IntroductionExercise at high intensity may cause lower affective responses toward exercise compared with moderate intensity exercise. We aimed to elucidate affective valence and enjoyment in high- and moderate-high interval exercise.MethodsTwenty recreationally active participants (9 females, 11 males, age range: 20–51 years) underwent three different treadmill running exercise sessions per week over a 3-week period, in randomized order; (1) CE70: 45 min continuous exercise at 70% of heart rate maximum (HRmax), (2) INT80: 4 × 4 min intervals at 80% of HRmax, (...) (3) INT90: 4 × 4 min intervals at 90% of HRmax. Pre-tests included graded submaximal steady state intensities and a test to exhaustion for determining peak oxygen uptake and HRmax. Affective valence (pleasure/displeasure) was measured before, during and after the sessions using the Feeling Scale (FS). Enjoyment was assessed before and after the sessions applying the Physical Activity Enjoyment Scale (PACES) and during the sessions using the Exercise Enjoyment Scale (EES).ResultsThe participants felt lower pleasure (between-sessions effect:p= 0.02,pη2: 0.13) during INT90 sessions (FS: 1.08, 95% CI: 0.35–1.92) compared with INT80 (FS: 2.35, 95% CI: 1.62–3.08,p= 0.052) and CE70 sessions (FS: 2.45, 95% CI: 1.72–3.18,p= 0.03), with no differences between INT80 and CE70 sessions (p= 1.00). There were higher enjoyment after INT80 sessions (PACES: 101.5, 95% CI: 95.7–107.3) versus CE70 sessions (PACES: 91.3 95% CI: 85.5–97.1,p= 0.046), and no differences between INT90 (PACES: 98.2, 95% CI: 92.4–103.4) and CE70 (p= 0.29) or INT80 (p= 1.00). For enjoyment during exercise, CE70 were perceived more enjoyable, and INT80 and INT90 less enjoyable in week 2 (EES: week x session:p= 0.01,pη2: 0.11; CE70: 4.3, 95% CI: 3.6–4.9, INT80: 4.6, 95% CI: 3.9–5.2, INT90: 4.0, 95% CI: 3.4–4.7) and 3 (EES: CE70: 4.2, 95% CI: 3.7–4.8, INT80: 4.8, 95% CI: 4.2–5.3, INT90: 4.3, 95% CI: 3.8–4.9) than in week 1 (EES: CE70: 3.5, 95% CI: 3.0–4.0, INT80: 5.0, 95% CI: 4.5–5.5, INT90: 4.5, 95% CI: 4.0–5.0).ConclusionThe negative affective consequences associated with high intensity interval exercise can be alleviated by keeping the intensity at or around 80% of HRmaxwhile preserving the beneficial enjoyment responses associated with interval exercise. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In this first part, I raise the issue of the reflexivity of justification and question whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. (shrink)

The evolution of Euler diagrams is examined from Euler's original system through the modifications made by Venn and Peirce. It is shown that these modifications were motivated by an attempt to increase the expressivity of the diagrams, but that a side effect of these modifications was a loss of the visual clarity of Euler's original system. Euler's original system is reconstructed from a modern, logical point of view. Formal semantics and rules of inference are provided for this reconstruction of Euler's (...) system, and basic logical properties are proved. (shrink)

This paper analyses Steven Vogel's claim that his account of a post-natural environmental philosophy solves the dualism problem within the field. Through what I will call a novel critique of social constructionism, this paper examines whether Vogel's attempt succeeds or whether it reinforces the problem he wants to solve. Could the ontological foundations of social constructivism themselves be in conflict with Vogel's stated aim of overcoming the human/ nature dualism? The last part of the paper focuses on the significance and (...) role of a post-natural environmental philosophy for the field of environmental philosophy in general. (shrink)

This paper seeks to expand our understanding of initial trust by looking at how variation in risk influences the nature of trust and the process of initial trust formation. Four hypotheses were tested in two experiments involving participants with and without work experience. A first hypothesis suggested a positive relationship between a general propensity to trust and initial trust; a second hypothesis, a negative relationship between risk and initial trust; whereas a third hypothesis posited that risk would increase the importance (...) participants place on benevolence and integrity. A fourth hypothesis suggested that risk would have a positive and moderating influence on the effect of out-of-role behavior when presented after role-conformant in-role behavior. Findings are presented and discussed and practical implications suggested. (shrink)

