The orthodox answer to my question is this: in a case of self-deception, the self acts to deceive itself. That is, the self is the author of its own deception. I want to explore an opposing idea here: that the self is rather the subject matter of the deception. That is, I want to explore the idea that self-deception is more concerned with the self’s deception about the self, than with the self’s (...) deception by the self. The expression would thus be semantically comparable to expressions like ‘self-knowledge’ (which involves knowledge about the self) rather than to expressions like ‘self-control’ (which involves control by the self).1 On this approach, what goes wrong, when we are self-deceived, is that we lack self-knowledge; or, more accurately, since one can lack knowledge without falling into error, what goes wrong is that we have false beliefs about ourselves. Not any kind of false belief about oneself; I am not self-deceived when I mistake my shoe size. Rather, self-deception requires false beliefs about the kind of subject matter that, were one to get it right, would constitute self-knowledge. It is an interesting fact about current English that, though we talk freely of self-knowledge, we have no common term to designate its absence. Seventeenth century writers talked of self-ignorance; but the term has fallen from use. I suggest that ‘self-deception’ is the nearest we have. (shrink)

Histories of the Self The self is a historical phenomenon. As Nietzsche pointed out, the forms of self now taken for granted are the product of an arduous and often violent development whose beginnings, in Nietzsche's accounts at least, predate Cesare Borgia.1 Nietzsche is not the only figure to have attempted to write the history of the self. Max Weber and Norbert Elias immediately come to mind.2 More recently, Charles Taylor has historicized modern Western identity (calling (...) it “a function of a historically limited mode of self-interpretation … which had a beginning in time and space and may have an…. (shrink)

Who or what is “I”? Does “I” refer to the soul, body, or something else? This paper aims to clarify the Iranian Sufi Maḥmūd Shabistarī’s metaphysical account of the self in The Rose Garden of Mystery (Gulshan-i Rāz). Some of Shabistarī’s commentators-for example, Lāhījī-argue that the “self is the determined Real” without offering a full account. This paper presents Shabistarī’s self by examining Gulshan in the context of commentaries, secondary sources, and Islamic thought and by presenting opposing (...) interpretations and reasons for the most prominent interpretations. In Gulshan, the self is neither the soul nor the body. It is the Real’s determination, a face among the eternally manifesting, unrepeated faces of the Real. This paper argues that the self is the human’s fixed entity (quiddity, ʿayn-i thābitah), whose aptitudes are perpetually unfolding; it is an eternal becoming of the Perfect Man. The self is not reified (i.e., it is of no definite content or form) or fully known; it changes every moment; it is the ever-changing “I” of the moment. Shabistarī’s metaphysics helps the modern person realize that her self is divine; it teaches her that because the world-including humans, animals, and the environment-is God’s manifestation, it deserves care. (shrink)

The article examines the challenge of achieving sustainable mediational equilibrium within the Self–Other relationship. It argues that the mere pursuit of mutual understanding among dialogue participants is insufficient to guarantee productive communication, particularly in contexts where interactions are driven by competition for scarce resources and opportunities. Under such conditions, subjects risk becoming dependent on instrumental reason – the logic of control and suppression – which transforms both the Self and the Other from fully-fledged personalities into functions of reified (...) rationality. The analysis introduces a distinction between two roles of the individual: the person as a bearer of unique values and meanings, and the individual as a subject of social relations, an actor immersed in practical interactions. It is demonstrated that the capacity of the former to exert control over the latter is limited, and that interactions are shaped not only by the personal qualities of the participants but also by the impersonal logic of instrumental reason. This logic is conceptualized as a kind of third subjectivity that mediates the dialogue between the Self and the Other. Achieving mediational equilibrium becomes possible through the development of autonomy among the parties, through their transformation, mutual recognition, and the search for a measure of compatibility. This approach is traced through examples from A.S. Akhiezer’s theory of sociocultural mediation, A.P. Davydov’s concept of inter-subjective dialogue, and R. Bush and J. Folger’s theory of transformative mediation. Key concepts in the latter include empowerment (strengthening participants’ ability to clearly recognize their goals and make responsible decisions) and recognition (willingness to hear and understand the Other’s perspective). The essence of transformative mediation lies in the transition from imposing one party’s position to a collaborative search for new possibilities, allowing the realization of both Self and Other’s interests through dialogue. In conclusion, the article asserts the importance of overcoming the logic of mutual accusations by shifting the focus from the opponent’s personality to the impersonal structures limiting the self-determination of all parties. (shrink)

This paper explores the heart and brain metaphors used in the meaning-making efforts of Chinese individuals diagnosed with depression. Past studies assert that the origin of Chinese language metaphors for thinking and feeling can be found in traditional Chinese medico-philosophical theory, where the heart is viewed as the seat of thought and emotion, and the brain, which constitutes the cognitive center in western theories of the self, is secondary. While most participants employed heart metaphors to express thinking and feeling, (...) many of the participants also employed brain metaphors. Instead of suggesting that this multiplicity implies westernization, this paper argues that cultural understandings of the self can be multiple. To appreciate this, it is necessary to look at spontaneously generated speech in a narrative context. This paper thus analyzes three participant narratives, a process that carries several implications for studies approaching the relationship between metaphor, culture, and the self. (shrink)

