Despite the salient experience of encoding threatening events, these memories are prone to distortions and often non-veridical from encoding to recall. Further, threat has been shown to preferentially disrupt the binding of event details and enhance goal-relevant information. While extensive work has characterised distinctive features of emotional memory, research has not fully explored the influence threat has on temporal memory, a process putatively supported by the binding of event details into a temporal context. Two primary competing (...) hypotheses have been proposed; that threat can impair or enhance temporal memory. We analysed two datasets to assess temporal memory for an in-person haunted house experience. In study 1, we examined the temporal structure of memory by characterising memory contiguity in free recall as a function of individual levels of heart rate as a proxy of threat. In study 2, we replicated marginal findings of threat-related increases in memory contiguity found in study 1. We extended these findings by showing threat-related increases in recency discriminations, an explicit test of temporal memory. Together, these findings demonstrate that threat enhances temporal memory regarding free recall structure and during explicit memory judgments. (shrink)

Emotional fluctuations are ubiquitous in everyday life, but precisely how they sculpt the temporal organisation of memories remains unclear. Here, we designed a novel task – the Emotion Boundary Task – wherein participants viewed sequences of negative and neutral images surrounded by a colour border. We manipulated perceptual context (border colour), emotional-picture valence, as well as the direction of emotional-valence shifts (i.e., shifts from neutral-to-negative and negative-to-neutral events) to create events with a shared perceptual and/or emotional context. We measured (...) memory for temporal order and temporal distances for images processed within and across events. Negative images processed within events were remembered as closer in time compared to neutral ones. In contrast, temporal distances were remembered as longer for images spanning neutral-to-negative shifts – suggesting temporal dilation in memory with the onset of a negative event following a previously-neutral state. The extent of negative-picture induced temporal dilation in memory correlated with dispositional negativity across individuals. Lastly, temporal order memory was enhanced for recently-presented negative (versus neutral) images. These findings suggest that emotional-state dynamics matters when considering emotion-temporal memory interactions: While persistent negative events may compress subjectively remembered time, dynamic shifts from neutral-to-negative events produce temporal dilation in memory, with implications for adaptive emotional functioning. (shrink)

Remembering when emotional experiences occurred can be adaptive, yet there is no consensus on how emotion influences temporal aspects of memory. Temporal memory, a type of associative memory, refers to the capacity to encode, store, and retrieve information about the sequence and timing of events. This Special Issue presents evidence on how emotion affects three aspects of temporal memory: temporal-order, temporal source, and event segmentation. The contributions suggest that emotion often increases (...) temporal-order memory, a result that is harder to reconcile with some dominant emotional memory theories, including the Object-Based Framework, the Dual Representation Account or other trade-off models, but may fit with Arousal-Biased Competition theory. The contributions also suggest that emotion can act as a boundary between events, although only under some experimental set-ups. Findings regarding its effect on temporal source memory were less clear. We discuss the diversity of findings in light of theories of emotional associative memory and methodological factors, such as the direction of the shift in emotional experience and discrepancies between temporal-order and temporal distance measures as indices of event boundaries. We provide a roadmap for future studies aimed at understanding how emotion shapes the fate of our memories as they unfold in time. (shrink)

Episodic memory, with its emphasis on temporal–spatial contexts, has been a longstanding focus in memory research. While previous studies have investigated the role of emotion in temporal source memory using emotionally charged stimuli, such as emotional words or images, the influence of a separated emotional context remains less explored. This study sought to understand the impact of separate emotional contexts on temporal source memory. Participants were shown Chinese characters alongside separate emotional contexts (i.e. (...) a neutral or negative picture) and then engaged in either a retrieval practice or a control condition. Finally, they were tested for recognition, temporal source memory, and emotional source memory for all the learned characters. Results revealed that a negative emotional context, unlike a neutral setting, enhanced the accuracy of temporal memory for adjacent neutral characters. However, this negative context reduced the accuracy of recalling the associated emotion. Importantly, the boost in temporal memory due to the emotional context remained even when participants were unsure or mistaken about the associated emotion. This study demonstrates the complex interplay between emotion and temporal memory, underscoring the enhancement effect of separated emotional contexts on temporal recall, irrespective of explicit emotional memory retrieval. (shrink)

