This article critically examines the rationales for the well-settled principle in sentencing law that an offender’s remorse is to be treated as a mitigating factor. Four basic types of rationale are examined: remorse makes punishment redundant; offering mitigation can induce remorse; remorse should be rewarded with mitigation; and remorse should be recognised by mitigation. The first three rationales each suffer from certain weaknesses or limitations, and are argued to be not as persuasive as the fourth. The article then considers, and (...) rejects, two arguments against remorse as a mitigating factor in sentencing: that the crime, not the offender, is the focus of punishment; and that the truly remorseful offender would not ask for mitigation. The article concludes with a brief consideration of whether a lack of remorse should be an aggravating factor. (shrink)

Malcolm Bull. On Mercy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019, 191 pp., $24.95, ISBN 9780691165332Martha Minow. When Should Law Forgive? New York: Norton, 2019, 252 pp., $27.95 (ha...

This article examines what repentance might mean on the part of conscientious violent extremists, who commit very serious violent crimes, intending their acts to advance a political or ideological cause and firmly believing their acts to be morally permitted or required. The article looks at remorse, repudiation of one’s conduct, repudiating aspects of the self, and resolving to make amends. The article presents a modest conception of what should be accepted as repentance in such contexts. Repentance can come in degrees, (...) and it should usually be enough that the extremist is genuinely remorseful and repudiates their violent actions against innocent people, even if it would be better in many cases if they also abandoned extremist thinking and dropped their commitment to their ultimate cause. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

This article replies to some of Richard Lippke’s criticisms of my earlier article on the issue of whether remorse should mitigate sentence. I query whether remorse-based mitigation must always wait for signs of moral reform, and re-affirm that remorse is worthy of recognition in itself and not just for the moral reform it may bring. I also argue that, where delayed mitigation is appropriate, the task of ascertaining moral reform is not as dubious, practically or in principle, as Lippke maintains. (...) I then confirm that my defence of the principle that remorse should mitigate sentence is not necessarily a defence of current practice. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.