The author emphasizes importance of the resolution of International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights by the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization on 16th December 1966, that took place at the same day as the resolution of International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. This consists in overcoming of the doctrine of the 19th century that the development of economic and social rights presents a menace to the realization of political rights which connects in an inseparable way (...) both categories of the above mentioned rights. (shrink)

Artykuł traktuje o współczesnym zakwestionowaniu nowożytnej wizji człowieka jako podmiotu. Ukazuje, w jaki sposób takie myślenie stało się swego rodzaju ponowoczesną dominantą, a odnosząc się do kilku konkretnych koncepcji filozoficznych, tłumaczy jak należy rozumieć idę „śmierć człowieka” i jakie są jej konsekwencje. W pierwszej części autor ukazuje, że nowożytne kreowanie podmiotu na szczególnego rodzaju suwerena, władcę siebie i świata, w konsekwencji doprowadza do jego „śmierci”. „Śmierci”, która w pewien sposób została sprowokowana przez samych rzeczników podmiotowości, przez ich pomysł ubóstwienia podmiotu, (...) uczynienia go absolutnie niezależnym, autonomicznym, niczym nieskrępowanym.W drugiej części, odwołując się do takich filozofów jak Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida, Foucault, autor tłumaczy, z czym wiąże się ponowoczesna idea „śmierci człowieka”. Uzasadnia, że każdy z tych filozofów, porzucając metafizykę, kwestionując nowożytne rozumienie podmiotowości, proponuje wizję człowieka, który przestaje być „jakiś”, jakoś określony, stale obecny, zdefiniowany. Zgodnie z takim myśleniem człowiek staje się całkowicie nieokreślony. Na koniec, odwołując się do myślenia Michela Foucaulta, autor ukazuje istotne znamiona kultury, w której żyjemy, jako konsekwencje przyjęcia pewnych ponowoczesnych założeń w myśleniu o człowieku. Mówi więc o „kulturze niedialektycznej”, „kulturze dobrego funkcjonowania” oraz „kulturze oporu”. (shrink)

Artykuł jest próbą ukazania źródeł współczesnej kultury. Autor stawia w nim tezę, że u jej podstaw znajduje się dziś myślenie w gruncie rzeczy antyhumanistyczne – myślenie spod znaku „śmierci człowieka”, jego bytowej nieokreśloności, ale również spod znaku nowożytnego cogito, podmiotu zabsolutyzowanego, który staje się szczególnego rodzaju fundamentem, ostatecznym podłożem rzeczywistości. W pierwszej części autor przedstawia specyfikę nowożytnego rozumienia bytu ludzkiego, zgodnie z którą człowiek – jako podmiot myślący, poznający, samoświadomy, racjonalny – przypisuje sobie rolę nowożytnego suwerena, Demiurga, jedynego ustawodawcy i (...) architekta nowego, prawdziwie ludzkiego świata. W ten sposób – zgodnie ze znaczeniem słowa „podmiot” – człowiek staje się „ostatecznym podłożem” rzeczywistości. Dalej autor wykazuje, że absolutyzowanie podmiotu, przypisywanie mu coraz to większych kompetencji, doprowadza ostatecznie do jego podważenia i zanegowania. Odwołując się do koncepcji takich filozofów jak Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Foucault, Derrida twierdzi, że negacja kartezjańskiego cogito, „śmierć” pewnej określonej wizji człowieka jako podmiotu rodzi myślenie, zgodnie z którym człowiek staje się bytowo nieokreślony.Zarówno nowoczesne jak i ponowoczesne spojrzenie zostały w pewien sposób naznaczone myśleniem antyhumanistycznym. W jednym i drugim przypadku mamy bowiem do czynienia z nierealistycznym spojrzeniem na człowieka. Autor mówi o „antyhumanizmie pana i władcy” oraz „antyhumanizmie zluzowanego” i wskazuje, że właśnie one stanowią swego rodzaju podglebie współczesnego humanizmu. W punkcie ostatnim pokazano, że sposób rozumienia roli podmiotu na przestrzeni ostatnich kilku wieków, został zbudowany na niezwykle prostej opozycji – wszystko albo nic. Ponieważ nieprawdą jest, że podmiot jest dla siebie całkowicie racjonalny, przejrzysty, że jest autonomicznym panem samego siebie, musi zniknąć, trzeba o nim zapomnieć, stąd idea „śmierci człowieka”. W tym kontekście, odwołując się do intuicji francuskiej profesor filozofii Chantal Delsol, autor przedstawia próbę wyjścia z aporii między nowoczesnym podmiotem absolutnym, samowystarczalnym, a ponowoczesnym podmiotem, którego właściwie nie ma. Wskazuje na konieczność realistycznego spojrzenia na człowieka, gdyż tylko na takim spojrzeniu można zbudować prawdziwie humanistyczną kulturę. (shrink)

MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY – REALITY ENCLOSED IN DASEIN Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was supposed to divert philosophy towards the absolutely fundamental issue, which in the history of philosophy, unfortunately, as the author claimed, had been neglected. It was an attempt to designate the real foundation, which western metaphysics – while forgetting about being – had never touched. Thus, Heidegger focused on being. He asked about its sense, the way in which it can be described and explained. The answer was (...) to be found in the analysis of some special being – the human being. Only man, who exists in such a way (Heidegger uses the concept of Dasein) that by his very nature refers to being, is “open” to being. This article shows Heidegger’s explanation based on the analysis of man’s being, connecting the existence of reality with human existence, in its essence making the world thoroughly dependent on man, enclosing the world in Dasein. The world ceases to be the whole reality consisting of particular essences existing independently of man. It becomes “the condition”, the way of being. In the first part, the author presents how the fundamental ontology, while placing being at the centre of the discourse and using the phenomenological method, directs the attention to man. When asking about being, it asks about Dasein, about the way of man’s being. Then, the paper presents the existential analytics, the hermeneutics of Dasein, which is crucial from the point of view of Heidegger’s philosophy. The author explains what Heidegger’s existentials are and what it means that man exists as “being-in-the world”, that he exists in a way of “care”. Finally, it is shown that such an understanding of human being, the way in which he cares about the world and understands the world, i.e. designs it, results in enclosing the world in Dasein. The very sense of reality becomes thus the sense of human existence. Keywords: FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, REALITY, DASEIN. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the S. Gogotskomu, outstanding Ukrainian philosopher. Proceedings Gogotskogo played a crucial role in spreading the philosophy of I. Kant in Ukraine.

From the viewpoint of its Stalinist-era creators, the IKKN/INS could at best be described as a mixed success. Despite heroic efforts, it failed to train the cadres that might have permeated Polish scholarship with Marxism-Leninism. If it was the major channel for transmitting Soviet experience to Polish academia, then Poland's universities would not learn to be Soviet—the Polish historian Jerzy Halbersztadt has made the point that the institute was the only direct conduit of Soviet experience into Polish academic life. It (...) even had a major role in educating some of Poland's most famous critical thinkers, although they, unlike their master Adam Schaff, seem less fond of reminiscing about the institute. Leszek Koŀakowski writes that he does not regard his role in the ideological struggles of the early 1950s as a “source of pride”.90The legacy of the IKKN/INS has also been a mixed one. It was not only a “foundry of revisionists”. For every future critical thinker of world repute, it graduated several cadres who served the PZPR loyally over decades. Adam Schaff recognises this dual legacy. Looking back on a long and active life, he has called the institute a “pearl in my crown”.91 Its members filled top party and government posts throughout the history of People's Poland. Andrzej Werblan served as Central Committee secretary and a member of the Politburo, Sylwester Zawadzki became minister of justice, Stanisŀaw Wroński was minister of culture, Mieczysŀaw Jagielski was the Politburo member who negotiated the Gdańsk accords, Stanisŀaw Kania succeeded Edward Gierek, and Mieczysŀaw Rakowski acted as General Jaruzelski's Party First Secretary.92Undoubtedly much of the institute's strange course is to be attributed to the designs of Adam Schaff. Despite his Moscow training, Schaff retained an attachment to the Polish academic milieu which had formed him. He may have believed in Stalinist doctrine, but he also believed that this doctrine would show its superiority in competition with other views—even if the competition was far from a fair one. Of course, Schaff tried to retain ultimate control, and to play, as he now calls himself, the “grey eminence”. Nevertheless, his was a very unstalinist way of propagating Stalinism, and he must be given credit for helping to keep a spirit of intellectual inquiry alive in Poland during the dark years of the early 1950s.Yet Schaff tends to exaggerate his personal role in educating philosophers, dissidents and critical thinkers. This tendency is itself a legacy of the Stalinist period and its concentration of power. Stalinists view the present as their personal creation and therefore reject all criticisms of the past. At the final meeting of the Crooked Circle Club in 1962, Schaff encountered unwonted criticism from, among others, Andrzej Walicki. Schaff shot back at him: “You are ours, you are our creation, a creation of socialism ... we educated you, and we didn't do such a bad job.” But far from being a “creation” of Schaff's, the non-party member Walicki had been denied admission to graduate studies in philosophy. He felt relieved when those in attendance, who knew him better than Schaff did, burst out laughing.93The point is that the Polish intellectual world maintained its integrity outside the IKKN/INS, and in the end it was the institute which merged into the Polish intelligentsia, rather than the opposite. After 1957 the non-Marxist sociologists and philosophers made their way back to academia, and were joined by many former INS staff members. The basic unity of Polish social science training, and of the Polish intelligentsia, was restored.94Of course in a larger sense the fate of the IKKN/INS had little to do with the designs of its master. Schaff admits as much, proclaiming that “I did this because I did not know what I was doing!” If he had been asked to start such a project five years later, the answer would have been: “No!”95 The fatal flaw of the Institute for Training Scientific Cadres was cadres: Poland did not have them. By 1956, Schaff and the party leadership, and perhaps Soviet advisers as well, had learned that one could not create an elite party scientific institution almost out of nothing. It would either be party or scientific, because apparatchiki could not become scientists, scientists would not become apparatchiki, and students could not produce teachers. In the Stalinist period, Polish intellectual life had stood in the shadow of the party; yet during the Thaw the relationship was reversed—increasingly the tiny party training institute was engulfed by the shadow of the resurgent Polish universities. Talented young people, even those in the party, made their way into the traditional higher educational establishment.The IKKN/INS did not, therefore, fail because of its own failings, nor succeed because of its own successes. It was a failed part of a failed whole. To succeed, “mild” revolution would have required decades, and Poland's Stalinists had only a few years. To make matters worse—or better, depending on viewpoint—they did not use these years in a conventional Stalinist manner. Under Schaff's guidance and at somewhat erratic Soviet bidding, the institute became an awkward series of half-measures, reminiscent of much of Polish Stalinism. When Poland's communists fell back and regrouped in 1956, the IKKN/INS occupied a lonely position they preferred to abandon. (shrink)