「意識のクオリア」も五感も、すべては錯覚だった。「心は脳が作り上げた幻想である」ことを述べた著者が、自己意識や五感が錯覚であることに的を絞って説明。.

This book covers a broad range of topics in the history of economics that have relevance to economic theories. The author believes that one of the tasks for a historian of economics is to analyze and interpret theories currently outside the mainstream of economic theory, in this case non-Walrasian economics. By doing so, he argues, new directions and new areas for research can be developed that will extend the current theories. Familiar topics covered include: the division of labor, economies of (...) scale, wages, profit, international trade, market mechanisms, and money. These are considered in the light of the well-known non-Walrasian schools of thought: the classical, Marxian, Austrian, and Cambridge schools. (shrink)

My general contention is to defend the compositional principle of meaning--that the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts --with respect to belief contexts, which do not always appear to allow salva veritate substitutivity of synonyms. I argue that this appearance is an illusion which results from confusing beliefs that are not about linguistic expressions with beliefs that are about linguistic expressions. In doing so, I invoke and elaborate the Gricean distinction between what (...) a sentence means and what the speaker means in using the sentence. (shrink)

We show that the evasion number $\mathfrak {e}$ can be added to Cichoń’s maximum with a distinct value. More specifically, it is consistent that $\aleph _1<\operatorname {\mathrm {add}}(\mathcal {N})<\operatorname {\mathrm {cov}}(\mathcal {N})<\mathfrak {b}<\mathfrak {e}<\operatorname {\mathrm {non}}(\mathcal {M})<\operatorname {\mathrm {cov}}(\mathcal {M})<\mathfrak {d}<\operatorname {\mathrm {non}}(\mathcal {N})<\operatorname {\mathrm {cof}}(\mathcal {N})<2^{\aleph _0}$ holds.

It may appear that in order to be any way at all, a thing must exist. A possible – worlds version of this claim goes as follows: (E) For every x, for every possible world w, Fx at w only if x exists at w. Here and later in (R), the letter ‘F’ is used as a schematic letter to be replaced with a one – place predicate. There are two arguments against (E). The first is by analogy. Socrates is (...) widely admired now but he does not exist now. So, it is not the case that for every x, for every time t, Fx at t only if x exists at t. Possible worlds are analogous to times. Therefore, (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1973: 503 – 05 and Salmon 1981: 36 – 40). For the second argument, replace ‘F’ with ‘does not exist’. (E) then says that for every x, for every possible world w, x does not exist at w only if x exists at w. This is obviously false. Therefore (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1977: 498). Despite their considerable appeal, these arguments are not unassailable. The first argument suffers from the weakness inherent in any argument from analogy; the analogy it rests on may not.. (shrink)

Modal Dimensionalism is a metaphysical theory about possible worlds that is naturally suggested by the often-noted parallelism between modal logic and tense logic. It says that the universe spreads out not only in spatiotemporal dimensions but also in a modal dimension. It regards worlds as nothing more or less than indices in the modal dimension in the way analogous to the way in which Temporal Dimensionalism regards temporal points and intervals as indices in the temporal dimension. Despite its naturalness and (...) intuitive appeal. Modal Dimensionalism has been largely ignored while the debates between David Lewis and his critics have dominated the discourse on the nature of possible worlds. It is high time that we took Modal Dimensionalism seriously as a viable alternative. (shrink)

『古事記伝』の完成に一生を費した宣長は、また、親思いで子煩悩、恐妻家で、町内の諸行事や歌会にまめに参加する、すぐれて人間的な生涯を送った人でもあった。本書は、言語をとおして人間存在にこだわり続けた本居 宣長の基礎的入門である。.

"This book aims to shine light on the scene created by "belief" and "knowledge" and how they influenced the history of ideas at turning points interweaving its important epochs." -- Preface.