Common wisdom, philosophical analysis and psychological research share the view that memory is subjectively positioned toward the past: Specifically, memory enables one to become re-acquainted with the objects and events of his or her past. In this paper I call this assumption into question. As I hope to show, memory has been designed by natural selection not to relive the past, but rather to anticipate and plan for future contingencies -- a decidedly future-oriented mode of subjective temporality. (...) This is not to say memory makes no reference to the past. But, I argue, past-oriented subjectivity is a by-product of a system designed by natural selection to help us face and respond to the "now and the next". I discuss the implications of the proposed temporal realignment for research agendas as well as the potential limitations of measures designed to explore memory by focusing on its retentive capabilities. (shrink)

The notion of memory storage, central to most contemporary theories of remembering, is challenged from a philosophical perspective as being contradictory and untenable. It criticizes this storage hypothesis as relying upon a linear explanation of time, an assumption which results in infinite regression, solipsism, and a failure to contact the real past. A model based on the phenomenological viewpoints of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty is offered as an alternative paradigm. Finally, a research method suggested by this descriptive approach (...) to memory is presented and illustrated. (shrink)

An account of the development of temporal understanding is proposed which links such understanding with the development of episodic memory. We distinguish between different ways of representing time in terms of the kinds of temporal frameworks they involve. Distinctions are made between frameworks that are perspectival or nonperspectival and those that represent recurrent sequences or particular times. Even primitive temporal understanding integrates both perspectival and nonperspectival components. However, since early frameworks are event-based and localized, they are (...) not yet sufficient for episodic memory in that they do not enable the child to think of events as having occurred at particular points in time. We describe the emergence of new kinds of frameworks in terms of the development of temporal decentering. Two levels of temporal decentering are distinguished, with the higher level involving an appreciation of how event representations depend on one's temporal perspective. (shrink)

BackgroundTemporal interference (TI) stimulation is a novel technique that enables the non-invasive modulation of deep brain regions. However, the implementation of this technology in humans has not been well-characterized or examined, including its safety and feasibility.ObjectiveWe aimed to examine the feasibility, safety, and blinding of using TI on human participants in this pilot study.Materials and methodsIn a randomized, single-blinded, and sham-controlled pilot study, healthy young participants were randomly divided into four groups [TI and transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) targeting the (...) right frontoparietal region, TI-sham, and tACS-sham]. Each participant was asked to complete N-back (N = 1 to 3) tasks before, during, and after one session of stimulation to assess their working memory (WM). The side effects and blinding efficacy were carefully assessed. The accuracy, reaction time (RT), and inverse efficiency score (IES, reaction time/accuracy) of the N-back tasks were measured.ResultsNo severe side effects were reported. Only mild-to-moderate side effects were observed in those who received TI, which was similar to those observed in participants receiving tACS. The blinding efficacy was excellent, and there was no correlation between the severity of the reported side effects and the predicted type of stimulation that the participants received. WM appeared to be only marginally improved by TI compared to tACS-sham, and this improvement was only observed under high-load cognitive tasks. WM seemed to have improved a little in the TI-sham group. However, it was not observed significant differences between TI and TI-sham or TI and tACS in all N-back tests.ConclusionOur pilot study suggests that TI is a promising technique that can be safely implemented in human participants. Studies are warranted to confirm the findings of this study and to further examine the effects of TI-sham stimulation as well as the effects of TI on deeper brain regions. (shrink)

Tactile exploration often involves sequential touches interspersed with stimulus-free durations. Whereas it is obvious that texture-related perceptual variables, irrespective of the encoding strategy, must be stored in memory for comparison, it is rather unclear which of those variables are held in memory. There are two established variables—“intensity” and “frequency”, which are “temporally global” variables because of the long stimulus integration interval required to average the signal or derive spectral components, respectively; on the other hand, a recently established third (...) contender is the “temporally local” variable that codes for kinematic profiles of very short, suprathreshold events in the vibrotactile signal. Here, we present the first psychophysical evidence that temporally local variables can be stored in memory. To that end, we asked participants to detect changes in pulsatile indentation stimuli at their fingertips with and without a gap of 1 s between stimulus presentations. The stimuli either contained global variables alone, or a mix of local and global variables. We found, first, that humans are much better at detecting a change in stimuli when local variables are available rather than global ones alone—as evident by the fact that 21 compared to only 6 participants out of 25 yielded a valid psychophysical curve, respectively. Second, this observation persists even when there is a gap between the stimuli, implying local variables must be stored in memory. Third, an extensive array of relevant intensity definitions failed to explain participants’ performance in any consistent manner, which implies that perceptual decisions were less likely to be driven by intensity coding. Taken together, our results suggest that humans perform pulsatile change detection utilizing local pulse shape, and to a lesser degree global pulse rate, and that both parameters can be stored in memory. (shrink)

