Collection of articles on philosophy of social sciences; Shīʻah.

I Agree with R. G. Austin, who in his recent paper, 107 ff.) showed that Virgil did not write this proem to the Aeneid, and suggested that it was produced in the first half of the first century, perhaps prompted by the problem mentioned by Servius on A. I. I: ‘multi varie disserunt cur ab armis Vergilius coeperit.’ I wish here to comment briefly on the content of the lines. graciliqui... carmen refers to the writing of the Eclogues. As Austin (...) points out, Virgil has gracilis only in E. 10. 70 ff., the conclusion of the whole of the Eclogues:Haec sat erit, divae, vestrum cecinisse poetam,dum sedet et gracili fiscellam texit hibisco,Pierides…. (shrink)

It was a generally accepted tenet of ancient literary criticism that an excess of sibilants was cacophonous. To discover if and to what extent this antipathy is discernible in the actual practice of the main Latin poets, random samples of 50 lines from each were analysed. The results of this analysis are set out in Table I.

The Slovak political thought of the 19th century mingles with the nation-building efforts. According to the author the nationalists were one of the intellectual elites of Central Europe, which based their nation-building on ethnic ideology. This ideology embodied various elements, such as passive historicism, "prilepenectvo" and the will to become a historical subject. They made use of a non-political concept of nation as a language an cultural community, which gradually became politicized. The ultimate objective was the institutionalization of the nation, (...) defined originally non-politically. According to the author there are two ways of achieving this objective, conceived of as ideal types: the type A implies the institutionalization from above, based on an intervention of a power instance ; the type B implies the institutionalization resulting from gradual growth of national capacities in the political frame of Hungary of that time. These types correspond to different views of what is political activity. Nevertheless, the Slovak political thought of the 19th century did not go beyond the level of experimentation. (shrink)

History and Philosophy of Logic, Volume 32, Issue 3, Page 291-292, August 2011.

Recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) represent a form of psychosis. It may be useful to compare RCVH to another form of psychosis, catatonia. Both include a long list of medical illnesses and have been examined using several different hypotheses. Catatonia has a variety of hypotheses, including neurocircuitry, neurochemistry, and an integrated neuropsychiatric hypothesis. This hypothesis for catatonia supports Collerton et al.'s Perception and Attention Deficit model (PAD) for RCVH.

This paper articulates and defends a novel version of internalist evidentialism which employs dispositions to account for the relation of evidentialsupport. In section one, I explain internalist evidentialist views generally, highlighting the way in which the relation of evidential support stands at the heart of these views. I then discuss two leading ways in which evidential support has been understood by evidentialists, and argue that an account of support which employs what I call epistemic dispositions remedies difficulties arguably faced by (...) these two leading accounts. In sections two and three, I turn to advantages that my dispositionalist account of evidential support offers evidentialists beyond its remedying apparent difficulties with rival accounts of support. In section two, I show that the account is well-suited to help the evidentialist respond to the problem of forgotten evidence. And, in section three, I show that adopting my dispositional account makes possible an attractive and natural synthesis of evidentialism and virtue epistemology which is superior to the leading contemporary synthesis of these views. (shrink)

What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good. Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi‐realism can give any set of commitments no ‘rational grounding’ in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical rationality, since a set of (...) obviously bad commitments could be internally consistent. Nor is it necessary, since a set of obviously good commitments could be internally inconsistent. I therefore argue for an objectivist view of the grounding of commitments, taking them to be attitudes which get their rationality, or lack of it, from their responsiveness to natural human needs and well‐being. Since this view is objectivist, it avoids the problems which face subjectivism. (shrink)