The Lukács Circle in Szeged, a spontaneous, unofficial organization of young Hungarian scholars and philosophy teachers, characteristically represented Georg Lukács' influence on young Hungarian intelligentsia in the period of late socialism. In this paper, the author recalls and critically analyses the intellectual milieu and motives that led a considerable part of young Hungarian intelligentsia of that time to make a cult of Lukács' philosophy. The key to the analysis is the ambiguous character of the political feelings and philosophical orientation of (...) many young people in the period of late socialism and the paradoxical non-bourgeois bourgeois character of Lukács' philosophy. Lukács' young followers were dissatisfied with the political conditions of real socialism and with official Marxism. However, they considered themselves Marxists and were convinced by the anti-capitalist, romantic idea of democratic socialism. In the eyes of his young followers, Lukács was a genuine philosopher whose teaching was interwoven by his wide-ranging bourgeois middle-class education, promising both a real philosophical alternative to official Marxism and a high-level philosophical foundation for a non-capitalist but democratic future human history. The author argues that Lukács' philosophy did not satisfy these expectations. In his political philosophy, the philosopher could not move away from the mythological idea concerning the leading role of the communist party and therefore could not elaborate a genuine philosophical foundation for the idea of democratic socialism. Despite the superiority of his philosophy, his methodology and approach to the history of philosophy failed to provide a real philosophical alternative to the Bolshevik tradition of Marxism. (shrink)

Dr. Laszlo’s hypothesis (2009) is in my opinion appealing on many levels. He proposes that phenomena of apparent transpersonal communication between human beings are due to the intermediary of information-carrying holograms in the reactive quantum vacuum produced by human brain activity. He also suggests that valid information regarding the world in general is available through the same mechanism, on the grounds that all material objects “excite the ground state of the [zero point] fi eld” and produce further such holograms. On (...) this hypothesis we are literally immersed in a sea of information, with the capacity for accessing that information as well as producing more of it by our own thought processes. (shrink)

"The Consciousness Revolution is an extrodinary discussion among three of the very finest minds of our time, spirited in its exchange, compassionate in its embrace, brilliant in its clarion call to awaken our conscience and consciousness." Ken Wilber, author of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality and One Taste.

_A leading European intellectual reflects on the changing concept of melancholy throughout history_ Alberto Manguel praises the Hungarian writer László Földényi as “one of the most brilliant essayists of our time.” Földényi’s extraordinary _Melancholy_, with its profusion of literary, ecclesiastical, artistic, and historical insights, gives proof to such praise. His book, part history of the term _melancholy_ and part analysis of the melancholic disposition, explores many centuries to explore melancholy’s ambiguities. Along the way Földényi discovers the unrecognized role melancholy may (...) play as a source of energy and creativity in a well-examined life. Földényi begins with a tour of the history of the word _melancholy,_ from ancient Greece to the medieval era, the Renaissance, and modern times. He finds the meaning of melancholy has always been ambiguous, even paradoxical. In our own times it may be regarded either as a psychic illness or a mood familiar to everyone. The author analyzes the complexities of melancholy and concludes that its dual nature reflects the inherent tension of birth and mortality. To understand the melancholic disposition is to find entry to some of the deepest questions one’s life. This distinguished translation brings Földényi’s work directly to English-language readers for the first time. (shrink)

The book aims to provide a comprehensive, new look at business ethics topics and models from a European perspective. Apart from theoretical arguments and empirical data, case studies and games are used to get closer to real life problematics of business. The book is written by leading business ethics professors of the Community of European Management Schools (CEMS). Chapters of the handbook first describe the central issue and the latest theories and practices. They then introduce new approaches and analyze real (...) world examples. Finally conclusions are provided, which include ethical warning signals, proposals for future research and suggested policy recommendations. (shrink)

Chapter 1 WHY SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY? Some reasons, for synthetic philosophy generally The persistent theme of this study is the timeliness and the necessity of ...

This book is a collection of scholarly papers, which focus on the role of spirituality and ethics in renewing contemporary management praxis. The basic argument is that a more inclusive, holistic and peaceful approach to management is needed if business and political leaders are to uplift the environmentally degrading and socially disintegrating world of our age. The book uses diverse value-perspectives (Hinduism, Catholicism, Buddhism and Humanism) and a variety of disciplines to extend traditional reflections on corporate purpose. It focuses on (...) a self-referential organizational-existential search for meaning, identity and success. Spirituality and Ethics in Management will be of value to managers, students of business and public administration, ethicists, psychologists and scholars in religious studies. The book can be used as supplementary reading in graduate and post-graduate courses in leadership, business ethics, managerial psychology, and social studies of religions. (shrink)

This book discloses the spiritual dimension in business ethics and sustainability management. Spirituality is understood as a multiform search for meaning which connects people with all living beings and God or Ultimate Reality. In this sense, spirituality is a vital source in social and economic life. The volume examines the spiritual orientations to nature and business in different cultural traditions: Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Sufism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism. It studies how spirituality and ecology can contribute to transforming contemporary management theory (...) and praxis. It discusses new leadership roles and business models that emerge for sustainability in business and shows how entrepreneurship can be inspired by nature and spirituality in a meaningful way. (shrink)

