autonomous self-control of episodically disordered psychiatric patients. Autonomy is understood in this context in terms of sovereignty ("governing" or "managing" oneself). After critically analyzing this idea of autonomy in the context of various forms of self-commitment and pre-commitment, we argue that what is at stake in using Ulysses contracts in psychiatry is not autonomy as sovereignty, but autonomy as authenticity. Pre-commitment directives do not function to protect (...) autonomous self-control. They serve in upholding the guidance that is provided by one's deepest identity conferring concerns. We elucidate this concept of autonomy as authenticity, by showing how Ulysses contracts protect the possibility of being "a self.". (shrink)

Though the art of compromise, i.e. of settling differences by mutual concessions, is part of communal living on any level, we often think that there is something wrong in compromise, especially in cases where moral convictions are involved. A first reason for distrusting compromises on moral matters refers to the idea of integrity, understood in the basic sense of 'standing for something', especially standing for the values and causes that to some extent confer identity. The second reason points out the (...) objective nature of moral values, which seems to make them immune from negotiation and barter. If one sincerely holds some moral conviction to be true, than compromising on that belief must be a sign of serious confusion.In order to reach a better understanding of these two reasons, I analyse what is involved in personal integrity and how this relates to moral integrity. I argue that the search for moral integrity naturally brings us to the question of how one could accept moral compromises and still uphold the idea that moral values and principles have an objective authority over us. To address this question I will present a version of moral pluralism which tries to capture the enormous complexity of what should matter to us as moral persons, and which explains why value-rankings are often deeply indeterminate. The general position I defend in this paper is that compromises involving moral values and norms may be morally required and, therefore, be laudable. To sustain this position I will arrive at a view of ethical objectivity that allows the possibility to negotiate about the truth of moral beliefs. (shrink)

I oppose the way John Skorupski characterizes morality in terms of the blameworthy and the role he consequently assigns to punitive feelings in directing one's will and shaping one's character. Skorupski does not hold that the punishment involved in blame- and guilt-feelings grounds the normativity of moral obligation. He defends a specific view of moral psychology and moral practice in which the blame-feeling disposes to the withdrawal of recognition, which involves some sort of casting the transgressor out of the community (...) resulting in the suffering of repentance which is necessary to make atonement (at-one-ment) possible. I argue that this picture threatens to socialize morality. I defend the Kantian idea that the will is not aligned to obligation through castigation, but through our consciousness of our vocation as takers and givers of reasons. This highlights very different feelings as essential to the typically moral stance, feelings that are not necessarily punitive, like feelings of respect and reverence. (shrink)

If one demystifies entropy the second law of thermodynamics comes out as an emergent property entirely based on the simple dynamic mechanical laws that govern the motion and energies of system parts on a micro-scale. The emergence of the second law is illustrated in this paper through the development of a new, very simple and highly efficient technique to compare time-averaged energies in isolated conservative linear large scale dynamical systems. Entropy is replaced by a notion that is much more transparent (...) and more or less dual called ectropy. Ectropy has been introduced before but we further modify the notion of ectropy such that the unit in which it is expressed becomes the unit of energy. The second law of thermodynamics in terms of ectropy states that ectropy decreases with time on a large enough time-scale and has an absolute minimum equal to zero. Zero ectropy corresponds to energy equipartition. Basically we show that by enlarging the dimension of an isolated conservative linear dynamical system and the dimension of the system parts over which we consider time-averaged energy partition, the tendency towards equipartition increases while equipartition is achieved in the limit. This illustrates that the second law is an emergent property of these systems. Finally from our large scale linear dynamic model we clarify Loschmidt’s paradox concerning the irreversible behavior of ectropy obtained from the reversible dynamic laws that govern motion and energy at the micro-scale. (shrink)

In his ‘Review of Belief’s Own Ethics,’ Ars Disputandi 3 , Igor Douven argued that ‘P, but I lack sufficient evidence for p’ is heard as odd not for conceptual reasons, but for pragmatic reasons. We hear this sentence as odd, because we are not regularly exposed to it. In this reply, the author argues that the assertion ‘P, but I lack sufficient evidence for p’ sounds contradictory, because the two parts of the assertion refuse combination on conceptual grounds. We (...) are not regularly exposed to such assertions, because people normally find that a speaker can only be taken to assert p, if she beliefs that p. And people normally find that if one believes that p, then this is because, by one’s own lights, one has sufficient evidence for p. One may not be fully aware of this evidence. But it would certainly be contradictory to believe sincerely that p, while also believing that one lacks sufficient evidence for p. (shrink)

