In contemporary culture, existing audiovisual recordings are constantly reused and repurposed for various ends, raising questions regarding the ethics of such appropriations, particularly when the recording depicts actual people and events. Every reuse of a preexisting recording is, on some level, a misuse in that it was not intended or at least anticipated by the original maker, but not all misuses are necessarily unethical. In fact, there are many instances of productive misuse that seem justified. At the same time, there (...) are other instances in which the misuse shades into abuse. Documentary scholars have long engaged with the question of the ethical responsibility of documentary makers in relation to their subjects. But what happens when this responsibility is set at a remove, when the recording already exists for the taking and repurposing? Reuse, Misuse and Abuse surveys a range of contemporary films and videos that appropriate preexisting footage and attempts to theorize their ethical implications. (shrink)

This article looks at the way Matthew Weiner deploys double vision in his historical re-imagination of the 1960s in Mad Men. At issue is both the way the past haunts the present on the diegetic level in the form of flashback sequences, as well as the way Weiner performs simultaneity by virtue of parallel editing, especially in the closing sequences of individual episodes. At issue also is the way stock footage of key historical events such as the moon landing (...) is deployed so as to offer a further juxtaposition of present and past. (shrink)

Since at least the 1970s, one of the stock standard tools in the animal protection movement’s arsenal has been illegal entry into factory farms and animal research facilities. This activity has been followed by the publication of images and footage captured inside those otherwise socially invisible places. This activity presents a conundrum: trespass is illegal and it is an apparent violation of private property rights. In this paper we argue that trespass onto private property can be justified as an (...) act of civil disobedience. We look at one particular type of justification: the use of information gathered through trespass in public policy formation. We then animate this analysis both with an historical overview of the effects of sharing information about animal agriculture, and with a specific case study of trespass undertaken recently. (shrink)

A popular approach to defining fictive utterance says that, necessarily, it is intended to produce imagining. I shall argue that this is not falsified by the fact that some fictive utterances are intended to be believed, or are non-accidentally true. That this is so becomes apparent given a proper understanding of the relation of what one imagines to one's belief set. In light of this understanding, I shall then argue that being intended to produce imagining is sufficient for fictive utterance (...) as well. (shrink)

I am extremely grateful to all commentators for such patient, generous, and stimulating contributions. What follows are some thoughts to enrich the conversation, but these are by no means intended to be definitive answers to the worries they have raised.

What is fiction? It permeates contemporary life: via novels we read, stories we tell, box-sets we watch, and as philosophers, thought experiments we use. Many think it should be characterised in terms of a relation to the imagination. In this essay, I’ll consider prominent expressions of this view, as well as rejections of it. Before this, I’ll introduce two methodological approaches that it’s helpful to distinguish.

Recently, philosophers have identified certain fictional propositions with which one does not imaginatively engage, even where one is transparently intended by their authors to do so. One approach to explaining this categorizes it as 'resistance', that is, as deliberate failure to imagine that the relevant propositions are true; the phenomenon has become generally known (misleadingly) as 'the puzzle of imaginative resistance'. I argue that this identification is incorrect, and I dismiss several other explanations. I then propose a better one, that (...) in central cases of imaginative failure, the basis for the failure is the contingent incomprehensibility of the relevant propositions. Why the phenomenon is especially commonplace with respect to moral propositions is illuminated along the way. (shrink)

A half-billion years ago, a few species of single-celled protozoa stumbled irreversibly from loose social interaction into a tight, specialized interdependence. They became multi-celled metazoa, and human beings are one sort. Metazoa greatly transcend their constituent cells in lifetime, abilities, experiences and even materials (like bone). New kind of beings emerged out of the interactions of the old.

Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning, and Work presents significant new contributions to central issues in the philosophy of music, written by leading philosophers working in the analytic tradition. The issues tackled include: the question of what sort of thing a work of music is; the nature of the relation between a musical work and versions of it; the nature of musical expression and its contribution to musical experience; the relation of music to metaphor; the nature of musical irony; the musical (...) status of electro-sonic art; and the nature of musical rhythm. Aestheticians, musicologists, music practitioners, and those interested in philosophy generally will find the papers in this volume rewarding reading. (shrink)