The age-old question “What is truth?” is not an unambiguous one. There are at least two different meanings. In one sense, it is a semantic question about the meaning of the word “truth” and/or a metaphysical question about the nature of the property of truth, that is, how truth can be defined in terms of other notions, if it is definable at all. In another sense, it is an epistemological question about the criterion or test of truth, that is, how (...) we can recognize or accept (empirical) propositions as true. Ayer, in Language, Truth and Logic (LTL) and some other articles, tried to convince us that when we attempt to elucidate a theory of truth, we are only engaging in the epistemological project of finding the criterion of truth. This anti-semantical and anti-metaphysical view is based on Ayer’s (radical) deflationism about truth. In this chapter, I will argue that since Ayer did not accept that the criterion of truth is intimately related to the concept of truth, he can be seen as a deflationist about the nature of truth and as an advocate of a certain (Schlickian) kind of correspondence conception about the criterion of truth. His position would not be tenable if he had maintained what some of his contemporaries accepted, namely that there is a close connection between the two truth-theoretical tasks: the definitional and the criterial one. (shrink)

This book contains an original analysis of the existential there-sentence from a philosophical-linguistic perspective. At its core is the claim that there-sentences' form is distinct from that of ordinary subject–predicate sentences, and that this fundamental difference explains the construction's unusual grammatical and discourse properties.

_An exemplary collection of work from one of the world’s leading scholars of intellectual history__ “Földényi... stage[s] a broad metaphysical melodrama between opposites that he pursues throughout this fierce, provoking collection (expertly translated by Ottilie Mulzet).... He proves himself a brilliant interpreter of the dark underside of Enlightenment ambition.”—James Wood, _New Yorker__ László Földényi’s work, in the long tradition of public intellectual and cultural criticism, resonates with the writings of Montaigne, Walter Benjamin, and Thomas Mann. In this new essay collection, (...) Földényi considers the continuing fallout from the collapse of religion, exploring how Enlightenment traditions have not replaced basic elements of previously held religious mythologies—neither their metaphysical completeness nor their comforting purpose. Realizing beautiful writing through empathy, imagination, fascination, and a fierce sense of justice, Földényi covers a wide range of topics including a meditation on the metaphysical unity of a sculpture group and an analysis of fear as a window into our relationship with time. (shrink)

In my paper, I spell out which types of libertarian theories can be refuted by Libet-style experiments and which cannot. I claim that, on the one hand, some forms of deliberative libertarianism and restrictive libertarianism cannot even in principle be denied on the basis of these experiments; and on the other hand, standard libertarianism, along with some versions of restrictive and deliberative libertarianism, can in principle be refuted by these experiments. However, any form of restrictive libertarianism can be refuted in (...) the future only if researchers perform new and “untraditional” Libet-style experiments. This is because “traditional” Libet-style experiments investigate decisions in Buridan-type situations. But these decisions are irrelevant with regard to free will, according to the restrictivists. -/- In the first section, I clarify some terminological issues in order to set the stage for a precise analysis. In the second, I attempt to show what the main reason is for thinking that Libet-style experiments seem to be problematic for libertarian theories. Although showing that actions are unconsciously initiated does not pose a real challenge for the elaborated philosophical theories of free will, Libet-style experiments may be problematic for most libertarian theories because, pace Roskies and Nahmias, libertarians have good reasons for saying that local determinism and free will are incompatible. In the third section, I argue that because some versions of deliberative libertarianism do not claim that decisions about actions are the center of freedom-relevant indeterminism, Libet-style experiments are unable to refute them after all. In the fourth, I attempt to show why standard centered libertarianism according to which there are no relevant metaphysical differences between different types of conscious decisions is in principle vulnerable to Libet-style experiments to a greater extent. Fifth, I point out the reasons why restrictivist centered libertarianism is less vulnerable to these experiments. Still, I argue that moderate-restrictivism can in principle be denied by Libet-style experiments if these experiments are modified in an important respect. However, proponents of hard-restrictivism should not worry about the possible results of these experiments because these theories restrict the set of free decisions to such a great extent that they cannot be subjected to a proper empirical test. (shrink)

The world's foremost systems philosopher presents a new scientific theory to explain how the universe defies our current understanding of fundamental physical laws.

