In this dissertation I provide a tenseless account of tensed sentences and tensed belief. I begin by distinguishing tensed theories of time from tenseless theories of time. Tensed theories of time hold that there is a time that is objectively present, and that the moment that is objectively present changes from one moment to the next. I reject tensed theories of time. I deny that there is a time that is objectively present that changes from one moment to the next. (...) Instead, time is in many ways analogous to space and 'now' is in many ways analogous to 'here'. Just as there is no one location that is objectively here, there is no one moment that is objectively now. Nothing metaphysically distinguishes the present moment from past and future moments. ^ There are two major challenges facing the tenseless theory of time. The first challenge is: can a tenseless theory of time provide a plausible account of the truth-conditions for tensed sentences? Tensed sentences such as 'The meeting is now!' provide a prima facie reason in favor of irreducibly tensed properties: the sentence is true if and only if the meeting has the tensed property of being now. I examine existing attempts by tenseless theorists for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that they are unable to provide a complete account of what makes tensed sentences true. I formulate and defend a new tenseless account of the truth-conditions for tensed sentences, the type-context theory, which makes use of David Kaplan's theory of indexicals. ^ The second challenge facing the tenseless theory of time is: can a tenseless theory of time provide a plausible account of our tensed psychological attitudes? Most of our psychological attitudes such as belief, desire, relief, regret and anticipation are irreducibly tensed: we cannot adequate describe such attitudes without appealing to tensed language. I do not take relief in the tenseless fact that I got my wisdom teeth out in 1998. I take relief in the tensed fact that my wisdom teeth were extracted in the past. I do not run to the bus stop merely because I believe that the bus arrives at 8:45. I run to the bus stop because I believe that the bus is arriving now. How can the tenseless theory of time explain the central role that tense plays in our psychological attitudes? I claim that the objects of tensed beliefs are properties. The account I defend is a version of the self-ascription accounts defended by Roderick Chisholm and David Lewis. I argue that such a view can provide a plausible tenseless account of tensed belief. ^. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a reductive account of intentions which I call a gate-based reductive account. In contrast with other reductive accounts, however, the reductive basis of this account is not limited to desires, beliefs and judgments. I suggest that an intention is a complex state in which a predominant desire toward a plan is not inhibited by a gate mechanism whose function is to assess the comparison of our desires given the stakes at hand. To vindicate this account, (...) I rely on several considerations: the similarity between epistemic feelings and the feeling of being decided that tells us that we have an intention, the necessity of postulating a gate mechanism to explain our hesitating behavior, and the tight link that exists between the realization of our actions and our desires. In agreement with non-reductivists, I nevertheless acknowledge that intentions encompass plans, although I emphasize that the planning capacity must also be dependent on our motivational life and the general evaluative mechanisms that explains our emotions. (shrink)

Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have (...) the most profound consequences for the way in which philosophers think about inquiry, criticism and rational belief. The new variant on Bayesian theory is presented in such a way that a non-specialist will be able to understand it. The book also offers new solutions to some classic paradoxes. It focuses on the intuitive motivations of the Bayesian approach to epistemology and addresses the philosophical worries to which it has given rise. (shrink)

Local sustainable food systems have captured the popular imagination as a progressive, if not radical, pillar of a sustainable food future. Yet these grassroots innovations are embedded in a dominant food regime that reflects productivist, industrial, and neoliberal policies and institutions. Understanding the relationship between these emerging grassroots efforts and the dominant food regime is of central importance in any transition to a more sustainable food system. In this study, we examine the encounters of direct farm marketers with food safety (...) regulations and other government policies and the role of this interface in shaping the potential of local food in a wider transition to sustainable agri-food systems. This mixed methods research involved interview and survey data with farmers and ranchers in both the USA and Canada and an in-depth case study in the province of Manitoba. We identified four distinct types of interactions between government and farmers: containing, coopting, contesting, and collaborating. The inconsistent enforcement of food safety regulations is found to contain progressive efforts to change food systems. While government support programs for local food were helpful in some regards, they were often considered to be inadequate or inappropriate and thus served to coopt discourse and practice by primarily supporting initiatives that conform to more mainstream approaches. Farmers and other grassroots actors contested these food safety regulations and inadequate government support programs through both individual and collective action. Finally, farmers found ways to collaborate with governments to work towards mutually defined solutions. While containing and coopting reflect technologies of governmentality that reinforce the status quo, both collaborating and contesting reflect opportunities to affect or even transform the dominant regime by engaging in alternative economic activities as part of the ‘politics of possibility’. Developing a better understanding of the nature of these interactions will help grassroots movements to create effective strategies for achieving more sustainable and just food systems. (shrink)