This systematic literature review contributes to the increasing interest regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) in family firms—a research field that has developed considerably in the last few years. It now provides the opportunity to take a holistic view on the relationship dynamics—i.e., drivers, activities, outcomes, and contextual influences—of family firms with CSR, thus enabling a more coherent organization of current research and a sounder understanding of the phenomenon. To conceptualize the research field, we analyzed 122 peer-reviewed articles published in highly (...) ranked journals identifying the main issues examined. The results clearly show a lack of research regarding CSR outcomes in family firms. Although considered increasingly crucial in family firm research, a study investigating family outcomes (e.g., family community status, family emotional well-being), as opposed to firm outcomes, is missing. This literature review outlines the current state of research and contributes to the actual debate on CSR in family firms by discussing how family firms can use CSR activities as strategic management tools. Moreover, our analysis shows a black box indicating how CSR links different antecedents and outcomes. The black box is significant since firms generally need to know where to allocate their scarce resources to generate the best outcomes. We identify nine research questions based on these findings, which we hope will inspire future research. (shrink)

In the first half of this book, I offer a theory of fictional content or, as it is sometimes known, ‘fictional truth’.The theory of fictional content I argue for is ‘extreme intentionalism’. The basic idea – very roughly, in ways which are made precise in the book - is that the fictional content of a particular text is equivalent to exactly what the author of the text intended the reader to imagine. The second half of the book is concerned with (...) showing how extreme intentionalism and the lessons learnt from it can illuminate cognate questions in the philosophy of fiction and imagination. For instance, I argue, my position helps us to explain how fiction can provide us with reliable testimony ; it helps explain the phenomenon of imaginative resistance ; and it fits with, and so supports, a persuasive theory of the nature of fiction itself. In my final chapter, I show how attending to intentionalist practices of interpreting fictional content can illuminate the nature of propositional imagining itself. (shrink)

This article is an exploration of whether education can be considered a beast-like being, developed by utilising Heidegger’s philosophy to consider education from an ontotheolgical perspective. Education is a hypernym for its constituent elements; this article is exploring this hypernym as a being, whilst arguing that the growing importance of education is causing it to gain a ‘monstrous anatomy’. This argument is parallel with the Heideggerean question of ontological difference: the divide of being and Being. Ideas about education’s formation as (...) a technology and its God-like status are used to further illustrate the monstrosity of education. The theory of hyperobjects is also utilised to illuminate understanding of this being. Finally, this article explores the ways we are losing control of Education, as we have become too reliant on it to shape our view of the world. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die Konzeption einer Metaphysik im Denken von Heinrich Scholz" verfügbar.

Beginning with the question of the usefulness of Rousseau's Émile for contemporary education, this article explores the fantasy held by educational thinkers and practitioners regarding Rousseau's concept of Natural Education. Using French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan's theory of fantasy, which is based on a relationship between the subject and the object of their desire, Nicholas Stock breaks down Natural Education in a number of ways. Initially, he explores the signifier of nature as an object of desire for both Rousseau and (...) the contemporary educationalist. Next, he examines how Rousseau deploys the signifier in Émile and how this creates an ontology of the child that claims to understand their nature while designating them as Other. This point opens up discussion of desires in light of Lacan's examination of Marquis de Sade and sadism. Equally, in exploring Rousseau's dialectical relationship with Sade, Stock goes on to discuss how the fantasy of nature in Rousseau opens up possibilities of sadistic desire. Finally, he concludes the article by deconstructing the binary upheld between nature and culture through an exploration of pastoral literature. It is this pastoralism that gives a desirable quality to nature, thus sustaining its fantasy in educational circles. (shrink)

Guy Stock; III*—Empirico-Realism and Contingent Truths, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 23–42, https://doi.org/1.

In order for true beliefs acquired from reading fiction to count as knowledge proper, they must survive ‘the challenge from luck’. That is, it must be established that such beliefs are neither luckily true, nor luckily believed by readers. The author considers three kinds of true belief a reader may, she assumes, get from reading fiction: a) those based on testimony about empirical facts; b) those based on ‘true in passing’ sentences; and c) those beliefs about counterfactuals one may get (...) from reading a ‘didactic’ fiction. The first group escape the challenge from luck relatively easily, she argues. However, things turn out to be more complicated with the second group. The author examines Mitchell Green’s suggestion, effectively, that knowledge of fictional genre may see off the challenge from luck here, but rejects this in the form presented by Green, adapting it substantially to offer beliefs of this kind a more promising escape route. The author finishes by following Green’s lead once again, and discussing the category of ‘didactic’ fiction, as he calls it. She argues that any true beliefs about counterfactuals gained from such fictions are likely to be lucky. The author concludes however that things are much more promising for any true beliefs gained about oneself as a result of engaging with what Green calls an ‘interrogative’ fiction. (shrink)