Ferenc Huoranszki argues for two main claims in the ninth chapter of Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis (Huoranszki 2011). First, Huoranszki tries to show that libertarian restrictivism is false because self-determination in the libertarian sense is not necessary for our responsibility, even if motives, reasons or psychological characteristics can influence us relatively strongly to choose one or the other alternative. second, Huoranszki rejects the so-called manipulation argument.1 this is an argument for the conclusion that unless physical indeterminism is (...) true, nobody can be morally responsible because our behavior is never independent enough of our environment. Therefore, according to Huoranszki, neither libertarian self-determination nor physical indeterminism is required for moral responsibility. in my view, Huoranszki’s counterarguments do not defeat libertarian restrictivism. How- ever, they can force philosophers who defend this theory to modify or refine it. i analyze Huoranszki’s arguments against libertarian self-determination in the first part of my paper. in the second part, I briefly argue for one supervenience argument inspired by a similar objection made earlier (bács 2012). According to this modified argument, Huoranszki’s theory about abilities and responsibility would entail that if physical determinism is true then we are responsible for our ordinary actions only because we are able to do miraculous acts as well. if this objection is correct, Huoranszki’s compatibilism is unsuccessful. (shrink)

In natural sciences, the most interesting and relevant questions are the so-called why-questions. There are several different approaches to why-questions and explanations in the literature, however, most of the literature deals with why-questions about particular events, such as ``Why did Adam eat the apple?''. Even the best known theory of explanation, Hempel's covering law model, is designed for explaining particular events. Here we only deal with purely theoretical why-questions about general phenomena of physics, for instance ``Why can no observer move (...) faster than light?'' or ``Why are Kepler's laws valid?''. Here we are not going to develop a whole new theory of why-questions in physics. We will just touch upon some ideas and examples relevant to our subject. (shrink)

With humanity facing its greatest series of simultaneous crises, leading systems thinker Ervin Laszlo offers the solutions that will ensure the wellbeing of society at all levels and of our planetary home. Providing a holistic context to where we are and how we got here, he assures us that evolution unfolds in a nonlinear, fluctuating fashion. What is called for at this critical juncture - as our sacred task - is a phase of upshift to higher levels of order and (...) coherence to get us to where we are going. This practical handbook lays out, with clarity, why this upshift is needed, what inner potentials we possess to draw upon, and what the action steps are that will move us all toward this achievable vision of harmony and wholeness. With an inclusive list of conscious organizations already contributing to this vision, this book is essential reading for carrying out and completing the process of global transformation already well underway. (shrink)

This book offers an original hypothesis capable of unifying evolution in the physical universe with evolution in biology; herewith it lays the conceptual foundations of ?transdisciplinary unified theory?. The rationale for the hypothesis is presented first; then the theoretical framework is outlined, and thereafter it is explored in regard to quantum physics, physical cosmology, micro- and macro-biology, and the cognitive sciences (neurophysiology, psychology, with attention to anomalous phenomena as well). The book closes with a variety of studies, both by the (...) author and his collaborators, sketching out the implications of the hypothesis in regard to brain dynamics, cosmology, the concept of space, phenomena of creativity, and the prospects for the elaboration of a mature transdisciplinary unified theory. The Foreword is written by philosopher of science Arne Naess, and the Afterword is contributed by neuroscientist Karl Pribram. (shrink)

The relationship between humans and non-human animals has received considerable attention recently. Animal advocates insist that non-human animals must be included in the moral community. Consequently, eating meat is, at least in most cases, morally bad. In an article entitled “In Defense of Eating Meat”, Hsiao argued that for the membership in the moral community, the “root capacity for rational agency” is necessary. As non-human animals lack this capacity, so the argument runs, they do not belong to the moral community. (...) Consequently, harming non-human animals for human nutrition can be justified. In this short comment I would like to highlight some of the most important errors of the above argument, primarily from the perspective of a biologist. I conclude that assuming the existence of a mysterious “root capacity for rational agency” is a biological nonsense. It cannot be verified, and it only obscures reality. In my opinion, the greatest problem with Hsiao’s argument is that it tries to defend anthropocentrism, a view that has presumably been the very cause of the spoiled non-human–human relationships. Perhaps adopting a vegan lifestyle is a better solution than quieting one’s conscience. (shrink)

For simplicity, most of the literature introduces the concept of definitional equivalence only for disjoint languages. In a recent paper, Barrett and Halvorson introduce a straightforward generalization to non-disjoint languages and they show that their generalization is not equivalent to intertranslatability in general. In this paper, we show that their generalization is not transitive and hence it is not an equivalence relation. Then we introduce another formalization of definitional equivalence due to Andréka and Németi which is equivalent to the Barrett–Halvorson (...) generalization in the case of disjoint languages. We show that the Andréka–Németi generalization is the smallest equivalence relation containing the Barrett–Halvorson generalization and it is equivalent to intertranslatability, which is another definition for definitional equivalence, even for non-disjoint languages. Finally, we investigate which definitions for definitional equivalences remain equivalent when we generalize them for theories in non-disjoint languages. (shrink)

The article discusses why the notion of infinity is indispensable in contemporary phenomenology. I will heavily rely on some of L(szl) Tengelyi’s ideas, who in his turn uses Marc Richir’s early works on Cantor and Kant. Although – similarly to Richir and Tengelyi – I also examine some of Cantor’s ideas, I concentrate on a different and more fundamental part of his theory than Tengelyi and Richir.

If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical facts of the world. The aim of this paper is to clarify what logical/mathematical facts actually are and how these facts can be accommodated in a purely physical world.