On the first day of the class for Introduction to Philosophy, your professor tells you that if you keep perfect attendance, complete every homework satisfactorily, participate in class discussion actively, and score 100% in every examination, you will certainly get an A+ for the course. You work hard and by the end of the semester, you think you have accomplished all these things. You are pleased. Why? Because you think as follows: “I have kept perfect attendance, completed every homework satisfactorily, (...) participated in class discussion actively, and scored 100% in every exam. This means I get an A+ for the course because, as the professor said, if I keep perfect attendance, complete every homework satisfactorily, participate in class discussion actively, and score 100% in every exam, I get an A+ for the course.”. (shrink)

When I assertively utter the sentence `Spot is a cat', the sentence I utter expresses a proposition. The truth condition of the proposition so expressed is determined by the semantic values of the singular term, `Spot', and the predicate, `is a cat'. If `Spot' refers to a certain particular entity E and `is a cat' expresses a certain particular property P, then the proposition in question is true if and only if E has P. Such is the theoretical cash value (...) of reference. The referent of a given singular term generally figures in this manner in the truth condition of the proposition expressed by any sentence containing the singular term outside direct quotations and other referentially opaque contexts.1 Given this understanding of the notion of reference, I wish to address an important question: How is the reference of a proper name determined? (shrink)

予備知識不要(多少の忍耐力は必要)。わたしたちの日常を支えるもっとも基礎的な概念「正しい」を、理屈にこだわり丁寧に分析する哲学入門。 No Philosophical knowledge necessary (but a certain amount of patience is required). Carefully reasoned introductory discussion of the basic concept of correctness that underlies our everyday life.

Sherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist “in the world of” the Sherlock Holmes stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists “in the world of” (...) the relevant fiction. I wish to defend this pretheoretical intuition. To do so, I need to defend two claims: that fictional individuals do not actually exist, and that they exist “in the world of” the relevant fiction. The aim of this paper is to defend the first claim. (shrink)

Modal realism -- Time, space, world -- Existence -- Actuality -- Modal realism and modal tense -- Transworld individuals and their identity -- Existensionalism -- Impossibility -- Proposition and relief -- Fictional worlds -- Epistemology.

ABSTRACTAnother individual’s gaze automatically shifts an observer’s attention to a location. This reflexive response occurs even when the gaze is presented subliminally over a short period. Another’s gaze also increases the preference level for items in the gaze direction; however, it was previously unclear if this effect occurs when the gaze is presented subliminally. This study showed that the preference levels for nonsense figures looked at by a subliminal gaze were significantly greater than those for items that were subliminally looked (...) away from. Targets that were looked at by a subliminal gaze were detected faster ; however, the participants were unable to detect the gaze direction. These results indicate that another individual’s gaze automatically increases the preference levels for items in the gaze direction without conscious awareness. (shrink)

Modal realists should fashion their theory by postulating and taking seriously the modal equivalent of tense, or modal tense. This will give them a uniform way to respond to five different objections, one each by Skyrms, Quine, and Peacocke, and two by van Inwagen, and suggest a non-Lewisian path to modal realism.

In this article, I highlight the following points. In 2022, the publication of the two volumes Inédits I (1946-1947) and Inédits II (1947-1949) was a great surprise. Among the many discoveries I made, I will focus here on the reading notes Merleau-Ponty had prepared on Hegel’s Aesthetics. I suggest that the motives of his reading of Hegel’s Aesthetics must be understood according to two aspects, intimately linked: they are first due to the fact that he himself was trying to formulate (...) his own theory of art and aesthetics; and second that he had in mind Sartre’s work What is Literature? I show that, indeed, in his reading of the Aesthetics, Merleau-Ponty very clearly focuses on the distinction between the different genres of art and on their historical divisions. This is a point that leads me to raise the following question: What are the distinctions between artistic genres in Merleau-Ponty? Here, for me it is above all a question of taking into account Merleau-Ponty’s reservations, exposed in his later essay “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” concerning the Sartrean conception of literature which distinguishes poetry from prose. Ultimately, I defend the idea that Merleau-Ponty proposes an experience of art that is inter-genre and inter-media, which opens an indefinite horizon from the historical limitation of art. Based on his theory of language and art, he thus recognized the historicity of language and art, while considering the possibility of transforming this historicity into something open. (shrink)

It seems to be a challenging task for those non-Western scholars who are deeply immersed in European intellectual resources to theorise multiple forms of modernity and deparochialise political theory. What difficulty awaits us in non-Western contexts, when we attempt to throw off these shackles and to open up alternative views of modernity? To address this question, this article attempts to critically examine Maruyama Masao (丸山眞男, 1914–1996), an influential scholar on the history of Japanese political thought, with respect to his view (...) of Japanese modernity, thereby exploring what obstacles await him in pursuing the multiplicity view of modernity and how he actually or potentially overcomes them. In doing so, I develop two arguments. First, Maruyama's move towards multiple modernities remains incomplete because he fails to throw off the shackles of universal history. Second, however, we can identify an alternative way in his own thought that, though not taken by himself, potentially goes beyond universal history towards multiple modernities. (shrink)