The Person Vanishes argues that despite John Dewey's failure to articulate «an adequate theory of personality», his writings provide at least a theory-sketch of human personality consistent with the assumptions that framed his philosophical outlook. Recognizing the new developments in society, science, and the arts, Dewey argues for the necessity of a Copernican revolution in our understanding of the human self; from the monadic and minimalist self of the Cartesian-Newtonian modernist tradition to a relational and processual model of (...) selfhood consonant with the press of post-modernist historical experience. As a field and activity conception, Dewey's self emerges as a nexus of relational energizing, genuinely moored in a cultural surrounding in which ongoing creative reconstruction becomes the mark and criterion of the self's health and growth. What vanishes in Dewey's reconstruction is not the self as such, but only the entitative, substantive self of early modernism. Dewey's understanding of the self is grounded in the conviction that philosophy must begin its inquiry from the ordinary experience of plain men and women. The Person Vanishes examines Dewey's participatory notion of deliberation, what he calls «dramatic rehearsal», by using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study. The analysis attempts to cash out the personal and collective habits, as well as the different modalities of ends, facts, and values that diagram the existential dimensions of this problematic situation. Contrary to traditional dualistic and spectatorial accounts of deliberation, Dewey's «dramatic rehearsal» shows the complexity of decision-making when the genuine limitations of daily life are taken seriously. The attempt to march to Dewey's participatory philosophy reveals the escapist nature of all dualistic philosophical traditions and the reason for their continuous failure to resolve concrete social and personal conflicts. (shrink)

The relation between the concepts of the subject of apperception, the phenomenal self, and the noumenal self has long puzzled commentators on Kant’s theoretical account of the self. This paper argues that many of the puzzles surrounding Kant’s account can be resolved by treating the subject of apperception and other transcendental predicates of thinking as a dimension of the noumenal self. Yet this interpretation requires a clarification of how the transcendental predicates of thinking can be attributed (...) to the noumenal self without violating the thesis of noumenal ignorance. The clarification is achieved through a careful analysis of the meaning of the latter thesis. The paper’s interpretation is then shown to be consistent with Kant’s rejection of traditional ontology and with the dual-aspect view. The paper’s final section argues that transcendental predicates are properly construed as logical predicates but must be distinguished from ordinary examples of the latter. (shrink)

_The human experience has long been characterized by a tension between two fundamental forces: the self-centered tendencies of our ego and the outward-stretching pull of empathy. In the contemporary world, where technology is rapidly amplifying both our individual power and interconnectedness, navigating this tension within an ethical framework has become more crucial than ever. This article argues that a paradigm shift is necessary, one that moves beyond a purely egoistic understanding of the self and redefines it through the (...) lens of empathy. Examining this redefinition through the prisms of neuroscience, moral philosophy, and technological development, we explore the potential for fostering an ethical landscape where individual progress thrives in tandem with collective well-being._. (shrink)

The ideal of authenticity that developed in the Romantic era emphasized that both individuals and places find their own authentic process for cultivating their identity and humanity, a notion that has become controversial in modern philosophy. This article will explore the concepts of authenticity and place and discuss their relevance for Bildung theory today. Based on the works of Charles Taylor, we will argue that Bildung can be seen as constituted by and constitutive of language and moral spaces that go (...) beyond the self and its individuality. In this view, Bildung can be understood as a ‘moral topography of the self’ with both substantial and procedural aspects. However, language and moral spaces (i.e. communities) can both enable and constrict our Bildung processes. Drawing on Rahel Jaeggi, we thus argue that alienation is an equally important concept to understand the complex and dialectical relationship between individuals and communities in our current moment. (shrink)

James Mark Baldwin was one of the leaders in the new experimental psychology that developed at the end of the 19th century. In a discussion of F. H. Bradley’s view of the self, he makes an apparently odd remark. Baldwin describes Bradley’s account of the active self, the self of volition and desire. In particular, he refers to Bradley’s account of the feeling of self activity. On the latter, certain contents defining the ‘I’ remain constant, while (...) there is change in which certain other contents replace others; in acting on desire the self expands itself to include certain new contents within itself. Bradley puts it this way: ‘In desire and volition we have an idea held against the existing not-self, the idea being that of a change in that not-self. This idea … is felt to be a part of that self which is opposed to the not-self…’. We have ‘the expansion of the self so far as that is identified with the idea of the change’. Often the desire has consciously before itself the idea of those elements which it wishes to include within itself. But often, too, these elements are below the threshold of consciousness, implicity rather than explicit: ‘… in some cases where the self apprehends itself as active, there seems at first sight to be no idea. But the problem is solved by the distinction between an idea which is explicit and an idea not explicit’. Baldwin comments on this account, that. (shrink)