According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart'sThe Concept of Lawand Alf Ross'sOn Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken.The Concept of Lawdoes not go beyondOn Law and Justicein so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared understanding between participants in a project perceived (...) by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward inThe Concept of LawandOn Law and Justiceare very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality. (shrink)

John Hartley opens his short history of cultural studies by evoking a sense of the contested nature of the field in the contemporary moment and the intense debates about its objects, scope, methods, and goals: “Even within intellectual communities and academic institutions, there is little agreement about what counts as cultural studies, either as a critical practice or an institutional apparatus. On the contrary, the field is riven by fundamental disagreements about what cultural studies is for, in whose interests it (...) is done, what theories, methods and objects of study are proper to it, and where to set its limits” (1). (shrink)

I introduce the concept of ‘fused descriptive and normative proposition.’ I demonstrate that and how this concept has a basis in reality in lawyers' propositions de lege lata, and I point out that and why we do not find fused modality in language qua language, morals and the relationship between parents and children. The concept of ‘fused descriptive and normative proposition’ is of interest in a number of contexts, inter alia in relation to law, cf. the debate about the status (...) of lawyers' propositions de lege lata (“exactly what kind of propositions are lawyers' propositions about what is the law?”), and in relation to philosophy, cf. the debate about the relationship between ‘the is‘ and ‘the ought.’ As a consequence of the reality basis and interest of this concept, I see the concepts of ‘descriptive proposition’ and ‘normative proposition’ as the extreme points on a graduated dimension, from the purely descriptive to the purely normative. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In the first part (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In this second part, I shall outline a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. (shrink)

In Transcendence and Sensoriness , scholars of theology, philosophy, art, music, and architecture, discuss questions of transcendence, the human senses, and the arts through case studies considered in a broad theological framework of religious aesthetics of the arts.

Change can be difficult to achieve, and system inertia may be considered relevant. There is a tendency for dynamic systems to enter into specific states characterized by stabilizing factors. The present work attempts to define inertia processes and explores these with regard to pro-environmental behaviour and decision-making. Inertia processes can be considered both within an organizational context and from the level of the individual, and may involve a number of psychological processes and aspects of the decision-making process. A few suggestions (...) for research are also presented. (shrink)

In 1968, an antisemitic campaign, launched by the Polish government, caused around 13,000 Jews to leave Poland. About 2500 of these refugees came to Denmark, while only about 25 ended up in Norway. The migration to Norway could potentially have reached low hundreds, but as oral-history sources indicate, the Jewish congregation in Oslo turned down a government initiative in 1969. Based on written and oral sources, and secondary literature, I argue that there was an equally important factor differentiating the two (...) countries. Comparing the Danish and Norwegian refugee reception policies, the article finds that Danish authorities and their NGO partners at decisive stages in the process were more proactive than their Norwegian counterparts in their efforts to persuade Polish Jews to come. The most critical point was in June 1969, when Denmark’s embassy in Warsaw started issuing Jews with automatic visas, while Norway retained its existing application process. (shrink)

Trust has a great potential for furthering our understanding of organizational change and learning. This potential however remains largely untapped. It is argued that two reasons as for why this potential remains unrealized are: (i) A narrow conceptualization of change as implementation and (ii) an emphasis on direct and aggregated effects of individual trust to the exclusion of other effects. It is further suggested that our understanding of the effects of trust on organizational change, should benefit from including effects of (...) trust on the formulation stage. It should also benefit from exploring the structuring effects of trust in organizations. Throughout this chapter, ways to extend current research on trust in organizations are suggested. The chapter also provides examples of relevant contributions where available. In order to capture organizational effects of trust, it is suggested that trust should be studied over longer time intervals, and include several referents of trust, spanning both horizontal and vertical relationships in the organization. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. In the first part of this enquiry (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In the second part (Eng 2014b), I outlined a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. In this third and final part, I shall argue that Rawls's reflective equilibrium cannot justify the choice of itself and that in the broader perspective thus necessitated, we cannot escape the metaphysical issues integral to the Kantian approach. (shrink)