The relation between the concepts of the subject of apperception, the phenomenal self, and the noumenal self has long puzzled commentators on Kant’s theoretical account of the self. This paper argues that many of the puzzles surrounding Kant’s account can be resolved by treating the subject of apperception and other transcendental predicates of thinking as a dimension of the noumenal self. Yet this interpretation requires a clarification of how the transcendental predicates of thinking can be attributed (...) to the noumenal self without violating the thesis of noumenal ignorance. The clarification is achieved through a careful analysis of the meaning of the latter thesis. The paper’s interpretation is then shown to be consistent with Kant’s rejection of traditional ontology and with the dual-aspect view. The paper’s final section argues that transcendental predicates are properly construed as logical predicates but must be distinguished from ordinary examples of the latter. (shrink)

The Person Vanishes argues that despite John Dewey's failure to articulate «an adequate theory of personality», his writings provide at least a theory-sketch of human personality consistent with the assumptions that framed his philosophical outlook. Recognizing the new developments in society, science, and the arts, Dewey argues for the necessity of a Copernican revolution in our understanding of the human self; from the monadic and minimalist self of the Cartesian-Newtonian modernist tradition to a relational and processual model of (...) selfhood consonant with the press of post-modernist historical experience. As a field and activity conception, Dewey's self emerges as a nexus of relational energizing, genuinely moored in a cultural surrounding in which ongoing creative reconstruction becomes the mark and criterion of the self's health and growth. What vanishes in Dewey's reconstruction is not the self as such, but only the entitative, substantive self of early modernism. Dewey's understanding of the self is grounded in the conviction that philosophy must begin its inquiry from the ordinary experience of plain men and women. The Person Vanishes examines Dewey's participatory notion of deliberation, what he calls «dramatic rehearsal», by using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study. The analysis attempts to cash out the personal and collective habits, as well as the different modalities of ends, facts, and values that diagram the existential dimensions of this problematic situation. Contrary to traditional dualistic and spectatorial accounts of deliberation, Dewey's «dramatic rehearsal» shows the complexity of decision-making when the genuine limitations of daily life are taken seriously. The attempt to march to Dewey's participatory philosophy reveals the escapist nature of all dualistic philosophical traditions and the reason for their continuous failure to resolve concrete social and personal conflicts. (shrink)

_The human experience has long been characterized by a tension between two fundamental forces: the self-centered tendencies of our ego and the outward-stretching pull of empathy. In the contemporary world, where technology is rapidly amplifying both our individual power and interconnectedness, navigating this tension within an ethical framework has become more crucial than ever. This article argues that a paradigm shift is necessary, one that moves beyond a purely egoistic understanding of the self and redefines it through the (...) lens of empathy. Examining this redefinition through the prisms of neuroscience, moral philosophy, and technological development, we explore the potential for fostering an ethical landscape where individual progress thrives in tandem with collective well-being._. (shrink)

James Mark Baldwin was one of the leaders in the new experimental psychology that developed at the end of the 19th century. In a discussion of F. H. Bradley’s view of the self, he makes an apparently odd remark. Baldwin describes Bradley’s account of the active self, the self of volition and desire. In particular, he refers to Bradley’s account of the feeling of self activity. On the latter, certain contents defining the ‘I’ remain constant, while (...) there is change in which certain other contents replace others; in acting on desire the self expands itself to include certain new contents within itself. Bradley puts it this way: ‘In desire and volition we have an idea held against the existing not-self, the idea being that of a change in that not-self. This idea … is felt to be a part of that self which is opposed to the not-self…’. We have ‘the expansion of the self so far as that is identified with the idea of the change’. Often the desire has consciously before itself the idea of those elements which it wishes to include within itself. But often, too, these elements are below the threshold of consciousness, implicity rather than explicit: ‘… in some cases where the self apprehends itself as active, there seems at first sight to be no idea. But the problem is solved by the distinction between an idea which is explicit and an idea not explicit’. Baldwin comments on this account, that. (shrink)

The ideal of authenticity that developed in the Romantic era emphasized that both individuals and places find their own authentic process for cultivating their identity and humanity, a notion that has become controversial in modern philosophy. This article will explore the concepts of authenticity and place and discuss their relevance for Bildung theory today. Based on the works of Charles Taylor, we will argue that Bildung can be seen as constituted by and constitutive of language and moral spaces that go (...) beyond the self and its individuality. In this view, Bildung can be understood as a ‘moral topography of the self’ with both substantial and procedural aspects. However, language and moral spaces (i.e. communities) can both enable and constrict our Bildung processes. Drawing on Rahel Jaeggi, we thus argue that alienation is an equally important concept to understand the complex and dialectical relationship between individuals and communities in our current moment. (shrink)