In the third part of the Ethics, Spinoza provides a naturalistic picture of human psychology. Spinoza's account distinguishes between active and passive affects. This chapter discusses how Spinoza's theory of affects demonstrates that the self with which human individuals identify in daily life is the result of a complex and constantly on‐going imaginative construction shaped by desires and causal interactions with other individuals and external causes. The core of the affective field is occupied by desire, which is the expression (...) of the individual's conatus to persevere in its own existence. The whole social world arises as a product of the imaginative desire of the mind. Spinoza's account of the affects shows how both of these ideas originate from the complex interplay of affective conditionings and external causes, structured and shaped in the affective field produced by each individual's desiderative imagination. (shrink)

In line with a particular form of analysis as developed by Michel Foucault, this article proposes to elucidate a particular way of understanding Buddhist monastic culture as detailed in the rules concerning behaviour (the Vinaya), which may be called the “care of the self approach”. To develop this argument, the article first describes the nature of the Vinaya as a “training scheme” rather than a system of prohibitions or rules. Second, it examines the nature of confession or what is (...) called “truth telling”. Third, it examines the nature of transgression of the Vinaya rules. Fourth, I examine the Vinaya and the role of ethics. Lastly, it is shown how these approaches to monastic Buddhism deal with the nature of the transformation of desire to construct what may be seen as a form of “ethical technology” or alternatively as a “transgressive technology”. (shrink)

This article provides a relation between the problem of shame in both Levinas and Agamben, focusing, for the most part, in the development of Levinas' metaphysics and its relation to the emotional tonality of shame in three works: "On Escape", "Time and the Other" and "Otherwise than Being". In stressing the unique take that Levinas has on metaphysics, I try to point at the tension between Jewish and Greek thought in Levinas, and his option for a radical notion of a (...) situated understanding of the "ethical". Hence my interest in contrasting Levinas and Agamben, as Agamben's appropriation of Levinas' lexicon in his "Remnants of Aushwitz" places the subject in a political, and material, position which is ultimately uncompatible with Levinas' situational and metaphysical take on the self. (shrink)

SummaryThis article situates Ernest Renan's representation of the historical Jesus in the author's intellectual, personal and political trajectory. It traces the development of Renan's ideas about Jesus across a variety of texts, from his loss of faith at the Seminary of Saint-Sulpice in 1845 until the publication of Life of Jesus in 1863. It particularly argues that Renan's best-selling book should be rooted in the cultural aftermath of the revolutionary upheavals of 1848 to 1851. The violence of the June Days (...) and the election of Louis-Napoléon bred in Renan a deep disillusionment with democracy and socialism. Where French writers of the 1830s and 1840s had offered a proletarian Christ promising social revolution, Renan therefore depicted a liberal Jesus who offered a non-violent ‘revolution’ of personal morality. This Jesus was an individualist who spurned the temporal realm with ‘transcendent disdain’, preferring instead to pursue a state of inner liberty and perfection. Furthermore, this article argues that this representation of Jesus reflected the self-justification of Second Empire liberals such as Renan, who had retreated from frontline politics into the realm of culture and ideas. Indeed, Life of Jesus was itself a product of precisely this retreat. (shrink)

Résumé Ce document examine les liens entre la manière de rendre compte de la réalité sociale esquissée par George Herbert Mead et développée par Beth Singer et la contrepartie que l’on trouve chez les promoteurs du réalisme critique. Que ce soit principalement dans l’optique d’une défense de la pertinence des contributions de Mead ou dans la perspective d’un raffinement de l’ontologie sociale associée au réalisme critique, les auteurs qui ont déjà comparé ces perspectives ont considéré avant tout les différences. Dans (...) cet article, je soutiens qu’il existe des similitudes importantes entre la manière de rendre compte de la collectivité, des normes et des droits chez Mead et Singer et les thèses récentes énoncées de certains partisans du réalisme critique. En outre, je suggère que dans les cas mêmes où les limitations de l’analyse de Mead sont évidentes, par exemple dans sa description par trop « socialisée » du soi, diverses réponses aux critiques peuvent être apportée et plus d’une se trouve en cohérence avec des aspects centraux du réalisme critique. (shrink)

_Zhang Yimou: Interviews_ Edited by Frances Gateward Conversations with Filmmakers Series Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001 ISBN 1578062624 169 pp.