This paper presents the hypothesis that concept possession is sufficient and necessary for self-consciousness. If this is true it provides a yardstick for gauging the validity of different research paradigms in which claims for self-consciousness in animals or human infants are made: a convincing demonstration of concept possession in a research subject, such as a display of inferential reasoning, may be taken as conclusive evidence of self-consciousness. Intuitively, there appears to be a correlation between intelligence in animals and the existence (...) of self-consciousness. I present three discussions to support the hypothesis: an analogy between perception and conception, where both are self-specifying; an argument that any web of concepts will always include the self-concept; and a fresh interpretation of Bermũdez showing how his theory of non-conceptual content provides strong support for the concept possession hypothesis. (shrink)

Foucault’s Forgotten Marxism. This article tries to point out several methodological issues concerning Foucault’s Surveiller et punir, such as the equivocal status of some of Foucault’s main concepts, or the assumed homogeneity of the various disciplinary institutions analyzed in this book. And it aims at suggesting that such issues might find a solution, should one consider the Marxist background on which, as the Lectures at the Collège de France of the year 1973 clearly show, Foucault’s theories were dependant. In the (...) opinion of the author, only in as much as this heritage is accepted and seriously taken into account, shall Foucault’s concepts and theses regain their political and critical pertinence. (shrink)

The central aim of this paper is to shed light on the nature of explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that computational models in this domain possess explanatory force to the extent that they describe the mechanisms responsible for producing a given phenomenon—paralleling how other mechanistic models explain. Conceiving computational explanation as a species of mechanistic explanation affords an important distinction between computational models that play genuine explanatory roles and those that merely provide accurate descriptions or predictions of phenomena. It (...) also serves to clarify the pattern of model refinement and elaboration undertaken by computational neuroscientists. (shrink)

Cette nouvelle enquête sur le patrimoine narratif de tradition orale dans les Alpes de la Savoie s’est inscrite dans la continuité des enquêtes de Charles Joisten, commencées dès les années 1950 et qui ont donné les recueils de contes et de récits de croyance rendus disponibles au tournant de ce siècle. Seul ce type d’enquête directe s’est révélé capable de nous permettre — en tirant parti des moyens disponibles de nos jours, notamment d’enregistrement — de donner le jour à de (...) nouveaux exemplaires de cette matière de l’oralité. Nous exposerons ici les aspects de notre expérience sur plusieurs années de terrain ayant abouti à plusieurs publications. Nous mettrons l’accent sur les questions de forme narrative et de fond dans l’univers de l’oralité, tout particulièrement en ce qui concerne la narration des croyances, dans leurs contextes historiques. Our new survey on the narrative heritage from oral tradition in the Alps of Savoy has been performed in the continuity of Charles Joisten’s opus, gathered since the 50s, which was made fully available in collections of tales and belief narratives about the turn of this century. This type of direct investigation in face-to-face interaction—taking advantage of current means of recording available today—has proved to remain still nowadays the only one able to elicit new data. The main aspects of our field experience in the long term which resulted in several publications about tales and belief narratives will be questionned. While putting the emphasis on narrative form and substantive issues in the realm of orality, we will focus particularly on belief narratives in their historical contexts. (shrink)

Making Sense of Evolution explores contemporary evolutionary biology, focusing on the elements of theories—selection, adaptation, and species—that are complex and open to multiple possible interpretations, many of which are incompatible with one another and with other accepted practices in the discipline. Particular experimental methods, for example, may demand one understanding of “selection,” while the application of the same concept to another area of evolutionary biology could necessitate a very different definition.

Why is there a specific problem with biological individuality? Because the living realm contains a wide range of exotic particular concrete entities that do not easily match our ordinary concept of an individual. Slime moulds, dandelions, siphonophores are among the Odd Entities that excite the ontological zeal of the philosophers of biology. Most of these philosophers, however, seem to believe that these Odd Cases oblige us to refine or revise our common concept of an individual. They think, explicitly or tacitly, (...) that to be a living, evolutionary entity is to be a living individual. In this paper, we explore an alternative proposal: the variety and oddity of the forms of the living realm might be ontologically regimented through an increase in the categorial complexity of the living realm, by admitting, beside living individuals, living non-individuals or by acknowledging, more generally, that the evolutionary development of the living forms is not necessarily a process of building individuals, that life is not necessarily individuals-oriented. We claim that, from an ontological point of view, the spectacle of the living realm obliges us to take aggregativity seriously. (shrink)