In the verbal domain, there is only very weak evidence favoring the view that working memory is an active state of long-term memory. We strengthen existing evidence by reviewing two recent fMRI studies of verbal working memory, which clearly demonstrate activation in the superior temporal lobe, a region known to be involved in processing speech during comprehension tasks.

Aphasia is an acquired impairment of language functions resulting from a brain lesion. It is usually accompanied by deficits in non-linguistic cognitive processes. This study aimed to investigate in patients with aphasia the complex interrelationships between selected cognitive functions: auditory speech comprehension, working memory, and temporal information processing in the millisecond time range. Thirty right-handed subjects aged from 27 to 82 years suffering from post-stroke aphasia participated in the study. Verbal working memory and spatial working memory (...) were assessed with: a receptive verbal test and the Corsi Block-Tapping Test, respectively. Both these WM tests used the forward tasks and backward tasks. Auditory comprehension was assessed by receptive language tests, and TIP efficiency was assessed by auditory perception of temporal order in the millisecond time range. We observed better performance of forward WM tasks than backward ones, independently of the type of material used. Furthermore, the severity of auditory comprehension impairment correlated with the efficiency on both forward and backward VWM tasks and the backward SWM task. Further analysis revealed that TIP plays a crucial role only in the latter task. These results indicate the divergent pattern of interactions between WM and TIP depending on the type of WM tasks. Level of verbal competency appeared to play an important role in both VWM tasks, whereas TIP appeared to be important for SWM, but only on the backward task. (shrink)

Research targeting emotion’s impact on relational episodic memory has largely focused on spatial aspects, but less is known about emotion’s impact on memory for an event’s temporal associations. The present research investigated this topic. Participants viewed a series of interspersed negative and neutral images with instructions to create stories linking successive images. Later, participants performed a surprise memory test, which measured temporal associations between pairs of consecutive pictures where one picture was negative and one was (...) neutral. Analyses focused on how the order of negative and neutral images during encoding influenced retrieval accuracy. Converging results from a discovery study (N = 72) and pre-registered replication study (N = 150) revealed a “forward-favouring” effect of emotion in temporal memory encoding: Participants encoded associations between negative stimuli and subsequent neutral stimuli more strongly than associations between negative stimuli and preceding neutral stimuli. This finding may reflect a novel trade-off regarding emotion’s effects on memory and is relevant for understanding affective disorders, as key clinical symptoms can be conceptualised as maladaptive memory retrieval of temporal details. (shrink)

Is consolidation needed to account for retroactive interference in free recall? Interfering mental activity during the retention interval of a memory task impairs performance, in particular if the interference occurs in temporal proximity to the encoding of the to-be-remembered information. There are at least two rival theoretical accounts of this temporal gradient of retroactive interference. The cognitive neuroscience literature has suggested neural consolidation is a pivotal factor determining item recall. According to this account, interfering activity interrupts consolidation (...) processes that would otherwise stabilize the memory representations of TBR items post-encoding. Temporal distinctiveness theory, by contrast, proposes that the retrievability of items depends on their isolation in psychological time. According to this theory, information processed after the encoding of TBR material will reduce the temporal distinctiveness of the TBR information. To test between these accounts, implementations of consolidation were added to the SIMPLE model of memory and learning. We report data from two experiments utilizing a two-list free recall paradigm. Modeling results imply that SIMPLE was able to model the data and did not benefit from the addition of consolidation. It is concluded that the temporal gradient of retroactive interference cannot be taken as evidence for memory consolidation. (shrink)

The text analyses rituals as endeavours to preserve the identity of a people or a portion of a people. Rituals present or re-present the supposed common history of all the migrants. Social memory and history then tend to merge and to forget... forgetfulness is the driving force behind the writing of history. Particularly critical is the moment when the migration starts, because the need to adapt to new conditions as well as to maintain what is represented as their social (...) identity makes dual – and at times contradictory – demands on the migrants’ imagination. Examples taken from Portuguese migrations are offered as expressions of the conceptual issues raised. (shrink)

Episodic memories are shaped by the representational format of their contents. These formats are not only determined by medial temporal lobe areas, but essentially also by the neocortical regions which these areas control. The representational formats of medial temporal lobe and neocortex are sufficient to determine both, memory contents and subjective memory qualities, without the further need for an attribution system.