Periods of accelerated societal change in European history have disrupted gradual alteration in the landscape, creating breaks with the past. This has led to, what we refer to as, the contemporary landscape identity complex in the Netherlands. Composed of dissonant narratives surrounding the landscape that play out on the societal level, the contemporary landscape identity complex may create tensions that can obstruct conservation efforts. In this article, we map out this complex. Three narrative clusters, distilled from literature and supplemented by (...) interviews, aid in understanding the tension regarding the future of the Dutch contemporary rural landscape, namely: ‘the utilitarian narrative’, ‘the romantic narrative’, and ‘the eco-scientific narrative’. The contemporary landscape identity complex is fed by these narratives, specifically through how rural landscapes are imagined and discussed, as opposed to how they are lived and acted upon. The way such narratives play out in practice is further investigated through a case study on the ‘Bommelerwaard’, an area in the south-central of the Netherlands. From our results, we propose a pathway to reconcile the contemporary landscape identity complex towards a landscape conservation ethic that allows for a co-existence of a diversity of images and ideas about (semi-) natural landscapes. (shrink)

If we understand death as the irreversible loss of the good of life, we can give meaning to the idea that for suffering patients in the end stage of their illness, life may become an evil and death no longer a threat. Life may lose its good already in the living person. But what does the good of life consist in, then? I defend an internalist view according to which the goodness of life is intrinsically related to the attitudes, concerns, (...) interests and experiences of the person who is leading the life. This results in the contention that the core of what we understand as the value of a person’s life is to be identified with what makes life go well for the person living the particular life. This internalist view does not presuppose (or imply) hedonism or mentalism, nor does it pose an experience requirement. Something may be good for you, because it is valuable as seen from your authentic viewpoint, even if you do not actually experience this goodness, or think otherwise because you are mistaken about your own well‐being. To test this position, and the authenticity‐requirement it includes, I discuss three cases of patients who are persistent in denying that in their life any value is left and who contend that death is no worse than further living. Internalism acknowledges that in the life of these patients there may be ’functionings’ and ’beings’ that are worthwhile, where the test of value is at least partially independent of subjective assessment. Still, internalism claims that something truly valuable can only contribute to the good of one’s life of it has positive meaning as seen from the attitudinal viewpoint that identifies oneself. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to review the recent popularity of casuistry as a model of moral inquiry. I argue that proponents of casuistry do not endorse the particularist epistemology that seems to be implied by their position, and that this is why casuistry does not seem to present something really new in comparison to 'top-down' generalist approaches. I contend that casuistry should develop itself as a (moderately) particularist position and that the challenge for the defender of casuistry is (...) to come up with ideas that strengthen the ('intuitionist') model of rationality that underlies most forms of particularism. (shrink)

This paper presents a new model for how the voting worked at the Athenian dramatic competitions, and demonstrates its viability mathematically. Previous proposals have either failed to take full account of the ancient sources or have not considered all the possible permutations of judging results. As is generally recognized, ten votes were cast, but in most circumstances not all were counted. Sections I-IV consider the tragic competition at the Dionysia, in which three competitors vied for the prize. For the questions (...) we consider, two likely cases are examined (when the votes are divided 4-3-3 and 5-3-2), then a random distribution covering all possible cases, and finally the situation when two competitors are favoured against a third (when the votes are divided 5-5-0, 5-4-1 and 4-4-2). Section I presents the proposal and situates it within the Athenian cultural context. Section II asks how many lots are typically drawn before a victory is obtained. Section III considers how other places are determined. Section IV introduces the question of 'fairness': does the person who receives the most votes actually win? Section V considers adjudication for comedies and at the Lenaia. Section VI considers dithyrambic competitions. (shrink)

Shows the way to a postmodern ethics – neither utilitarian nor deontological – by reflecting on its key concepts of freedom, value, intersubjectivity, obligation, responsibility, rights, ethos, history, and culture.

Een theologisch betoog van de gereformeerde Kamper hoogleraar in (o.a.) de Ethiek.

With particular reference to Marx's critique of religion.

PREFACE The 'central intuition ' ofRicoeur's philosophy Every philosophy is born out of a pre-philosophical experience. It starts from the questions that ...

As Anthony Tol explains in his general introduction to (his translation of) Vollenhoven's 1926 inaugural address, the Reformed epistemology that Vollenhoven espouses here is essentially three-layered. Most basic is the intuition - the starting point of all knowing. It starts with discerning. Then there is knowledge. At this point language, communication, and judgments are relevant. The third layer is thought. Thought may disclose and renew or criticize and correct against the background of what we know. Thought is also central to (...) concept formation. The factor that runs through these three layers is truth, taken realistically. It has its seat in the intuition of discerning. It is central to knowledge, for the essence of knowledge is said to be "possessing truth." And in connection with thought, or more particularly in concept formation, the latter is described as "truth grasped in a form." Apart from advocating his own understanding of epistemology in this inaugural address, Vollenhoven takes issue with how epistemology is generally understood. The critique is cast in a historical overview. (shrink)

Nagelaten manuscripten en notities van de Nederlandse hoogleraar in de filosofie (1892-1978), behorend tot de grondleggers van de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee.