While the paradigm of utility maximisation has formed the basis of the majority of applications in discrete choice modelling for over 40 years, its core assumptions have been questioned by work in both behavioural economics and mathematical psychology as well as more recently by developments in the RUM-oriented choice modelling community. This paper reviews the basic properties with a view to explaining the historical pre-eminence of utility maximisation and addresses the question of what departures from the paradigm may be necessary (...) or wise in order to accommodate richer behavioural patterns. We find that many, though not all, of the behavioural traits discussed in the literature can be approximated sufficiently closely by a random utility framework, allowing analysts to retain the many advantages that such an approach possesses. (shrink)

It is illegitimate to read any ontology about "race" off of biological theory or data. Indeed, the technical meaning of "genetic variation" is fluid, and there is no single theoretical agreed-upon criterion for defining and distinguishing populations (or groups or clusters) given a particular set of genetic variation data. Thus, by analyzing three formal senses of "genetic variation"—diversity, differentiation, and heterozygosity—we argue that the use of biological theory for making epistemic claims about "race" can only seem plausible when it relies (...) on the user’s own assumptions about race; the move from biological measures to claims about “race” inevitably amounts to a pernicious reification. We also excavate assumptions in the history of the technical discourse over the concept of "race" (e.g., Livingstone's and Dobzhansky's 1962 exchange, Edwards' 2003 response to Lewontin 1972, as well as contemporary discussions of cladistic "race", and "races" as clusters). We show that claims about the existence (or non-existence) of "race" are underdetermined by biological facts, methods, and theories. Biological theory does not force the concept of "race" upon us; our social discourse, social ontology, and social expectations do. We become prisoners of our abstractions at our own hands, and at our own expense. (shrink)

Advocates of extended cognition argue that the boundaries of cognition span brain, body, and environment. Critics maintain that cognitive processes are confined to a boundary centered on the individual. All participants to this debate require a criterion for distinguishing what is internal to cognition from what is external. Yet none of the available proposals are completely successful. I offer a new account, the mutual manipulability account, according to which cognitive boundaries are determined by relationships of mutual manipulability between the properties (...) and activities of putative components and the overall behavior of the cognitive mechanism in which they figure. Among its main advantages, this criterion is capable of (a) distinguishing components of cognition from causal background conditions and lower-level correlates, and (b) showing how the core hypothesis of extended cognition can serve as a legitimate empirical hypothesis amenable to experimental test and confirmation. Conceiving the debate in these terms transforms the current clash over extended cognition into a substantive empirical debate resolvable on the basis of evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology reveals two attitudes regarding the classification of phenomena. On the one hand, they are classified by type. On the other, the “banality of saturation” reduces these types topossibleinterpretations, in which case saturation isn’t a qualitative rupture anymore, but a possible hermeneutic attitude to any phenomenon. Hence, there is, in Marion’s phenomenology, a tension between a metaphysical attitude that maintains categorial discontinuities, and a hermeneutic temptation driven by the recovery of quantitative continuities between all phenomena. Yet, Marion does (...) not push this quantitative temptation to its limits; he steps back in front of a specifically saturated phenomenon: the icon. (shrink)

En este artículo se desea mostrar la distinción que Jean-Luc Marion realiza entre fenómenos de derecho común y fenómenos saturados, se refleja de manera paradigmática su concepción de arte al presentar el ídolo como una modalidad saturada de los fenómenos; a su vez se presenta la diferencia entre los objetos construidos o los fenómenos constituidos por un sujeto que son presentados como principio y fundamento. Desde aquí se considera la pintura como una experiencia fenoménica de anamorfosis, donde la mirada del (...) espectador se somete al fenómeno, planteando la posibilidad de recibir aquello que se quiere ver. Además, busca mostrar cómo desde el arte, el proceso de la visibilidad es presentado como construcción del fenómeno que opera desde lo invisible. Se mostrará, entonces, cómo la reflexión artística de Jean-Luc Marion permite entrar en el corazón de su obra, observando cómo se puede modificar los conceptos de donación y de sujeto. (shrink)

ArgumentThis paper aims to understand the emergence of comparative anatomy in the eighteenth century in the Parisian Académie Royale des Sciences. As early as the 1670s, a program centered on animal anatomy was conceived, which was a first attempt to give some autonomy to studies on animals and to link anatomy with natural history, but it declined after 1690. However, a variety of studies on animals was published in theMémoiresof the Académie during the eighteenth century. We propose a descriptive typology (...) of them in order to explore the status of animals and the significance of anatomy in each type, and to determine, in particular, which elements of Perrault's program were passed on at the Académie throughout the century. We discuss the influence of this legacy on the development of comparative anatomy after 1750, especially in Daubenton's work. (shrink)