Emotional stimuli are consistently better remembered than neutral stimuli. However, the reported effects of emotional stimuli on source memory are less consistent. In four experiments, we examined spatial and temporal source memory and free recall for emotional words previously studied in an fMRI experiment. In the fMRI experiment, the unpleasant but not the pleasant words were shown to activate the amygdala. In the experiments reported here, spatial and temporal source memory were reduced for the unpleasant (...) words compared to pleasant and neutral words. Reduced spatial memory for unpleasant words was observed across studies that varied the specific stimuli, task conditions, and incidental versus intentional encoding instructions. Free recall was enhanced for the pleasant and unpleasant words compared to neutral words. The results demonstrate reduced source memory for unpleasant words even when item recall is enhanced. Our findings are consistent with prior reports of amygdala-mediated amnestic effects evoked by unpleasant stimuli. (shrink)

This paper examines Bergson’s position concerning the relation between memory and the immediate experience of change. I argue that Bergson’s view, which has not been discussed in significant detail in the literature, can shed new light upon recent debates on the topic. I approach this in three steps. First, I examine the “memory theory” of immediate temporal experience in its two main forms — a “traditional” version and a “modified” account — situating Bergson’s views vis-à-vis this distinction. (...) Second, I explore a contemporary defence of the memory theory and underline a limitation in this account. Finally, I focus on a feature of Bergson’s reflections on memory and temporal experience that can potentially address this limitation. (shrink)

The chapter’s central question is how place and memory connect so intimately and how the architecture of buildings and rooms can play such a powerful role in memory. I develop an initial answer in two steps. First, I explicate Merleau-Ponty’s argument in the passivity lectures (IP ) that, contra classical concepts of memory as purely passive recording or purely active construction, memory entails a peculiar passivity that is not, however, wholly passive. Merleau-Ponty’s argument entails some deep (...) conceptual points about the ontology of temporality and spatiality that I briefly tackle. In the second step I flesh out these ontological points in terms of a passivity granted by bodily levels and habits. This let me show how place, as that through which we move and as intrinsic to movement, also grants a passivity crucial to memory, such that our memorial activity is fringed with and draws on a passivity that is beyond us in the places we inhabit. I make sense of this by conceptualizing such passivity, specifically as granted by places through which we move, as an “I already can” that is kin to a habit—but outside us. We thus find ourselves fringed with a peculiar habit through which we find our movements already passively woven into surrounding places. I suggest that architecture works to actively articulate this fringing habit, and that, like bodily habits, this fringing habit opens our future by keeping our past going—and thus garbs our movement with our past. To move in architectural places is thus to move to one’s future through the garb of one’s past and is thence to be fringed with memory. The key to this linkage between memory and place is the passivity of memory. (shrink)

Hoerl claims that episodic memory is necessary for a concept of the past, and that we should consider some severely amnesic patients as lacking such a concept. I question whether this description of such patients is plausible, and whether it helps us understand lack of insight in amnesia. I finish by arguing that Hoerl’s analysis of what constitutes a concept of the past raises interesting developmental issues.

Despite highlighting the role of the attribution system and proposing a coherent large-scale architecture of declarative memory, the integrative memory model would be more “integrative” if the temporal dynamics of the interactions between its components was clarified. This is necessary to make predictions in patients with brain injury and hypothesize dissociations.