Although Emmanuel Levinas is widely respected as one of the classic thinkers of our century, the debate about his place within Continental philosophy continues. In _Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,_ Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak shows Levinas's thought to be a persistent attempt to point beyond the borders of an economy where orderly interests and ways of reasoning make us feel at home--beyond the world of needs, beyond the self, beyond politics and administration, beyond logic and ontology, even beyond freedom (...) and autonomy. Peperzak's examination begins with a general overview of Levinas's life and thought, and shows how issues of ethics, politics, and religion are intertwined in Levinas's philosophy. Peperzak also discusses the development of Levinas's relations with Husserl and Heidegger, demonstrating thematically the evolution of both Levinas's anti-Heideggerian view of technology and his critical attitude toward nature. (shrink)

This phenomenological study begins by presenting trust as a characteristic form of interpersonal and communal relationship. In the second chapter, the scope is narrowed to someone's reliance on one or more trustworthy individuals. Chapters 3 to 5 explore specific aspects of trust, insofar as we confide in social structures or movements, the impersonal regularities and events of nature, or our own particular talents, motivations, and possibilities. In a world that is ravaged by the omnipresence of suffering and the most outrageous (...) manifestations of evil, no philosopher can avoid the question of what kind of trust may be profound and strong enough to overcome the ultimate anxiety or despair that threatens all human existence. In the Western tradition of belief, thinking, faith, and searching for the first and ultimate, that question is approached here through reflection upon the radical difference between trust in the universe and faith in God. (shrink)

Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak contends that while many Catholic philosophers try to practice a modern, autonomous style of thinking, their experience of a faith-guided life necessarily compels them to integrate their scholarly pursuits with their Christian faith. He writes, "Christians who think cannot separate their thought from their faith and theology." Indeed, he argues that the work of Christian, particularly Catholic, philosophers loses its vitality when philosophers try to restrict their reflections to natural reason alone. In this book he explores (...) the essential unity of philosophical and theological thought from various perspectives and pleads for a radical change of method in philosophy. "This book breaks the modern taboo of the separation between philosophy and theology. It is an invitation to philosophy to recover its rooting in life and to become knowledgeable about love. It is an invitation to theology to rediscover its vocation as a mature consciousness of faith, to communicate using all forms of human thought, and to avoid the pathology of fundamentalism. Peperzak, whose thought is rooted in the traditions of Western philosophy and Christian theology and who is also profoundly aware of the contemporary philosophical-theological debate, is able to speak efficaciously whether to Catholic intellectuals or to any scholar interested in the integrality of human wisdom." —_Giovanni Ferretti_, Università degli Studi, Macerata, Italy "_Philosophy between Faith and Theology_ is a masterful expression of the intellectual resources of the Catholic tradition, as brought to bear on issues of Catholic faith, education, and culture." —_Jeffrey Bloechel_, College of the Holy Cross _ "This book makes an original contribution to Catholic studies, philosophy, and theology by charting a useful, cogent, and meditative course between Christian faith and scholarship. On the basis of a lifetime's erudition and experience, Adriaan Peperzak transforms the ways we think about faith, theology, and philosophy." — Kevin Corrigan, Emory University_. (shrink)

1. bd. Inleiding en geschiedenis der Grieksche wijsbegeerte vóór Platoon en Aristoteles.

One of our most distinguished thinkers, Adriaan Peperzak has masterfully explored the connections between philosophy, ethics, religion, and the social and historical contexts of human experience. He offers a personal gathering of influences on his own work as guides to the uses of philosophy in our search for sense and meaning. In concise, direct, and deeply felt chapters, Peperzak moves from Plato, Plotinus, and the Early Christian theologians to Anselm, Bonaventure, Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, Hegel, and Levinas. Throughout these carefully linked (...) essays, he touches on the fundamental ideas-from reason and faith to freedom and tradition-that inform the questions his work has consistently addressed, most specifically those concerning philosophy as a practice. (shrink)

Against the widespread antiplatonism of our century, noted philosopher, Hegel, and two great postmodern thinkers, Heidegger and Levinas, transform Plato's thoughts about reality, truth, and the Good into elements of their own reflection. He then presents his own retrieval of Platonic themes and arguments, showing how fruitful a critical reexamination of Plato's work can be, even today. Anyone interested in continental philosophy, phenomenology, ethics, or the history of philosophy should read this book.

The fruit of the author's many courses on Emmanuel Levinas in Europe and the United States, this study is a clear introduction for graduate students and scholars who are not yet familiar with Levinas's difficult but exceptionally important oeuvre. After a first chapter on the existential background and the key issues of his thought, chapters 2, 3, and 4 concentrate on and include a short text, "Philosophy and the idea of the Infinite," which contains the program of Levinas's entire oeuvre. (...) Chapter 5 is a companion to the reading of Levinas's first opus magnum, Totality and the Infinite. It analyzes the structure of this book and shows how its questions and answers adhere together. "Through phenomenology toward a saying beyond phenomena and essence" could be the summary of Levinas's attempt to think, with and against Martin Heidegger, the otherness of the Other. -- Amazon.com. (shrink)

Studie van het werk van de Duitse filosoof (1859-1938), stichter van de wijsgerige fenomenologie, om te komen tot een nieuwe theorie over het leren, die dienstig moet zijn aan de opvoedings- en onderwijspraktijk.