El presente artículo indaga una serie de dispositivos editoriales fotográficos contemporáneos construidos con materiales visuales de archivo a partir de tres figuraciones (Haraway, 2017 y 2019) que definen modulaciones subjetivas específicas, estrategias con las que configuran una determinada matriz narrativa (Despret, 2021): la detective, la prófuga y la testigo serán presentadas aquí a través del respectivo análisis de Los órdenes del amor, de Lucila Penedo (2022), Querida Natacha, de Natacha Ebers (2020), y Nuestros códigos, del Archivo de la Memoria Trans (...) Argentina (2023). Para llegar a construir estas figuraciones partiremos de tres consideraciones iniciales: (a) el modo en que estos dispositivos despliegan la dimensión biográfica desde el archivo hacia el espacio público y las prácticas de lectura que propician, (b) la consideración de lo fotográfico como evento (Azoullay, 2015), como temporalidad expandida, y (c) la dimensión háptica de la experiencia de contacto con los dispositivos editoriales, entendiendo esta dimensión como aquella que habilita una experiencia afectiva y sensorial con estos materiales (Bruno, 2019; Sedwick, 2018). (shrink)

This paper examines the different conceptions of personal renewal offered in the writings of John Dewey and Stanley Cavell. Both conceptions, I suggest, can be seen as attempting to reconcile the quest for self-realization with democratic life through a poetic, essentially Emersonian vision of the self as a continual work-in-progress. Accordingly, the kinds of selves that Dewey and Cavell seek are in the end highly compatible. Yet it seems clear too that Dewey and Cavell also stand in a (...) somewhat different relation to the Emersonian tradition, and thus diverge in important ways as to the most preferable means of personal renewal. While Dewey tends to focus on the extensive workings of embodied habit, Cavell's ``Emersonian Perfectionism'' takes a more distinctively linguistic turn. After showing the strengths and weaknesses of each approach to personal renewal, I prevail upon the need for educational environments that recognize both the discursive and nondiscursive dimensions of reconstructing the self. (shrink)

Inquiry into the felt dimension of experience can be deeply transformative, but more than promoting transcendence it can help us make contact with the intricacy of our open and embodied self-….

In his presentation of different life-philosophers, Fellmann shows that the discrediting of the Philosophy of Life as a dangerous irrationalism misses the main point. This lies in the discovery of emotional intelligence, which is found in modern forms of self-experience in opposition to the Cartesian Cogito. It is not about overcoming rationalism, but rather enriching it with the first-person perspective.

One argument against epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution. A particularly powerful form of this argument was developed by William James. James argued against epiphenomenalism on the grounds that, if it were correct, it would be inexplicable why the things that we find pleasurable are mostly beneficial to us while the things we find painful are mostly harmful. The aim of the present paper is to defend and extend James’s argument. James’s argument is here defended against criticisms due to (...) Karl Popper, John Eccles and William Robinson. Recently, an argument similar to James’s has been developed by Hedda Hassel Mørch. Mørch argues that the phenomena to which James drew our attention can be explained if we say pleasure and pain have phenomenal powers. In the present paper it is argued that, as it stands, the argument developed by Mørch is not satisfactory. It is argued that Mørch’s account needs to be supplemented with the thesis that the self has certain causal powers. A similar addition, it is argued, needs to be made to a position defended by Bradford Saad. The paper argues that, supplemented with the appropriate attributions of causal powers to the self, James’s argument against epiphenomenalism is effective. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to shed light on two somewhat underappreciated theories, which, by drawing attention to the embodied and relational nature of the self, both went beyond the disembodied and individualist paradigm long before most current leading approaches in the field. The paper first considers the routes out of the crisis of this paradigm proposed by care ethics. The first part focuses mainly on Carol Gilligan’s relational account of subjectivity, which served as an inspiration for (...) the development of care ethics as a moral theory, and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of her account. In the next step, the paper sets out to compare the view of the self deployed by care ethics with Donald Winnicott’s account of the transitional area of play. The paper argues that both care ethics and Winnicott’s theory make it possible to understand human subjectivity as at the same time dependent and mature, ambivalent and integrated, vulnerable and responsible, relational and non-arbitrary. Winnicott and care ethicists jointly demonstrate that it is neither an absolute symbiosis with others, nor a total separation from them, that is decisive for the well-being of an individual and a social field. Rather, it is beneficial and morally desirable to cultivate concrete interpersonal relationships in the area of complex relationality. The paper concludes that the crisis of the disembodied and individualistic paradigm of the self cannot be overcome by an uncritical emphasis on the positive function of relational, embodied and supra-individual aspects of human existence. Though essential, these aspects are at the same time complex and developmentally conditioned. (shrink)

