In this work, Professors Rosenfeld and Mancini have brought together an impressive group of authors to provide a comprehensive analysis on the greater demand for religions exemptions to government mandates. Traditional religious conscientious objection cases, such as refusal to salute the flag or to serve in the military during war, had a diffused effect throughout society. In sharp contrast, these authors argue that today's most notorious objections impinge on the rights of others, targeting practices like abortion, LGTBQ adoption, and (...) same-sex marriage. The dramatic expansion of conscientious objection claims have revolutionized the battle between religious traditionalists and secular civil libertarians, raising novel political, legal, constitutional and philosophical challenges. Highlighting the intersection between conscientious objections, religious liberty, and the equality of women and sexual minorities, this volume showcases this political debate and the principal jurisprudence from different parts of the world and emphasizes the little known international social movements that compete globally to alter the debate's terms. (shrink)

Analisi di più aspetti dell’argomentazione giuridica, esposti in quattro saggi. 1. La ricerca della verità nella testimonianza della vittima dei processi per stupro, partendo dalla vicenda biblica di Susanna e i vecchioni, dal processo seicentesco per lo stupro di Artemisia Gentileschi, passando per il romanzo “A Passage to India”, fino all’esame della più recente giurisprudenza (Susanna, Artemisa, Adela … ovvero la semplice verità, di Emanuele Filograna). 2. La giustificazione dialogica e monologica delle argomentazioni: confronto tra le tesi di (...) E. Tugendhat e R. Alexy in merito alla teoria del consenso come giustificazione ultima non solo dell’argomentazione, ma anche della decisione giuridica (Giustificazione, argomentazione e decisione giuridica. Teorie dialogiche e fonologiche: Alexy e Tugendhat, di Massimo Mancini). 3. Analisi del particolare status argomentativo della giustificazione dei diritti umani, con particolare riferimento alla loro natura assoluta o storica, esaminando le argomentazioni relative ai diritti alla vita, alla libertà ed all’integrità fisica, cui corrispondono le rispettive violazioni: l’uccisione, la schiavitù e la tortura (Problemi di argomentazione e giustificazione dei diritti umani, di Massimo. Mancini). 4. Illustrazione degli elementi di continuità tra il processo accusatorio antico (greco e romano) e moderno e, segnatamente, della terzietà del giudice e della cross-examination, attraverso l’esame dei processi ad Oreste, Socrate ed Apuleio (La Verità nel contraddittorio, di Roberto Paradisi). (shrink)

This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.

In this paper, I argue that certain perceptual relations are represented in visual experience.

What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces (...) a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. She then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kinds of properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. She goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. Siegel's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision. (shrink)

Those who model doxastic states with a set of probability functions, rather than a single function, face a pressing challenge: can they provide a plausible decision theory compatible with their view? Adam Elga and others claim that they cannot, and that the set of functions model should be rejected for this reason. This paper aims to answer this challenge. The key insight is that the set of functions model can be seen as an instance of the supervaluationist approach to vagueness (...) more generally. We can then generate our decision theory by applying the general supervaluationist semantics to decision-theoretic claims. The result: if an action is permissible according to all functions in the set, it’s determinately permissible; if impermissible according to all, determinately impermissible; and – crucially – if permissible according to some, but not all, it’s indeterminate whether it’s permissible. This proposal handles with ease some difficult cases ) on which alternative decision theories falter. One reason this view has been overlooked in the literature thus far is that all parties to the debate presuppose that an acceptable decision theory must classify each action as either permissible or impermissible. But I will argue that this thought is misguided. Seeing the set of functions model as an instance of supervaluationism provides a compelling motivation for the claim that there can be indeterminacy in the rationality of some actions. (shrink)

In a previous paper, we discussed a model that considers abnormal eating behaviour epiphenomena of a more profound disorder of lived corporeality and identity (Stanghellini and Mancini, this issue). The core idea is that persons with FEDs experience their own body first and foremost as an object being looked at by another, rather than coenaesthetically or from a first-person perspective. In this paper, alienation from one’s own emotions, disgust and shame for one’s body of persons with FED, will be (...) discussed in the light of the embodiment and identity model of FED. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 2, Page 434-453, March 2022.

There is an important division in the human mind between perception and reasoning. We reason from information that we have already, but perception is a means of taking in new information. Susanna Siegel argues that these two aspects of the mind become deeply intertwined when beliefs, fears, desires, or prejudice influence what we perceive.