L’invention de la théorie de l’inconscient, sur fond de Vaterkomplex non liquidé, semble avoir opéré chez Sigmund Freud – « Juif sans Dieu » revendiquant son athéisme –, comme un symptôme (Nom-du-Père) lui ayant garanti une « fidélité hérétique » dans son rapport contrasté au judaïsme. Peut-être bien que L’homme Moïse et la religion monothéiste (1939), œuvre testamentaire mise en chantier dans le contexte de la montée du nazisme en Europe, aurait à sa manière permis au fondateur de la psychanalyse (...) – au terme d’une méditation métapsychologique serrée sur la genèse et le devenir de l’identité juive –, l’esquisse d’une transfiguration par l’exil. (shrink)

RESUMEN A pesar de la declaración de la muerte del Sujeto en la segunda mitad del siglo XX, tanto Marion como Badiou mantienen esta categoría en el centro de sus filosofías. Sin embargo, para poder hacerlo abandonan sus determinaciones metafísicas de principio y fundamento con el fin de desplazarlo dentro de una posición secundaria de Sujeto de un acontecimiento. Así, el Sujeto, en tanto que substancia, da lugar a un proceso de subjetivación que responde a un acontecimiento que, desde siempre, (...) lo llama. En este texto se muestra que esta estructura apostólica del Sujeto contemporáneo también tiene sus raíces en cierta lectura disidente de Descartes, con la condición de que aceptemos, en una lógica derridiana, escuchar la polifonía de sus textos filosóficos. ABSTRACT Despite the death of the Subject during the second half of the 20th century, both Marion and Badiou maintain this category at the centre of their philosophies. However, in order to do so, they abandon its metaphysical determinations of principle and foundation to displace it within a secondary position of Subject of an event. Thus, the Subject as a substance is replaced by a process of subjectivation that responds to an event that since ever calls it. We show in this text that this apostolic structure of the contemporary Subject has its deep roots in a dissenting reading of Descartes, if we accept to listen, with Derrida, all the polyphonic richness of philosophical texts. (shrink)

Completeness is an important but misunderstood norm of explanation. It has recently been argued that mechanistic accounts of scientific explanation are committed to the thesis that models are complete only if they describe everything about a mechanism and, as a corollary, that incomplete models are always improved by adding more details. If so, mechanistic accounts are at odds with the obvious and important role of abstraction in scientific modelling. We respond to this characterization of the mechanist’s views about abstraction and (...) articulate norms of completeness for mechanistic explanations that have no such unwanted implications. _1_ Introduction _2_ A Balancing Act: When Do Details Matter? _3_ The Norms of Causal Explanation _4_ The Norms of Constitutive Explanation _5_ Salmon-Completeness _6_ From More Details to More Relevant Details _7_ Non-explanatory Virtues of Abstraction _8_ From Explanatory Models to Explanatory Knowledge _9_ Mechanistic Completeness Reconsidered _10_ Conclusion. (shrink)

La théorie de la perception emprunte, chez Descartes, deux chemins différents. D’un côté, la perception interne se développe selon le paradigme visuel de l’intuitus ; de l’autre, la perception externe est pensée à l’aune d’un modèle discursif. À la présentation s’opposerait donc une signification. Or, contre les commentateurs qui ont fait de Descartes le philosophe ayant ouvert l’ère de la représentation, l’auteur montre que le modèle discursif prime sur le paradigme visuel et que bien que Descartes affirme que les idées (...) sont comme des images et des tableaux, son modèle de la perception est en fait celui de la fable, c’est-à-dire d’un texte. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes three concepts of "race": bio-genomic cluster/race, biological race, and social race. We map out realism, antirealism, and conventionalism about each of these, in three important historical episodes: Frank Livingstone and Theodosius Dobzhansky in 1962, A.W.F. Edwards' 2003 response to Lewontin (1972), and contemporary discourse. Semantics is especially crucial to the first episode, while normativity is central to the second. Upon inspection, each episode also reveals a variety of commitments to the metaphysics of race. We conclude by interrogating (...) the relevance of these scientific discussions for political positions and a post-racial future. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the view that our knowledge of our desires is inferential and based on the consciousness we have of our emotions, and on our experiences of pain and pleasure.