RESUMEN Introducción: El proceso de cuidar es el resultado de una construcción propia de cada situación, se origina con la identificación de los problemas de salud y las necesidades reales o potenciales de las personas, familia y comunidad que demandan cuidado. Objetivo: Evaluar el impacto del Diplomado Prevención del Síndrome de Burnout, en el autocuidado del personal de enfermería de la Atención Secundaria de Salud de la provincia Camagüey. Métodos: Se realizó un estudio descriptivo observacional, en el Hospital Amalia Simoni (...) Argilagos de Camagüey, durante el Diplomado Prevención del Síndrome de Burnout dirigido al personal de enfermería de la Atención Secundaria de Salud. Para ello se aplicó una encuesta y el Test Psicológico de Maslach y Jackson al inicio y al final de la aplicación del Diplomado. Los datos aportados por estos instrumentos se complementaron con los provenientes de la aplicación de la técnica del PNI. Resultados: Predominó el sexo femenino. El total de los cursistas son licenciados en Enfermería. Con la ejecución del diplomado se constatan cambios importantes en cuanto a la autopreparación, el rendimiento, los hábitos de descanso, satisfacción personal y realización de ejercicios físicos. Discusión: La aplicación del diplomado logró transformar estilos de trabajo, afrontamientos al estrés, así como una mejor satisfacción personal y colectiva. ABSTRACT Introduction: The process of taking care is the result of a proper construction of every situation, it originates with the identification of the problems of health and the real or potential needs of the persons, family and community that demand care. Objective: To evaluate the impact of Postgraduate Course Prevention of the Syndrome of Burnout, in the self-care of the personnel of infirmary of the Secondary Attention of Health of the Camagüey province. Methods: a descriptive, observational study was carried out in the Hospital Amalia Simoni Argilagos of Camagüey, during Postgraduate Course Prevention of the Syndrome of Burnout directed to the personnel of infirmary of the Secondary Attention of Health. For that reason, a survey and the Psychological Test of Maslach and Jackson was applied at the beginning and at the end of the application of the course. The information contributed by these instruments complemented itself with the originated ones from the application of the technique of the PNI. Results: The sex that predominated was the feminine one. All of the students are licensed in Infirmary. With the execution of the course important changes are stated as for the self-preparation, the yield, the habits of rest, personal satisfaction and achievement of physical exercises. Discussion: The application of the course managed to transform styles of work, confrontations to the stress, as well as a better personal and collective satisfaction. (shrink)

I compare Locke's views on the nature and powers of the self with E. J. Lowe's view, ‘non-Cartesian substance dualism’. Lowe agrees with Locke that persons have a power to choose or not to choose. Lowe takes this power to be non-causal. I argue that this move does not obviously succeed in evading the notorious interaction problem that arises for all forms of substance dualism, including those of Locke and Descartes. However, I am sympathetic to Lowe's attempt to give (...) a metaphysical account of a robust sort of agency that would explain how human beings might be genuinely autonomous. (shrink)

In the act of self-observation, an individual becomes simultaneously observer and observed, subject and object. While some philosophical psychologists have dismissed thisreflexivity, the present author proposes that it isthe essential feature of the self, making it the basis of a new, conceptually simple, structural and dynamic theory of the self. Drawing from psychopathology, poetry and literature, the author portrays normal and disordered psychological states as disturbances in reflexivity. Qualitative and quantitative variations in this core function are proposed (...) to define discreet spectra of psychological situations. The author briefly examines the theories and practices of psychoanalytic and existential psychology, and proposes clinical applications of the new views here depicted. He attempts to show that inherent limits to our simultaneous knowledge of both aspects of the reflexive duality limit the precision and validity of all psychological theorization. (shrink)

This volume illuminates the processes of self maintenance and change.