S76 1992 305.8—dc20 92-25829 "The Ethnographer's Magic: Fieldwork in British Anthropology from Tylor to Malinowski" was originally published in Observers Observed: Essays on Ethnographic Fieldwork (History of Anthropology Vol. ... Toward a History of the Interwar Years" was originally published in Selected Papers from the American Anthropologist, 1921-45, edited by George W . Stocking, Jr., pp.

This volume attempts a critical historical consideration of the varying colonial situations in which (and from which) ethnographic knowledge essential to anthropology has been produced. The essays cover regions from Oceania, Southeast Asia and southern Africa to North and South America.

In the early years of this century the debate as to the nature of judgment was a central issue dividing British philosophers. What a philosopher said about judgment was not independent of what he said about perception, the distinction between the a priori and empirical, the distinction between external and internal relations, the nature of inference, truth, universals, language, the reality of the self and so on.

Note, by Sir D. Ross.--Reason and intuition.--The kinds of belief.--Religious belief.--Conflicts of belief.--The eclipse of cause.--Materialism in politics.--On the need for a social philosophy.--Can philosophy determine what is ethically and socially valuable?--The philosophy of democracy.--The principles and limitations of state action.--Leisure.--Locke's contribution to political theory.--Jeremy Bentham.--The empiricism of J. S. Mill.--Is a science of theology possible?--Will and action in ethics.

I trace a brief history of philosophical discussion of the concept WOMAN and identify two key points at which, I argue, things went badly wrong. The first was where when it was agreed that the concept WOMAN must identify a social not biological kind. The second was where it was decided that the concept WOMAN faced a legitimate challenge of being insufficiently “inclusive”, understood in a certain way. I’ll argue that both of these moves are only intelligible, if at all, (...) in the context of an anti-naturalist picture drawn from either post-structuralism or radical feminism. They become incoherent when adopted by methodological naturalists, who – especially when concerned to track oppression and discrimination – have no good reason to deny that WOMAN refers to a pre-given, biological kind. (shrink)

Thomas S. Kuhns Variante einer Theorie der Wissenschaftsgeschichte hat in einem Werk Ludwig Flecks (von 1935) einen wichtigen Vorläufer. Durch die Frage, wie es komme, daß die Flecksche Theorie seinerzeit nicht so bekannt wurde wie die Kuhnsche Bearbeitung etwa dreißig Jahre später, stellt sich das Problem der wissenschaftlichen Beachtung. Eine Theorie der wissenschaftlichen Beachtung muß zwei Dimensionen "thematischer Rahmen" und "wissenschaftliche Theorie" unterscheiden. Beachtung gefunden werden kann nur, wenn ein bestimmter Text sich innerhalb eines etablierten thematischen Rahmens befindet und wenn (...) die darin vertretene Theorie in Widerspruch zu Grundgesetzen etablierter Theorien steht. (shrink)

The mammalian dentition is a segmented organ system with shape differences among its serially homologous elements (individual teeth). It is believed to have evolved from simpler precursors with greater similarities in shape among teeth, and a wealth of descriptive data exist on changes to the dentition that have occurred within mammals. Recent progress has been made in determining the genetic basis of the processes that form an individual tooth, but patterning of the dentition as a whole (i.e. the number, location (...) and shape of the teeth) is less well understood. In contrast to similarly organized systems, such as the vertebral column and limb, Hox genes are not involved in specifying differences among elements. Nevertheless, recent work on a variety of systems is providing clues to the transcription factors and extracellular signalling molecules involved. (shrink)

I defend an account of sexual orientation, understood as a reflexive disposition to be sexually attracted to people of a particular biological Sex or Sexes. An orientation is identified in terms of two aspects: the Sex of the subject who has the disposition, and whether that Sex is the same as, or different to, the Sex to which the subject is disposed to be attracted. I explore this account in some detail and defend it from several challenges. In doing so, (...) I provide a theoretical framework that justifies our continued reference to Sex-directed sexual orientation as an important means of classifying human subjects. (shrink)