I draw upon Edmund Husserl’s classic text, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, in order to reframe some of his insight regarding the structures of inner time-consciousness and lay the groundwork for a few claims of my own. First, I show how musical expression is constituted in relation to the flowing movement of absolute subjectivity. Moreover, by carefully distinguishing between retention and recollection, I clarify, on the one hand, music’s ability to support access to memory proper (...) and, on the other hand, its ability to keep the past “in play,” so to speak. In this way, we come to understand how music offers a unique memorial capacity—it makes possible the life of the past, as the vital movement of absolute subjectivity. Throughout the essay, I refer to Josquin’s motet Ave Maria…virgo serena in order to clarify the specific temporal structures that are at issue. (shrink)

Research on temporal comparison has shown that people dissociate themselves from their past to attain a positive self view. Social comparison research has demonstrated that the distinctness of contextually activated information determines whether a recalled self exerts assimilation or contrast effects on the current self. However, hardly any study addressed individual differences. Also, very little is known about whether the ease or difficulty to date past events and experiences influences current self-judgments. We present a new scale capturing the degree (...) of the current self time extension. Three studies support the notion that temporal self-extension determines how past selves are accessed and processed, regarding both the abstractness with which self-knowledge is retrieved and the experienced temporal distance to the past. These findings have important implications for temporal as well as social comparison processes. (shrink)

We highlight recent progress in neuroimaging and neuropsychological research on memory mechanisms in the medial temporal lobe that speaks to the involuntary nature of memory retrieval processes. We suggest that evidence form these studies supports Barzykowski and Moulin's proposal that memory signals involved in experiences of familiarity and déjà vu can be generated in the absence of retrieval intentionality.

Regularities in event timing allow for the allocation of attention to critical time-points when an event is most likely to occur, leading to improved visual perception. Results from recent studies indicate that similar benefits may extend to memory for scenes and objects. Here, we investigated whether benefits of temporal regularity are evident when detailed, item-specific representations are necessary for successful recognition memory performance. In Experiments 1 and 2, pictures of objects were presented with either predictable or randomized (...) event timing, in separate encoding blocks. In the test phase, old and new objects were presented, intermixed with perceptually similar exemplars of encoded objects. In Experiment 3 we attempted to replicate previously reported memory enhancements for scenes. In contrast to predictions, temporal regularity did not affect response times or improve recognition memory accuracy in any of our experiments. These results suggest that any effects of temporal expectation on memory are subtle and may be sensitive to minor changes in task parameters. In sum, indirect upregulation of attention through imposed temporal structure may not be sufficient to have downstream effects on memory performance. (shrink)

Various kinds of observations show that the ability of human beings to both consciously relive past events – episodic memory – and conceive future events, entails an active process of construction. This construction process also underpins many other important aspects of conscious human life, such as perceptions, language and conscious thinking. This article provides an explanation of what makes the constructive process possible and how it works. The process mainly relies on attentional activity, which has a discrete and periodic (...) nature, and working memory, which allows for the combination of discrete attentional operations. An explanation is also provided of how past and future events are constructed. (shrink)

Most theories and models of memory are based on two assumptions that contain theoretical problems. These problems are reflected in the memory-trace paradox, which consists in believing that the past is contained in the memory trace, and in the fallacy of the homunculus, which consists in assuming the existence of an unconscious intentional subject. We will discuss these and present an alternative hypothesis concerning the relationship between memory, consciousness and temporality. This holds that consciousness is not (...) a unitary dimension, but is the set of distinct and original modes to address the object. Among the modes of consciousness, a distinction is made between Knowing Consciousness (KC) and Temporal Consciousness (TC). KC describes the mode of addressing the object in order to know it. TC describes the mode of consciousness that temporalizes its object according the subordinate structures of temporality, the past, the present and the future. Finally it is shown how the hypothesis accounts for a variety of memory disorders and phenomena while avoiding the memory- trace paradox and the fallacy of the homunculus. (shrink)

Investigates the roles of temporal concepts and self-consciousness in the development of episodic memory. According to some theorists, types of long-term memory differ primarily in the degree to which they involve or are associated with self-consciousness (although there may be no substantial differences in the kind of event information that they deliver). However, a known difficulty with this view is that it is not obvious what motivates introducing self-consciousness as the decisive factor in distinguishing between types of (...) memory and what role it is supposed to play in remembering. The authors argue that distinctions between different kinds of memory should be made initially on the basis of the ways in which they represent events. In particular, it is proposed that the way in which remembered events are located in time provides an important criterion for distinguishing between different types of memory. According to this view, if there is a link between memory development and self-consciousness, it is because some temporal concepts emerge developmentally only once certain self-conscious abilities are in place. (shrink)