This article considers one element within the long tradition of the church’s self-identification as a city. It focuses on England, c. 1450 to c. 1510, and considers how the civic rhetoric developed by Italian humanists, pre-eminently Leonardo Bruni, was refracted through an ecclesiastical lens and so appropriated for English clerical use. It describes how two useful elements were quarried from recent writings imported from Italy: the first was the emphasis on the city and its buildings as a locus of (...) virtue; the second was that, because of its virtue, that city was under attack. The discussion begins with the time of social unrest in the mid-fifteenth century,in the wake of which Thomas Chaundler wrote his praise of Thomas Bekynton, bishop of Bath and Wells, and his building works in his episcopal city. It ends in the first years of the sixteenth century with the relations between Christopher Urswick, dean of Windsor, and Thomas Goldstone, prior of Christ Church, Canterbury. Their re-use of older texts, specifically the Speculum regis Edwardi III, which they assumed to be by Archbishop Simon Islip, and more recent humanist ones, by Celso Maffei and Goldstone’s predecessor as prior, William Sellyng, identified other enemies who attacked the church: invoking the name of Thomas Becket, they saw those oppressing them to be not rebels against authority but those in authority. This allows us to reflect on how a few English readers of humanist civic rhetoric found in it potentially radical force. (shrink)

I am grateful for the responses from Serife Tekin and James Phillips to my paper (Lumsden 2013), for they allow me to clarify my position. Tekin (2013) accurately characterizes me as attempting to salvage the value of narrative theory without accepting the more stringent demands that have been required or implied, notably the necessity for personhood of a whole life narrative. She notes that I attempt to provide an alternative view of the unity of a person, to the degree that (...) there is that unity, by seeing a self as a bundle of narrative threads. She acknowledges my suggestion that the bundling involves connections at both conscious and unconscious levels. She says we are left with a problem, the .. (shrink)

The thesis addresses the issues of error through misidentification and immunity to error through misidentification in relation to the problem of the first person. First, it provides an explanation of error through misidentification. Secondly, it shows that there are two possible ways of understanding immunity to error through misidentification. It is then argued that the first understanding of immunity to error through misidentification leads to what is labelled "the trilemma about the self". That is to say, either we provide (...) an explanation of immunity to error through misidentification, but we subscribe to two contentious metaphysical views about the self-the Cartesian and the Idealist; or else we hold the view that the self is identical with a human being, but we have no explanation of immunity to error through misidentification. It is then shown that in order to solve the trilemma, a different understanding of immunity to error through misidentification must be offered. After discussing various possible understandings of immunity to error through misidentification, a sound account of it is finally provided. Moreover, it is shown how non-inferential, introspection-based mental self-ascriptions can comply with it, in such a way that they turn out to be logically immune to error through misidentification. Finally, by drawing on Evans' and Peacocke's accounts of the possession conditions of the first person concept-in which IEM I-judgements play a central role-, it is shown that it is a concept of a human being who thinks of herself as such. Hence, our first person concept is firmly anti-Cartesian and anti-Idealist. As a consequence, it is maintained that not only is there no need to hold the Cartesian and the Idealist metaphysics of the self in order to explain why some I-judgements can be immune to error through misidentification, but it is also argued that one can no longer be either Cartesian or Idealist. For that would expose one to conceptual incoherence. (shrink)

This book addresses the question of human uniqueness at a time when academic discourse has all but abandoned its long-held commitment to the value of individuality.

Some of the most intriguing and important phenomena in modern many-body physics are explainable in terms of self-consistent quantum mechanical field theory. This is the powerful theory developed by Umezawa and co-workers and modified by Benson and Hatch in applications to ferromagnetism. It is usually lengthy and involved mathematically. Thus, it is very helpful and meaningful to see its overall step-by-step progress in simple, diagrammatic flow starting from basic principles, with a ferromagnetic model as an example. As one immediately (...) notes, there are two paths leading to very powerful physical conclusions and implications, and something most interesting is that each path implies the other. Many useful examples of applications of these methods are noted and some future possible applications are cited. (shrink)

But suppose now that technology were no means, how would it stand with the will to master it? Martin Heidegger.