In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I.

Evidentialists and Pragmatists about reasons for belief have long been in dialectical stalemate. However, recent times have seen a new wave of Evidentialists who claim to provide arguments for their view which should be persuasive even to someone initially inclined toward Pragmatism. This paper reveals a central flaw in this New Evidentialist project: their arguments rely on overly demanding necessary conditions for a consideration to count as a genuine reason. In particular, their conditions rule out the possibility of pragmatic reasons (...) for action. Since the existence of genuine pragmatic reasons for action is common ground between the Evidentialist and the Pragmatist, this problem for the New Evidentialist arguments is fatal. The upshot is that the deadlock between these two positions is restored: neither side can claim to be in possession of an argument that could convince the other. As it happens, I myself favor Pragmatism about reasons for belief, and although I don't claim to be able to convince a committed Evidentialist, I do make a prima facie case for Pragmatism by describing particular scenarios in which it seems to be true. I then go on to develop my own preferred version of the view: Robust Pragmatism, according to which a consideration never constitutes a reason for believing a proposition purely in virtue of being evidence for it. (shrink)

Recent accounts support the existence of two distinct feelings of guilt: altruistic guilt (AG), arising from the appraisal of not having been altruistic toward a victim and deontological guilt (DG), emerging from the appraisal of having violated an intuitive moral rule. Neuroimaging data has shown that the two guilt feelings trigger different neural networks, with DG selectively activating the insula, a brain area involved in the processing of disgust and self-reproach. Thus, insula activation could reflect the major involvement of self-reproach (...) in DG rather than in AG. However, only a few studies have empirically tested whether and how DG and AG differently affect decision making and none have compared enhanced self-worth. Here we asked three groups of participants, respectively, induced with either pride, DG or AG, to participate in a third-party version of the ultimatum game in which they were asked to decide on behalf of others to accept or reject economic offers with several degrees of fairness. Results revealed that only deontological participants had higher median acceptances of Moderately Unfair offers as compared to proud participants. However fairness judgments were not different between groups, suggesting that deontological participants’ moral standards had not decreased. Crucially, a higher increase in DG was associated with an increase in the odds of accepting 30:70 offers. The opposite effects that DG and pride exert on self-worth can account for these results. Specifically, proud participants felt entitled enough to take action in order to restore equity, while deontological participants followed the “Do not play God” principle, which limited their decisional autonomy, not allowing them to decide on behalf of others. (shrink)

Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of (...) hallucinations are dim, and that this undermines the case for disjunctivism. (shrink)

Situated in a period that witnessed the genesis of institutions that have lasted to this day, this path-breaking study looks at how ancient Christian women, particularly in Asia Minor and Egypt, initiated ascetic ways of living, and how these practices were then institutionalized. Susanna Elm demonstrates that--in direct contrast to later conceptions--asceticism began primarly as an urban movement, in which women were significant protagonists. In the process, they completely transformed and expanded their roles as wife, mother, or widow: as (...) Christian ascetics, they became `virgin wives', `virgin mothers', and `virgin widows' - with all the legal and economic implications of such a dramatic shift. As importantly, though, Christian men and women ascetics lived together. As `virgins of God' they created new families `in Christ'. No longer determined by their human bonds or human sexuality, they were `neither male nor female'. Finally, the book demonstrates how ascetic bishops - today known as saints - eventually `reformed' these early models of communal, ascetic life by dividing the `virgins of God' into monks and nuns and thus laid the foundation for the monasticism we know today. (shrink)

Este artículo busca dar cuenta de los problemas inherentes al subjetivismo desde el concepto del otro a través de dos exponentes de la fenomenología como son M. Merleau-Ponty y M. Heidegger, buscando las similitudes teóricas entre estos filósofos. Desde conceptos como “inter-corporalidad” merleaupontiano y el dasein heideggeriano apreciaremos la necesidad ontológica del hombre por el otro, el cual lo constituye, y lo muestra como un ser inter-subjetivo.Este artículo busca dar cuenta de los problemas inherentes al subjetivismo desde el concepto del (...) otro a través de dos exponentes de la fenomenología como son M. Merleau-Ponty y M. Heidegger, buscando las similitudes teóricas entre estos filósofos. Desde conceptos como “inter-corporalidad” merleaupontiano y el dasein heideggeriano apreciaremos la necesidad ontológica del hombre por el otro, el cual lo constituye, y lo muestra como un ser inter-subjetivo. (shrink)