In this chapter, we argue that trust can be better understood in relation to people’s attempts to deal with vulnerability in social interactions. Different situations afford different forms of adaptation that correspond to different forms of trust. We describe three forms of trust: trust as a decision, trust as a performance and trust as an uncontrollable force. We show how these different types of trust differ with respect to assumptions about trust, trustworthiness and agency as well as with respect to (...) the accompanying emotions and outline a tentative process model of trust. We conclude the chapter by reviewing the contribution of the suggested framework as well as indicating questions for further research. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to point out the salient patterns of agreement and dis‐ agreement between Alf Ross and Hans Kelsen's analyses of valid law and efficacy. I argue that the disagreement has the character of systemic postulation on the part of both interlocutors. My main thesis is that the disagreement is not one of philosophical principle, but one that must be resolved on the basis of pragmatic considerations, i.e., the choice between the two valid‐law schemes pertains neither (...) to necessity nor to truth, but to expediency and values. (shrink)

The similarities between virtuality and play are obvious, beginning with, for instance, the ubiquitous character of both. This paper deals with how insights from research on play can be used to enlighten our understanding of the ethical dimensions of activities in cyberspace, and vice versa. In particular, a central claim that play is beyond vice and virtue is debated and contested.

According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law and Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken. The Concept of Law does not go beyond On Law and Justice in so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared (...) understanding between participants in a project perceived by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward in The Concept of Law and On Law and Justice are very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality. (shrink)

This paper investigates the actual use of truth as a criterion in the setting up of and choice between descriptive characterisations. The consideration for truth is often weighed against other considerations. This weighing character is illuminated through examples from everyday life, politics, law, and science. In everyday life the weighing character shows itself inter alia through the categories of ‘white lies’ and ‘great questions’, and in politics, inter alia through the categories of ‘personal character’ versus ‘the party’. In law there (...) are numerous examples of norms that increase the probability of untrue characterisations being taken as a basis for the application of the law. This paper focuses on the categories of ‘exclusion of evidence’, ‘burden of proof’, and ‘adjusting of facts as a means to concretely reasonable and just results’. The paper concludes by showing that burden of proof considerations are also found in an area in which many people assume that the truth criterion is paramount, namely science. The method is thus casuistic. However, the aim is a certain representativity in relation to the problem aspects. (shrink)

On several levels, there is now a debate whether the concept of God can be made compatible with modern science. In an attempt to elucidate this debate, I give an account of my own experiences from writing a book on the foundation of quantum mechanics. In my opinion, one can give two independent arguments for the existence of God by taking as departure an epistemic (knowledge-based) interpretation of quantum theory. However, I also argue that any religious belief should be the (...) result of an existential choice governed by each person’s own context (history and culture). In particular, I give my account of Christianity as a religion connected to our western culture, how one as a scientist can relate to the relevant dogmas. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno was one of the foremost radical thinkers of the Twentieth century. Critic of the Enlightenment, liberalism and modernity, he was the architect behind the famous Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and his work ranged over philosophy, social and cultural theory, art and music. In this lucid book, Espen Hammer critically considers and defends Adorno's most important contribution: his political thought and it contemporary relevance. Espen Hammer examines the background to Adorno's thought in the work of Kierkegaard, (...) Marx, Weber and Walter Benjamin and assesses Adorno's critique of Enlightenment and modernity in his famous work, Dialectic of Enlightenment. He then considers Adorno's critique of Kant and Hegel and considers Adorno's celebrated theory of negative dialectics. He defends Adorno's against Jurgen Habermas's criticism that Adorno's thought is irrational and subject-centred before considering how Adorno's theory of alterity is evident in the work of Derrida and Levinas. Adorno and the Political is an invigorating exploration of a key political thinker and is also a useful introduction to his thought as a whole. It will be of interest to those in philosophy, sociology and politics. (shrink)