The paper develops a view of interpretative cultural practice as a complex system of dynamically changing constituents which stand in definite relations to one another. These constituents are the Object of Interpretation (O), Result of Interpretation or interpretation itself (I), the Process of interpretation (P) and the interpreting Subject (S). It is argued that if such a view as this is adapted, ‘singularism’ as a norm for cultural practices necessarily gives way to ‘multiplism’. Singularism and multiplism are terms used by (...) Michael Krausz in Rightness and Reasons (1993). Krausz also talks of certain interpretative practices as imputational, in the sense that the object of interpretation changes, is ‘imputed upon’ during the course of the practice. This paper contends that all cultural practices are imputalional, for each such practice leaves its effect on the object. Not only does practice affect the object, but it affects the subject too The evolution of the subject, the self, through imputational interpretative cultural practices is explored as a major element in the making of a human individual. (shrink)

Spinoza, as a monist and a rationalist, seems unlikely to have occasion to confront any form of the solipsism problem. However, a close examination of his epistemology reveals that he does in fact confront a very radical form of this problem, and offers an equally radical solution to it, derived from the very epistemological premises that make it a potential problem for him. In particular, we find that the conception of the mind as the “idea of the body,” premised on (...) the strict identity of mental modes (“ideas”) and extended modes (“bodies”) forecloses any possibility of awareness extending “beyond” the confines of the finite body, or of any idea being able to be about anything other than its own bodily mode: ideas can only be ideas “of” the body of which they are the idea, and hence the mind, as the idea of the body, cannot have any ideas “of” anything outside of the body. The solution comes from the “Common Notions” which establish the existence of the world outside the body not by “reaching” that world, but merely by establishing immanently the nature of the finite body qua finite body. This manner of instantiating an infinite externality of the body within the body itself, though highly exceptional in European intellectual history, bears interesting similarities to the solutions to distinct but parallel problems concerning the relation of the finite to the infinite found in Chinese thought, in particular in the Zhuangzi and in the Huayan and Tiantai schools of Buddhism. (shrink)

The paper takes its cue from the emergence in our society of a new view of the adolescent, which a branch of the psychological literature has spelled out in terms of a passage from Oedipus to Narcissus. It is argued that pre-college ethics education should engage with this passage by deploying educational strategies modelled according to the Care of the Self paradigm but revisiting it through Kierkegaard’s idea of repetition. The latter prevents that paradigm from fostering a sort of (...) aestheticization of ethical life and allows us to mobilize it in ethics education. Against this backdrop two pedagogical methods—autobiographical writing and essay writing—are discussed as possible tools for a Care-of-the-Self-oriented education. (shrink)

The book is an examination of the problem of the self and the role of error in its identity.

This collection of essays examines urban communities and societies in Asia and the West to shed much-needed light on issues that have emerged as the world experiences its new urban turn. An urbanized world should be an improving place, one that is better to live in, one where humans can flourish. This book examines contemporary practices of care of the self in cities in Asia and the West, including challenges to citizenship and even the right to the city itself. (...) Written by a range of academics from different backgrounds (from architecture and urbanism, anthropology, social science, psychology, gender studies, history, and philosophy) their trans- and multidisciplinary approaches shed valuable light on what are sometimes quite old problems, leading to fresh perspectives and news ways of dealing with them. One thing that unites all of these papers is their people-centred approach, because, after all, a city is its people. (shrink)

_Zhang Yimou: Interviews_ Edited by Frances Gateward Conversations with Filmmakers Series Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001 ISBN 1578062624 169 pp.

This paper examines the different conceptions of personal renewal offered in the writings of John Dewey and Stanley Cavell. Both conceptions, I suggest, can be seen as attempting to reconcile the quest for self-realization with democratic life through a poetic, essentially Emersonian vision of the self as a continual work-in-progress. Accordingly, the kinds of selves that Dewey and Cavell seek are in the end highly compatible. Yet it seems clear too that Dewey and Cavell also stand in a (...) somewhat different relation to the Emersonian tradition, and thus diverge in important ways as to the most preferable means of personal renewal. While Dewey tends to focus on the extensive workings of embodied habit, Cavell's ``Emersonian Perfectionism'' takes a more distinctively linguistic turn. After showing the strengths and weaknesses of each approach to personal renewal, I prevail upon the need for educational environments that recognize both the discursive and nondiscursive dimensions of reconstructing the self. (shrink)

Résumé Ce document examine les liens entre la manière de rendre compte de la réalité sociale esquissée par George Herbert Mead et développée par Beth Singer et la contrepartie que l’on trouve chez les promoteurs du réalisme critique. Que ce soit principalement dans l’optique d’une défense de la pertinence des contributions de Mead ou dans la perspective d’un raffinement de l’ontologie sociale associée au réalisme critique, les auteurs qui ont déjà comparé ces perspectives ont considéré avant tout les différences. Dans (...) cet article, je soutiens qu’il existe des similitudes importantes entre la manière de rendre compte de la collectivité, des normes et des droits chez Mead et Singer et les thèses récentes énoncées de certains partisans du réalisme critique. En outre, je suggère que dans les cas mêmes où les limitations de l’analyse de Mead sont évidentes, par exemple dans sa description par trop « socialisée » du soi, diverses réponses aux critiques peuvent être apportée et plus d’une se trouve en cohérence avec des aspects centraux du réalisme critique. (shrink)