L'importanza del significante non deve far sì che questo sia interpretato come l'unica componente del linguaggio umano, sebbene ne sia una delle più elevate; pur intendendo la comunicazione umana come convenzionale, nel convenire occorre distinguere, tra convenzione essenziale e funzionale: è certo vero che solo nella prima, nel linguaggio come nel diritto, si potrà incontrare il significante, ma nella seconda sono concentrati i molteplici prodotti della prima, che si presentano come precipitati o cristallizzati a seguito di una reazione chimica, che (...) hanno perso sì la dimensione esistenziale, ma hanno conservato origine e natura umane. Così deve essere debitamente considerato anche il ruolo del senso già dato, del significato positivo dei vocaboli: in particolare, proprio nel linguaggio giuridico, politico ed economico, si è sempre manifestato il bisogno di uno specifico vocabolario, se non di un gergo, che risponda con maggior aderenza o efficacia alle esigenze delle argomentazioni trattate. Nel linguaggio giuridico ed economico si può riscontrare una certa omogeneità nelle società complesse contemporanee, una comune tendenza alla generazione (o forse degenerazione) di terminologie e fraseologie esoteriche che si spingono ben al di là delle logiche e necessarie esigenze di specializzazione, somigliando più a gerghi approssimativi (ad esempio il legalese, per gli anglofoni, assume sempre più la fisionomia di un vero e proprio slang) che ad appropriati e scientifici codici comunicativi. Un fenomeno comune a tali linguaggi è il frequente ricorso alle sigle, abbreviazioni o acronimi, il cui uso generalizzato conduce spesso ad effetti in contraddizione con la loro causa originaria: espedienti linguistici apparentemente coniati allo scopo di migliorare, velocizzare ed estendere la comprensione di termini e concetti complessi, al contrario, generano frequentemente confusione e misunderstanding al di fuori del loro specializzato e ristretto ambito di provenienza e, qualche volta, anche all’interno. Un'adeguata risposta alla proliferazione e diffusione di nuove e sommarie terminologie, abbreviazioni e slogan, che solo apparentemente arricchiscono il lessico, restringendo sempre più, al contrario, l'ambito della convenzione essenziale, potrebbe essere forse ottenuta solo attraverso il recupero della dimensione ontologica del linguaggio, mantenendone sì l'elevato grado di specializzazione, ma non rinunciando per questo alla ricchezza espressiva tanto dei vocaboli quanto della fraseologia. (shrink)

Fatigue and increased fatigability occur as symptoms in almost every medical and psychiatric condition, as well as being common reactions to non pathological physical and psychological strain and stress. We will attempt to clarify the semantics of the terms "fatigue" and "fatigability", and we will put forward the hypothesis that the special kind of mental fatigability which characterises many cases of mild to moderate dysfunction of the brain is functional in a sense that it represents an overload of pathological information (...) (from the injured area) to higher cognitive mechanisms which may themselves be anatomically and physiologically intact. (shrink)

Op-ed about the role of anti-hypocrisy in political criticism.

In this paper I argue that certain type of first-personal causal property, efficacy, is represented in perceptual experience.

This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of dependence that can found (...) in the relationship between experiences and desires as well. This conclusion brings us a large part of the way to the conclusion that like beliefs, experiences can be ill-founded by depending on a desire. (shrink)

This book breaks new ground in our understanding of how we perceive and represent the space around us - one of the central topics in cognitive psychology. It presents a new view of development and spatial cognition by reversing the usual focus on vision and examining the evidence on representation in the total absence of vision without specific brain damage. Findings from the author's work with congenitally totally blind and with sighted children, together with studies from a wide variety of (...) other areas, are set in the context of intersensory and spatial development. Touch and movement are considered as converging sources of reference information with and without vision. The findings have important implications for future work in many fields, particularly developmental pscychology; cognition, cognitive neuroscience and visual handicap, and make this new work essential reading for students and researchers in these fields. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.

Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to (...) accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational. (shrink)

Perception is our key to the world. It plays at least three different roles in our lives. It justifies beliefs and provides us with knowledge of our environment. It brings about conscious mental states. It converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of invariant features in our environment. Corresponding to these three roles, there are at least three fundamental questions that have motivated the study of perception. How does perception justify beliefs and yield knowledge of our (...) environment? How does perception bring about conscious mental states? How does a perceptual system accomplish the feat of converting varying informational input into mental representations of invariant features in our environment? -/- This book presents a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perception that is informed by empirical research. So it develops an account of perception that provides an answer to the first two questions, while being sensitive to scientific accounts that address the third question. The key idea is that perception is constituted by employing perceptual capacities - for example the capacity to discriminate instances of red from instances of blue. Perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence are each analyzed in terms of this basic property of perception. Employing perceptual capacities constitutes phenomenal character as well as perceptual content. The primacy of employing perceptual capacities in perception over their derivative employment in hallucination and illusion grounds the epistemic force of perceptual experience. In this way, the book provides a unified account of perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence. (shrink)

This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...) with the common idea that in the case of belief, there are two different incommensurable senses of rationality, one of which is distinctively epistemic. I present considerations that favor Equal Treatment over these two alternatives, reply to objections, and criticize some arguments for Evidentialism. I also show how Equal Treatment opens the door to a distinctive kind of response to skepticism. (shrink)

In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.

This paper proposes that the question “What should I believe?” is to be answered in the same way as the question “What should I do?,” a view I call Equal Treatment. After clarifying the relevant sense of “should,” I point out advantages that Equal Treatment has over both simple and subtle evidentialist alternatives, including versions that distinguish what one should believe from what one should get oneself to believe. I then discuss views on which there is a distinctively epistemic sense (...) of should. Next I reply to an objection which alleges that non-evidential considerations cannot serve as reasons for which one believes. I then situate Equal Treatment in a broader theoretical framework, discussing connections to rationality, justification, knowledge, and theoretical vs. practical reasoning. Finally, I show how Equal Treatment has important implications for a wide variety of issues, including the status of religious belief, philosophical skepticism, racial profiling and gender stereotyping, and certain issues in psychology, such as depressive realism and positive illusions. (shrink)

German philosophy as it is today can best disprove the various theories of "Historical Reason." Philosophic thought seems to go its necessary way regardless of immediate historical and social situations.

the scholion of the “Commenta Bernensia” to Lucan 8, 824–826 about the Sibylline oracle concerning the prohibition for the Romans to send a military contingent to Egypt reveals both the influence of late antique commentaries cum notis variorum and the presence of allegedly genuine details about the history of the late Roman republic from sources now lost.

O artigo versa sobre duas passagens cruciais em que toma forma o tema da comunicação entre vida humana e vida não humana: o século XVI, com Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) e Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), e o século XVIII, com Jean-Jacques Rous-seau (1712-1778), o qual se inspira directamente nos Essais. O artigo mostra até que ponto a ética de Montaigne se concentra sobre a escuta da natureza imanente a cada indivíduo, comportando em si a ideia da solidariedade que une todos os (...) seres vivos, reconhecendo na comunicação entre a subjectividade humana e a natureza animal a primeira modalidade de identificação com a vida débil, oprimida e sofredora, a qual é condição de explicação de uma ideia de justiça "natural e universal". A piedade constitui já uma disposição para a alteridade que brota do sentimento de identificação com a vida, na sua contingência e capacidade de sofrer. O artigo mostra também até que ponto a reflexão moral de Bruno chega a uma conclusão similar, na medida em que se afasta de uma antropologia que se recusa a conceber o ser humano como centro privilegiado de sentido no universo, antes colocando o homem e o animal numa relação de reciprocidade e de copertença. Será precisamente na medida em que retoma esta elaboração antidualista que Rousseau transformará a piedade no principal eixo da moral. /// The article focuses on the two crucial moments in which the theme of communication between human life and non-human life takes form: the XVI century, with Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), and the XVIII century, with Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who directly takes inspiration from the Essais. The article shows how the ethics of Montaigne is centred upon the auscultation of the nature immanent to each individual, and at the same time embraces the idea of the solidarity which connects all living beings, acknowledging in the communication between human subjectivity and the animal nature the first modality of an identification with forms of life which are weak, oppressed and suffering, as condition of explanation for an idea of justice that is both natural and universal Piety constitutes thus a disposition for the alterity which grows from the feeling of identification with life in its contingency and capacity for suffering. The article also shows to what extent Bruno's moral reflexion comes to a similar conclusion, to the extent that it distances itself from an anthropology that refuses to take the human being as a privileged centre of meaning in the universe, placing rather the human being and the animal in a relation of reciprocity and mutual belonging. It shall precisely be to the degree that he takes up this antidualistic formulation that Rousseau will transform piety into the main axis of the moral life. (shrink)