This book examines the logical foundations of visual information: information presented in the form of diagrams, graphs, charts, tables, and maps. The importance of visual information is clear from its frequent presence in everyday reasoning and communication, and also in compution. Chapters of the book develop the logics of familiar systems of diagrams such as Venn diagrams and Euler circles. Other chapters develop the logic of higraphs, Pierce diagrams, and a system having both diagrams and sentences among its well-formed representations. (...) Syntax, semantics, rules of inference and soundness and completeness results are provided for each of the systems. In addition to developing the logic of diagrams, key questions about the status of visual information Hammer discusses, such as the relationship between the language and visually-presented information. (shrink)

A formal system is studied having both sentences and diagrams as well-formed representations. Proofs in the system allow inference back and forth between sentences and diagrams, as well as between diagrams and diagrams, and between sentences and sentences. This sort of heterogeneous system is of interest because external representations other than linguistic ones occur commonly in actual reasoning in conjunction with language. Syntax, semantics, and rules of inference for the system are given and it is shown to be sound and (...) complete. (shrink)

This paper describes a way of creating and maintaining a `dynamic encyclopedia', i.e., an encyclopedia whose entries can be improved and updated on a continual basis without requiring the production of an entire new edition. Such an encyclopedia is therefore responsive to new developments and new research. We discuss our implementation of a dynamic encyclopedia and the problems that we had to solve along the way. We also discuss ways of automating the administration of the encyclopedia.

What is the connection between dispositions and ethics? Some might think very little and those who are interested in dispositions tend to be metaphysicians whose interests are far from value. However, we argue in this paper that dispositions and dispositionality are central to ethics, indeed a precondition. Ethics rests on a number of notions that are either dispositional in nature or involve real dispositions or powers at work. We argue for a dispositional account of value that offers an alternative to (...) the traditional fact-value dichotomy. We explain the place of value within a structure that explains the possibility of ethics. Elsewhere in this structure, we argue that moral responsibility is a precondition for ethics and that it is a dispositional notion depending critically on what Mumford and Anjum have called the dispositional modality. Moral responsibility in turn depends on there being both agency and normativity. We argue that intentionality and agency are preconditions for agency and that value is a precondition of normativity. All these notions are dispositional and make best sense if there are real dispositions or causal powers of agents. (shrink)

From the mid 1990s, the OECD started the planning of the Program for International Student Assessment, now well known as PISA. 1 The first PISA testing took place early in 2000, and the results were published in December 2001. Since then, PISA results have gradually become a kind of global “gold standard” for educational quality, and educational policy has been globalized, lifted out of the domestic policy, as proudly stated by the PISA director, Andreas Schleicher in the TED-talk quoted below. (...) The presentation is transcribed in 29 languages and has been seen by some 758 thousand viewers. (shrink)

Stanley Cavell is a leading figure in American philosophy and one of the most exhilarating and wide-ranging intellectuals of our time. In this book Espen Hammer offers a lucid and thorough account of the development of Cavell's work, from his early writings on ordinary language philosophy and skepticism to his most recent contributions to film studies, literary theory, romanticism, ethics, and politics. The book traces the many lines of skepticism occurring in Cavell's work and shows how they amount to (...) a rich and subtle picture of human subjectivity. Hammer explores Cavell's passionate engagement with Austin and Wittgenstein's visions of language, and his uncovering of conceptions of the ordinary in Emerson and Thoreau. Central sections of the book are devoted to the tragic and the comic as these modes of existence come into play in Shakespeare and Hollywood cinematic drama. In elaborating Cavell's responses to thinkers such as Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida, the author situates Cavell's writing within the wider context of contemporary continental philosophy. Hammer clearly reveals the existential dimensions of Cavell's thought. He argues that his variant of ordinary language philosophy is a vital stimulus to self-transformation in cognitive, aesthetic, ethical, and political domains, contributing significantly to a rethinking of issues such as responsibility and autonomy, and the relationship between philosophy and literature. A critical introduction to the thought of an inordinately complex writer, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars in philosophy, literary theory, cultural theory, comparative literature, and media and cultural studies. (shrink)