In 'Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation', (see preceding article) Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague criticize the analysis of explanation offered by Hempel and Oppenheim in their 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation'. These criticisms are shown to be related to the fact that Hempel and Oppenheim's analysis fails to satisfy simultaneously three newly proposed criteria of adequacy for any analysis of explanation. A new analysis is proposed which satisfies these criteria and thus is immune to the criticisms brought against the (...) earlier analysis. (shrink)

In this short piece I defend my position on self-consciousness against the objections raised by Dow and Musholt to a paper in the same issue. These are that (1) Bermudez’s (1998) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness broadly supports the CP Hypothesis; (2) the self-concept requires no further complexity than knowledge of one’s own existence and capacity to take deliberate action; (3) understanding the idea of a perceiver requires understanding the concept of an agent that performs the action of perception; (4) Dow (...) dismisses the possibility of scrub jay self-consciousness too readil. (shrink)

Lacepède was a key figure in the French intellectual world from the Old Regime to the Restoration, sinc e he was not only a scientist, but also a musician, a writer, and a politician. His brilliant career is a good example of the progress of the social status of scientists in France around 1800. In the life sciences, he was considered the heir to Buffon and continued the latter’s Histoire naturelle, but he also borrowed ideas from anti-Buffonian scientists. He broached (...) many important subjects such as the nature of man, the classification of animals, the concept of species, and the history of the Earth. All these topics led to tensions in the French sciences, but Lacepède dealt with them in a consensual, indeed even ambiguous way. For example, he held transformist views, but his concept of evolution was far less precise and daring than Lamarck’s contemporaneous attempts. His somewhat confused eclecticism allowed him to be accepted by opposing camps of the French scientific community at that time and makes his case interesting for historians, since the opinions of such an opportunistic figure can illuminate the figure of the French intellectual better than more original works could do. In turn, Lacepède’s important social and scientific position gave his views a significant visibility. In this sense, his contributions probably exerted an influence, in particular with regard to the emergence of transformist theories. (shrink)

The article aims at assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the objections to Habermas’s epistemic conception of democracy raised by Thomas McCarthy in some of his essays. The author defends two ideas. First, he contends that McCarthy is mistaken in believing that democratic debates would not be a matter of consensus. In this regard, two arguments are raised, showing that the search for agreement and consensus by citizens in public forums can hardly be dismissed and that consensus can be invested (...) with many meanings in democratic life. Secondly, however, the author approves McCarthy when challenging Habermas’s epistemic claims regarding his theory of democracy. Not all democratic deliberations can be analysed in epistemic terms, in particular, debates on values. The pitfalls of any epistemic account of this form of deliberation are pointed out in the end of the essay. (shrink)

This is a story about three of my favorite philosophers—Donnellan, Russell, and Frege—about how Donnellan’s concept of having in mind relates to ideas of the others, and especially about an aspect of Donnellan’s concept that has been insufficiently discussed: how this epistemic state can be transmitted from one person to another.

L’idée de faire de la liberté individuelle le point d’appui de la philosophie politique normative constitue l’une des manifestations les plus frappantes de l’influence du libéralisme sur la pensée moderne – une influence qui s’est d’ailleurs exercée jusque dans les conceptions non-libérales telles que le républicanisme. Après tout, il n’est pas naturel de vouloir faire passer toute la définition d’un ordre social désirable et d’un gouvernement raisonnable (c’est ce à quoi vise, en général la...

This article renders a close reading of those passages in Walter Benjamin's work where he uses the term “unscheinbar.” Arguing that this concept cannot be reduced to its privative prefix “un-,” the article explores how moments in time, objects or images that are not meaningful in themselves can nevertheless trigger an experience that is to be called such. The article analyzes Benjamin's ideas on friendliness, commemoration, melancholy, mémoire involontaire and photography with the purpose of understanding how a detail or fragment (...) strikes us as significant, despite the fact that it cannot become visible as a unity or whole in its own right. (shrink)

Dans le courant du XVII e siècle se multiplient en Chine les discours sur l’amitié. En partie liés à la déliquescence des structures traditionnelles et notamment familiales qui servaient de base au fonctionnement social de l’empire, ils proposent de réévaluer le lien amical dans l’organisation politique. He Xinyin (1517-1579) est à cet égard l’un des penseurs les plus innovants et radicaux. À travers la lecture de quelques essais majeurs recueillis dans le recueil de ses œuvres complètes, l’article entend expliciter la (...) réévaluation de l’amitié et sa dimension subversive chez cet auteur et montrer comment une telle redéfinition a pu instiller dans la culture chinoise du XVII e siècle et au-delà de nouveaux rapports subjectifs où l’individu émerge comme une entité cardinale dans les rapports sociaux ainsi que les idées de liberté d’expression. (shrink)